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This study advances the thesis that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is driying a 
counter-hegemonic globalisation project centred around the idea of '21 ,t century 
socialism', in which the regionalisation and globalisation of Venezuela's endogenous 
development finds its most advanced and explicit expression in the Boliyarian 
Alternative for the peoples of our America (ALBA). The multi-dimensional inter-
and transnational processes operate within and across a range of sectors and scales 
whilst the structural transformations are driven by an interplay of state and non-
state actors, the latter increasingly operating in a 'transnational organised society'. 
The Venezuelan government's Higher Education For All (HEF A) strategy, as 
operationalised through the Bolivarian University of Venezuela (UBV), assumes a 
central role in the direct democratic and participatory democratic processes upon 
which a bottom-up construction of counter-hegemony depends. 
The study is framed by a critical theory approach, and based on 13 months of 
participatory ethnographic fieldwork in a municipalised UBV in Venezuela. l\lichael 
Burawoy's Extended Case Method is at the core of a critical case study methodology 
that facilitates a theoretically informed and empirically grounded analysis of the 
multi-scalar sets of social relations involved in the revolutionary project. The 
methodological framework combines two objectives: on one hand, as an expression 
of moral and ethical commitment to a more equitable world, the research exercises 
solidarity with the counter-hegemonic processes currently driven by a growing 
number of progressive governments and social, popular movements in the emergent 
Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region. On the other hand, the study 
contributes to the development of a counter-hegemonic globalisation theory. 
The thesis analyses the conjunction of projects, processes and politics at work and 
shows how these are being mobilised through the strategic use of scale. The 
adopted approach systematically explores the set of dynamics involved, starting with 
the social contradiction in hegemonic globalisation and the crisis of hegemony in 
pre-revolutionary Venezuela. This is followed by a discussion of the resurgence of 
the Left in LAC, a theorisation of Venezuela's 'revolutionary democracy' as the key 
feature of 21 st century socialism, and its regionalisation as ALBA. These processes 
involve a re-scaling of state power to the subnational as well as transnational scales. 
At the local scale, HEFA and the UBV's practice of participatory action research 
(PAR) is explored within the context of a marginalised urban neighbourhood in 
Venezuela. The UBV -PAR supports the creation of 'popular power' and the 
construction of the 'organised society' as essential conditions of 21 ,t century 
socialism on a regional and global scale. In sum, the significance and originality of 
this study of Venezuela's 21 st century socialism is revealed through an in\Tstigation 
and elaboration of structural features, political alignments and empirical findings to 
explain the dynamics of the counter-hegemonic project. 
Keywords: Globalisation, counter-hegemony, democracy, 21 q century socialism, 
revolution, higher education, regionalism, .ALBA, endogenous development 
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Prologue 1 
Prologue 
I started this PhD project in October 2003, in continuation of my 2002 ;"laster 
dissertation of case study research into primary school exclusion in neoliberal 
Nicaragua. Under the title Child Ltbour, Primary School Exclusion and Globalisation in 
Rural Nicaragua: Participatory Inquiry for Local Solutions, I was awarded my '1 + 3' ESRC 
studentship. Since then, the journey has been long, and a lot seems to haye fallen 
aside, personally, but also in terms of ideas. Unchanged, however, has remained my 
dedication to "research as moral practice", which to Pat Sikes and Ivor Goodson 
(2003) is integral to a life-history approach and the acknowledgement that the 
researcher identity is influenced by context, or experiences in life. I make this claim 
with respect to my moral upholding of a democratisation of education from which 
I undoubtedly have benefited, despite the economicist rationale underlying the 
widened access to post-basic education of the less privileged sectors in the 
industrialised countries in the 1970s. 
Growing up in the shadow of Nicaragua's 1979 Sandinista revolution in a territory 
itself occupied by the US armed forces and influenced by the socio-political agenda 
of Germany's 68-generation, I decided against becoming a teacher-functionary in 
Bavaria's segregationist school system, for which I had qualified. ~ly search for 
professional and personal reorientation took me, in January 1997, to San Carlos, a 
town on the Southern end of Ltgo Cm'iboica - 'Lake Nicaragua' - about eight hours 
by bus from the capital Managua (provided the bus did not break down), unpaved 
road half the way, and sometimes standing all the way. Rather than the originally 
planned six months, I worked for one year as a voluntary English teacher in the 
San Carlos branch of the Universidad Popular de Nicaragua, a people's university 
founded with the Sandinista spirit of making higher education accessible to the 
rural populations, followed by two years in the German School in 0. Ianagua. The 
contrast in experiences benveen the impoverished rural en\'ironment and the elite 
school could not hayc been starker. I also remember ;\1anagua's Central American 
Uni\Trsity (UCA), not so much for teaching languagcs there, but because \ Iaura, 
Prologue 
who I got married to, invited me to my first lecture on globalisation deliyered by 
visiting scholar William Robinson in early 2000. 
In the late 1990s, Nicaraguans were struggling to come to terms with the legacy of 
the 1980s US-counter-revolutionary, terrorist war against their country, the 
apparently irrevocable defeat of their revolution in the 1990 and 1996 ballots, and 
the increasing visibility of neoliberal depredation. Nicaragua, as I experienced it, 
allowed no escape from the ubiquitous poverty, injustice and pervasive 
hopelessness. Harry E. Vanden seemed all too right when stating in 1999: ',\"\'hat 
was once a nation mobilised and ready to take on almost any challenge that the US, 
its allies or quislings might hurl at it, had become as cowed and downtrodden as 
any in the Third World" (p. 69). However, the hegemonic neoliberal consensus 
was already beginning to crack in Latin America under growing popular resistance, 
the Zapatista uprising on 1 ] anuary 1994 (the day of the formal launch of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA), and Colonel Chavez' election 
as President of Venezuela in 1998. 
As world history and my own join, I consider myself extraordinarily privileged to 
participate in this historical conjuncture: Nicaraguans now reclaim hope, and 
dignity, as I witnessed at the 27th anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution in 2006, 
a few months before Daniel Ortega's return to the presidency and the country's 
adherence to the 'Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America', the 
ALBA. ,And, to be sure, it is the entire region, and large parts of the South, that are 
joining in with great expectations and much more fervour. In case of doubts: on 
Carre/era Norte, about half-way between Augusto Cesar Sandino ~-\irport and the 
remnants of Managua's city centre, enter the bam'o popular to your right and inquire 
why its inhabitants re-named their neighbourhood Bamo Hugo Chcit,!!;;; 1 
1 Castilian (,Spanish') papillar, as in 'popular education', 'popular sector' or 'popular classes', connotes \ot) the 
people', which (in L\C) conceptually includes the working class, peasantry, unemployed, impoverished and 
occasionalh- the lower middle-strata, .\ 'popular organisation' is usually composed by 'the people' and works 
in the intc~est of the popular sectors (see Kane, 2001: 8-9). The bamo is the geographical ,Irea (although it 
em also be \;cwcd as ;\ social spacc) in a town or city where the popular cLlsses In'e. 
Prologue 3 
The re-orientation of my PhD originated in a presentatlon delivered b,' two 
Venezuelan government 'activists' on Venezuela's non-formal higher education 
programme Misi6n Sucre, delivered at the Comparative Education Conference in La 
Habana, Cuba, October 2004. My friend and colleague l\fario Novelli still takes 
great pleasure in eliciting humerous reactions in his seminars, recalling a peculiar 
situation: asked about women's rights and sexism, one of the Venezuelan (male) 
presenters replied in the sense of ''Well, before the Revolution - yes, there were 
some problems; but not now anymore". My urge to find out about what was going 
on in Venezuela was rewarded by the ESRC's approval of change of country focus. 
When I first arrived in Caracas in June 2005, with only basic background 
knowledge, I was highly sceptical about that unorthodox "revolution". 1\11,' 
scepticism increased, went, and sneaks back in regularly. Then, I perceived 
irreconcilable contradictions between officials' discourses and my observations in 
the streets. It was difficult to enter the bam'o, where the revolution happens. But 
even there it was difficult to see - instead of guns and red and black flags and the 
like, community members meet somewhere in a local leader's home to plan the 
roof for the communal sports ground. And how long, and how much trust, would 
it take to find out that the self-confident cooperative worker used to be illiterate 
and work as a prostitute. When taken on a 'guided tour' by some official, doubts 
always remained whether the examples really reflected the general reality: "Is this a 
model cooperative set up to for the 'revolutionary tourist'?" Or, "Does the 
cooperative worker really speak her mind?" 
After a total of 13 months of fieldwork in Venezuela, spread over more than two 
years (2005-2007), and participation in 'my' community there, I believe that many 
of the visiting observers, including some of the 'progressives', draw distorted 
conclusions due to only superficially engaging with the structures and the 
revolutionary actors . .t\fter all, who says what is crucial. For instance, one would 
think that a taxi drivcr - apparently dissociated from the elite sector - knows what 
he (I only met one female taxi driYcr in the entire period) is talking about \\'hcn, for 
instance, discrediting the government's free uniyersal health care scheme. Until I 
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realised that there are two classes of taxi drivers: those I call the 'embittered' ones, 
in new air-conditioned cars, a legacy of their once lucrative jobs in the oil sector, 
and ftred after participating in the opposition's counter-revolutionary economic 
sabotage of the winter of 2002/2003. To them, the corporate media lies are 
welcome feed, claiming, for example, that the 30.000 Cuban medical staff 
(Aporrea, 10/12/2008a) who are setting up the free national health care system 
would earn US$1000 per month (each, supposedly); and my taxi driYer would curse 
on communism having arrived in Venezuela whilst driving past McDonald's. On 
the other hand, his colleague from the bam'o, whom his battered taxi has served as 
a means of income-generation for some 35 years, often has a much more 
sophisticated outlook on Venezuela's social panorama. 
Members of 'my' community in Coro sometimes wondered why I was there and 
what was so interesting about what they were doing. I hope this thesis is a 
sufficiently dignified and respectful explanation. 
Introduction 
Introduction 
1 Project, 9 Principles, 7 Guidelines, 5 Motor; 
The presidential election of 3 December 2006 confirmed Hugo Rafael Chayez 
Frias as head of state of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (RBV), when the 
office holder received 63% of the votes in a contest in which 75% of the electorate 
participated.3 The result meant both the Bolivarian Movement's 11 th consecuti\'e 
absolute victory since first elected in 1998 - at the municipal, federal state and 
national levels, as well as referenda - and the ratification of a counter-hegemonic 
political economy model referred to as '21 st century socialism'. Throughout 2006, 
the government had put the major pillars of its political programme in the case of 
re-election, such as constitutional reform and the formation of the United Socialist 
Party of Venezuela (pSUV), to discussion in society, so that voters could take an 
informed and conscious decision (e.g. Diario Vea, 21/02/2006; Panorama, 
02/09/2006). Morally driven and legitimated by the democratic concerns of social 
justice, equity and equality, with the start of the new presidential term on 10 
January 2007, the revolution accelerated and entered a new, radicalised phase 
termed National Prqject Simon Bolivar. 
The 'project' is embedded in nine fundamental principles established in Articles 1-9 
of the 1999 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (CBRV). They guide the 
policies and objectives of the national development plans: the General Strands of the 
Nation's Economic and Social Development Plan 2001-2007 (henceforth: NESD-2001) 
(RBV, 2001); and its successor, the General Strands of the Nation's Economic and Social 
Development Plan 2007-2013 (henceforth: NESD-2007) (RBV, 2007a). NESD-2007 
is composed of seven guidelines, and their operational base is provided by the so-
2 TIllS is the headline to Chapter 14 in Giordani (2007). Dr Giordani was '\'uIll:;tcr for Planning and 
Development from 1999 to January 20l1S. From 1973-1999, he was lecturer and researcher in the faculty of 
Economic and Social Sciences in the Central UW\'erstty of Yenezuela and in the Centre of Development 
Studies (CENDES) . 
. , ~ational Electoral Council, http://\V\vw.cnc.gov.ve/diyu.ij:acionPresldcncial/resultado naClon.tlphp 
(17/08/2007). 
Introduction 6 
called "Five Constituent Motors" (see Appendix 3a), which are: a) enabling legislation 
[lry habilitante], a constitutional mechanism that transfers to the executive the pO\\Ter 
of passing laws by decree, in this case 26 laws over a period of 18 months between 
January 2007 and July 2008;4 b) constitutional reform, to establish the socialist state 
under the rule of law (rejected by popular referendum on 2 Dezember 2007); c) 
moralz!J and enlightenment, which refers to education as the major tool for citizens' 
consciousness-building for redefining social relations; d) a new power geometry, or a 
national geopolitical restructuring to optimize popular power, related to e) the 
explosion of communz!J power, i.e. power to the organised communities. 
Correspondingly, NESD-2007 articulates the major development objectives as a 
New Socialist Ethics, Greatest Social Happiness, Protagonistic Revolutionary DemOlTary, 
Socialist Mode of Produdion, New National Geopolitics, Venezuela: Energy /r/orld Power, 
and New International Geopolitics (see Appendix 3c). 
The elements identified in this concise overview provide the grounds, framework 
and guidance for popular and governmental revolutionary action, with a reversal of 
the century-long "process of expropriation" at its heart (MINCI, 2007a: 10). 
Speaking of revolution, as Marta Lagos, Director of Latinobar6metro, recently 
reiterated, appears appropriate in the light of the full-scale transformation of Latin 
American and Caribbean (LAC) societies grounded in the constitutional projects 
advanced in several countries (cited in ABN, 15/09/2008). 'Transformation', as 
Stephen Gill notes, "implies social change that has a fundamental, pervasiYe or 
structural quality" (2008: 43). Accordingly, within a critical globalisation theory 
framework, I argue that we are witnessing the emergence of a rival structure, or an 
"alternative configuration of forces" (Cox, 1996), the conditions for which have 
historically been produced by the social contradictions in hegemonic globalisation. 
For analytical purposes, I prefer 'counter-hegemony' over labels such as 
'alternative' as the former draws attention to ideology and power, which the latter 
not necessarily does. The perceived counter-hegemony consists in the construction 
of '21 st century socialism', which is being regionalised and globaliscd as the 
.. See http:;' /ww\\,.l1ll11cLg()b.n)norici;\~ II / I R~059 Iconsulte el contenido.html (06/ (lH 2(108). 
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Bolivarian Alternative for the peoples of our America (ALBA). Launched in 2004 
by Cuba and Venezuela, ALBA is a concrete L-\C integration strategy and a 
powerful counter-hegemonic idea increasingly complemented by institutions. 
Within Venezuela's larger foreign policy objective of democratising international 
relations and building a multi-polar world, ALBA applies the principles of 
complementarity, cooperation and solidarity in order to fight social injustice and 
poverty. While Venezuela uses its oil reserves strategically as a geo-political tool, 
the multi-dimensional ALBA regionalism is being constructed jointly by state 
actors and the "organised society" across scales. This involves transnational, 
bottom-up processes, where 'transnational' means the transcendence of national 
borders by social forces with respect to the economic, political, social, cultural and 
ideological (Robinson, 2004a: 46; Gill, 2008: 81). The formation of the "organised 
society" is a condition for "revolutionary democracy", in the construction of which 
Venezuela's higher education for all (HEF A) strategy, as operationalised by the 
Bolivarian University of Venezuela (UBV), assumes a key role. 
Meta-theoretical framework: critical theory 
The nominal inception of 'critical theory' dates back to the foundation of the 
Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt/Main (Germany) in 1923 ('the Frankfurt 
School'), which understood itself as an "intellectual bulwark" in defence of Marxist 
theory in the aftermath of the murders of socialist-communist leaders IZarl 
Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in 1919, as well as the victory of the Bolshevik 
revolution in Russia and the unsuccessful revolutions in Europe (How, 2003: x; 13; 
Bottomore, 2002: 11). However, I use 'critical theory' in a broader sense, to 
integrate (neo-)Marxist and (neo-)Gramscian thinking, particularly Robert Cox of 
the so-called Italian School of international relations, aspects of the work of 
Portuguese legal sociologist Boaventura de Sousa Santos, political philosophers 
Nicos Poulantzas and Norberto Bobbio, and American philosophers and 
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guemlleros, such as liberation pedagogues Paulo Freire and Orlando Fals Borda, as 
well as Sim6n Bolivar, Sim6n Rodriguez and Jose 1\ Iartl. 5 
To Max Horkheimer, who was the Frankfurt Institute's director in the early 1930s 
. , 
the "social function" of philosophy consisted in the "development of critical and 
dialectical thought", which critical theory attempts to achieve through linking social 
philosophy with empirically-oriented social science (Horkheimer, 1986: 267-68; 
How, 2003: 17). By building on a critique of the limitations of traditional science, 
whose mere description of facts and subsequent classification and generalisation of 
phenomena disregards underlying "dynamic relationships" between persons, 
phenomena, and disciplines, critical theory declares reality the object of theory and 
refutes the "positivist separation" of theory and action (Horkheimer, 1986: 4-6). 
However, while the so-called first generation of Frankfurt School theorists 
employed an inherently positivistic subject-object rationality - i.e. (observing) 
subjects facing a world of external objects (the observed) - J iirgen Habermas' 
ontological reconception incorporated the hermeneutic concept of 
intersubjectivity, which acknowledges the existence of relationships between 
subjects and thus bears greater emancipatory potential (How, 2003: 47; Benjamin 
in How, 2003: 105). In contrast to Marx's deterministic economicism, the 
Frankfurt School theorised a more balanced relationship between structure and 
agency, where the defence of subjectivity "against the idea of an objective, law-
governed process of history" (Bottomore, 2002: 49) required the generation of 
concepts which would acknowledge agency as something substantially more "than 
a reflex of supposedly objective economic conditions" (How, 2003: 15). 
A dialectical approach reveals that neither the social economy, nor sOClety 
generally, function without frictions, contradictions, or class-conflicts 
(Horkheimer, 1986: 13). Accordingly, in contrast to positivist problem-solying 
theory, which assumes a functional coherence of existing phenomena (linear 
causality), critical theory identifies the "sources of contradiction and conflict in 
5 I follow Bolivar, i-.larti and the ~-\LB:\ agreements in re-appropriating '.-\merica' as .\ geographical concept 
to cowHer its hegemonic (ab)use as 'United States of ~orth .-\merica' (L'S.-\). 
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these entities" and "evaluates their potential to change into different patterns" 
(Sinclair, 1996: 6). These are the two uses of dialectics that Cox (1981: 133-3-1-) 
identifies: the "level of logic", i.e. truth-seeking dialogue through the exploration of 
contradictions; and the "level of real history", where in a concrete historical 
situation the confrontation of opposed social forces (conflict) provides potential 
for transfonnation. Moreover, a dialectical philosophy, Horkheimer states, "will 
tend to extract the relative truths of the individual points of view and introduce 
them in its own comprehensive theory" (1986: 255). Thus, as in a dialectical 
relationship the interacting elements create a larger unity, critical theory "leads 
towards the construction of a larger picture of the whole of which the initially 
contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to understand the processes of 
change in which both parts and whole are involved" (Cox, 1996: 89, 131). In order 
to facilitate such understanding, this thesis employs a trans- or post-disciplinary 
approach to holistically analyse social, political, cultural and economic processes (cf 
Jessop & Sum, 2001). A post-disciplinary approach transcends disciplinary 
boundaries to follow "ideas and connections wherever they lead", and therefore 
facilitates more coherence than disciplinary studies (Sayer, 1999: 5). This involves, 
as Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth (2003: 4) suggest, connecting moral with social 
theory and political analysis. 
Cox's "historicist epistemology" (Sinclair, 1996) enables us to understand that a 
given world order is not static but subject to continuous, structural change. In 
analytical tenns, 'world order' refers to particular configurations of social forces in 
historical situations that involve political agency and power struggles (Gill, 2008: 
xiv, xvii). In Social Forces, States, and World Orders, Cox (1981) juxtaposes critical with 
ahistorical problem-solving theory. In essence, research guided by problem-solving 
theory accepts the status quo, understood as the structures ("framework for 
action") set by social relationships and the institutions into which they are 
organised. A smooth functioning of these arrangements is pursued by resolving 
particular problems arising in parts of the complex whole. For instance, the 
limitations that inc\Titably accompany Yenezuela's rapid expansion of higher 
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education (HE), and the social programmes generally, with respect to 
infrastructure, personnel, etc., could be subject to problem-solving, 'goal-
attainment' research (see MES, 2007: 400-1; D'Elia, 2006: 213-20). Such issues are 
largely excluded from my analysis in this thesis. Not only are the reyolutionan' 
protagonists themselves in a much better position to analyse such problems, 
ethically-speaking I would view such work as inherently patronising and neo-
colonialist. Instead, I associate research in the critical theory paradigm with moral 
committment to emancipatory social and political transformation towards a more 
equitable, "alternative world order", by examining the origin of the prevailing 
relational and institutional parameters, and the contradictions and power involyed 
in processes of change (Cox, 1981: 128-30). It is the interest in (a strategy of) social 
transformation that makes critical theory a theory of action (Carnoy, 1984: 57). 
Research into the nature of social phenomena builds on several interrelated 
philosophical assumptions, which should be made explicit: fltstly, ontological 
assumptions concern the nature of the social world investigated, essentially 
whether 'social reality' is external, given and objective, or created internally by 
individual consciousness. Secondly, epistemologic:al assumptions refer to the character 
or "grounds" of knowledge - its nature, forms, and acquisition - and how this 
understanding of the world can be communicated. Thirdly, human nature, 
particularly the relationship between people and their environment, comprises the 
rival images of determinism and voluntarism: people as either the "products of the 
environment" or as the initiators of their own actions (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
To 1\fartyn Hammersley (1995: 37), critical theory oscillates between realism and 
relativism, arguably dissolving the "binary opposition" of the two ontological 
positions (David, 2002: 17).6 'Realism' should not be taken as the "naiye" or 
"crude" realism positivism builds upon; that is, the assumption that there is a 
"reality independent of the researcher", and that research would produce \'alid 
knowledge' that corresponds to that reality (Hanunersley, 1992: 43, 50). Rather, a 
6 See Hammersley (1992: ..J.6-S.f1 for a discussion of the conflict between realism and rdati\;sm. 
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"subtle realism" (Hammersley, 1992: 50-2), or "more sophisticated realism" 
(Roberts & Sanders, 2005: 309), would resemble the critical realist position of a) 
that an external world independent of human consciousness exists; and b) that 
there is a dimension that "includes our socially determined knowledge about 
reality" (Danermark et al, 2003: 5-6). In contrast to naive realism, reality would then 
include phenomena that are not immediately empirically observable: structures, 
causal processes, and mechanisms (Danermark et al, 2003: 8-10; Roberts & 
Sanders, 2005: 309). As Norman Fairclough (2005) puts it, a realist social ontology 
regards both concrete social events (agency) and abstract social structures as part 
of reality. As a conceptual abstraction, 'social structure' "corresponds to how the 
collective agency of human beings produces regularities that are more or less 
institutionalized over time and space" (Gill, 2008: 16). 
Cox's ontology presumes a "real historical world in which things happen", an 
"objective reality" which nevertheless is intersubjectively, or collectively, 
constructed (Cox, 1996: 145). Social constructionism, as an epistemology, is 
ontologically rooted in relativism which, however, does not mean that a socially 
constructed reality would not be real. rviichael Crotty therefore argues that social 
constructionism is realist and relativist at the same time (1998: 63). Social 
constructionism (in contrast to constructivism, as "meaning-making activity of the 
individual mind") implies the collective, intersubjective generation of meaning, 
knowledge and other social processes (Crotty, 1998: 58). It is this insight upon 
which Cox builds when arguing that human institutions, such as the state, "are 
made by people", i.e. by "intersubjective ideas", which are "collective responses to 
a collectively perceived problematic that produce certain practices" (Cox, 1996: 51-
2). They constitute the objective world (Cox, 1996: 514). Consequently, social 
reality is not fLxed, and depends on processes of historical and spatial change (Cox, 
1981: 128). Epistemologically, however, according to Sinclair (1996: 8), Cox's 
"method of historical structures" employs both positivist and historicist 
epistemologies by incorporating the static (synchronic) and the dynamic 
(diachronic) moments of structures. \,\'ithin the former, which assumes the 
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separation of the observing subject from the observed object, problem-soh"ing 
theory can serve critical ends to evaluate how a process, institution or relationship 
operates on a daily basis. The latter, which reciprocally inter-relates subject and 
object, facilitates analysing contradictions and conflicts in structures, the 
characteristics of social forces, and thus the potential for change (Cox, 1996: 147, 
51-4). 
As previously indicated, historical structures evolve from "persistent social 
practices", made and transformed by collective human activity (Cox, 1987: 4). By 
drawing on Antonio Gramsci's dialectical unity of determinism and voluntarism, 
Cox speaks of a "framework for action" that forces individuals or collectivities to 
... move with the pressures or resist and oppose them, but they cannot ignore 
them. To the extent that they do successfully resist a prevailing historical structure, 
they buttress their actions with an alternative, emerging configuration of forces, a 
rival structure. (Cox, 1981: 135). 
Collective action, therefore, has the potential to transform social relations and 
social structures (Gill, 2008: xvii). This bears two implications for this thesis: fIrstly, 
I understand 'revolution' as a process in which actors' subjective collective 
mobilization on grounds of distinct systems of beliefs and ideas occurs within 
structural relations that create revolutionary opportunities. This defInition 
combines structural theories of revolution, with their emphasis on outcome as the 
seizure of state power, with actor-centred theories and their view of re\'olution as 
an "open-ended process of social transformation" (see Stahler-Sholk, 2001). 
Secondly, the multiple forces, dimensions and levels which compose the 
framework for action suggest that resistance can never be at once, full-scale, as if 
occurring in a 'vacuum', but would rather challenge certain forces at certain points 
in time, and that structural transformation is a lengthy and gradual process ripe 
with contradictions. To me, such issues are inherent in Gramsci's 'war of position', 
which I discuss in Chapter Three. For instance, while challenging global capitalism 
through the .ALBA fair trade regime, Venezuela is tightly integrated in hegemonic 
globalisation through its membership in the Organisation of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) (\\'hich howeyer is also used as a countcr-hegcmc l llic 
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tool) and the monopoly rent extraction from oil exports. Although the purpose of 
this thesis is not to explore such contradictions at great length, they do exist, be it 
in the form of Venezuela's oil shipments to the US or Nicaragua's negotiations 
with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
While society is the product of the complex interaction of structure and agency, 
structures enable the powerful as they provide resources and opportunities for 
them, while they simultaneously constrain the sub-alterns (Hay, 1995: 200; 206). 
Conceptualising structure as "inherently relational" means that what is perceived 
as a structure depends on the individual perspective: 
Power is a question of agency, of influencing or 'having an effect' upon the 
structures which set contexts and define the range of possibilities of others. [ ... ] 
one person's agency is another person's structure. [ ... ] The actions of ministers 
and governments produce the structures that constrain junior civil servants and 
state functionaries, the effects of whose actions similarly constrain the rest of us 
(Hay, 1995: 191). 
As stated, in accordance with the prenuses of critical theory, my analysis and 
theorizing of the Bolivarian processes is less concerned with a problem-solving 
evaluation of the effectiveness with which policies are operationalized. Rather, as a 
kind of 'moral evaluation' in solidarity with the revolutionary processes and their 
actors, this study aims to contribute to the ''battle of ideas" by demonstrating that 
there is an alternative to the neoliberal dogma. Such normative political and 
ideological conunitment rejects 'neutrality', 'objectivity', and 'value-freedom', which 
positive science derives from the subject-object dualism and a rigorous application 
of the scientific method (see Hammersley, 1995: 1-20). This is, however, not given 
in a study of historical structure, where "the enquirer's mind enters into the 
historical process - observer and observed, agent and structure, become 
intertwined" (Cox, 1996: 29). As Carr & K.emrnis (1986: 62) add, since ,'alue 
judgements cannot be founded on empirical knowledge, they do not have the 
status of valid knowledge in positi"ism. However, the supposed objectivity and 
value-freedom in positivc science has long been challenged by the Funkfurt 
School theorists, who identified "value freedom" as a value in itself (Outhwaitc 
1994: 4; Halfpenny 2000). 1Ioreover, problem-soking thcory's conscr;ansm, as 
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well as its "pretensions to escape from history", make it prone to "unconscious 
ideology" (Cox, 1996: 56-7). Social science "is never neutral" and "theory is always 
for someone and for some purpose" because perspectiYes, which are at the root of 
theory, derive from a position in (social and political) time and space (Cox, 1981: 
128, italics original; 1996: xi, 56-7, 376). Thus framed, the research process which, 
as Gramsci suggests, involves feeling and passion, emphasizes intersubjectiye 
relationships and immersion in reality: 
The intellectual's error consists in believing that one can know without 
understanding and even more without feeling and being impassioned (not only for 
knowledge in itself but also for the object of knowledge): in other words that the 
intellectual can be an intellectual (and not a pure pedant) if distinct and separate 
from the people-nation, that is, without feeling the elementary passions of the 
people, understanding them and therefore explaining and justifying them in the 
particular historical situation and connecting them dialectically to the laws of history 
and to a superior conception of the world, SCientifically and coherently elaborated -
i.e. knowledge. (Gramsci, 1971: 418). 
In accordance with its normative commitment, this thesis aims to combine the 
descriptive-explanatory with analysis and theorizing of 'the project' in order to 
capture its systematicity, historicity and cultural embeddedness. In this endeavour, 
as both a methodological and ethical imperative, I integrate LAC sources to the 
greatest extent possible. Their translations from Castilian are my own unless 
otherwise indicated. Selectivity in this respect is inevitable, because a more 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of the philosophical and ideological 
contributions to the revolutionary project would certainly exceed the scope and 
purposes of this thesis. As regards Chavez' and the revolution's frequent reference 
to LAC liberation and revolutionary philosophers, leaders and movements, an 
important point should be clarified right at the outset: despite the predominance of 
Bolivar, the liberator of large parts of South America from Spanish rule about two 
hundred years ago, the Bolivarian project is neither 'monolithic' in this regard, nor 
should every historical source integrated in the discourse be taken at face yalue. ;\s 
George Lipsitz (1998: 296) argues with respect to the relevance of ~Iarti's thinking 
in the contemporary world, today's problems cannot be resolyed by using 
\Tsterda\"s solutions as blueprints. Rather, as Steye Ellner and 11iguel Tinker Salas 
. , 
propose, while Chavez' glorification of L.\C historical actors undoubtedly 
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constitutes a simplification of complex historical realities, it may be yiewed as a 
"revisionist historiography" in reaction (or "overreaction") to the stigmatisation 
and "elimination" of popular (indigenous, African, .. -\merican) cultures, identities, 
and history per se under the "imported bourgeois democratic model" and the 
accompanying imagery of a 'US-baseball-whisky-culture' (Ellner & Tinker Salas, 
2007a, b). Furthermore, Venezuelan historian J. Pascual Mora (2006) shows that 
Chavez' historical reference is neither just a whim nor simply a cooptation to 
supposedly legitimate and/or expand personal power. To the contrary, I would add 
that the strong historico-philosophical, and therefore moral, anchorage contributes 
to safeguarding the revolution from abuse and betrayal, in addition to the strong 
identification between the people and the leader, as emphasized by Diana Raby 
(Raby, 2006: 244-45). 
Researching revolution 
In his introduction to the first five years of Nicaragua's revolution led by the 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN or Sandinistas) (1979-1990)7, Thomas 
W. Walker (1985: 1) points to a number of dilemmas faced by everyone writing 
about revolution: while, on one hand, authors may be unwilling to attribute any 
human error or flaw to the revolutionaries, on the other hand there exists a 
competing, counter-revolutionary 'literature' of deliberate disinformation. Since 
revolution is a marketable topic, the historical record is further distorted by "hastily 
thrown-together journalistic efforts" that lack analytical and factual depth, as well 
as historical perspective. Additionally, revolutions by definition are "rapidly 
changing processes": 
To stay "on top" of all important aspects of a given revolutionary experience and 
produce a solid, comprehensive study is an awesome challenge for anyone 
individual. Moreover, this task is made even more difficult if, as is often the case, a 
covert effort is being made to distort and discredit virtually every aspect of the 
revolutionary experience. At such times, the scholar is faced with the task of 
determining, one by one, which alleged flaws of the revolution. are real an~ w~ich, 
on the other hand, are carefully planted distortions or straight-out fabncatlons 
(Walker, 1985: 1). 
7 111c 1979 popular rcyolution a.gaIDst the US-i.nstalled S~moza dynasty,. one of the longes~-la~t!l1~ ~d_ 
cruellest dictatorships Ul the regton, was the first successful rC\'olutlon SUlCC the Cuban rc\ O\utH 111 ( 1 )9). 
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Considering its historcial and global relevance, a decade of Boliyarian reyolution 
has received disproportionately little scholarly attention. ~ruch of what is 'thrown' 
on the market resembles the kind of essayistic accounts criticized by Walker, often 
centred around the charismatic figure of Chavez (as reflected in the frequency of 
'Chavez' in the titles), with the effect of intentionally or unintentionally reinforcing 
the impression of the revolution being reducible to one person. History, ho\ve\rer, 
is not simply made by prominent individuals, but by human collectivities (Cox, 
1996: 145). Nevertheless, as Raby shows, successful popular revolutionary strategy 
requires some form of leadership, either in the form of a party or of a charismatic 
personality (2006: 230-57). The latter, of which the Cuban and Venezuelan 
revolutions are examples, inevitably draws attention to the contentious and 
contested issue of 'populism', which (in the North) has come to be associated with 
manipulation, demagogy and dictatorship. In defensive reaction, sympathizers of 
the revolutions often downplay the role of the populist leader by over-emphasizing 
popular action (e.g. Valencia Ramirez, 2008). A brief clarification of these issues is 
therefore necessary. 
I accord with Raby's persuaSIve statement of a dialectical relationship between 
Chavez and the people, a "mutually reinforcing partnership" through which the 
participants acquire a collective identity and become a political subject while 
contributing to the ideological evolution and maturity of the leader. Neither of the 
two could exist without the other (Raby, 2006: 233, 244). This "charismatic bond" 
derives from "genuine dialogue" with the people - through mass rallies, televised 
speeches and frequent personal dialogue with small groups and individuals - where 
a populist discourse appeals to 'the nation' or 'honest citizens' rather than to 
narrow class issues (Raby, 2006: 240, 244). In addition to discourse, the charismatic 
appeal of the populist leader depends on decisiye action of heroic significance that 
demonstrates commitment and leadership capacity .... -\ series of such actions, to 
which I refer throughout the thesis, can be identified: the Cha,rez-led 1992 military 
uprising, his electoral ,rictory in 1998, his return after the. \pril 2UU2 coup d'etat, 
the economic sabotage of \\inter 2002/2003, the recall referendum ,rictory of 2U04, 
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and his immediate acceptance of defeat in the constitutional refonn referendum of 
December 2007 (Figure 5.1 in Chapter Five graphically illustrates key political 
events of the Chavez era). These actions stand in a "relationship of intense 
symbiosis" with popular protagonism: the 1989 popular rebellion against 
neoliberalism ('the Caracazo'), the people's resistance to the 2002 coup, which was 
decisive for its frustration and, above all, democratic participation in all its 
dimensions. 'The people', it has to be insisted, is not a manipulated, "ignorant 
multitude", as is often implied: 
Despite the crucial role of the leader in galvanising and focussing popular 
discontent where established political parties have singularly failed to do so, the 
[popular] movement is not simply created by the leader and neither is it a passive 
tool in his or her hands (Raby, 2006: 246). 
By drawing on Ernesto Laclau, Raby identifies 'populism' as a "political technique 
or phenomenon which may manifest itself at different times in movements of 
totally opposed ideology and significance" (2006: 241). It is a conjunctural 
phenomenon that emerges in a situation of hegemonic crisis (Cammack in Raby, 
2006: 243), especially when two conditions are given: "a crisis of political 
representation", and a "powerful but disorganised popular movement". In other 
words, a populist movement will not develop if the majority of the working or 
popular classes are already organised in the existing party structures through which 
they view themselves represented (Raby, 2006: 246). Importantly, Raby 
distinguishes different fonns: 'classic populists' (e.g. Argentina's Juan Domingo 
Peron), associated with nationalist-reformist policies of state intervention and 
popular welfare; the 'neo-populists' of the 1990s, that implemented neoliberalism 
combined with targeted welfare programmes, such as ex-presidents ~1enem 
(Argentina), Fujimori (peru) and Bucaram (Ecuador); 'reactionary populism', in 
which the popular movement is manipulated and captured by a demagogic leader 
at the service of bourgeois interests; and, in stark contrast, 'progressive populism', 
or a "populism of the dominated classes", with revolutionary and socialist potential 
provided its social base is "an autonomous movement of the dominatcd classes" 
and its leader "a true representati\"c of that movement" (2006: 256). If uscd at all, 
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this thesis underscores that with respect to Venezuela and Chayez, it should be 
made explicit that it is the progressive form of populism that is referred to.8 
Under globalisation, one country alone cannot pursue an independent or counter-
hegemonic development project. Venezuela's globalisation of its endogenous 
development model, which underlies 21 st Century Socialism, therefore is a strategic 
imperative. Consequently, increasing our understanding of the Boliyarian 
revolution requires taking a broader analytical look, which in this thesis I restrict to 
the LAC region. I integrate Michael Burawoy's (1998; 2000) Extended Case 
Method (ECM) in a critical case study methodology to link macro-processes and 
globalisation theory with a critical ethnographic case study (the 'micro') in a UBV-
community in the north-western state of Falcon, through which I accessed Bam'o 
Cruz Verde in Coro, the Falcon state capital. Extending theory is a key purpose of 
the method and, as Cox states (1981: 128), theorising has to build on empirical-
historical study. 
Since the Bolivarian revolution can be considered the first case of a so-far 
successful democratic transition to democratic socialism, this thesis aims to 
contribute to (counter-hegemonic) globalisation theory (re)construction. The 
analysis presented is probably the fIrst attempt to link the revolutionary grassroots 
democratic processes with global counter-hegemony and LAC regionalism. It is in 
this sense also an act of solidarity because, as one high-level research participant 
mentioned, the institutions that have the capacity to undertake research and 
theorising are opposed to the process. In other words, the revolution is under-
theorised, and the actors themselves, as I could observe with respect to the UBV 
teaching staff, appear as too busy doing the reyolution. The considerable scope in 
analytical, theoretical and practical terms implies a balancing act bet:\veen 'depth' 
and 'breadth', which I hope to have successfully managed. GiYen the space 
constraints, I make no attempt to systematically Slln'e\' the different bodies of 
H .\s 'progressives' (e,g, progre~sive forces, progresSl\'C governments) can be considere~ those who rejecr 
\1L'wlng global inequality (and social fascism, see Chapter One) as men rabIe, and fight tor ,!lternatl\'cs 
(~antos, 2001: 2l)!)). 
Introduction 19 
literature upon which I draw. Rather, I integrate pertinent works in the respectiye 
fields to situate my debate of Venezuela's revolution. Furthermore, this thesis 
should be understood as only one possible interpretation of the complex 
processes. Far from claiming to be a comprehensive account, the thesis deyelops 
those aspects of primary relevance to my central argument. Certain important 
issues receive only marginal attention, such as the political party system, especially 
with respect to the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (pSUV), whose formation 
is too recent to evaluate its impact on the revolution at this point. PSUY, which 
participated for the first time in the November 2008 municipal and federal state 
elections, appears to aim to take the form of a Gramscian mass party rather than a 
Leninist vanguard party (Harris, 2007). Nevertheless, the possibility of the 
emergence of Marxist-Leninist democratic centralism will have to be considered, 
and the party will be central to future analysing of Venezuela's democracy (cf. La 
Ramee & Polakoff, 1999: 141-56). In sum, I expect this thesis to pose many 
questions, which I hope will encourage future research and theorising. 
Layout of thesis 
The principal question that I ask in this thesis is how to make sense of the 
Bolivarian revolution. What do we make of this project, and how is it realised? In 
other words, how is counter-hegemony constructed, and how can we produce 
knowledge that permits an extension of existing theory? In order to answer these 
questions, I organise this thesis in three sections, whose six chapters systematically 
explore the revolutionary project from different angles. Part I comprises two 
chapters which establish the theoretical and methodological framework for analysis 
and theorisation of the Bolivarian revolution. Rather than proyiding a 
comprehensive account of globalised neoliberalism, Chapter One isolates norms 
and key features (structures, mechanisms, actors) of the global framework for 
action with respect to the issues of relevance to the thesis. I theoretically explore 
the concepts of hegemony, power, global justice, and the production of space and 
scale in uneven geographical development. \~Tithin this frame\vork, I draw attention 
to the link bctwcen the violent implementation of neolibcral economics in LAC 
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and the strategy of polyarchy promotion. A final section of the chapter examines 
the "crisis of hegemony" in Venezuela, which provided the conditions for the 
Bolivarian revolution to evolve. Chapter Two develops the critical case study 
methodology that allowed me to research the counter-hegemonic processes. The 
chapter includes an account of the research process and strategy within the UBY-
Falcon and the Barrio Cruz Verde community in Coro, the capital of Falcon state. 
Part II consists of five chapters, each of which examines and theorises a different 
aspect of the construction of the counter-hegemonic globalisation project. Chapter 
Three resumes aspects of the discussion of hegemony in Chapter One to discuss 
issues around the resurgence of LAC's Left. Chapter Four draws upon the CBRV 
to conceptualise the theory and practice of revolutionary democracy within the 
broader idea of 21 st century socialism. My analysis concentrates on the politically 
"organised society", rather than economic organisation, to argue that 'revolutionary 
democracy' joins liberal with socialist philosophy, rather than playing one out 
against the other. Chapter Five situates Venezuela's conception of democracy 
within the national development agenda, as outlined in NESD-2001 and NESD-
2007. I introduce Venezuela's endogenous development paradigm, upon which 
21 st century socialism rests and in which the government's HEFA strategy is 
embedded. The role of the UBV in the construction of the organised society at the 
community scale, as the basis of revolutionary democracy and from where a 
'transnational organised society' can emerge, is illustrated through my case study of 
the UBV's participatory action research (PAR) in Bam'o Cruz Verde, Coro. Chapter 
Six employs New Regionalism Theory to explain the inter- and transnationalisation 
of endogenous development as an inter- and trans-scalar regional integration 
strategy. My analysis of two Venezuela-driven initiatives - ALBA and the Union of 
South American Nations (UN.ASUR) - insists that the entire LA.C region is being 
integrated through multi-dimensional and transnational processes that depend on 
organised society activism. Three case studies aim to substantiate my claims. 
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The Conclusion in Part III pulls together the different threads running through the 
thesis, in an attempt to extend counter-hegemonic globalisation theory .. A.n 
epilogue presents some recent LAC developments. The ~\ppendices and 
Photographs provide visual support to the arguments developed in the thesis. 
PART I 
Hegetnony and Globalisations.· Theory 
and Method 
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Chapter One 
Globalisations and Hegemony 
You! . .. Wly don't you shut up? 
KingJuan Carlos de Borban to President Chavez 
Introduction 
The introductory quote stems from an exchange between the I<ing of Spain and 
Spanish President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero on one side, and President 
Chavez on the other, at the 17th Ibero-American Summit of Heads of State, 
Santiago de Chile, 10 November 2007. After a discourse by Zapatero, in which he 
pointed to the "enormous responsibility" of Latin America for its under-
development, Chavez reminded Zapatero that "external factors" would also have 
to be considered, including colonialisation and coup d'etats against progressive 
presidents, such as Salvador Allende (Chile, 1973) and himself (April 2002), the 
latter of which was supported by the Spanish government then led by 'post-
FrancoisI' Jose Maria Aznar. Chavez called ex-president Aznar "a fascist", whom 
Zapatero - nominally a 'socialist' - defended stating that Aznar, as an elected 
representative of Spain, should deserve more respect. Chavez' response that Aznar 
never had been a model of courtesy to him and his administration was met by the 
I<ing's intervention, which Chavez ignored, instead citing Uruguayan independence 
hero Jose Gervasio Artigas: ''With the truth, I don't offend or fear".9 
The significance of the described encounter for this chapter lies in its 
exemplification of the state of democracy in capitalist globalisation: representatives 
of supposedly oppositional parties join forces with a monarch in the defence of 
transnational capital and their own class interests. Howeyer, neither Chaycz nor 
9 This paragraph is based on Hugo Chdr1e::;.. Jose LIl~f &driguez Zapatero and the King of Spain, Z\:et, 
05j(l1/2008, at http://www.zcommtmications.orglzneth;cw:\rticle/16118. The King\ quote III ong1llall~ 
T".' . .. Por qui no Ie (aIItJJ? 
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other Latin American dignitaries, including Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua), Carlos Lage 
(Cuba), and Evo Morales (Bolivia), permitted themselves to be silenced, and 
especially Ortega had a case in point: the privatisation of Nicaragua's energy sector 
under his neoliberal predecessors, in the course of which the Spanish transnational 
Union FENOSA acquired the energy supply monopoly for thirty years to come, 
had produced a prolonged energy crisis and severe human rights violations, 
including the right to life per se (CENIDH, 2008). 
Within a critical globalisation theory framework, the chapter aims to develop an 
understanding of aspects of 'hegemonic globalisation', as the structural framework 
within which the Bolivarian revolution occurs. I fIrst establish that there are 
different forms of globalisations, and then discuss several concepts relevant to the 
notion of 'hegemony': civil society, the state, power, and organic intellectuals. 
Developing the argument that the social contradictions in hegemonic globalisation 
have produced the conditions for the emergence of counter-hegemony in the 
region involves exploring issues of uneven development and global justice. I 
examine aspects of the neoliberalisation of LAC, especially the US-driven strategy 
of 'polyarchy promotion'. This leads into a historical analysis of the contradictions 
in Venezuela's so-called '4th Republic' regime, which created the context and 
conditions for the Bolivarian revolution to emerge. 
Globalisations & hegemonic globalisation 
A starting point for analysing the Bolivarain revolution as a counter-hegemonic 
globalisation project is to understand the phenomenon of 'globalisation' as a set of 
globally interconnected spatio-temporal processes that include transnational and 
transregional processes, rather then merely international and interregional ones 
(Held et al, 1999: 15-17). Although the 1990s development "policy buzz" of 
'globalisation' has been superseded by a 'knowledge-based economy' (I<.BE) 
discourse (Robertson, forthcoming), 'globalisation' selTes as the frame of reference 
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of this thesis. The logics or processes of hegemonic, capitalist globalisation, may be 
summed up as follows: 
• Financial deregulation and the development of international financial 
markets. 
• Profound technological changes, technology transfer and product 
innovation and the emergence of a new production paradigm. 
• The development of 'free' markets shaped by classical economic theory. 
• The information revolution and its impact on the media and 
communications systems. 
• The diminution of costs and time in moving commodities and people from 
one place to another. (Harvey, 1989; 2000; Cerny, 1995; Castells, 2000a; 
Mittelman, 2004). 
With this understanding In mind, I approach globalisation from a 
'transformationalist' angle, which characterises 'globalisation' as a set of non-linear 
and socio-historically contingent processes shaped by multiple conjunctural forces 
and inscribed with contradictions (Held et al, 1999: 7). A transformationalist 
approach recognises that while the nation state is not necessarily any longer the 
primary scale of political, economic and ideological struggles, it does not mean that 
'the national' is redundant Oessop, 2008: 137). On a more political note, to 
Ronaldo Munck (2007: 599), a transformationalist approach should critically 
examine change and offer emancipatory radical reforms. I follow this proposal by 
concentrating on the structural patterns of global inequality, which is often a major 
concern of Marxist 'hyperglobalists'. At the same time, howc\"er, this thesis 
confirms to some extent the 'sceptics' by showing that globalisation has not 
inexorably undennined governments' regulative power but, rather, that regulation 
is also subject to political will (Held et al, 1999). 
GlobaiiJationJ 
Santos (2002a: 177-79) argues that "globalisation" is not a single entity but best 
understood as sets of social relations, through which in a dialectical process of Jc-
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and reterritorialisation a given local condition or entity is successfully globalised, in 
the sense of traversing borders, in turn confining competing localisms to a 
subaltern status or excluding them altogether. Conversely, the localisation of a 
globalism expresses itself in, for instance, the establishment of Export-Processing 
Zones (EPZs), as it restructures local conditions according to transnational 
imperatives. Capitalist globalisation as the hegemonic form of globalisation, or 
"globalisation from above", is assumed by many people - including its yictims - as 
the only, inevitable form of globalisation (Santos, 2004: 149). This idea is 
disseminated and consolidated through the hegemonic discourse on globalisation, 
which constructs globalisation as the natural order and an impersonal force devoid 
of agency and interests on part of a powerful US-led transnational capitalist class 
(fCC) as the agent of transnational capital and concentrated in the triad regions 
(North America, East Asia, Western Europe) (Robinson, 2004a). In analytical 
terms, the merit of distinguishing between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
globalisations consists in seeing alternative forms of globalisation; in normative 
terms, it means that naming them as such lends these efforts visibility and 
credibility and counters their censoring or distorted representation by, for instance, 
the corporate media (Santos, 2004). 
Hegemo,!), 
Robinson (200Sa: 1-2) identifies at least four different conceptions of 'hegemony' 
in the international relations and globalisation literature. These are hegemo,!), as: 
a) International domination, i.e. "dominance backed by active domination", as in 
the case of the USSR exercising hegemony over Eastern Europe during the 
Cold War. 
b) State hegmemo,!)" when a core nation state (a 'hegemon'), such as the US, 
imposes the rules and enforcement to permit the inter-state system (world 
capitalist system) to function. 
c) Consensual domination or ideological hegemO!!J, i.e the way in \\'hich a ruling group 
establishes and maintains its rule. 
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d) Exercise of leadership within historical blocs within a particular world order, \dlich 
combines the fonner two by referring to a pre-emment state power 
constructing ideological leadership (consent) around a particular historic 
project, such as post-WWII US and the development of a Fordist-
I<.eynesian social structure of accumulation that was internationalised under 
the leadership of the US capitalist class. 
While these conceptions are interwoven, this thesis prioritizes the use of 
'hegemony' in the third, Gramscian sense, in which a particular social group or 
stratum, class or class fraction exercise(s) hegemony: "Supremacy of a social 
group" manifests itself in economic, intellectual, political and moral leadership, to 
which the subalterns give their active consent, while domination (coercion) is used 
only exceptionally on those who do not consent (Gram sci, 1971: 12, 57-8). 
Consent and coercion, respectively, refer to the two "levels" that according to 
Gramsci make up the superstructure: civil society, as the "ensemble of private 
organisms", through which cultural hegemony, i.e. the predominance of bourgeois 
values and norms (ideology), or "hegemony in the arena of consciousness", IS 
exercised; and political society (the state), that exercises "direct domination" if 
consciousness cannot be controlled, and in which law becomes a repressive 
instrument (Gramsci, 1971: 12, 247; Carnoy, 1984: 76). By ascribing civil society to 
the superstructure, which is decisive for Gramsci's conceptual system, his (anti-
economistic) analysis contrasts Marx, to whom civil society pertained to the 
structure, or the "base", i.e. the social relations of production (Bobbio, 1987: 148-
49). In fact, Gramsci appears to have avoided both materialist and idealist 
reductionism by arguing that structure (the economic) and superstructure (the 
ethico-political/ideological) are dialectically inter-related (Gramsci, 1971: 366; Cox, 
1996: 131). 
While Gramsci offers several conceptions of the state in relation to hegemony, to 
l\fartin Camoy the "integral meaning" as the state encompassing civil society 
("dictatorship + hegemony") would best fit an anah'sis of advanced capiulist 
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societies (Anderson in Carnoy, 1984: 72-3; Gramsci, 19"71: 239). This "enlarged 
notion" of the state (Mouffe, 1979: 201) counters the liberal ontological separation 
of civil and political society, i.e. civil society as "a realm of free individuality entirely 
, , 
apart from the state", and the neo-realist idea of an independent civil society as a 
constraint or counter-weight to the state (Cox, 1981: 134; Gill, 2008: 29n4). 
Moreover, it also contradicts a statist and functionalist reductionism, according to 
which everything in society would belong to the state and serve its interests 
(Forgacs, 1988: 224). However, by declaring the state apparatus an "extension of 
the hegemonic apparatus", Gramsci in essence followed Marx' instrumentalist YleW 
of the state at the exclusive service of the bourgeoisie to perpetuate control over 
society (Carnoy, 1984: 50, 74). Before turning to Nicos Poulantzas' non-
instrumentalist, relational theory of the state, it is opportune to clarify some issues 
concerning the contested concept of 'civil society'. 
Civil society 
Alejandro Colas proposes that civil society is not an ontologically given, but a 
"historically variable", social space constructed by collective agency (Colas, 2002: 
26). In contrast to liberal republicanism which, as previously stated, tends to view 
'civil society' as a 'neutral' space separated from the state and the market and in 
which individuals and groups would exercise citizenship on equal terms, Colas 
conceptualizes 'civil society' as a sphere in which socio-political struggles are 
resolved within the context of capitalist social relations - "a domain where the class 
antagonisms inherent in the structural power of both state and market play 
themselves out, chiefly through the medium of social movements" (2002: 43). 
Colas defines 'social movement' as a "sustained and purposeful collective 
mobilisation by a group of people in pursuit of socio-economic and political 
change" (ibid.). In essence, I take on Colas definitions. Howc\'er, rather than 
follo\ving Colas in attempting to re-define the historical association of civil society 
with liberal individualism and a capitalist market society (Colas, 20U2: 29-3"7) - a 
space commonly dominated by "the propertied and the pri\'ileged" (Raby, 2006: 
-+1-2) - the Bolivarian revolution has dismissed the concept altogether and replaced 
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it with the "organised society". As will become clearer throughout the thesis, 
'organised society' refers (above all) to popular, mass-based organisation and 
collective exercise of power through councils and movements within non-capitalist 
social relations. 
Under globalisation, a 'global' or 'transnational' civil socIety has emerged, 
composed of social forces (progressive and reactionary) which are weakly 
embedded, such as international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), 
churches, political parties and associations, communications corporations and 
MNC/TNC-activities generally, as well as governmental actiyity shaping political 
terrain outside the formal juridical purview of the state. Although these groups may 
represent the concerns of large numbers of people, in terms of de facto organisation, 
they integrate a tiny minority (Gill, 2008: 36, 247). ;\foreover, INGOs tend to 
operate in the interest of the global capitalist order. Therefore, in analogy to the 
above, this thesis advances the concept of a 'transnational organised society' 
composed of counter-hegemonic social forces in pursuit of grand-scale, inter-state 
and transnational transformations. 
State power 
Poulantzas refuted the Marxist/Gramscian instrumentalist conception of the state, 
which views the state as a passive 'thing', as much as the liberal notion of the state 
as an autonomous (neutral) subject that would arbitrate among social classes 
(poulantzas, 2000[1978]: 129-31). In contrast to the instrumental notion of the 
state, which reduces the state apparatus to state power (the power of the 
bourgeoisie, under capitalism), to Poulantzas not all state action can be reduced to 
direct political domination (2000[1978]: 12-14, 30-1, 148). Poulantzas therefore 
extended Gramsci's integral notion of the state's political space (ideological 
hegemony + repressi,'e apparatus) by elaborating its relationship to the capitalist 
relations of production, thus drawing attention to the state's positi,"e role in 
constituting and reproducing social classes, i.e. class struggle and class powcr and 
domination. By characterising 'class power' as "the capacity of one or scycral 
_.,~~HSnY 
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classes to realize their specific interests [ ... ] in opposition to the capaClty (and 
interests) of other classes", Poulantzas adopts a relational conception of both 
'class' and 'power', both of which will be discussed further down in the chapter 
(poulantzas, 2000[1978]: 27, 30, 49,51,147; Carnoy, 1984: 111). Since class power 
is above all determined by the antagonistic positions occupied by different classes 
in the social division of labour, it contains political and ideological domination and 
subordination in addition to economic production and exploitation G essop, 2008: 
121). 
Since this thesis is primarily concerned with the political processes in the 
construction of 'revolutionary democracy' in Venezuela, and to some extent in the 
region, rather than with the transformations in the economic apparatus and within 
state institutions, Poulantzas' relational theory of the state is useful as it illuminates 
the forces, power struggles and contradictions at work within the state in a 
democratic transition to democratic socialism. Accordingly, Poulantzas viewed the 
capitalist state as the "material condensation" of the relations of class forces 
(2000[1978]: 128-29). In turn, the state's institutional materiality is grounded in the 
relations of production and the social division of labour, and the 'bourgeois state', 
or rather, 'bourgeois-dominated state', is "the result and place of class struggle". 
Thus viewed, the state is a dynamic "institutional ensemble rather than a unitary 
political subject", a "strategic site traversed by class struggles", where state power 
(political class domination) is inscribed in the state's very materiality, its 
"institutional matrix", which includes all the institutions of hegemony, including 
the legally private ones: judiciary, army, police, administration, political parties, 
church, etc. Gessop, 2008: 120,125; italics original; Hay, 2006: 75; Carnoy, 1984: 
171; Poulantzas, 2000[1978]: 14,36,135). 
The capitalist state orgaruses the dominant classes into a power bloc, while 
"disorganising-diyiding the dominated classes", for instance through mobilising the 
rural classes and the petty bourgeoisie in support of the po\ver bloc through 
material concessions. State personnel and the functions of the state system can be 
Chapter One 31 
unified through the dominant ideology and may resist revolutionary efforts not 
only out of selfish "economic-corporate" interests, but also in consideration of the 
"national interest" and the like (Jessop, 2008: 124). For not simply being a 
monolithic bloc, but a social relation, however the state's different leyels , , 
apparatuses and sections can equally be power centres for different fractions or 
fractional alliances in the power bloc, and/or centres of resistance for elements 
among the popular masses (Jessop, 2008: 123). The state, therefore, "is located 
within a complex dialectic of structures and strategies" (Jessop cited in Hay, 2006: 
75). This means that in any attempt of a democratic transition to socialism, a 
revolutionary government does not automatically exercise control over the 
(pivotal) state apparatuses. Poulantzas refers to this phenomenon as the "internal 
contradictions and disarticulations" of 'formal' and 'real' power. The state as a 
"strategic field" in this case means the bourgeoisie being able to strategically shift 
power from one apparatus to another when the relationship of forces within any 
one institution swings to the side of the popular forces. "Taking state power" thus 
implies a revolutionary "transformation of the state apparatus" (poulantzas, 
2000[1978]: 138-43). 
It is perhaps useful to illustrate this argument with an example of the Bolivarian 
government's struggle to increase real power. The unsuccessful April 2002 coup 
d'etat against Chavez (the coup failed due to immediate popular reaction) was 
staged in response to the government's announcement to bring the state oil 
company PDVSA under government control (Bartley & O'Brian, 2002; Gott, 
2005: 217-60; Golinger, 2005). PDVSA was nationalised in 1976, but kept being 
managed by the same corrupt executives as before ("a state within a state"), outside 
of minsterial control and against the national interest. From 1989 on, when 
Venezuela's oil sector was opened to foreign capital, an alliance between the 
management and transnational capital aimed to establish a "new governance 
structure" designed to block the government's (l\1inistry of Energy and :\1ining) 
pursuit of a fiscal revenues maximisation strategy counter to the company's policy 
of "high volumes and low prices" ~Ionuner, 2003: 133-36). PDY~.I.\ is of utmost 
Chapter One 32 
national economic and therefore revolutionary importance, and when the 
government finally gained control over this key state institution after the frustrated 
coup, the national and transnational elites shifted their counter-revolutionary 
activities from political to economic warfare (as in pre-coup Chile in 1973), in the 
form of a "bosses' lockout" between December 2002 and FebrualT 2003 with the 
, , 
aim to devastate the economy and bring the government down 
Constructing hegemony 
Constructing hegemony requires for a class to transcend its class interests (interests 
that arise directly out of the relations of production) and integrate the interests of 
other social forces, i.e. "popular and democratic demands and struggles of people", 
or a national popular (Simon, 1982: 42). As regards the class dimension, Gramsci's 
(1971: 180) relation of social forces follows Marx in stating that "the level of 
development of the material forces of production" provides the basis for the 
emergence of the various social classes. Gramsci adds, however, that class 
formation depends on the subsequent relation of political forces, i.e. the development 
of collective consciousness (solidarity based on common interest) and political 
organisation. This process, which culminates in hegemony, comprises three levels, 
in the course of which not only a "unison of economic and political aims" is 
brought about, but in which ideology ("intellectual and moral reform") functions 
as a cohesive force ("cement") between diverse classes and strata that form a bloc 
of social forces (Gramsci, 1971: 181-83, 328). Ideology then is all-pervasive in its 
conception of the world - in art, law, economic activity, and in all manifestations 
of individual and collective life (Gramsci, 1971: 328, 376). In other words, the 
"decisive passage" in the development of hegemony is that from the structure "to 
the sphere of the complex superstructures" (Gram sci, 1971: 181), which means 
"passing from the specific interests of a group or class to the building of 
institutions and elaboration of ideologies" (Cox, 1996: 133). ~-\s these ideol()gies 
and institutions become universal, in the sense that they do not appear to belong to 
the ruling class but rather as operating in the general interest, they include some of 
the interests of subordinate classes (consession-making), while ensuring the 
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leadership of the hegemonic class. In Chapter Three, I will return to the role of 
ideology in 'revolutionary class' formation in Venezuela. 
A moment of hegemony is a particularly stable historical structure produced by a 
dialectical "fit" or "historical congruence" between a prevailing socio-economic 
system and sets of power relations, ideas, ideologies and theories, and social 
institutions (Cox, 1981; Gill, 2008: 17). A historical bloc is formed when an alliance 
of different class forces politically organises around a set of hegemonic ideas that 
give coherence and strategic direction to its constituent elements (Gill, 2008: 60). 
That is, a coherent conjunction of material capabilities, ideas and institutions: 
• Material power can be dynamic (organisational and technological capabilities) 
as well as accumulative, i.e. resources (natural, equipment, wealth) that 
technology can transform. 
• Ideas are understood as sets of historically conditioned or intersubjectively 
constructed meanings or images of social order, which either confirm or 
challenge the legitimacy and nature of existing power structures (e.g. 
competing meanings of 'justice' or the 'public good'). 
• As amalgams of material capabilities and ideas, institutions have an 
administrative as well as an ideological function. They facilitate consensus-
building through conflict resolution between contending social forces and 
thus reduce the need for coercion. Once their mission is accepted as 
legitimate in the sense of acting in the general (universal) interest, they 
acqmre a powerful role in stabilizing, perpetuating and universalizing a 
particular order. Institutions co-opt elites from peripheral countries and 
absorb and redefine potentially counter-hegemonic ideas, as in the case of 
the World Bank, IMF and the Organisation of American States (O_AS) with 
regard to concepts such as 'self-reliance', 'participation', 'sustainable 
development', 'empowerment' and the idea of democracy per se (see, for 
example, World Bank, 1995; 1999). These institutions form part of the neo-
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imperialist governance system characterized by a transnational rather than 
inter-state structure (Cox, 1981: 136-45; 1996: 138-39).10 
Cox's analytical framework contains a second part, to which he refers as three 
dialectically related levels, or "spheres of activity": the social forces engendered in the 
modes or social relations of production, the forms of state, and world orden In 
contrast to historical economism, 'production' in Cox's historical materialism does 
not simply refer to economic human activity (agriculture, industry etc.), but 
includes "the production and reproduction of knowledge and of the social 
relations, morals and institutions" within which the production of material goods 
takes place (Cox, 1989: 39). Social forces, states and world orders are reciprocally 
and in "indeterminate ways" related with material capabilities, ideas and 
institutions. The power relationships between those who control the production 
processes and those who execute them is a central analytical concern of historical 
materialism and, as the wealth of a society as well as power in the state and in 
international relations derives from productive power, the "dialectical possibilities 
of change in the sphere of production" may facilitate changes in the spheres of the 
state and world order (Cox, 1981: 134-35). In other words, the patterns of relations 
of production, i.e. the agency of social forces, are the "radical potential" of Cox's 
approach, because they are at the root of why and how particular forms of state 
and world order come about - or apart, which is key to counter-hegemony 
(Cammack, 2007b: 15). 
Hegemof!J and power 
Under hegemony, power is exercised through cultural and political intermediaries, 
rather than directly by social classes (Forgacs, 1988: 300). The consensual element 
in hegemony, i.e. the "acceptance by the ruled of a 'conception of the world' that 
belongs to the rulers", which appears as "common sense" (Fiori cited in Carnoy, 
1984: 68), mystifies the power relations upon which the order rests (Cox, 1996: 56). 
10 Nco-imperialism, or neo-colonialism, do not require direct control of a foreign state, bu_t lffiply the 
control of a national economy by external interests, either directly through foreIgn ownership ot producuve 
resources and foreign direc; U;yestment, or in a more subtle war by sctung the basic condmons of 
production by external institutions (peet, 1991: 1 ~5). 
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Steven Lukes, in his two editions of Power: A Radical View, identifies this as the 
'third dimension' of power. Paradoxically, power is most effectively and insidiously 
- -
exercised the least observable it is, and Lukes asks how the powerful secure the 
willing compliance (active consent) of those they dominate (1974: 23; 2005: 1). In 
the second edition of his book, Lukes has decisively re-defmed the concept of 
power, from focusing on the exercise of power as domination exclusiyely, towards 
viewing power as a dispositional concept - a capacity (potentiality) that individual 
or collective social agents (groups, states, institutions, associations, clubs, social 
movements, etc.) mayor may not exercise over others (2005: 69-72). I introduce 
the three 'faces' of power before discussing the associated issues of 'real interests' 
and 'false consciousness'. 
The one-dimensional, 'liberal-pluralist' view (e.g. Robert Dahl) assumes that power 
is dispersed in society, in which different interest-groups (parties) compete for 
power and not one single group or interest would dominate (McAnulla, 2002: 278). 
In pluralist theory, 'class' is a non-issue (Bachrach & Botwinick, 1992: 145). Power 
is restricted to observable decision-making with respect to explicit policy 
preferences in concrete situations: A exercises power over B through influencing 
B's behaviour by making them do what they otherwise would not do. Bachrach 
and Morton S. Baratz's "reformist" view introduced the politics of non-decision-
making, or "the power to decide what is decided" (Lukes, 2005: 38, 111). Power 
may be exercised in such a way that potential conflicts of interest do not appear on 
the political agenda in the first place. Potentially "dangerous" issues may 
consciously or unconsciously be prevented from being raised and remain non-
issues, which reproduces the status quo and limits pluralist claims to "political 
openness and popular sovereignty" (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962: 948-52; Crenson 
cited in Lukes, 2005: 47-8; Bachrach & Botwinick, 1992: 50-3). In both cases, 
however, those subject to power are aware of their differing (subjectiye) interests, 
which is manifest in obseroable conflict. However, while in the one-dimensional \'iew 
such conflict is overt (differing interests cannot be assertcd), in the two-
dimensional \'ic\v such conflict is coyert (the differing interests cannot bc yoiccd in 
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the first place). Both dimensions also share a methodological indi\-idualism that 
downplays power exercised by the practices of institutions and socially structured 
and culturally patterned group behaviour (Lukes, 2005: 23-6). For instance, it may 
be institutions' ideological bias that drives a selective articulation of social problems 
and conflicts (Crenson cited in Lukes, 2005: 47-8). 
Lukes' third, 'critical theory' view of power, adds that power is also exercised by 
manipulating (influencing, shaping, or detennining) people's perceptions, 
cognitions, beliefs, preferences and desires through non-personified social 
arrangements and collective forces, such as the control of information through 
mass media and processes of socialisation (e.g. schools, leaders, etc.). Conflict then 
is "latent" (not observable), but remains potential, and "consists in a contradiction 
between the interests of those exercising power and the rea! interests of those they 
exclude" (1974: 24-5; italics original). In this view, "people's wants may themselves 
be a product of a system which works against their interests" (1974: 34). Conflict, 
in other words, does not arise and people's active consent derives from an 
acceptance of "their role in the existing order of things", i.e. perceiving the status 
quo as natural or god-given, thus unchangeable, or as even beneficial, and not act 
towards changing it (1974: 24). 
The "power of the powerful", as Lukes sums up, consists in their being capable of 
activating power under particular conditions, which draws attention to their being 
"responsible for affecting (negatively or positively) the (subjective and/or 
objective) interests of others" (2005: 68). This statement contains practical, moral-
political and evaluative contexts of power; that is, knowledge of the power of 
others, responsibility regarding the exercise of power, and judging social systems 
according to the distribution of power within them. The point is that as power is 
unevenly distributed in societies, the more powerful actors can and should be held 
responsible for their actions and/or non-actions (the latter of which also can be 
action in the sense of having significant causal consequences). For instance, 
unequal access to utilities such as housing, water, food, and education, can either 
Chapter One 37 
be viewed as an 'objective' structural phenomenon (the outcome of uncoordinated 
pursuit of self-interest of a multitude of actors), or as action and/or non-action on 
part of those in strategic positions, who have economic and political po\ver over-
usually politicians and other members of the TCC. Powerlessness thus yiewed is an 
injustice that can be reduced or remedied and can itself become a criterion for the 
evaluation of a society (2005: 65-9, 77). 
Lukes' third dimension of power has been contested because the notion of 'real 
interests' (what they are and how to arrive at it) and the associated 'false 
consciousness' are themselves contested issues. They make an analysis of power as 
value-laden and inevitably involves moral and political positioning (2005: 81, 124). 
However, Lukes rejects a notion of 'real interests' that identifies individuals' 
interests exclusively with orthodox class interests, categorized as 'workers', 'petty 
bourgeois' or 'bourgeois' (2005: 122, 144). Rather, identities are not confined to an 
attributed social role, as social actors have multiple, conflicting interests of 
different kinds, which can include more subjective preferences or more objective 
(nevertheless culture-dependent) welfare interests (or, 'primary goods', 'resources', 
'capabilities') (2005: 81-2, 111, 118, 145). Nevertheless, the capacity of ideological 
power to impose internal constraints, i.e. to subvert and transform commonsense 
to secure compliance should not be dismissed, and the recognition of this third 
face of power as "interests imputed to and unrecognised by the actors" requires an 
external cognitive standpoint (2005: 145-6). However, instead of a "presumptuous" 
understanding of 'real interests', Lukes relativates 'real interests' as not an absolute, 
"canonical set" determined by the outsider, but as "a function of one's explanatory 
purpose, framework and methods". This means, for instance, in a class analysis, 
'real interests' can be material interests, while in a 'capabilities' framework it can 
mean basic capabilities that are precluded by the existing arrangements (2005: 148). 
While, for Gramsci, as we have seen, the acceptance of the sub-alterns of a class 
society was the result of hegemony, 1farx, Lenin and Engels had attributed 
subordination to an inherently patronizing 'false consciousness', which suggests 
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'experts' (or academics or revolutionaries, etc.) making epistemological claims to 
truths unavailable to others. Lukes therefore proposes to associate 'false 
consciousness' with a "cognitive power" in the sense of "the power to mislead', which 
can take many forms: censorship, disinformation, or personal and institutionalised 
ways of "infantilizing judgment" (2005: 149, italics original). At the core of false 
consciousness remains 'ideology', or 'distorted knowledge', i.e. a distortion of 
moral, social and political reality, as underlying Herbert Marcuse's 'false needs' 
(Marcuse, 1964: 26) and Freire's 'culture of silence' (Freire, 1996[1970]: 69-72, 87; 
Ewert, 1991: 346; Morrow & Torres, 2002: 102). To Freire, a "person's false 
consciousness of reality" originates in vertical power relations and the thus 
historical absence of dialogue and participation (1996[1970]: 111; 197-+: 120). 
Freire's shift in terminology indicates his emancipatory approach to the issue: the 
'culture of silence' acknowledges that there are "forms of accumulated experience" 
that through processes of dialogical learning have the potential to take the form of 
critical knowledge (Morrow & Torres, 2002: 102, 105). Freire insists that revolution 
involves such "truth-creating" processes, which have to be achieved by the 
tyrannised themselves, in "communion" with their leaders through which "both 
groups grow together, and the leaders, instead of being simply self-appointed, are 
installed or authenticated in their praxis with the praxis of the people" (1996[1970]: 
111). This appears to be implicit in Raby's characterization of 'progressive 
populism", to which I drew attention in the Introduction. 
Whether the dilemmas of 'real interests' and 'false consciousness' can be resolved 
on a purely theoretical level is open to contestation. In pragmatic terms, however, 
they indicate the connections between power and decision-making, and underscore 
the need to evaluate which political principles, structures and processes may be 
best-suited to create conditions that reduce power constraints and therefore 
contribute to people's understanding of their interests (Bachrach & BOt\vinick, 
1992: 56). While the three faces of power contribute to an understanding of class 
po\ver ('power over'), the conception seems to COn\TY a rather linear and 
deterministic understanding of power, in the sense that the capacity to exerClSC 
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power ('power to') is given and would always produce the desired results. I will 
therefore complement my discussion of power with Andrew Sayer's critical realist 
conception, in my sub-section on space and scale further down in this chapter. 
First, I draw attention to 'organic intellectuals' and their role in perpetuating class 
power. 
Organic intellectuals 
Gramsci developed the concept of 'organic intellectuals' to argue that 'the 
intellectual' is not defined by the "intrinsic nature of intellectual activities", but by 
the intellectual's function in society (1971: 8-9). Although problem-solvers and 
other producers of technical knowledge can belong to the category, decisive is the 
class identification, or in whose interests the intellectual theorises and directs 
(Cammett, 1967: 202-3): 
If social classes do not exercise power directly, but through political and cultural 
intermediaries, then the role of these intermediaries - the intellectuals - in 
maintaining and reproducing a given economic and social order (in the exercise of 
hegemony), is of decisive importance (Forgacs, 1988: 300). 
In other words, the processes of intellectual production and historical change are in 
a dialectical relationship (Gill, 2008: 18). While any social group can develop their 
own organic intellectuals, the subordinate classes face a "historic obstacle" in the 
form of the social division of labour; that is, the separation of mental (intellectual) 
from manual labour in the class society - a society characterised by the inter-
generational perpetuation of classes and a near-monopolisation of knowledge that 
provides the ruling groups with the ownership and control of a predominant part 
of the means of material and mental production (Carnoy, 1984: 33, 51): the 
hierarchical organisation of the work process reserves intellectual functions to the 
dominant classes, who reproduce themselyes through the education system 
(Forgacs, 1988: 300); and the power "of capital over labour", into which mental 
labour tends to be converted (Harvey, 2006: 31, 107, 139). ~-\ counter-hegemonic 
(socialist) project \vould thus ha\'e to overcome the diyision of labour and create its 
O\VI1 organic intellectuals, which are t\\'O key rationales of the Bolivarian H EF.-\ 
policies. 
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Neoliberal hegemony 
In response to the wide-spread opinion of the 'powerless state' under neoliberal 
globalisation, Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck underscore the "mobilisation of state 
power" as crucial in the process of 'neoliberalisation', understood as the extension 
and reproduction of the commodification of social life (fickell & Peck, 2003). The 
globalisation of neoliberalism is perhaps the most illustrative example of Santos' 
idea of a globalised localism. By the time the Fordist model of production entered 
the structural crisis of 1973-74 (Cox, 1996: 276-77), an initially "small, unpopular 
sect" at the University of Chicago, which included radical-capitalist organic 
intellectuals Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedman, had already developed an 
ideological framework for an alternative world order (George, 2000). The so-called 
'Chicago boys' sided with Pinochet's dictatorship to implement the first neoliberal 
'experiment' on a national scale after the US-led coup d'etat against the 
constitutional president Allende on 11 September 1973 (Chossudovsky, 2002: 17; 
Cunningham, 2002: 120). After attempting to construct a democratic socialism in 
Chile, the violent restoration of "economic freedom" - according to liberals a 
condition for personal and political freedom (Hayek, 1944: 10) - involved an "all-
out war" against organised labour, leftist social movements and the popular sectors 
generally, with the "strategic objective" (rather than by-product) of a sustained 
destruction of Chilean democracy 01 alenzuela, 1989: 188; Lance Compa cited in 
Robinson, 1996: 165). The alliance of fascist-type practice and neoliberal ideology 
became the continental model - a "multinational terrorist organization" under the 
code name Operation Condor (Dinges, 2004) - and included agents such as the US 
State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), and USAID, alongside global capital, as for instance 
represented by the World Bank, which after the coup was quick to release credits 
for two agricultural land projects, approved in 1970 and then 'frozen' during 
Allende's presidency in support of the economic sabotage led by the national 
bourgeoisie (George, 1976: 259; Robinson, 1996). 
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Neoliberalism is not an undifferentiated, monolithic project across the globe. 
Instead, it is historically and geographically contingent (e.g. institutional legacies, 
local political forces and resistance) (Tickell & Peck, 2003), and the Chilean case 
features prominently to exemplify the general mechanism through which LAC was 
neoliberalised from the 1970s onwards: the "democratic transitions" and neoliberal 
state building were possible only after military regimes had modified the previously 
existing social structures (Lander, 2007: 16). Rooted in neoclassical economic 
theory, the set of World Bank and IMF-driven structural adjustment policies 
(SAPs) subsumed as 'Washington Consensus' - a "hegemonic policy fix" (Tickell 
& Peck, 2003) - typically targeted fiscal discipline, new public expenditure 
priorities, tax reform, financial liberalisation, competitive exchange rates, trade 
liberalisation, foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation, and property 
rights (Williamson, 1993). Reduced state spending and privatisation have primarily 
been responsible for the inequitable impact of SAPs on access to basic services and 
utilities, above all food, water, electricity, education and health care (e.g. Samoff, 
1994; Bonal, 2002). 
Ankie Hoogvelt (2001) reminds us that modernisation theory and its "'how to 
develop' manual" for the South constitutes a problem solving theory approach, 
while dependency theory's emphasis of the historically created unequal North-
South structures is firmly located in critical science. However, employment of 
critical or problem-solving theory is not a matter of 'Left' or 'Right', in the sense 
that supporters of the status quo would not reflect upon the broader context or 
question elements of the prevailing order (Cammack, 2007b; Robertson & Dale, 
2008). Accordingly, by the 1980s, a US-Republican foreign policy think tank 
named the "Santa Fe Committee" had started drawing attention to Gramsci within 
the US State Department. A series of documents referred to as the Santa Fe 
Documents have advised successive US governments to revitalise both the principles 
of the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which pronounced the US' claim to the \,\1 estern 
hemisphere ('~\merica for the .. Americans'), and the historical use of the OAS as a 
foreign policy tool (Comite de Santa Fe, 1980; 1988; 2000). The first Santa Fe 
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Document (Comite de Santa Fe, 1980) states that the l\fonroe doctrine had alread\-
been "multinationalized" through the OAS-convened 10th Inter-American 
Conference in Caracas in 1954. There, elite rulers and dictators jointly declared any 
potentially "communist" government a "threat to the sovereignty and political 
independence of the American States", and the Declaration of Caracas defined 
'democracy' as strictly "representative democracy" (OAS, 1954: 604). By explicit 
reference to Gramsci, the Santa Fe II Document strategically distinguishes between 
"temporal" and "permanent" government. To achieve the latter, i.e. hegemony, the 
US Information Agency (USIA) is stated as "our agent" in charge of taking control 
of countries' civil society institutions to "cultivate values" in the "cultural war" 
over the political culture, state structures and institutions (Comite de Santa Fe, 
1988: 6-7). 
This indeed presents itself as a paradoxical and equally cynical scenario: while, in 
the 1970s/80s, the Left was discussing Gramsci, the radical Right was building 
hegemony by globalising the neoliberal ideology through a global network of 
institutions, not only the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) but foundations, 
research centres, think tanks, publishers and the like. Neoliberalism has become 
the "ideological 'commonsense' of the times" (Tickell & Peck, 2003), an inevitable 
and natural condition of humankind, as expressed in British ex-prime minister 
Thatcher's "there is no alternative" (TINA). To add to the irony, the ideological 
counter-offensive called for by Susan George (2000), in which "we set the agenda 
instead of letting the Masters of the Universe set it at Davos" (ibid.: 34), had in fact 
already been under way, however ignored or sceptically dismissed by the majority 
of 'progressive' academia - a 'scepticism' that appears to persist, and that will be 
dealt \vith in greater detail in Chapter Three. Again the enemy appears to haye 
been more astute in recognising the potential: while blaming the Clinton 
adminstrations for a "decline of US power" in the hemisphere, the 2000 Santa Fe 
IV Document already warned of Chavez' revitalisation of OPEC and his growing 
influence in LAC (Comite de Santa Fe, 2000). _\s will become evident throughout 
Part II of the thesis, the key pillars of \T enezuela's counter-hegemonic strate~'I' 
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were already publicly available prior to Chavez' election in 1998, and analysing such 
primary sources could prevent untenable and counter-emancipatory claims. I refer 
to such unfortunate examples as Portes & Hoffman who include Chavez in their 
list of discredited, authoritarian neo-populists Fujimori, Menem and Bucaram who 
are "unable to implement a coherent, alternative model of development" (2003: 
77). 
Global capitalism in crisis 
A key argument this thesis builds upon is that the conditions for the contemporary 
revolutionary processes in LAC have been produced by the contradictions in 
hegemonic globalisation. In this respect, Robinson (2004a: 145-58) and Harvey 
(2003: 137 -43) identify the following twin -dimensions underlying the crisis 0 f 
global capitalism: 
a) A structural cnSlS of over-accumulation (surplus of capital lacking 
opportunites for profitable investment), accompanied by under-
consumption, has imposed limitations on the development of the capitalist 
system. The undermining of (state-led) redistributive mechanisms under 
globalisation have produced global social apartheid and a crisis of social 
reproduction, associated with structural irrelevance in terms of production 
and consumption of a significant proportion of humankind (Cox, 1981: 
149), and with a global downward equalisation of salaries, which in turn 
reduces the capacity of the market to absorb the global production. 
b) Social apartheid has certainly in the South produced a moral crisis, or a 
crisis of authority and legitimacy. As consensual integration of subordinate 
groups in the historical bloc is undermined by diminished material rc\\"ards, 
and as many are forcibly excluded, coercion to maintain the ruling groups' 
supremacy assumes an increasingly salient role oyer consent. 
Hegemony, therefore, is more consistent and intense in the corc, while in the 
periphery it is n10re laden with contradictions (Cox, 1996: 137). Indeed, the 
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contemporary counter-hegemonic challenge emerged from spontaneous popular 
grassroots resistance in the South and has become organised in the 'anti-
globalisation movement' and the World Social Forum (porto Alege, Brazil), which 
under the slogan Another World is Possible has decisively contributed to strategies for 
a democratisation of the global system. The following sub-sections will explore a 
range of dimensions related to the stated contradictions in the global capitalist 
system. 
The globalisation ojinequalz!J 
According to the United Nations, extreme inequality globally is the "cumulative 
result" of the structural reforms of the past two decades (UN, 2005: 20). The 
following statistics indicate the material dimension of global inequality: 40% of the 
world's population, who live on less than US$2 a day, account for 5% of global 
income, while the richest 20% account for three-quarters (UNDP, 2007: 25). 
UNDP (1998: 2) states that the richest 20% of the world's people account for 86% 
of total private consumption, and the poorest 20% only for 1.3%. Based on World 
Bank data, Thomas Pogge (2007a, b) calculates that as the median consumption 
expenditure rose 20.7% worldwide over the 1990-2001 globalisation period, the 
populations of the high income countries gained 52.7%, whilst the bottom 
percentile lost 7.3%, and the second percentile gained 1.0% only. In Bolivia and 
Nicaragua, for instance, a gap of 97 and 87 places in the Human Development 
Index (HDI) ranking, respectively, separates the poorest 20% from the richest 20% 
(UNDP, 2006: 270). Beatriz Stolowicz underscores the notion of a redistribution 
from bottom to top, stating that in 2001, for each 'poverty reduction' dollar Latin 
America received from the North, the region's poor paid over SLX dollars back 
(Stolowicz, 2004: 173).11 
Globalisation 'works' for those 10-15% of the \vorld population who are tied into 
the system of commodity fetishism (consumerism), primarily located in the triad 
regions, but also in "oases of affluence" in the 'Third \\'orld' and the former 
II For further inequality statistics see: UNDP (1996: 1-13; 2005: 32-9); Castells (2000b: 73-82); Robimo!1 
(2004a: 152-55); Harvey (2L1l)(J: xi-xii); Robertson eI al (2007: 28-35). 
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Eastern bloc (Chossudovsky, 2002: 89-95). The subaltern 'rest' are either assigned 
the role of "feeders" (cheap labour/raw materials) or, in the absence of 
employment and purchasing power about 40% have been rendered structurally 
irrelevant ("systematically worthless populations") both in terms of production and 
consumption. They pertain to the 'Fourth World', a phenomenon driven by the 
global division of labour integral to transnationalised production processes and the 
associated global downward equalisation of salaries and labour conditions. 'Fourth 
World' (Castells, 2000b: 161), or 'the South', as used here12, refers to "a new 
geography of social exclusion" that joins inter-country with the dramatically 
increased intra-country inequalities, i.e. the selective inclusion and exclusion of 
segments of societies and territories across nation states (Cox 1996: 113; Castells 
2000b). To Harvey (2006: xi), such inequality is an expression of class power. 
Hayek's cynical attempt to construct a moral justification for a social-Darwinist 
world by attributing inequality to the individual rather than the collective (Hayek, 
1944, esp. Chapter VIII: 76-82) provided welcome fuel for Thatcher's TINA-
doctrine. Rather than merely being a ry-product of globalisation, inequality in fact is 
an ideological component integral to neoliberalism in order to increase 
competition. In paraphrasing Adam Smith, who defined individual greed and 
selfishness as positive factors that would add up to collective well-being (in 
Carnoy, 1984: 24-5), Thatcher reportedly postulated: "It is our job to glory in 
inequality and see that talents and abilities are given vent and expression for the 
benefit of us all" (cited in George, 2000: 30). As the "entrepreneurally fit" subject 
is sorted out from the "noncompetitive unfit" (perera, 2006: 4), neoclassical 
economics which (as a positive science) in theory rejects any such values as justice, 
in practice constitutes a theory of justice according to which "in competitive 
markets everyone gets what they deserve" (patomaki, 2007: 108). 
Poverty and inequality are distinct phenomena ~1arshall, 1950), and in many cases 
poverty is a consequence of unfair distribution. In contexts of po\"erty, it is 
12 'Fourth \Vorld' has also been used as ;1I1 'inter-state system'-concept, I.e. cOW1tries that have sunk 
"irretriC\'ably" in poverty (Cox, 1996: 193) or that have "not begun to industnalize" (.\min, 1999: 60). 
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inequality that makes poverty most humiliating and inacceptable, as "\farx has 
illustrated in his metaphor of a house which, irrespective of size and comforts, will 
always appear small or shabby next to a palace (1942: 268). As Fidel Castro (1999: 
64) states with respect to Cuba: "[I]t's better to socialise poverty than to distribute 
the scarce wealth there is among a small minority that takes everything and leaves 
nothing for the rest of the people". The hegemonic poverty reduction discourse 
(e.g. World Bank) and its connotations of compassion and charity, however, 
repudiates inequality and egalitarian principles of global distributive justice. In fact, 
'poverty reduction' can be viewed as a generously funded "counter-paradigm" built 
into the neoliberal dogma that leaves the capitalist status quo unchallenged and 
assumes a legitimisation function while offering NGOs and development problem-
solvers a comfortable niche (Chossudovsky, 2002: 52). Concerns with (in)equality, 
however, become counter-hegemonic as equality refers to justice, which is political 
as it challenges entrenched power asymmetries and thus the global structural 
framework that perpetuates poverty and inequality in the interest of the affluent 
countries and ruling elites (pogge, 2007a: 137). 
Uneven geographical development and the production of space and scale 
David Harvey insists that uneven geographical development, as manifest in the 
Fourth World phenomenon and more 'traditional' core-periphery asymmetries 
(geographical North-South, rural-urban), is not merely the result of geographical 
differentiation in resource endowments, physical possibilities and other locational 
advantages, but is a spatial structure produced by the asymmetrical concentration 
of wealth and power over time in certain places due to asymmetrical exchange 
relations (Harvey, 2003: 32, 94). As capitalism seeks competitive advantages, such 
regional and spatial differentiations and specialisations are both product and 
condition for capital accumulation, which simultaneously produces misery, as 
certain places Oowest costs or highest profit rates) and social formations therein 
(fe\v restricted strata of the population) are privileged for investment (or 
exploitation) over others (Harvey, 2006: 413-19; see Brenner, 2U()4: 13). Thus 
argwng, Han'c), demystifies classical location theory and its claim to a "spatial 
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equilibrium" Wl·th respect to capt'talist d' h di 'b' d pro uctton, exc ange, stn utton an 
consumption (Harvey, 2003: 95-6). 
Reference to uneven geographical development supports this thesis in two ways: 
firstly, as Part II will show, Venezuela's endogenous development paradigm seeks 
to equalise socio-spatial inequalities produced by capitalism both nationally and 
globally. Secondly, as a structure of space relations, uneven geographical 
development produces 'scale' (Smith, 1992; 1997; Harvey, 2000: 32, 77). In 
contrast to 'place' (or locale), which Jessop defmes as a bounded site of direct 
interactions among social forces (e.g. face-to-face relationships), neither 'space' nor 
'scale' are absolute, ontological 'givens', but constructed and reproduced through 
specific social relations. Accordingly, 'space' is dynamic, which implies that there is 
a "simultaneous multiplicity of spaces", shifting and overlapping, "cross-cutting, 
intersecting, aligning with one another, or existing in relations of paradox or 
antagonism" (I\1assey, 1994: 3). 'Scale' can be imagined as "the nested hierarchy of 
bounded spaces of differing size" Gessop, 2005b: 424-25). Since scalar 
structurations of social space i.e. the vertical positionalities (order) of 
geographical scales in relation to other scales and scaling processes - are 
historically constructed through processes of socio-political struggle and 
contestation, they are subject to change through collective action. Brenner refers to 
this as 'politics of scale' in its "most generic" meaning (2001: 599; also 
Swyngedouw, 1997: 141). Methodologically, scale is thus conceptualized as process 
(e.g. localisation, regionalisation, globalisation), rather than using socio-spatial 
concepts Oocal, urban, national, regional, global) as merely spatial qualifiers to 
connote the substantive sociological content of specific scales as sites for particular 
political, economic, social and cultural activities and processes. Scalar analysis thus 
becomes useful when there is a causal argument that links the substantive social 
content of the spatial unit under investigation to its embeddedness or positionality 
\vithin a broader scalar hierarchy (Brenner, 2001: 600; 2004: 8). 
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Analyses of 'politics of scale' have focussed on the global reorgarusatlon of 
capitalist production, accumulation and regulation, through a process sometimes 
referred to as "glocalisation", which has involved the de- and re-territorialisation of 
power to a range of different scales (e.g. Swyngedouw, 1997; Brenner, 1999; 200-1-; 
Jessop, 200Sa, 2008). This study attempts to use the concept for a first mapping of 
the spatiality of social power relations (participation-exclusion or domination-
subordination) and the re-scaling of power immanent in Venezuela's revolutionary 
democracy - a kind of 'revolutionary democratic politics of scale'. For these 
purposes, I explore two aspects: a non-areal conception of politics and democracy, 
and the spatiality of power. 
To Brenner, the suggested verticality of scalar relations does not exclude horizontal 
forms of inter-scalar relationships, such as networks of spatial connectiyity 
between actors located within geographically dispersed locations (cities, regions 
etc.) (2001: 610n9). Scalar structuration and other forms of socio-spatial 
structuration are dialectically intertwined, as for instance is typically the case with 
state power, where the scalar differentiation between national and sub-national 
tiers is inextricably linked to the state's territorialisation within self-enclosed 
boundaries, the bounding of each scalar tier within territorially demarcated sub-
national jurisdictional units (province, municipality etc.), and its geographical 
centralisation (the spatial centralisation of powers within the national territory) 
(Brenner, 2001: 60S; 2004: 69). However, while globalisation has involved the 
transnationalization of capitalist production and accumulation, formal politics 
('democracy') has remained restricted to areal, geographically-bounded, political 
communities at different scales. In Venezuela, this sub-national electoral geography 
comprises the federal state and the municipality. As Chapter Four \vill show, 
however, parallel to formal politics, 'the community' has become the predominant 
place and space within which Venezuela's revolutionary democratic structure is 
embedded, especially the community councils as the local spatio-scalar expression 
of democracy .. .:\s the non-areal governance structure associated \\ith globalisation 
imposes constraints on place-bound politics, the "non-congruence" of scale or 
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spatial fonus between economics and politics is often considered as undennining 
the democratic legitimacy of globalisation, including that of emergent regionalisms 
such as the EU (Low, 1997). Murray Low therefore proposes to complement the 
conception of the spatial organisation of democracy by non-areal fonus of 
democracy, dissociated from place, as exercised by transnational movements in 
their construction of transnational political spaces. This idea is inherent in my 
concept of the transnational organised society advanced in this thesis. 
Related to the non-areal conception of democracy is Andrew Sayer's (2004) critical 
realist theory of power, as it provides useful theoretical underpinnings for my 
empirical analysis of particular relations between power and place and space in 
revolutionary democracy and LAC regionalism. Rather than concentrating on a 
specific modality of power (domination, authority, coercion, manipulation, 
seduction), Sayer distinguishes between "power as capacity" ("powerl "), and 
"power as exercised" ("power2"). Power1 refers to the causal powers of agents or 
social objects - individuals, institutions and relations (including discourse) - with 
the potential to produce change. While this may be implicit in Lukes' conception 
of power discussed above, Sayer adds that social objects also have particular 
"causal susceptibilities", such as individuals being susceptible to feeling shame. 
Most of the causal powers, such as the power of a speaker to seduce or the power 
of an anuy to invade, are acquired, and neither powers nor susceptabilities are 
necessarily constant; that is, they may change over space and time (Sayer, 2004: 
261-62). 
Power2 refers to the activation of causal powers and susceptibilities, and is subject 
to a "double contingency": firstly, whether such powers are activated depends on the 
relation to other social objects, which have their own causal powcrs and 
susceptibilities; secondly, ~fthey are activated, their effects are equally dependent on 
the causal powers and susceptibilities of the other objects, which may rcinforce, 
modify, override, or block the activation of powerl. Sayer warns that powerl and 
powcr2 should not be equated with 'po\vcr to' and 'po\ver over', respectively. The 
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difference is that powerl does not assume the capacity to achieve a given effect 
irrespective of circumstance (as 'power to' would), and that power2 would not 
necessarily mean domination ('power over') because it does not necessarily 
produce the desired result(s). The successful exercise of po\ver1 depends on the 
relational factors. For instance, someone with the capacity (power1) to open a door 
may try but not succeed because the door is locked (power2) (Sayer, 2004: 262). 
Sayer (2004: 262-65) lists a set of aspects regarding the critical realist understanding 
of power, of which the following points appear relevant for the thesis: the double 
contingency shows that causation is non-linear, for which reason purposeful action 
may produce unintended positive (constructive) or negative (destructive) 
outcomes. This underscores the space and time relativity of any exercise of power. 
As all objects have causal powers and susceptabilities, activated or not, powerl is 
ubiquitous. However, they neither are everywhere equal, nor concentrated in one 
place. The power of multi/transnational corporations (MNCs/TNCs), for 
instance, is diffused over many locations, and may be concentrated in certain 
places. Power relations therefore produce dominant and subordinate agents, and 
the latter's repertoire of action, which involves a greater or lesser degree of 
freedom and thus responsibility, may include resistance or active consent. Here, the 
critical realist conception of power noticibly transcends critical theory's more 
deterministic 'false consciousness': 
In order to be dominated, seduced, manipulated by A or to submit to the authority 
of A, B must have the properties or susceptabilities - which may derive from its 
location within wider structures or networks - that make this possible, for not just 
any object can be dominated, etc. (Sayer, 2004: 265). 
The significance of Sayer's theorisation of power for counter-hegemony is this: 
different causal powers combined, as in collective action, may produce an 
"emergent power", which transcends the sum total of its constituent parts (2004: 
266). They can manifest themselves in social structures (2004: 266). Sincc the 
activation of causal powers, and therefore emergent po\vcrs, is always relational 
and contingent, thus potentially susceptible to the effects of counter-causal powers 
(po\vcr2), structural po\vcr (the framcwork for action) can be contcsted thruugh 
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counter-hegemonic action, in spaces constituted by the social objects across scales, 
such as in the transnational organised society. 
Accumulation by dispossession and social fascism 
Underlying inequality is 'accumulation by dispossession', which Han·ey (2003; 
2006) juxtaposes with Marx's 'primitive' or 'original' accumulation. 'Original', 
because to Marx such accumulation was the precondition for all further 
accumulation, or for capitalism to develop. Based on fraud, thievery, predation and 
violence, primitive accumulation has occurred most blatantly with respect to land 
in order to create a landless proletariat forced to sell their labour power (Han·ey, 
2006: 359). Harvey, however, shows that the predatory activity is not only an initial 
feature, but has become an on-going, internalised process within capitalism. 
Accumulation by dispossession is a response to the crisis of over-accumulation, at 
the root of which is the lack of profitable investment opportunities for surplus 
capital, without which devaluation looms (Harvey, 2003: 88). While the 
geographical expansionist potential ("spatio-temporal fix"), which delays the 
problem, is largely exhausted, the stabilisation of the system requires capitalism to 
create other funds of assets for investment by, and outside of, itself. I<ey processes 
to accumulation by dispossession are the commodification and privatisation of 
common property resources Qand, water), including the necessary conversion of 
property rights from common, collective or state to exclusively private, the 
suppression of alternative forms of production and consumption, as well as 
curbing rights of the subalterns, above all basic utilities (health care, transportation, 
social housing), welfare and pension rights. The commodification of nature (e.g. 
genetic material), intellectual property and, importantly, of higher education has to 
be added. In these processes, the state assumes a crucial role due to its definitional 
powers of legality and its monopoly of \riolence, in the face of popular resistance to 
this form of redistribution from bottom to top (Han'ey, 2003: 145-59). 
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Related to accumulation by dispossession is the phenomenon of 'social' or 'societal 
fascism'. It is a fonn of "pluralist fascism" produced by society rather than by the 
state, in which powerful non-state actors exercise veto power over the lives of the 
'powerless'. Nevertheless, as suggested with respect to accumulation by 
dispossession, the neoliberal state assumes the role of the "complacent bystander" 
or "active culprit" (Santos, 2001; 2002a: 453; 2005: 60). Santos distinguishes 
between fasa·sm of sodal apartheid (socio-geographical segregation, the Fourth World), 
fascism of insecun!J (chronic anxiety),jinancial fascism (speculation, 'casino capitalism,), 
and parastate fascism (powerful non-state actors exercising political functions outside 
political control). As economic globalisation is driven by an expansion of 
consumerism, citizenship has been replaced by 'consumership' ("market 
participation") in the de socialized global economy, in which the rights of capital 
increasingly prevail over citizens' rights, and solvency rather than rights condition 
inclusion (Santos, 2002b: 7-12; 2004: 153; Muhr, 2008, for social fascism in 
neoliberal Nicaragua). 
Class formation under globalisation 
The phenomena of accumulation by dispossession and social fascism suggest a 
reconceptualisation of the orthodox Marxian conception of class, and class 
struggle, because resistance to dispossession under globalisation is of a different 
character to production-related struggles (Harvey, 2006: xvii). In Wage-labour and 
Capital, Marx (1942: 264) conceptualises 'class' as a relation, determined by the 
social relations of the production process. In the capitalist economy, class is 
fonned by the reciprocal relationship of wage labour and capital, from which Marx 
derives his essentialist categorisation of working class and bourgeoisie: while the 
fonner have only their labour power (a commodity) to sell, the capitalist class 
appropriates the produced surplus to their private benefit (r'v1arx, 19-1-2: 266-68; 
Marx & Engels, 1942[1848]: 204). Therefore, unlike the liberal idea of 'group', 
which can be defined by itself (e.g. in tenns of purposes and membership criteria), 
'class' can only be defined in its power relation to another class (Bachrach & 
Botwinick, 1992: 150). The "true basis" for class formation, as Z.~\. Jordan adds by 
Chapter One 53 
reference to Marx's Capital, is not income distribution, but the "distribution of 
property" Gordan, 1971: 26). The "dynamic" view of class is also upheld by E.P. 
Thompson, who demonstrates that class is "not a thing", but a "historical 
relationship" that "happens" in real contexts through the feeling and articulating of 
the "identity of interests" as a result of common experiences. Class formation 
involves social power struggles, which stresses the agency of working people as 
well as their consciousness in "the making of history", which is commonly 
obfuscated or obliterated from historical accounts (Thompson, 1968: 9-13). 
Marx' 'bipolar' conceptualisation of class is sociological, or theoretical, because 
when writing about actual events Marx also advanced a historical system of more 
flexible and numerous class categories Oumpenproletariat, industrial proletariat, 
petty bourgeoisie, financial bourgeoisie, industrial bourgeoisie, peasant class, landed 
aristocracy) Gordan, 1971: 29; Harvey, 2006: 26-7). While that system maintained 
the working class/bourgeoisie binary (possession of labour power vs ownership of 
capital), a more flexible conception that accounts for control over the labour of 
others and possession of scarce occupational skills appears more appropriate for 
class analyses in today's societies. Such an approach maintains the orthodox focus 
on power asymmetries as the cause for inequality and poverty, and the shaping of 
relative life chances, as well as conflict and the class struggles produced by these 
phenomena (portes & Hoffman, 2003: 43). In contrast to the advanced capitalist 
societies, where the "working class" constitutes a rather homogenous entity 
incorporated in fully monetised, legally regulated working relations, the dynamics 
of peripheral capitalism, where the modern mode of production co-exists with 
petty entrepreneurial and subsistence modes of production, suggest a more 
segmented class system conditioned by limited incorporation in the formal 
economy. Nevertheless, the so-called informal sector, or informal proletanat, 
contributes to capitalist accumulation through unregulated, semi-clandestine 
subsistence economic activities, and they are the largest class in Latin America 
(portes & Hoffman, 2003). 
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Portes & Hoffman (2003) categorise capitalists, executive and elite workers Qarge and 
medium employers, sernor executives, professionals) as the dominant classes in 
LAC. They are the elites who own and control the main part of material and 
mental production. The petty bourgeoisie (microentrepreneurs) constitute the link 
between the modern capitalist economy and the informal proletariat at the bottom; 
in-between, the formal proletariat is sub-divided in non-manual and manual formal 
workers. In Portes & Hoffman's study, which draws on data from the year 2000, 
Venezuela had an elite sector of 14%, which was well above the regional average of 
8.6%, and the formal and informal proletariat together made up almost three 
quarters of Venezuelan society in almost equal shares of 36% and 38°0, 
respectively. 
However, Portes & Hoffman's exclusive focus on the working population 
maintains the production-based categorisation of class and ignores the 
phenomenon of structural irrelevance under globalisation. By pointing to the 
restructured relations of production, Cox (1999: 9) proposes three categories: the 
integrated, which comprises Portes & Hoffman's three top classes (the elites) who 
control the production process, research and development, and who "propagate 
the ideology of globalisation"; the precarious, who are the lower skilled, easily 
disposable workers (high job insecurity); and the excluded, constituted by both the 
informal proletariat and the unemployed, structurally irrelevant sectors. Novelli 
(2004: 63) argues that Santos' (2002a) categorisation of 'intimate civil society', 
'strange civil society' and 'uncivil society' corresponds with Cox's schema, 
nevertheless conceptually expanded by integrating a human rights focus. Those 
integrated in intimate civil society enjoy "all the gamut of rights" - political, social, 
economic and cultural. Cox's 'precarious' equate with Santos' strange civil socie!}, who 
may exercise civic and political rights, and to some limited extent enjoy socio-
economic rights, but are excluded from cultural or "post-materialist" rights. Finally, 
the "utterly excluded" of uncivil society, who "haye no rights" (Santos, 2002a: 457). 
To the latter, which include Portes & Hoffman's informal proletariat, Santos also 
refers to as the underdaJJ of the e.'\:duded, constituted by social groups trapped in a 
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"circle of social fascism": unqualified and rrugrant workers, the more or less 
permanently unemployed, ethnic minorities, people with a disability, poor peasants 
in the periphery, inhabitants of shanty towns, and welfare recipients, \vith women 
and children disproportionately represented among these groups (Santos, 2002a: 
452; Cox, 1999). 
Therefore, neither Cox nor Santos dissociate class formation from the global 
production process, but extend the orthodox conception of class by a 
consumption-based understanding of inclusion and exclusion. This non-essentialist 
understanding of 'working class' maintains Marx's theoretical binary: while the 
generic meaning of class as "social dominance and subordination" arising from 
relationships of exploitation remains, the meanings of class change over time and 
space to allow consideration of identities such as gender, sexuality, 'race', ethnicity, 
nationality, environmentalism, caste and status group (Cox, 2002: 30; 1999: 15). 
Chapter Three will discuss 'revolutionary class' formation in the Bolivarian 
Republic. For now, I would like to briefly point to the other end of the spectrum, 
the TCC. Although there is disagreement throughout the relevant literature as to 
the degree of ttansnationality (de-territorialisation) and the exact composition of 
the TCC, the common denominator appears to be that the TCC integrates 
segments of national bourgeoisies that have a material interest in securing the 
conditions for capital accumulation on a global scale, which includes globalised 
production and the free flow of capital and services. Despite the common interest 
in driving global capitalism, the TCC is not a homogenous group, as intra-elite 
competition exists (e.g. trade conflicts) (Robinson, 2004a: 47; 2005: 6; Cox, 1996: 
111; Santos, 2002b: 6; Gill, 2008: 93-4; Jessop, 2008: 216). The shared ,-alues and 
norms that "underpin and interweave" with the structural power of transnational 
capital suggests speaking of a transnational capitalist 'culture', which has become 
institutionalised in a range of organisational forms and practices that hayc 
facilitated the establishment of a global regulatory ('disciplining,) goycrnancc 
structure, which includes the \Vorld Bank Group, L\IF, \\'TO, EU, OECD, 
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NAFTA, OAS, the Group of Seven/Eight (G-7/8) state apparatuses, and the 
European Roundtable of Industrialists (Hoogvelt, 2001: 148-55). The "historical 
congruence" between material forces, ideologies and institutions may allow 
speaking of a 'transnationl historical bloc', at the core of which Gill locates the 
Tee (2008: 60, 93, 126). Since inequality can be viewed as the essence of class 
antagonism, I shall next discuss Nancy Fraser's framework of justice for a 
glo balised world. 
A global (t'n )justice framework 
The various faces of injustice and power previously elaborated support Nancy 
Fraser's advocacy of a global rather than national-territorial approach to justice on 
one hand, and an extended analytical focus beyond the socio-economic to include 
the cultural and political, on the other. Fraser argues that the clear distinction of 
'domestic' from 'international' space of the I<eynesian-Westphalian political 
imagery would have to be superseded in consideration of the reality of 
transnational social processes and forces. This comprises not only the global 
economy (and finance), but the entire global governance structures (re)produced 
by the set of inter- and supranational institutions (2005: 71). In contrast to most 
models that limit notions of justice to distribution within a welfarist 
methodological nationalist framework (Fraser, 2005: 77; Patomaki, 2007), Fraser 
associates justice with "parity of participation", which requires 
social arrangements that permit all to participate as peers in social life. Overcoming 
injustice means dismantling institutionalized obstacles that prevent some people 
from participating on a par with others, as full partners in social interaction (Fraser, 
2005: 73). 
Therefore, a global justice framework analytically distinguishes between three 
reciprocally intertwined dimensions: the economic (distribution), the cultural 
(recognition), and the political (representation) (Table 1.1). The economic refers to 
the "economic ordering of society" that prevents people's full participation, i.e. the 
class structure in the sense of institutionalised economic mechanisms that 
systctnatically produce distributive injustice (Fraser, 2003: -tH). InjustlCcs include 
cxploitation (surplus appropriation for the benefit of others than thosc who 
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produce it), econonuc marginalisation and deprivation, while remedies entail 
redistribution from North to South, rich to poor, owners to \vorkers. Importantly, 
Fraser uses 'redistribution' as a generic term for political economic restructuring, 
which can be of two types: an cifJirmative strategy, associated with welfarist income 
and/ or wealth reallocations, which aim to increase the consumption share of the 
disadvantaged but leave the structural root causes for injustice untouched; or 
transformative remedies, i.e. radical economic restructuring historically associated 
with socialism, which would undermine class differentiation by altering the 
mechanisms that underlie and generate inequitable economic outcomes (including 
universalist social-welfare programmes, progressive taxation, a non-market public 
sector) (1995: 85; 2003: 13, 73-4). 
The cultural adds that people can also be prevented from interacting on equal terms 
by institutionalised relations or patterns of social, intersubjective subordination - a 
"status order" based on "cultural value", where the workings of social institutions 
impede parity along norms concerning gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nationality and 
'race' (Fraser, 2000: 113-14; 2003: 49). Misrecognition can be institutionalised 
through formal law, government policies and practices, or informally through 
social practices of civil society. As with redistribution, 'recognition' is a generic 
term that subsumes affltmative and trans formative remedies. The latter transform 
the cultural-valuational structure through deconstruction. That is, while affirmative 
recognition enhances eXlsnng status differentiations by revaluing deyalued 
identities in order to lncrease a group's self-esteem (e.g. 'women'; 'blacks'), 
trans formative recognition would deconstruct "symbolic oppositions" 
(dichotomies such as male/female or black/white) and destabilise boundaries 
between groups to facilitate regroupments by changing eycrybody's self-identity 
(Fraser, 1995: 83-4; 2003: 75). 
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Table 1.1 Global (In)Justice Analytical Framework 
Dimension Economic Cultural Political 
(Mal)Distribution (Mis)Recognition (Mis)Representation 
Class-based {relations of Social sta:us-based (relations Based on the Dolit cal 
production): economic ordering of recognition): peopie are constitution of society (:he 
~If society prevents enjoyment prevented fror1 in:eracling on na:ure o' :rle s:ate5 jur;scc,ion 
of full participation. equal :efMS by mstitutlOnalised and the decision rules that 
Problem Political economic s~rUC'Jral patterns of cultural value that structure contes:ation): 
of justice injustices include exploitation, effec:: mer relative standing as • Ordinari-oolitlcal: intra-
economic marginaLsation and social actors (actors' frame Misrepresentation 
deprivation. constitu::on as infer or, • Visfr3mi"G Who are the 
excluded, wholly other or sul)jects of justice? 
invisible). {boundarj'- setting). 
Cultural-valuational structural • Metapolitical: elr:e 
injustices include cultural monop:J1iSJ:ion of frame-
domrnation, non-recognition sating - the majority is 
and disrespect. excluded from participating 
in determining the division of 
poiitlcalspace 
~ Source. Developed from Fraser (2000; 2003: 200:J) 
Although distribution and recognition are implicitly political, as they are power-
laden, the political refers to who is entitled to a fair distribution and reciprocal 
recognition ("political membership"), and how claims to justice can be made and 
resolved or adjucated ("procedure"). The concept of framing is central, because it 
sets the boundaries of who is included, thus detennining who is a subject of justice, 
which connotes citizenship however defmed (see Chapter Four). As any claim or 
entitlement to social justice requires being included in the first place, the political 
becomes "the stage on which struggles over distribution and recognition are played 
out" (Fraser, 2005: 75). 
Representation depends on the political constitution of society, and injustice can 
occur at three levels: ftrstly, as ordinary-political misrepresentation, where political rules 
impede participation by some who are formally included, for instance through a 
particular electoral system such as majority vs proportional vote; secondly, as 
miiframing, where the boundaries of a community wrongly exclude some people, 
thereby completely negating them participation, or "the right to ha\'e rights" 
0\rendt cited in Fraser, 2005: 77). Under globalisation, misframing increasingly 
deftes justice due to the territorial state having ceased to be the primary unit of 
justice as the boundaries have shifted to the transnational (Fraser, 2005: 78). From 
this follows Fraser's third level, meta-political misrepresentation, \\"hich arises from the 
tTIonopolisation of frame-setting by states or transnational elites. In effect, those 
who are potentially harmed by the boundary-setting process are denied parity of 
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participation, as the creation of formal, democratic institutions where disputes 
about the 'who' could be aired and resolved are blocked. The yictims of "more 
powerful predator states" and "transnational private powers" - the majority of the 
world population - are deprived of mechanisms to challenge their oppressors, 
while the agents of global capitalist governance are "shielded from the reach of 
justice". The absence of such institutions, which would be necessary to overcome 
political injustice, reveals the inextricability of democracy and justice (Fraser, 2005: 
78, 85). 
Neither of the three dimensions of justice commits itself to anyone theory (cf 
Fraser, 1995: 71-2). Rather, Fraser's framework serves categorisation, and despite 
the analytical differentiation, redistribution, recognition and representation are 
dialectically intertwined: 
[T]he capacity to influence public debate and authoritative decision-making 
depends not only on formal decision rules but also on power relations rooted in the 
economic structure and the status order [ ... ] Thus maldistribution and 
misrecognition conspire to subvert the principle of equal political voice for every 
citizen, even in politics that claim to be democratic. But of course the converse is 
also true. Those who suffer from misrepresentation are vulnerable to injustices of 
status and class. Lacking political voice, they are unable to articulate and defend 
their interests with respect to distribution and recognition, which in turn exacerbates 
their misrepresentation (Fraser, 2005: 79n11). 
Consequently, democratising the process of frame-setting would redress meta-
political injustice. Here, ciffirmative politics of framing and their acceptance of the 
state-territorial principle of membership (as they only redraw the boundaries of 
existing states or create new ones, which in itself produces injustice) would haye to 
be supplemented by traniformative politics of framing. They would target the 
structural injustices that are located outside the state jurisdiction at the supra- and 
transnational levels, where social fascism originates, such as financial markets, 
governance structures, global corporate media and bio-politics (e.g. of climate and 
disease) (Fraser, 2005: 80-1). Fraser identifies (inter-/transnational) social 
movements as the primary actors in transformati\Te politics of framing, through 
which thc\, aim to redress the first-order injustices of maldistribution (or, rcsisting 
accumulation by dispossession), misrccogrutlon and ordinary-political 
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misrepresentation, the second-order injustices of misframing, and third-order 
meta-political misrepresentation (through which first-order political space is 
constituted). The latter refers to the 'how' of justice, and here the movements 
democratise the process of framing as they challenge the state and TCC monopoly 
to frame-setting in the transnational civil society and informal institutions, such as 
the World Social Forum, which could be prefigurations of new and formal 
institutions that may "translate transnational public opinion into binding, 
enforceable decisions". Complementing the "civil society track of transnational 
democratic politics" with a "formal institutional track" is the objective (Fraser, 
2005: 84-5). 
The value of Fraser's global justice framework lies in its significance for 
Venezuela's "revolutionary democracy". The chapters in Part II will argue that 
Venezuela's model of democracy simultaneously addresses all three dimensions of 
injustice. A democratisation of frame-setting is advanced through ALBA, under 
which states and social movements join in establishing formal institutions. As these 
are truly incipient processes and phenomena, I will only make tentative suggestions 
in this respect in the Conclusion of the thesis. However, there is clear evidence of 
the Bolivarian government redressing first- and second-order injustices by 
employment of both afflrmative and trans formative remedies in the transition to 
socialism. The groundwork for their analysis is provided by the following 
exploration of polyarchy promotion in LAC generally and Venezuela in particular. 
Promoting polyarchy 
The idea 
The political complement to global neo-liberal econoffilcs IS 'democracy 
promotion', a powerful ideological tool to drive the implementation of 'free' 
market policies (Robinson, 1996)13: the US-policy shift in the 1980s from 
supporting military dictatorships to promoting 'democracy' was to pre,"ent popular 
D .\Iso see Gills el a/ (1993), Frank (1993), Stiefel & \,\'olfe (1994: 5-11, 222) and 1 Ioogvclt (2001: 185, 192), 
on neo-imperialist aid conditionalities ('good governance', 'democracy' etc.), w}uch ;um to establtsh the 
precondirional structures for global capitalism in the targeted cOW1tnes. 
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democratic resistance movements to gaIn momentum agaInst global capitalist 
interests on the one hand, and to counter the occasional unpredictability of the 
installed dictators on the other. By permeating the political structures and the 
institutions of civil society of the targeted countries in order to control the electoral 
processes, it is not democracy in the sense of 'rule by the people' that is promoted, 
but polyarchy, or 'low-intensity democracy', where democracy is reduced to choice 
between competing fractions of the TCC. Building on Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony, i.e. rule by consent rather than by force, non-participatory elite 
polyarchy means "consensual domination" as the more viable option to 
dictatorships (Robinson, 1996; also Gills et al, 1993). 
Origin 
Robinson draws on Dahl's (1971: 8) concept of 'polyarchy', which Dahl thought of 
as being a "relatively" though "incompletely" democratised regime, meant to be 
"highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation". 'Inclusiveness' and 
'openness' refer to participation in a system of party-based political competition in 
processes of "free and fair elections", which are, however, as Dahl (1971: 1-5) 
concedes, only two out of a range of theoretical dimensions of democracy. Based 
on the premise that an extended suffrage would increase parliamentary 
representation of hitherto non- or under-represented groups, broadened 
participation together with political competition would continuously change the 
composition of the political leadership (Dahl, 1971: 20-1). 
Samuel P. Huntington (1989: 15) indicates that Dahl's Po!Jard!J concluded several 
decades of debate between two competing conceptualisations of 'democracy': as 
power/rule (cratoi) by the people (demos) on one hand, and Joseph A. Schumpeter's 
"economic" defInition of democracy on the other (Bottomore, 1976: xi). 
Schumpeter (1976[1942]: 250) dismisses what he calls "the classical doctrine" of 
"the will of the people" and "the common good", and with it citizens' capacity to 
(rationally) participate in political life. 14 Instead, by follo\\ing ~Iax \\'eber 
1,1 Schwnpeter defines "the classical doctrine" as ",that institutional .lrrangement for arnnng at polmcal. 
decisions which realizes the common good by making people Itself deCide Issues through the election 01 
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(1948[1918]), the "pluralist elitist model" (i\1acpherson, 1977), or "competitiye 
elitisim" (Held, 1987; 1996), conceives democracy as a "method" or "institutional 
arrangement" for arriving at political Qegislative and administrative) decisions 
analogous to the market in which different individuals and groups compete for the 
votes and political leadership ("competitive struggle"), as do enterprises for 
consumers (Schumpeter, 1976[1942]: 242, 269). Representative democracy, or 
"government approved by the people" rather than "government by the people", thus 
reduces democracy to "the opportunity of accepting or refusing the men who are 
to rule them" (Schumpeter, 1976[1942]: 246, 285; my italics). Huntington, in a 
polemicallegitimisation of polyarchy as the hegemonic conception of democracy, 
implicitly celebrates the replacement of critical (normative) discussion of 
democracy with problem-solving ones, and dictatorially postulates that democracy 
"has a useful meaning only when it is defined in institutional terms" (1989: 15).15 
Implications 
Robinson's seminal analysis counter-argues Dahl's pluralist assumption of 
polyarchy as supposedly de-concentrating power, diversifying the effective 
participation of citizens, and increasing the representation of interests in policy 
making (Dahl, 1971: 14). Party politics, however, render the sub-alterns 
unorganised and their interests unarticulated, and thus unrepresented, and "do not 
lead to genuine popular participation" as a "pluralism of the powerful" excludes 
the unorganised and those who lack wealth and thus power (Benello & 
Roussopoulos, 1972: 3-5; Gills et al, 1993: 25; Stolowicz, 2004: 178). Under elite 
polyarchy, a system's responsiveness to "all its citizens", which Dahl (1971: 2) 
states as a key characteristic of democracy, is not given. EYen when judged by its 
own criteria only, i.e. pluralist party politics, substantial programmatic differences 
individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will" (1976[1942]: 250). This is a simplification, as no 
such thing as the classical doctrine exists .. -\s several analysts argue, Schumpeter's characterisation turns out to 
be an amalgam ("confused mixture") of rather different models - especially developmental and protective 
democracy (examined in Chapter Four) - to construct a "straw man", rather than sernng sound analysis 
~facpherson, 1977: 85; Held, 1987: 171; Pateman, 1970: 17-18). 
15 Under neoliberalism, two derivatives of Schumpeter's conception ha\'e emerged, which both integrate 
I·Ia~·ek's idcolog)': the "legal democracy model", which refers to the rule of law for an indinJu~stic free 
market society; and "catalla~ .. y", which applies economic theory (rational choice) to the study ot polmed 
behaviourism (see Held, 1996; Cunningham, 2002: 101-22). :\either of the two shall be consIdered here U1 
more detail. 
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between political parties have virtually \ranished under TCC-formation (the 2nd face 
of power), and polyarchy has become a system of elite rule legitimated by carefully 
managed elections from which the subaltern majorities are excluded (Robinson, 
1996: 49; Stiefel & Wolfe, 1994: 23-4, 199). The introduction of some formal 
'democratic' procedures, while leaving intact political, economic and social 
structures from an authoritarian past, make polyarchy a new form of social control 
without bringing about fundamental changes in the established power imbalances 
(Gills et al, 1993: 3). In post-revolutionary Nicaragua, for instance, the restoration 
of elements of the pre-revolutionary status quo under liberal-right wing president 
Chamorro (1990-1996) was subsequently intensified and personified in the Aleman 
(1997 -2002) and Bolanos (2002-2007) presidencies, who both had been 
protagonists in the Somoza dictatorship (see Arnove, 1982; 1986; 1994; Robinson, 
1992a; Harris, 1998; Everingham, 1998; Muhr, 2008). Similarly, after Chile's 
"transition to democracy" of 1989/1990, ex-dictator Pinochet remained life-
senator and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces for almost another decade, 
self-granted through his 1980 constitution which is, despite modifications, still in 
place today (Republic of Chile, 1980; Valenzuela, 1989). Chile's constitutionally-
anchored neoliberal regime appears rock-steady under Michelle Bachelet, who 
entered office in early 2006 as the fourth post-Pinochet president and the second 
socialist-rooted one (Lander, 2007). As Gramsci, in the Lyon Theses, aptly 
analysed, and as Poulantzas (2000[1978]: 264) confltms, when hegemony fails, 
fascist-type reaction on part of the "bourgeois democrats" looms in the effort of 
preventing the reorganisation of the working class. The bourgeois 'democrats' 
safely return to power after society has been cleared from the threat of class 
conflict (Alatri cited in Cammett, 1967: 176). 
Macpherson ascribes the failure of the universal suffrage to bring about 'working 
class' government to the instrumentality of the party system, as parties are under 
the pressure of haying to compromise to represent the "common good" in the 
effort of securing majority support. As a mediator between conflicting class 
interests, the party system blurs class issues and defuses potential conflict. E,'cl1 if 
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the working class was to constitute a numerical majority (przeworski in Carnoy, 
1984: 32), it is not a homogenous, "single-minded" class, but composed of 
individuals with a variety of interests (Macpherson, 1977: 66-71). This problematic 
is certainly inherent in the non-essentialist conception of class previously explored, 
and Chapter Three will show how the formation of a 'revolutionary class' in 
Venezuela and LAC may possibly overcome this constraint. 
Robinson shows that polyarchy provides a more effective legitimisation of existing 
inequalities than authoritarianism, and functions as a mechanism for suppressing 
popular aspirations for more thoroughgoing democratisation - not only political, 
but social, economic and cultural (1996: 51). In fact, Hayek (in 1960) (in Held, 
1987: 250) bans concerns for social justice from the 'New Right' 'democracy' 
agenda altogether by declaring as coercion any legislation that would enforce (re-
)distribution. Huntington follows suit by declaring political democracy as "clearly 
compatible" with wealth and income inequality, as "[h]igh levels of economic 
equality" would inevitably go hand in hand with "extremely high levels of political 
coercion" (1989: 20). Huntington virtually oudaws challenging class dominance: 
"The maintenance of democratic politics and the reconstruction of the social order 
are fundamentally incompatible" (1989: 24). This provides an explanation for why 
Venezuela is under incessant attack for supposedly being "undemocratic", 
"dictatorial", or "terrorist": 
In its Parsonian-Schumpeterian version, the polyarchic definition of democracy is 
equated with the stability of the capitalist order. By definitional fiat, power is 
exercised in the general welfare and any attempt to change the social order is a 
pathological challenge to democracy (Robinson, 1996: 51). 
To some extent, Gills et a!s (1993) "low-intensity democracy" preceded Robinson's 
analysis. Other scholars have implicidy andlor explicidy integrated the concept: 
Stiefel & Wolfe (1994), Santos (2002a: 293; 462) .Ayritzer & Santos (2003), and 
Peter Wilkin (2003) in his "neoliberal" or "corporate democracy", which cyokes 
Santos' social fascism, as "a form of corporate government that reinforccs priyatc 
power against human rights and needs" (\V'ilkin, 2003: 655). I shall now turn to the 
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core issue of a discussion of polyarchy, which is the antagonism of capitalism and 
democracy. 
The antagonism of capitalism and democrary 
Liberalism and democracy are not as inter-dependent as suggested by the familiar 
expressions 'liberal-democratic' or 'democratic-liberal'. Rather, while the antique 
concept of democracy refers to a possible mode of government (counter-posed 
with autocratic forms such as monarchy and oligarchy), Bobbio argues that 
liberalism is a modern theory, or conception of the state which, in difference to the 
absolute or social state, conceives the state as having limited functions and powers 
(2005[1988]: 1). The individual, which the liberal, juridical state takes as its starting 
point, is thus freed from restraints of established institutions. 'Freedom', however, 
is primarily defined with respect to property and economic interaction, rooted in 
capitalist relations of production and individual rights (M:acpherson, 1977: 21; 
Bobbio, 2005 [1988]: 15-19). As Carnoy aptly states, the "security of property" 
becomes the "most important function" of the liberal state (1984: 30), and it is the 
defence of private ownership of the means of production that reveals its partiality 
(Held, 1987: 114). And, as Colin Hay adds, the state's "maintenance functions" for 
capitalism include the provision of infrastructure, military defence, a legal system 
and state intervention to mediate class struggle (2006: 64-5). 
That liberalism and democracy do not necessarily accompany each other is most 
evident in the fact that in modern western societies the ideology and institutions of 
liberal individualism were firmly established before they became formally 
democratised, as originally political rights and participation were strictly limited to 
the propertied classes (M:acpherson, 1977: 23; Held, 1987; 1996; Bobbio, 
2005[1988]). The elites' fear of universal suffrage reigned right into the 20th century 
and, according to l'v1acpherson, the democratic franchise was only gradually 
introduced from the early 19th century on, after the ruling classes became 
increasingly convinced that the poor would (could) not use their \Totes against the 
bourgeois state (1977: 37-43). The hegemonic ideology of \,\'estern liberal 
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democracy interprets the historical process of democratisation largely as the 
"product of evolution", which permits downplaying the class struggles and 
revolutions necessary to effect these qualitative transformations (Amin, 1993; Gills 
et ai, 1993: 32). Democracy is not the "logical outcome" of capitalism, as 
Schumpeter (amongst others) attempts to make believe (1976[1942])16. As E.P. 
Thompson (1968) has shown, democracy has been fought for by social (working 
class) movements in opposition to their exploitation by the liberal state and capital. 
Through law, the class struggle has been displaced from the economic 
(dispossession of the worker from the means of production) into the political 
('democracy,) sphere, in which every member of society is treated as an 'individual' 
separated from their respective production-based classes. On those grounds, the 
state claims to be free from class interests and to equally represent the collective 
will of capitalists and workers (poulantzas in Carnoy, 1984: 109, 114-18). 
In fact, democracy constitutes a major threat to capitalism. Santos argues that the 
"historical tension" between capitalism and democracy derives from the 
democratic struggles for expanding (social and economic) rights, and thus gaining 
some limited social redistribution by the welfare state, on one hand, and the view 
of profit-driven capitalism of any kind of redistribution as expropriation, on the 
other (2004: 153; 2005: 59-60). Polyarchy, as the liberal and neoliberal trivialisation 
of democracy, has neutralised democracy's redistributive capacity and thus appears 
to facilitate a 'reconciliation' of democracy and capitalism, rather than having to 
sacrifice the latter to the former (Santos, 2002a: 453, 462; 2004: 153). However, 
polyarchy promotion has not resolved the contradiction between capitalism and 
democracy, because of the disjuncture between political and social regime, i.e. the 
rise of social fascism (Santos, 2005: 60). Consequently, counter-hegemonic struggle 
requires the mobilisation of a hegemonic tool such as law for counter-hegemonic 
use (Santos, 2005: 60). 
16 "Historically, the modem democracy rose along with capitalism, and in causal connectlon with it. But the 
same holds true for democratic practice [ ... ]" (Schumpeter, 19:6[1942]: 296). 
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Dahl, in A Preface to Economic Democrary, published almost 15 years after Po!JantJ', 
recognised that under "corporate capitalism" interest groups can neither be treated 
as equal, nor is the state a neutral arbiter among different interests (Held, 1996: 
216): the great inequality in resources and therefore power, produced by the 
"unlimited" accumulation of economic resources ("economic liberty"), contains 
"severe violations of political equality and hence of the democratic process" (Dahl, 
1985: 50-1, 60). Dahl, arguing from a neo-pluralist position, however, stopped 
short of dealing with the political implications of his analysis - namely, class 
struggle and redistribution of power (Bachrach & Botwinick, 1992: 116-7). What 
Peter Bachrach & Aryeh Botwinick call the "structural mobilization of bias" refers 
to the preferential role of private corporations within liberal power structures, 
which has led to a tremendous concentration of capital and corporate veto power 
over governments through corporate elite control of capital investment allocation 
(1992: 49, 65). For example, in 1998, the assets of the world's top three billionaires 
surpassed the combined gross domestic product (GDP) of the 43 least developed 
countries (600 million people) (UNDP in Robinson, 2004a: 153); and, in 1999, 48 
out of the world's 100 biggest economies were MNCs/TNCs17, which meant for 
Venezuela - then LAC's third-largest economy after Brazil and Mexico - that the 
revenues of companies such as General Motors, Wal-mart or Exxon Mobil each 
exceeded the country's GDP by around 70%.18 
The discussion in this sub-section on democracy and capitalism has supported the 
argument that historical structures are not neutral: for some (individuals, 
institutions, states, etc.), they are a form of power, while for others they are a 
constraint to differing extents (Gill, 2008: 25, 45). Nicaragua is less powerful than 
the US. The structural power of capital implies a hierarchy in the neoliberal order, 
as those at the top exercise their power to influence policy development, through a 
mechanism that has come to be referred to as "new constitutionalism": a "quasi-
legal restructuring" that shifts the rights of citizenship and representation to capital 
17 \,\lulc TNCs operate "from their home bases across national borders", ~[\;Cs ~lre "established between a 
munber of countries" and operate "in accordance \vith prescribed agreements" Oudge uted U1 .\rcher, 2001: 
40). 
111 Source: htt:p:!l\\,\\,\\·.clfodorg.uk/polic.yltop100.shtml (retrieved 14/02/2003). 
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and attempts to make "liberal democratic capitalism" the only model for future 
national development (Gill, 2008: 138-39, 144). To Paul Cammack (2007a), new 
constitutionalism is a form of "meta-governance" through which regional and 
global capitalist institutions aim "to re-orient state agency" in pursuit of a politics 
of global competitiveness in a wide range of (social) policy areas. However, the 
institutions of global governance do not operate in isolation from states (i.e. 
'above' states), but through the agency of the states, and the two cannot simply be 
counter-posed (Cammack, 2007a; also see Jessop, 2008: 218-24, on "multiscalar 
metagovernance"). I will return to this argument in Chapter Three, with respect to 
revolutionary, 'transnational war of position'. 
Po!Jarchy-promotion in LA C 
As Robinson (1992a; 1996) and Golinger (2005) illustrate, CIA, NED, USAID, 
and US Information Agency (USIA), are among those subversive US-government 
foreign policy tools designed to penetrate civil society in targeted countries. Forms 
of US State Department intervention include anti-government propaganda and 
demagogy, de stabilisation, 'low intensity warfare' (terrorism), coups, installation of 
dictatorships and, finally, "democracy promotion". The commonsensical equation 
of democracy with polyarchy is driven and reinforced by bourgeois organic 
intellectuals, such as Pastor (1989) and Diamond et al (1989). Funded by TCC 
organisations, as stated in the prefaces to the respective books, first and foremost 
the NED, history is being rewritten by systematically obfuscating and downplaying 
US-intervention and the accompanying atrocities. 19 While some writers, such as 
Diamond et al (1989), explicitly refer to Dahl (1971) and Schumpeter (1976[1942]) 
in their conceptualisations of democracy, others, such as ex-US-President Carter, 
only implicitly embrace the concept (Carter, 1989: xvi). Carter, by many positively 
remembered for his supposed human rights promotion, in fact, drives a rather 
devious dissociation of social and economic rights from human rights, as he 
includes in his human rights category civil and political rights exclusively. He states: 
"Let me first discuss the relationship between democracy and human rights and 
19 For instance, Valenzuela (1989: 188) downplays the systematic murder of tem of thousands of Chileam 
under Pinochct as "some cases [otl death". 
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then between democracy and economic and social rights", and "[d]emocracy is not 
just a mechanism for protecting human rights; it is also a framework to permit 
people to decide which economic and social rights should be protected and how" 
(Carter, 1989: xv, xvii). 
While Carter (1989: xvi) laments the "plague of repression" and "murder" that had 
"descended upon Latin America" at the time he took office in 1977, his role in 
facilitating such crimes under his presidency is more controversial than commonly 
stated. With respect to Nicaragua, for instance, the Carter administration supported 
the Somoza dictatorship until shortly before its fmal defeat in July 1979, with the 
objective of establishing "Somocismo without Somoza" - that is, to preserve the 
system including Somoza's death squads through an invasion of OAS-
'peacekeeping' forces, as had successfully been done in the occupation of the 
Dominican Republic in 1965 (see Walker, 1985: 20-1; 2003; Robinson, 1992a). 
Moreover, Carter's 'human rights' policy was "the direct predecessor" of the more 
overt 'democracy promotion' that followed under President Reagan (Gills et ai, 
1993: 8).20 The so-called Linowitz Report - published at around the time of Dahl's 
Po!Jarci?Y - guided the Carter administration's policies and emphasised that military 
dictatorships and human rights crimes may not only be detrimental to US interests, 
but may destabilise capitalism itself (Robinson, 1996: 148). As Carter himself states, 
a "policy on terrorism", as advocated by sectors of the Reagan administration with 
the aim to reverse Carter's 'human rights' and 'democracy' (dis)course, was put on 
hold (until 11 September 2001) in favour of a Democrats-Republicans "bipartisan 
consensus" on polyarchy-promotion (Carter, 1989: xvii). 
US imperialism in LAC under the Monroe Doctrine manifested itself in an inter-
American system, or Pan-_Americanism. A series of Inter-American Conferences 
from 1889 on, as well as agreements such as the Inter-American Treaty of 
Reciprocal Assistance (1947), led to the constitution of the O.\S in Bogota in 1948 
(Ortega Diaz, 2007: 51-6; Piyidal, 2006: 189-90; Payne, 1996). Under the leadership 
20 See also, for instance, \'alenzuela (1989), also drawing on the "human rights abuses" discourse. 
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of the successive Bush and Clinton administrations (1988-2000), the hegemonic 
project experienced a "neo-imperialist" re-definition in the decade following the 
Cold War, when 'Pan-Americanism' was complemented by a global governance 
regime that has included NAFTA, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, from 
which the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) was expected to evolve21 , and 
the OAS Inter-American Democratic Charter (IDC) (Suarez Salazar, 2007; Dieterich, 
2004). The IDC, ratified on 11 September 2001, had been proposed at the 3rd 
Summit of the Americas, whose Declaration of Quebec CZ(y (2001) reiterates the 
twinning of polyarchy and neoliberalism by restricting 'democracy' to 
"representative democracy" and urging for the implementation of the FTAA by 
"no later than December 2005". 
Subsequently, in the absence of a binding definition of 'democracy' under 
international law (Nowak, 2003: 45), the IDC has become a key reference in Inter-
American treaties and declarations, and can therefore be considered an important 
hegemonic tool. In spite of the attempt to create an association between 
representative and participatory democracy (para. 5, Art. 6), 'representative' 
dominates the Charter and the party- and civil-society-group-based pluralist model 
is established as the only legitimate one: 
[s]olidarity among and cooperation between American states require the political 
organization of those states based on the effective exercise of representative 
democracy [ ... J. The effective exercise of representative democracy is the basis for 
the rule of law [ ... J. The strengthening of political parties and other political 
organizations is a priority for democracy. (IDC, 2001). 
Most importantly, the Charter confmns previously established mechanisms of 
outside intervention for "the preservation of the democratic system" (Art. 18) 
which, depending on interpretation, could include situations where popular 
demand for participation other than in elections becomes too strong. Finally, 
IDC's ~Article 27 sums up the repertoire of neoliberal/polyarchic 'democracy' as 
"good governance, sound administration, democratic values, and the strengthening 
21 The FT.\A was fonnall), created at the 1st Swnmit of the .\mericas, ~fiami, December 1994, when 34 
L\C heads of govenunent and state agreed on negotiating FT.~\ \\;thin ten I years Cuba was excluded by 
the US under Clinton's preSIdency. See http://ww\\..sU(lll11lt-amencas.org/en~· mLlll1lsummlthtm 
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of political institutions and civil society organisations". The following, and final 
section of this chapter, analyses polyarchy in Venezuela with respect to the 
conditions it created for counter-hegemonic reaction. 
Polyarchy in Venezuela's '4th Republic' 
Robinson (2005b) distinguishes between two categories of polyarchy promotion: 
either, governments disfavourable to global capitalist interests are overthrown to 
install TCC regimes; or, in countries where the TCC is already in power, political 
intervention programmes (e.g. NED) aim to bolster the neo-liberal elite and their 
hegemony in civil society. Simultaneously, popular, nationalist, revolutionary and 
other progressive forces are isolated and discredited. The latter strategy was applied 
in Venezuela, whose "transition to democracy" in 1958 constituted an important 
precursor to large-scale polyarchy promotion: the Punto Fifo Pad, signed prior to 
the 1958 elections between the three major parties of the day - Democratic Action 
(AD), Independent Electoral Political Organising Committee (COPEI), and 
Democratic Republican Union (URD) - installed coalition-based elite consensus 
politics, from which the Left, especially the Communist Party, was systematically 
excluded (Levine, 1989).22 In an attempt to build up Venezuela as an alternative to 
revolutionary Cuba, "strong" material support from the US, Venezuelan business 
elites and the government itself, combined with state terrorism against oppositional 
forces throughout the 1960s/7023, ensured the successful implementation and 
consolidation of polyarchy, especially from 1968 on: while that year still nine major 
parties and many minor groups competed in the national election, with none 
22 The Declaration of Independence on 5 July 1811 fotulded the 1 st Republic. The 2nd Republic followed 
with Bolivar's re-conquest of Caracas in 1813. The Congress of Angostura (today Ciudad Bolivar) installed 
the 3rd Republic on 11th April 1817. The 4th Republic started with Jose Antonio Paez' regime in 1830 and 
lasted tultil 15 December 1999, when CBRV was ratified by popular referendum (Gott, 2005: 135-48; 
Pividal, 2006: 97). Commonly, however, the 4th Republic is associated with the Punto Fijo Pact of 1958. 
\'enezuela's "transition to democracy" started with the fall of the authoritarian regime w1der the leadership 
of ~Iarcos Perez Jimenez, on 23 January 1958. Prior to Perez Jimenez coup d'etat in ~o\'ember 1948, 
Venezuela had been governed by AD for three years. Under Perez Jimenez, opposition politicians such as 
Carlos ;\ndres Perez, who later became president, had been exiled (see \"iciano & ~Iartinez, 2001: 3-/). 
2\ .\n estimated 12.000 opponents were tortured, murdered or made clisappear between 1960 and 1993. :\ 
specLiI commission formed under the Bolinrian government and led by then \ice-presldent Jose VICente 
Rangel (Bolivarian ;\ssociation against Silence and Oblivion) has been u1Vestigating the ~tate tnromt acts 
(Rangel, 2004; also Diario Vea, 08/10/2005). Rangel has ?een foreign nuruster (1":99-2001), the first C1\ilian 
defense minister in \' enezuelan history (2001-2002), and \'lce-presldent (2002-200 ) 
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gaining more than 30%, thereafter "electoral dispersion" was successfully abolished 
as the two "broadly similar" parties AD and COPEI became the dominant players, 
together accumulating 80% of the electorate (Levine, 1989: 260, 271). While URD 
disappeared in the late 1970s (Levine, 1989: 264), AD and COPEI would manage 
to continue alternating national government power until Chavez' election in 1998. 
As the Spanish constitutional rights experts Roberto Viciano Pastor and Ruben 
Martinez Dalmau (2001: 27) state in their analysis of the Bolivarian constituent 
process of 1998-2000, the parties' unconstitutional control over public 
administration generated "one of the most corrupt public administrations 
worldwide": 
Mia their oligarchies and leadership, the political parties have, with accuracy, 
made sure that the alternation of governments would not in any way affect the 
certain continuity of the political management of the system that they imposed. [ ... J 
What it represents are not the people or the communities, but the parties (Brewer-
Carras, 1992, cited in Viciano & MartInez, 2001: 26-7). 
Popular political participation was channelled within an organisational structure 
controlled by the oligarchy, i.e. "the political parties, the unions, the organised 
economic sectors, the professional societies, university groups" (ex-President 
Betancourt, 1962, cited in Levine, 1989: 258). Fourth Republic Venezuela became a 
reliable US-client state, both with respect to oil supply and for regional 
intervention, for instance against Sandinista Nicaragua (Robinson, 1996: 180; 
2005b; Golinger, 2005: 43; Hellinger, 2003: 32). 
The crisis of legitimacy into which the 4th Republic system had entered by the 
1980s primarily originated in the economic sphere, manifested itself in the social, 
and intensified as the political regime became increasingly questioned (Viciano & 
Martinez, 2001: 47). The unsustainability of the oil rentier ecomony-driven 
modernisation doctrine (puerta, 1992), the breakdown of the import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) model (Lopez ~faya, 2005: 527), massiye capital flight and 
increased indebtedness, fuelled the so-called 'black Friday' (18 February 1983), 
when a drastic devaluation of the national currency (the bolivar) sealed the end of 
the 1970s oil boom and signalled the ideological crisis from which the 4th Republic 
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never recovered (Hellinger, 2003: 27; World Bank cited in Green, 2003: 29). 
According to income-based estimates, between 1975 and 1988, structural 
impoverishment grew from 33% to 54%, and critical poverty from 13% to 22% 
(Riutort, 1999). A "new social consciousness", rather than a disinterest in politics, 
explains the steady decline of popular identification with political parties, from 
48,7% in 1973 to 29,8% in 1993 and 22,7% in 1998. In 1991, 65% of Venezuelans 
considered parties as "useless in this country" (Viciano & Martinez, 2001: 48, 86). 
The discreditation of party politics became reflected in rising Yoter abstention in 
national elections - from an average of below 15% between 1958-83 to 20% in 
1988 and to 40% in 1993 (Mascareiio, 2000: 29). While in 1984 almost a quarter of 
the population (23,9%) would have supported a coup d'etat against the bipartisan 
regime (Viciano & Martinez, 2001: 48), street protests were met with growing 
repression and criminalisation, which reached a record high under Carlos Andres 
Perez' second presidency (1989-1993) (Lopez Maya, 2005: 527-30). With reference 
to public opinion and personalities of academic, political and social life, Viciano & 
Martinez (2001: 48) sum up that the state under the rule of law had been abolished. 
The 'Caracazo' and the 1992 military rebellion 
Fourth Republic "complacent consensus politics" abruptly ended with the 
'Caracazo' of 27 January 1989, when in Caracas and other major cities the first 
spontaneous popular rebellion against the implementation (rather than the 
consequences) of neoliberalism in Latin America erupted in reaction to a 
disproportionate public transport price hike (Ellner, 2003; I<ornblith, 1998: 1-17). 
Ten days earlier, when entering office, president Perez broke with his electoral 
campaign promises and announced the country's subjugation to Washington 
Consensus adjustment (Hellinger, 2003: 31). The hopes that had been created 
among the popular and lower middle strata, that Perez return to power would 
mean a revival of Venezuela's 'golden' era, which Perez first presidency (19~ 4-79) 
symbolised, were shattered when Perez ordered the army to suppress the rebellion, 
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which cost between 300 (official sources) and 1000-2000 lives (independent 
sources) (see K.ornblith, 1998: 3; Gott 2005: 42).24 
By the time of the Caracazo, Colonel Chavez had for over a decade been building 
up a small conspiratory, "kind of Bolshevik" group (Chavez, 2007b: 23) within the 
armed forces, which since 1983 had called itself the Bolivarian Revolutionary 
Movement (Moviemiento Bolivariano Revolucionario, MBR-20025). Taken by surprise by 
the popular rebellion, the group was not in a position to support the people, and 
only subsequently accelerated their revolutionary efforts. Perez' order, which 
obliged middle rank army officers to suppress the popular sectors to whom they 
themselves pertained, caused a "crisis of identity" within the armed forces, which 
subsequently strengthened the subversive movement (Bonilla-Molina & Troudi, 
2005: 103). As the fltst of two attempts to topple the government in 1992 and "in 
tune with the popular mood" (Raby, 2006: 232), the military uprising under 
Chavez' leadership on 4 February 1992 cannot simply be portrayed as a 
conventional military COUp.26 As MBR-200 would argue with reference to Articles 
132 and 250 of the 1961 constitution, they pursued a restoration of democracy 
against an illegitimate government that had permanently violated the constitution 
and the state under the rule of law (Chavez, 2005; Viciano & Martinez, 2001: 69; 
D'Elia, 2006: 196). However, what had been planned as a joint military-civilian 
uprising turned into an unsuccessful, merely military rebellion due to a number of 
mistakes and failures, such as poor communication and a lack of trust of the 
military insurgents in the civilian forces (pereira Almao, 2004: 64-6). 
What goes often unnoticed is that the rebels' argumentation finds support In a 
number of MBR-200 position papers from around the time of the uprising: the 
2-1 On 27 February 2007, the National Assembly declared the day of the uprising the '~atlOnal Day of 
Popular Power and Against the Violation of Human Rights'. In the parliamentary session, the fugitive Carlos 
Andres Perez was identified as the primary responsible for the massacre (.\B~, 27/02/2007). 
25 '200' refers to Boli,'ar's 200lh birthday. ,\fBR-200 founding members were Cha.Yez,jesus Ernesto Urdaneta 
Hernandez and Felipe ;\costa Carles. Acosta Carles was shot during the Cara(a;:p, allegedly assassmated by 
the state security forces (pereira ;\lmao, 2004; Viciano & ~lartinez, 2001: 65-8). 
~() TIle second attempt (27 November 1992) is ofless historical significance (see Gott, 2005). 
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Plan de Operaciones 'Ezequiel Zamora" (1991)27, the Programme of the Revolutionary 
Government [Programa de Gobierno Revolucionario] (4 February 1992), the How to get out of 
the L.al?Yrinth [Como Salir del L.aben·nto] (September 1992), and a document from mid-
1992 called We rose for the Constitution [Nos alzamos por la Constitucion]. Constitutional 
reform had been discussed in Venezuela since the mid-/late 1980s and, reportedly, 
MBR-200's post-rebellion objective was to convene a national constituent 
assembly to draft a new constitution (Sonntag & Maingon cited in J\Iarapacuto, 
2005: 192-93; Lopez Maya, 2003: 81). Although the legal mechanism of revocation 
was only introduced under Chavez in the 1999 CBRV, from prison MER-200 
demanded a recall referendum against Perez. The government, on their part, had 
acknowledged the need for constitutional reform and set up a Special Bicameral 
Commission in 1989, without ever producing any results. Consequently, rather 
than achieving a re-legitimisation of the regime, the fruitless reform attempts and 
their ultimate suspension undermined the political stability and the legitimacy of 
the 1961 constitution (I<ornblith, 1998: 109-11; Viciano & Martinez, 2001: 56,81). 
In order to preserve the system, Perez was "sacrificed" via impeachment on 
grounds of corruption (Lopez in Viciano & Martinez, 2001: 72), making way for 
interim president Ram6n Jose Vehlsquez (1993/1994), followed by Rafael Caldera 
(1994-1998). Like Perez, Caldera had previously governed (1969-1974), and was 
also elected on an explicitly anti-neoliberal platform (Ellner, 2003; Marquez, 2003). 
Caldera challenged some entrenched postitions - by leaving COPEI, the party he 
himself had founded; by rejecting the elite claim that MBR-200 had pursued the 
assassination of Perez; and by releasing Chavez from prison in March 1994. 
However, he abandoned his electoral promise of reversing Perez' neoliberal 
policies, which further deepened the crisis of hegemony (Viciano & j\lartinez, 
2001: 84-9). The J\IBR-200, which only had about 1000 members in February 
1992, started to grow and abandoned clandestinity after Chayc;;:' release from 
prison, as units in cities and villages were established (pereira .\lmao, 2004). Crucial 
27 Source: Plan 
h t 1:. / w\\"\\". Llchira. 
15/08/:2007). 
de Estada/ 200..f-JOOB. Anleftdtntu, 
(retncyed 
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to Chavez' popularity was his integrity in the moment of defeat on -+ February 
1992, which turned him into a popular hero: after delivering himself, he got a one-
minute appearance on TV granted to call on his comrades to surrender and thus 
avoid further bloodshed. There, he articulated the famous "for now" [bor ahora] 
(which refers to the unachieved objectives) and assumed full responsibility for the 
operation.28 A few days later, the right-wing daily El Nacional - one of today's 
fiercest opposition papers - reported that Chavez had been the first public person 
in Venezuela to take on the full responsibility for a failed political action (cited in 
Puerta, 1992: 11). Similarly, El Diario de Caracas praised and published a poster of 
Chavez, which was cause for the government to confiscate the entire edition 
(puerta, 1992: 11). 
Neoliberal 'decentralisation' 
To re-legitimate the state and party politics, a political-administrative 
decentralisation process was implemented from 1989 on, which essentially 
consisted in a territorial deconcentration of central power to lower levels of the 
state apparatus. Its unquestionable merit was the introduction of direct, universal 
and secret elections of state representatives at the sub-national levels, who up to 
then had been appointed by the central power-holders. Opposition representation 
increased in the National Assembly and other (mainly municipal) public offices, of 
which Caracas mayor Arist6bulo IstUriz (1992-1996) of the left-wing La CausaR 
(The Radical Cause) deserves particular mentioning.29 However, as part and parcel 
of Washington Consensus politics, 'decentralisation' was a transnational project 
designed to save and modernise the oligarchic power and to integrate in the elite 
new social groups that would implement the neoliberal model and insert the 
country in global capitalism (Robinson, 2004b). Venezuelan sociologist Orlando 
Albornoz conf1tll1s that the ideological praxis of consensus prevailed due to a "re-
issued Punto Fijo Pact", where the hitherto 'progressive' forces, such as the 
l\Iovement to\,vards Socialism (1.\loviemiento al Socialismo, ;\L \S), allied with the 
211 Ch,lvez' brief speech is reproduced in Gott (2005: 67). 
29 IstUriz' municipal government (unsuccessfully) attempted to implement partICIpatory democratic 
mechanisms (see Goldfrank, 211(4). IstUriz left LI G1IIJaR in 1997 and co-founded PI:f7.1 Pard TodoJ 
(Fatherland For All). He was education minister under Chavez from 2001 to 20(r. 
Chapter One 
-7 
reactionary-conservative sectors (Albornoz, 1999: 156; 'Viciano & :\fartinez, 2001: 
91). 
Under Washington Consensus structural adjustment, the social contradictions 
intensified (Lopez Maya & Lander, 2000: 230). Macro-economically, the historical 
oil dependency prevailed, and external debt and inflation increased, accompanied 
by ongoing devaluation of the national currency (Battaglini, 2000); politically, 
federal states' fiscal dependency continued, and citizen participation and trust in 
the political system remained absent (Mascareiio, 2000); and, social polarisation 
aggravated. By 1997, income-based poverty had reached 67%, and critical poverty 
36%. The middle class shrunk from 57% in 1975 to 44% in 1988 and to 31% in 
1997 (Riutort, 1999). By 1998, income distribution had deteriorated to the 1970 
level, when the poorest fifth of Venezuelans received 3% of income, compared to 
53-54% of the richest quintile (World Bank, 1979; 2003a).30 
Some conclusions 
This chapter has established a theoretical, and to some extent contextual, 
framework that facilitates analysing the Bolivarian revolution as a counter-
hegemonic globalisation project. Establishing hegemony and constructing a 
hegemonic bloc, as Gill sums up, requires more than simply spreading the ideas of 
the ruling class in a particular time and space. It requires persuasion and relatively 
legitimate forms of rule, specific material potentials, ideas and institutions, and has 
to encompass a whole way of life (2008: 14). Importantly, social forces shaped by 
relations of production are responsible for the rise and demise of hegemonic order 
(Cox, 1981: 141-44). If hegemony means a structure of stable and unquestioned 
,ralues and understandings "about the nature of order", which "appears most 
actors as the natural order" (Cox, 1996: 151) and in the "general interest" (Santos, 
2002a: 459), counter-hegemony \'vould "offer new understandings and practices 
.l!l Poverty statistics differ according to source and method. \,'ith the exception of the \,'orld Bank (21)(1~:. 
which st~tes a decline of individual poverty (below US1/day) from 31.3°'0 in 1989 to 15% in 1998, othn 
estimates oscillate around the figures stated in the text (CEP.\L, 2000; C~DP, 20Ll(); Feres, 2!lnl). 
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capable of replacing the dominant ones and thus of offering a ne,,' common 
sense" (Santos & Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005: 18). 
'Power' has emerged as a key concept, which I approached from different 
complementary angles: coercion and consent (Lukes), state power (poulantzas), 
class power and the structural power of capital, and its contestation through 
collective, emergent power in particular spatial and temporal configurations (Sayer). 
Analytically, a major benefit of a globalisation theory approach lies in its 
recognition of multiple-level, inter- and trans-scalar processes, which involve a de-
and re-territorialisation of power. Based on this, Part II of the thesis, especially 
Chapters Four and Six, will develop the argument that the Bolivarian revolution is 
re-scaling state power in the construction of the socialist, "community state": 
downward to the organised society, and upward to the regional and global scales. 
This way, as will be seen, the revolution drives a comprehensive justice agenda in 
all three dimensions of Fraser's global justice framework: economic, cultural and 
political. 
During the 1980s, the US-strategy shifted from coerCIve power to consensual 
power. In reality, however, the two are not strictly separable as different 
mechanisms may be combined: polyarchy, human rights, neoliberal economics, 
military repression and state terrorism. However, as the Venezuelan case shows, 
hegemony is not a cohesive force, but "rife with contradictions and subject to 
struggle" (Carnoy, 1984: 70). In Venezuela, the detachment of the masses from the 
political parties from the early 1980s on supports the notion of a "crisis of 
hegemony", accompanied by an increasing supersession of leadership (hegemony) 
by dominance (coercion) (cf Carnoy, 1984: 78). In the three years preceding 
Chavez' election, between 1995 and 1998, the percentage of Venezuelans favouring 
radical change grew from 51 % to 63°0 (Consultores 21 cited in Hellinger, 2003: 
35). 
Nc\'cltheless, for several decades bourgeois orgaruc intellectuals have upheld 
"Venezuelan exceptionalism" and constructed the myth of the -l-th Republic as 
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Latin America's "oldest and most stable mass democracy in South America" 
(Levine, 1989: 247; also see Ellner, 2003; and Hellinger, 2003).31 Contemporary 
efforts to uphold the myth include McCoy & Myers' (2004: ix) compilation of \\'hat 
essentially are TCC 'obituaries' of 4th Republic supposedly "functioning 
democracy".32 McCoy and Myers, for instance, claim that 5th Republic Venezuela 
"is less open and less pluralistic than its predecessor", as the system is steering 
towards a mysterious "hybrid regime" which - interestingly - "combines elements 
of pluralism and authoritarianism, of representative and direct democracy, and of 
capitalism and statism" (2004: 3). Even if this was analytically correct, one is 
tempted to ask - "So what?". More importantly, equating democracy with "Dahl's 
notion of polyarchy" (McCoy & Myers, 2004: 3) demonstrates the importance of 
resuming the "major ideological battle" of defining 'democracy' (Gills et al, 1993: 3) 
- a battle that Huntington (1989) had unilaterally declared over. Prior to 
elaborating how Venezuela and LAC have taken up the challenge, I introduce the 
critical case study methodology that has allowed me to research counter-
hegemonic globalisation. 
31 The realist notion of 'exceptionalism' was underpinned by Venezuela being prinleged in companson to 
other L-\C countries (geographic position, resources), the absence of class and rac1al conflict as a~source of 
instability, and its healthy political culture and democratic system. See Ellner & Tinker Salas (200 b) for an 
excellent deconstruction of the myth . 
. n For instance, D.J. :'fyers was consultant for Perez' presidential campaign in 198~ /88 .. \nother contnbutor, 
R L. ,1 d I· Cruz Ins been \\'orld Bank and Inter-.\mericm Deyelopment Bank serum ecollorrust, ,Ind was alae e.l " . . 
director of the -lth Republic's Presidenrial Commission for State Reform (COPRE) :\clson OrtlZ used to be 
Pre~ldent of the Caracas Stock exchange (:'lcCoy & ~f~'ers, 2004 32~-30). 
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Chapter Two 
Critical Case Study Methodology 
The project is not just another subject, but a social responsibili!J. 
Addel Rodriguez, UBV-P~\R facilitator}} 
No claims to '~mpartiali!J" can release us from either the dilemmas of beingpart of the world we 
stucfy or from the unintended consequences of what we write. 
i\fichael Burawoy (1998: 17). 
Introduction 
This chapter builds upon the ontological and epistemological considerations 
discussed in the Introduction to outline the 'critical case study methodology' 
(Novelli, 2004) that facilitated my analysis and theorisation of counter-hegemonic 
globalisation. By 'methodology' I mean, similar to Lee Harvey, the "interface" 
between meta-theory, epistemological underpinnings, and methodic practice 
(Harvey, 1990: 1). Accordingly, the critical case study methodology comprises the 
four elements of research approach, model, method, and techniques. Combined, 
they facilitate a theoretically informed and empirically Qocally) grounded analysis of 
the complex, multi-scalar sets of social relations involved in the processes of 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic globalisations. As a multi-scalar methodology, 
it thus echoes Gill suggesting that within a historical materialist perspective, the 
practical and theoretical analysis of world order should simultaneously be 
conducted from 'the bottom upwards' and 'the top downwards', in a concern with 
movement rather than management, by dialectically appraising a giyen historical 
situation for the purpose of explanation rather than causality (2008: 20-1). 
In my Introduction to the thesis I argued that the core purpose of critical theory is 
to not only contribute to understanding the world, but to critique it and produce 
social emancipation and change. 'Critique' should reveal to individuals "how their 
.>'1 1" UBY -Commwuty i\ieeting. 12 :\ugust 2006. 
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beliefs and attitudes may be ideological illusions that help to preserve a social 
order which is alien to their collective experiences and needs" (Carr & Kemmis 
1986: 138-9). This ethical and political commitment runs through this thesis in 
two ways: through my meta-theoretical framework, which manifests itself in the 
critical ethnographic research approach; and, through the participatory action 
research (PAR) methodology as employed by the Bolivarian university (UBV) to 
support the construction of the organised society. Throughout this chapter, it will 
be seen that the two are intermingled, because it was through my ethnographic 
approach that I integrated in a UBV-PAR student group in the municipalised 
UBV in Coro. I thus became a participant in the group's PAR in Bam'o Cruz Verde. 
This local scale was the setting in which the micro-processes of ethnographic data 
gathering occurred, nevertheless methodologically linked to, and embedded in, the 
multi-scalar, macro-structural environment of hegemonic globalisation. 
Approach, model, method and techniques 
As stated, the critical case study methodology consists of the inter-related 
elements of approach, model, method and techniques, which have allowed me to 
move between my meta-theoretical positionality and the data-gathering practices. 
Approach in this instance refers to critical theory (as juxtaposed with problem-
solving theory), which informs my ethnographic approach, i.e. critical 
ethnography rather than conventional ethnography. By model of science I follow 
Burawoy's distinction between 'positive science' and 'reflexive science', i.e. 
whether the researcher is "external" to (separate from) the social world under study 
or embedded in it (1998: 10). The way this relationship is defined then detennines 
the method, or how exactly the research is carried out. As \vill be seen, Burawoy's 
Extended Case l\Iethod (ECl'v1) lends itself for a stud\, of globalisation as it 
facilitates moving between the micro and macro scales (1998: 5). Approach, 
model and method influence how the techniqueJ, i.e. the data gathering tools, are 
utilised. I deployed participant observation, fieldwork diary, documentary 
analysis, seminars in UBY, P.-\R in the bam'o, and semi-structured inter,jews. 
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Burawoy in fact attaches pnmacy to parnclpant observation, as for him 
'ethnography' means "writing about the world from the standpoint of participant 
observation" (1998: 6). I therefore view participant observation not simpl) a a 
technique, but as a methodology. Figure 2.1 systematises the research framework. 
Figure 2.1 
I CRITICAL CASE STUDY METHODOLOGY 
..... 
..... 
Source: Adapted from Novell i (2004: 86). 
Before exploring the different levels in more detail, I would like to return to the 
emancipatory interest in critical theory. As Lee Harvey aptly states, critical social 
research "involves an epistemological perspective in which knowledge and 
c!1t1que are intertwined" (1990: 3). This is of relevance for my critical 
ethnographic approach and the production of academic knowledge in thi the i 
as well as for my di cus ion of PAR in Chapter Five. 
I-Iabermas' P1St m I gy of knowledg -con titutiv inter t c nfront: th 
P itivi~ t claim tha t kn wI d c uld b pr duced in ep nd nt of human intcrc 'c. 
da f a particular u r individual but 
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as influencing the way we know (cognise) and how certain kinds of truth are 
produced. While positivism would equate 'true' knowledge with supposedly 
disinterested, scientific knowledge exclusively, Habermas argued that no form of 
knowledge is free from interests (How, 2003). Accordingly, as Table 2.1 shows, 
since knowledge is historically and socially rooted, different forms of knowledge 
originate in different human interests and means of social organisation which, 
subsequently, require different scientific methodologies (processes of knowing) in 
order to produce that knowledge. These methodologies have their own, internally 
coherent forms of rationality (Ewert, 1991), as I have attempted to show in my 
brief overview of approach, model, method and techniques above. 
Table 2.1 Habennasian Knowledge-Constitutive Interests 
Interest Knowledge Social Medium 
Technical 
Practical 
Instrumerta ·;causal expanation) 
Pm ct cal (understanding) 
Emancipator! Eman cpatory freflecticn i 
Source: CelTS Kernrnis (19&8: 138) 





Emp'rica -CI',3 -~tlc3"'ratJr) 
Herrnereutic,'i'1ce:rpre:i\·c 
entice Science:s 
While the technical and practical human interests represent positivism and 
hermeneutics, Habermas' epistemology introduced the critical, emant:tpatory 
interest. This refers to individual growth and is reflected in "our interest in self-
knowledge through self-reflection" (Mezirow in Ewert, 1991), or "consciousness-
raising" (How, 2003: 54), as well as our "interest in freedom and rational 
autonomy" (Carr & I(emmis, 1986: 136). The emancipatory interest contains 
analyses "that free consciousness from its dependence on hypostatized powers" 
(Habermas, 1972: 313). 
It is the task of the critical social sciences to elucidate distorted social conditions 
and to reveal how they can be eliminated in order to realise the rational 
capabilities of human beings - i.e. self-reflection and self-understanding - for 
self-emancipation (Carr & I(emmis, 1986: 136). Self-reflectiye understanding thus 
should enable people "to explain why the conditions under which they operate 
are frustrating and will suggest the sort of action that is required if the sources of 
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these frustrations are to be eliminated" (ibid.). When strategIc action, or 
"informed doing" (Carr & Kemmis, 1986: 149), coincides with self-reflection, i.e. 
when "knowing and acting are fused in a single act", we speak of emancipatol)' 
actions (Habermas, 1972: 212). In Freirean terms, such "social praxis" means that 
theory, rather than being prescriptive, informs action whilst action verifies theol)' 
- the action-reflection-action cycle (Freire, 1996 [1970]: 107). In the field of P ~\R, 
Freire's praxis philosophy is considered to be the fundamental epistemological 
principle. However, the dialectical principle of moving between action and 
reflection, between theory and practice, is also fundamental to my critical case 
study methodology, especially with respect to the objective of extending theory. 
The structure of this thesis, above all the sequence and contents of the chapters 
in Part II, are firmly grounded in the action-reflection-action principle. 
The approach: critical ethnograpry 
'Ethnography' originated in 19th century Western anthropology and has due to a 
variety of philosophical and theoretical influences become a broad category for a 
range of different approaches. Important commonalities, however, are the study 
of people or phenomena in natural, everyday settings and a relatively open-ended 
("exploratory") research process (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007: 1-4). How 
exactly an ethnographic study is theoretically and practically conceived depends 
upon ontological, epistemological, methodological and ethical decisions, which 
themselves depend strongly on the personality of the researcher and the purposes 
and objectives of the study (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994). What may broadly be 
subsumed as 'conventional ethnography', has been characterised as "a research 
process in which the anthropologist closely observes, records and engages in the 
daily life of another culture - an experience labelled 'fieldwork method' - and then 
writes accounts of this culture, emphasising descriptive detail" (Clifford, 1986: 6). 
Considering the inherent objectification and domination of 'the Other' in this 
traditional realist paradigm - the "naive" or "crude" realism positi\'ism builds 
upon, to which I referred in the Introduction to the thesis - it can credibly be 
argued that such a form of ethnography is a scientific approach to "culture 
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collecting", in the process of which facts and experiences are selected, gathered, 
and detached from their original temporal occasions (Clifford cited in Smith, 1999: 
61). In stark contrast, critical ethnography challenges the epistemological, political 
and immoral foundations of positivist ethnography. Inherently political, it 
"deepens and sharpens ethical commitments by forcing us to develop and act upon 
value commitments in the context of political agendas" (Thomas, 1993: 2-4). 
As a sub-category of critical ethnography, Andrew Mathers and J\Iario Novelli 
develop the concept of "engaged ethnography", with the "activist-researcher" at its 
core and the concern of "how academics can engage most appropriately and 
effectively with those movements that are pnmary agents of global 
transformation" (Mathers & Novelli, 2007: 230). It probably goes without saying 
that here, in this thesis, transformation refers to the idea of 'a better world', and 
that engaged ethnography supports those movements or governments that fight 
social fascism, accumulation by dispossession and, ultimately, capitalism. The idea 
of "research as solidarity" (Novelli, 2006) is premised on the organic intellectual's 
self-reflexive question Which side are you on? (Santos, 2001: 214). Blurring the line 
between researcher and activist means abandoning the outsider role of 'spectator' 
and instead becoming a committed actor (Mathers & Novelli, 2007). Such 
solidarity is a process constructed through practices where the researcher puts 
her/his time and skills at the service of the respective movement (e.g. translating 
and international spreading of documents, coordinating delegations, campaign 
activities or producing a documentary, as well as solidarity constructed around 
ideology and common material needs). The political role comprises possible modes 
of intervention, such as witnessing, to bring events to a wider audience, becoming 
a 'comrade' [companero] through "total commitment to the political strategy", 
expressed through, for instance, physical presence and solidarity work abroad, 
participation in demonstrations, blockades, and so on (?'.fathers & Novelli, 2007) . 
. Although my integration in UBY and in Bam'o Cruz Verde has not invoked or 
required such pronounced activism as in the cases of ~Iathers and ~o\'clli, I 
nevcrtheless \;c\\, my research as an expression of engagement and solidarity -
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solidarity exercised on political and ideological grounds which, howe\~er, I \~ie\V as 
an expression of human commitment, motiyated by "pure decency", as \\/alden 
Bello aptly expresses it (Bello, 2008: 440). As I will further explore throughout the 
chapter, I seek to exercise solidarity through primarily two practices: theory 
reconstruction and public sociology. 
The model.- reflexive social science 
My discussion of critical theory In the Introduction to the thesis and in this 
chapter, suggests that there are two broad models of social science within which 
ethnography can be conducted: one is the positive model, which is grounded in the 
subject-object dichotomy, i.e. the idea "that there is an 'external' world that can be 
construed as separate from and incommensurable with those who study it" 
(Burawoy, 1998: 10). Positive science employs the 'scientific method' in order to 
produce, what Burawoy calls by reference to I<atz' "4Rs", the "four prescriptive 
tenets of positive science": eliminating reactivity, i.e. the distortion of the findings 
through the researcher's interference or interaction with the world studied; 
reliability, which refers to the criteria of data selection, as the world is an "infinite 
manifold"; replicability, which underlies the natural scientific experiment and 
requires an unambiguous description of the research process in order to reproduce 
it under the same conditions; and representativeness, to be achieved through an 
appropriate sampling strategy to generalise the results (Burawoy, 1998: 10). 
Burawoy - as few others before him in the history of social science philosophy -
shows that positive science itself struggles to stand up to its own tenets due to 
"context effects", and I shall not reproduce these arguments here. Rather than 
attempting to eliminate the context effects, however, Burawoy proposes an 
alternative, reflexive science model that builds upon context as virtue, or strength, 
from which it derives its principles of inten;ention, process, stmduratiol1, and 
reconstruction. Burawoy follows Habermas and Cox in not dismissing the usefulness 
of the positive model, and instead arguing that different models are appropriate for 
different research issues (1998: 13-14). 
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Reflexive science builds on Habermas' commurucatlye actlon and takes the 
context, i.e. the relation between the interviewer and interviewed, and the 
embeddedness of the interview situation in the wider field of social relations, as its 
point of departure (Burawoy, 1998: 7; 2004: 1606): 
Where positive science proposes to insulate subject from object, reflexive science 
elevates dialogue as its defining principle and intersubjectivity between participant 
and observer as its premise (Burawoy, 1998: 14). 
Reflexive science uses preexisting theory as a guide that provides "cognitive maps 
through which we apprehend the world", combined with "engagement as the road 
to knowledge" (1998: 5). By rejecting detachment (objectivity), the traditional 
ethnographic "de-contextualisation" is countered and e\Teryday life is located in its 
extra-local and historical context - ethnography as the "study of others in their 
space and time" (1998: 4, 14; 2000: 4).34 
The Extended Case Method 
Participant observation, which to Burawoy is at the heart of ethnography, can be 
used for both reflexive and positive science. However, when applied to the 
reflexive model, the technique gives rise to the ECM. The method facilitated my 
analysis and theorisation of counter-hegemonic globalisation, as it links up the 
micro-practices under observation with the wider world through "multiple 
dialogues" at a range of levels (1998: 5) (see Figure 2.2). 
'I F . u'onal ethnograp11\' m'l" stud\' the internal life of institutions \\lthout stud'-ing the 
, 'or 111stance conven . . . ' . 
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Dialogue is "the unifying principle of reflexive science" (Burawoy, 1998: 16). 
Intervention thus refers to a dialogue between researcher and participants, as the 
participant observer extends (immerses) into the lifeworlds of the participants. 
Process is a dialogue between social situations, in which a multitude of situational 
knowledges produced from situational experiences (i.e. experiences located in a 
specific space and time) is aggregated (reduced) into an account of social processes. 
It means the extension of observation over time and space. Structuration is the 
dialogue between social processes at the research site and external social forces 
(structural constraints). Extending out from micro-processes to macro forces 
involves investigating the geographical and historical context, and employment of 
prior theory to identify external factors. Rec·onstruction or the extension of existing 
th ory in olves refutations and challenge of one's convictions or expectati n 
rather than 'induction' from the data for ne\,: theory (a in grounded theory) 
(Buravv 1998; 2000). Theory i thu recon tructed through actiye engag m nt 
vvith th \ rld. In m 7 ca e thr ughout th entir th is) I ~ tarted with xi:ting 
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theories of globalisation, Justice, democracy, and so on, in order to test their 
usefulness, to refute, to reconceptualise, and to expand. Burawoy captures the 
process thus: 
Theories do not spring tabula rasa from the data but are carried forward through 
intellectual debate and division. They then reenter the wider world of participants, 
there to be adopted, refuted, and extended in intended and unintended ways, 
Circulating back into science. Science offers no final truth, no certainties, but exists 
in a state of continual revision (Burawoy, 1998: 16). 
In this sense, producing this thesis has been an exploratory, experimental, open-
ended and dialogical process across a range of scales, from local to global, and 
one that has included community members, academics, and government officials 
in "real space and time" as well as through texts (cf Burawoy, 1998: 14). ~\s a 
dialectical process, I constantly moved between the concrete complex to the 
simple abstract in an attempt to make sense of the revolutionary processes. As 
the case studies in Burawoy et al (2000) demonstrate, the critical emancipatory 
potential of ECM consists in making the "dynamics of domination and 
resistance" visible, or to constructing alternative cognitive maps through which 
we understand and interpret the world (Burawoy, 1998: 5; 2000). Such "grounded 
globalisations" are local micro-processes of the production of counter-ideologies 
to hegemonic globalisation or, in evoking Habermasian philosophy, a response to 
the colonisation of the lifeworld through the 'system', as expressed in 
negotiations of the terms of domination, collective protest and the creation of 
alternatives (Burawoy, 2000: 25). Before elaborating on the research techniques, I 
layout how I developed my research in practice. 
Research process 
~\s stated in my Prologue, in late 2004, at the beginning of the +3 part of my 
studentship, I applied to the ESRC to conduct my research in Venezuela, rather 
than in Nicaragua. The de\"elopments in Venezuela appeared to become 
increasingly significant, and surprisingly little academic knowledge about the 
processes from witbin the revolution was ayailable, and especially with respect to 
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education. At the end of February 2005, the ESRC approved my proposed change, 
and I could start planning the fieldwork. Appendix 17 lists the key actiYlties and 
events during the entire +3 research period, and in the following I shall restrict 
myself to the most relevant aspects. 
I split the 12 months field research, as granted by the ESRC, into two parts: a first 
4-month period between June and October 2005 served to familiarise myself with 
the Venezuelan reality. Plainly put, the guiding question was 'What is going on in 
Venezuela?". I travelled large parts of the country mostly by local transport, met a 
diversity of people from inside and outside the revolution, pro and contra, 
immersed myself, and read 2-3 newspapers of different political alignment per day. 
I thus accumulated knowledge and understanding from many different angles. The 
whole period was an intensive educational experience that provided diverse 
insights into the complexities of social relations and processes in contemporary 
Venezuela. I visited a broad spectrum of environments and institutions, often 
conducting initial, exploratory interviews: ministries, local coordinating offices of 
the missions, the Endogenous Development Nucleus (NUDE) Fabricio Ojeda in 
Catia on the outskirts of Caracas, and a range of state and private educational 
institutions from pre-school to university. Other memorable experiences include 
several hours in a Caracas police station, and a discussion on globalisation and 
Latin American politics with a beach guard. Section 1 of the Photographs depicts 
some of the initial impressions. 
Upon returning to Bristol in October 2005, I spent three months analysing the 
collected infonnation. The process included co-authoring a first publication with 
Antoni Verger, which we also translated into Castilian, as well as my upgrading 
report, which helped sharpen my research focus and identify the prospecti\~e 
research site. In the report, I developed a rather comprehensi\"e and ambitious 
research agenda, as is reflected in the set of 30 research questions, reproduced in 
Appendix 16a. The questions wcre not viewed as the 'final word', but sen"cd as 
guidance and as a basis for further developing the research project. :\s I shall 
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discuss in the Conclusion of the thesis most questions have been addressed , , 
although some have been weighted more than others, while new issues emerged in 
the interplay of theory and practice. 
During the second, 8-month field period, from January to September 2006, I 
settled in Coro, the Falcon state capital, and integrated in UBV. The two field trips 
were complemented by a third, self-funded 5-week visit in July 2007, which 
allowed updating my knowledge and complying with my ethical commitment 
towards 'my' community. 'The community', I should note, in this thesis is primarily 
defined in geographical terms, which should not suggest that the relational aspect is 
ignored, i.e. the social relations between people in a defined location (see Chapter 
Four). The strategy of iterative visits bore two benefits: firstly, going back and forth 
rather than being permanently absorbed in the processes allowed for critical 
distancing and reflection. Secondly, thus 'prolonging' my immersion from 12 
months to a total of over two years enabled me to acquire a much more 
substantiated understanding, again methodologically grounded in the action-
reflection-action cycle. 
Prior to my first arrival in Venezuela in June 2005, I had identified UBV-Caracas as 
potentially the key institution through which to access Bolivarian education at its 
different levels and in its different forms. UBV is the first nation-wide university in 
the country's history and was founded in 2003, together with the Higher Education 
Ministry (l\1ES) and Mision Sucre. Both UBV and Sucre are the principal tools to 
achieve the declared objective of universal higher education, or HEF}L HE for all 
means that any bachilier35 who wants to enter and/ or continue tertiary level studies is 
legally entitled and actively supported to doing so. But it also means HE being at 
the service of all of society, rather than simply being a means of indiyidual social 
mobility. The policy is grounded in two rationales: the Bolivarian philosophy 
declares education at all levels, including HE (up to the undergraduate leycl) , as a 
constitutional human right. Equally important is the political, economic, social, 
.'5 Bacbiller is the holder of the badJ/llera/o, the qualification required to enter tertlary education. 
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cultural and ethical role of education in local, national and regional endogenous 
development and the construction of 21 st century socialism. Technical knowledge 
and skills are as important as creating political subjects and organic intellectuals -
"citizen professionals" - in the democratic transition to socialism. 
Misi6n Sucre is named after General Antonio Jose de Sucre (1795-1830), who is 
praised for inflicting upon the Spanish empire the decisive defeat in the Battle of 
Ayacucho (1824). Sucre was launched to provide HE for the historically excluded, 
and is more of an administrative rather than academic nature. This means that 
most of the 25-30 locally contextualised graduate programmes (pFGs) are offered 
in collaboration with about 15 HE institutions to which Sucre allocates students. 
The state HE sub-sector comprises Autonomous Universities, University Institutes 
and Colleges, Experimental Universities (including the National Experimental 
Polytechnic University of the Armed Forces, UNEF A), and UBV. Of these, the 
experimental universities and UBV cooperate with Misi6n Sucre. In contrast to Sucre, 
UBV has its own infrastructure and offers nationally standardised PFGs, of which 
there are rune: Agroecology, Architecture, Environmental Management, S ot:ial 
Communication, Political Studies and Government, Legal Studies, S odell Management of Local 
Development, Informatics for Sodal Management, and Public Health Management. UBV is 
also in charge of the academic co-ordination of Misi6n Sucre's three national PFGs: 
the National Programme for the Formation of Edut:ators (PNFE) , Integral Community 
Medidne and Energy Sdences. These programmes are offered in collaboration with the 
Ministry of Education (MED), the Bam'o Adentro [Inside the Barrio] health mission, 
and the national oil company PDVSA, respectively. Since 2006/07, diploma and 
post-graduate programmes, including PhD level, have been launched. 
The principles under which UBY operates are elaborated in the institution's 
Documento Rector (UBV, 2004). The Dotumento Rector has been under re\Tision since 
2007, with the objective of redefining the university as 'UBY 21', in alignment to 
21 st century socialism. UB\T is a "municipalised" university, characterised as 
an institution and a consolidated university community, organically linked to the 
local communities, to the regions and the country [ ... ], as a space that generates 
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and pr?motes social j~~tice through putting into practice the principle of equality of 
educational opportUnities, both in the access to it and in the educational 
achievements that correspond with the criteria of integral education throughout the 
entire life (UBV, 2004: 74). 
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As Chapter Five will further elaborate, municipalisation thus attempts to 
reconcile quantity with quality. The democratisation of HE is operationalised 
through a satellite structure: MES, regional UBV headquarters (see Appendices 7 
and 8), and about 2000 centres in all 335 municipalities, called aldeas (,university 
villages'). They have been referred to as "neuralgic centres" of investigation and 
development in the transition to socialism (Troudi & Monedero, 2007: 155, 185). 
In each municipality, there is a UBV coordinator. In 2006, almost 91 % of UBV's 
158.000 students participated in the municipalised aldeas. The municipalised 
students usually are professional/working adults, in contrast to those in the 
headquarters, who in their majority are secondary school graduates (11ES, 2007: 
397). 
UBV characterises the PFGs as "transdisciplinary" study programmes, which 
seek to foster understanding of the complexities of the processes studied, i.e. of 
the world and the social and human condition (2004: 94). In contrast to inter-
disciplinarity, which approaches an issue from different, mutually enriching 
disciplinary perspectives, transdisciplinary research aims to fuse and transcend 
disciplinary boundaries in order to produce "integrative knowledge". It can thus 
be viewed as a counterpart to the reductionist, 'breaking-up' inherent in the 
positive method of science (Rapport, 1997: 289; Despres et ai, 200-1-: 475; 
Lawrence & Despres, 2004). As UBV identifies transdisciplinary research often as 
action-oriented, and the knowledges produced as the result of intersubjectiyity 
(UBV, 2004: 94), at the core of the UBV PFGs, is the "student-community 
project" (or simply 'the project'), since 2007 officially and explicitly referred to as 
P.AR. Within the rationale of an open curriculum, the UBY-PAR fuses 2-
hours/\veek theory and methodology in the classroom \\ith -1- hours/\\"Cck 
formative research and prolonged social insertion for collectiye knowledge 
construction in the communities (UBV, 2005). The municipalised UBV -P .-\R is a 
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major instrument in the consolidation of the process as a reyolution from the 
bottom up, especially with respect to the formation of the community councils as 
the fundamental instances of revolutionary democracy. The UBY-P~-\R thus 
operates under 
the principle of the ethic of the collective which joins andragopedagogical principles, 
the flexibilisation of the curriculum, popular education and socio-communitarian work, 
coordinated by the municipalisation of the different Education Programmes as a 
response to the new institutionalisation of the state and the exercise of sovereignty, 
and the transformative practice of participation and protagonism (UBV, 2005: 12). 
Approaching UBV Caracas in 2005 enabled me to enter the satellite structure in 
different directions throughout the entire country: the regional headquarters, of 
which there existed four at the time, and different departments within them; 
municipal aldeas; and the MES as well as other ministries. Moreover, the inter-
connectedness of UBV, bamos and communities, facilitated access to other 
revolutionary institutions, projects and actors outside UBV. This strategy enabled 
me to gradually familiarise myself with the revolutionary structures from within. 
In summer 2005, four UBV headquarters had opened in the following cities and 
states: Caracas (Federal District), Punto Fijo (Falcon), Cuidad Bolivar (Bolivar), 
and Maracaibo (Zulia). I visited all four, had meetings with the directors and other 
key staff, and all four institutions offered their cooperation. A combination of 
personal and professional preferences influenced my decision for UBV-Falcon, 
and Coro as the municipal research site (Appendix 9). For example, Caracas is 
usually the centre of academic and journalistic attention, and I found it more 
challenging to be away from what I view is the epicentre of the revolution. UBV-
Maracaibo represented the opposite case: Zulia state is governed by the opposition, 
which can create a confrontational environment. UBV-Bolivar works to a great 
extent with the indigenous Amazonian peoples, which itself is extraordinarily 
interesting, but requires substantial knowlcdge of the respectiye linguistic and 
cultural backgrounds. In addition, the trayel distances to Caracas from Zulia and 
Bolivar are considerably longer than from Coro, and I ,'icwcd it as important to 
han.' relatively convenient access to the ministeriallc,'el conccntratcd in the capital. 
, 
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Once 1 had decided in favour of UBV-Falcon, Coro itself offered access to the 
Experimental University Francisco de Miranda (which integrates :\lision Sucre 
students), libraries, federal state institutions, the mayoralty and the Falcon Zona 
Educativa (the state education authority). 
As Appendix 9a shows, Coro is both the capital of Falcon state and of the 
municipality of Miranda. Coro is a one-hour bus ride from Punto Fijo, on the 
Peninsula of Paraguana, where the UBV-Falcon headquarters are. AppendLx 9b 
shows that in Falcon in 2006, seven PFGs had been municipalised, of which SLX 
were offered in the municipality of Miranda. However, as AppendLx 9c 
underscores, not all aldeas offer( ed) all PFGs. 1 approached the UBV -Miranda 
coordinator, Carina Salazar, who introduced me to Aldea Juan Crisostomo Fak6n in 
the centre of Coro. At the time, in 2006, several small aldeas in primary and 
secondary schools offered the PNFE. However, Crisostomo Fak6n was the only aldea 
in the municipality that offered Legal Studies, Social Communication, Social 
Management, and Environmental Management, either as evening classes during 
the week or as day classes on the weekend. Out of eight UBV-PAR groups in that 
aldea, 1 integrated in the Project I B Cruz Verde Community Council. The "1 B" means 
that the group, which had entered the municipalised UBV in autumn 2005, were in 
the second term of their ftrst year of study. Salazar had recommended that group, 
as it could count on two extremely committed facilitators: Sociologist Ana Scavo 
and Engineer Addel Rodriguez, each with about 20 years of participatory 
community work experience. 
In addition to my regular participation in the stated PAR theory module, I also 
participated in a range of Legal Studies units: SociologicalAna!Jsis of Right, Society, State 
and Constititution; Juridical Complexity and Diversi!),; and Hzstory of Vene::;.uela. I had two 
reasons for this: on one hand, as UBV-Falcon's general coordinator Jose Berrios 
emphasised in a presentation on 1 ~1arch 2006, law and the judiciary are central in 
the construction of the ne\v state, and my participation in Legal Studies facilitated 
access to indispensable substantial knowledge. On the other hand, the majority of 
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students in my PAR project group were enrolled in Legal Studies. Joining them in 
additional modules crucially helped to build up relationships, upon which trust 
depends, as I thus spent 3-4 evenings per week with the group, rather than just the 
one PAR session. 
As is often highlighted in ethnographic research (e.g. Mathers & Novelli, 2007: 11), 
gaining the participants' trust and building up mutual respect is both hard work 
and time intensive. Scepticism as to 'who is he' prevailed for a long time into the 
second field period in 2006. To state just one example, one evening in the PAR 
session, a student jokingly said ''Who knows what Thomas is doing with all this 
information. Maybe he's working for the CIA". A combination of strained laughter 
and uneasy silence filled the room. To some extent, it proved beneficial to already 
have a publication prepared in Castilian, which I could circulate so that the 
participants could see what I was writing about them. However, doubts persisted, 
and were only fully removed with my return in June/July 2007, for my third field 
period. In the meantime, i.e. in time of absence from the field between September 
2006 and June 2007, I had started to disseminate my work both academically and 
through public sociology activities, of which I kept the UBV -PAR group informed 
via e-mail correspondence. My engagement, as well as the fact that I returned, was 
perceived by the UBV-PAR group as a form of solidarity and a confmnation of my 
commitment to them and to my work. It re-defined our relationship as one 
increasingly characterised by trust. Noteworthy is that at the end of my 3rd field 
visit, I received an award from the UBV -PAR group in recognition of my social 
commitment to their work and the Bolivarian university (see Photographs Section 
Sd). Ethical commitment thus became intertwined with political engagement, 
which is an aspect of moral responsibility, to which I will return at the end of the 
chapter. 
The municipality of ~1iranda is composed of seven parishes lParroquiaJ], three of 
which join in Coro: San Antonio, San Gabriel, and Santa Ana. In July 2007, 15 
a/dea.f existed in the municipality of l\liranda, and in fact it now makes sense to 
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speak of the 'parishisation' rParroquializaci6n] rather than the municipalisation of HE 
(Interview 24, Appendix 16b; see Appendix 9c). Barno Cruz Verde is divided into 
four sectors: the urbanizaci6n [housing estate36], me parcelamiento [smallholdings], the 
bloques [blocks (of flats)], and the bam·o. Since the UBV-PAR group I had integrated 
in was rather large (about 30 students), it was split for the practical part: the group 
I joined did their PAR in the bam'o, while the other one worked in the parcelamiento. 
Out of the key events and activities listed in Appendix 17, I would like to point 
to two experiences that were decisive in shaping the direction of this thesis: 
fltsciy, I organised my return to Venezuela for my second field research period 
starting in January 2006 in such a way as to be able to participate in the World 
Social Forum, which was held in Caracas from 24-29 January 2006. There, I 
attended sessions on 21 st century socialism, popular education, and the like. A 
crucial input was provided by a group of UBV -Zulia students presenting a video of 
their UBV-PAR, which demonstrated the empowering effect that the PAR had on 
an indigenous community claiming their rights to a healthy environment and 
livelihood. On those grounds, right at my arrival in Coro, I started working 
towards my integration in such a UBV -PAR group. 
Secondly, the two facilitators I worked with, Scavo and Rodriguez, invited me to 
a 10-session workshop Education for Citizen Participation in the Communities, imparted 
by them in Barno Cruz Verde in August 2006. The workshop, whose politically 
heterogeneous group also included several UBV-PAR students, was offered 
independent of UBV or the government by an internationally funded NGO 
called Asociaci6n Civil Comunitaria "Sabana Lar;ga" (ACSALA) (see Photographs 
Section Se). The workshop provided an additional opportunity for familiarizing 
myself with the Bolivarian democratic and legal system, especially \vith respect to 
the different forms of revolutionary power and participation. Therefore, 
academically, the workshop further steered my thesis towards issues of 
.\6 Urbani""aciones are commonly middle- and upper-class neighbourhoods where property-owners hold legal 
"\; . 
land titles and tl1e buildings should conform to government norms (Goldfrank, 2004: 129,,13). 
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democracy and participation, while it also enabled me to intensify my relationship 
with Bam·o Cruz Verde and its inhabitants. 
Data collection and analysis 
The Extended Case Method deploys participant observation to locate local social 
situations (everyday life) in their extra-local and historical context (Burawoy, 1998). 
Approach, model and method influence how the techniques, i.e. the data gathering 
tools, are utilised. The choice of instruments is generally arrived at through the 
theoretical underpinnings of the research, the research questions (Appendix 16b), 
as well as availability and feasibility, which are (in part) conditioned by the 
researcher's personality. As previously stated, Burawoy strongly associates 
ethnography with participant observation, "designed to elucidate social processes 
in bounded communities or negotiated orders in institutions" (Burawoy, 2000: 1). 
On those grounds, I propose that a) participant observation is not merely a data 
gathering technique, but a methodological tool that deploys a range of techniques, 
which in my case were: field diary and documentary evidence, which according to 
Hammersley & Atkinson (2007) are key techniques in ethnography, as well as 
semi-structured interviews, seminars/workshops participation, and the UBV-PAR; 
and b) although Aldea Juan Crisostomo Falcon and Bam·o Cruz Verde were my 
principal ethnographic research sites, I conducted a multi-sited participant 
observation in a range of settings, as listed in Appendix 17: UBV-Miranda, Falcon 
and Caracas; revolutionary institutions (missions, NUDEs); ministries; workshops; 
and international forums, symposiums and conferences. I also did a 2-week 
fieldtrip to Nicaragua from Venezuela auly 2006), in order to research the 
construction of ALBA. My Case 3 in Chapter Six is based on that part of the 
research. 
f-;-'ield diary 
During all field tnps I kept a research diary detailing my expenences and 
observations in the diYerse en\;ronments I entered and immersed myself in. :\otes 
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were taken on a daily basis, usually several times per day according to the different 
activities or events I participated in. Often, brief situational jottings were developed 
and expanded on later or when transferred to the computer. During the first field 
period, notes were more 'scattered' or "unstructured" and descriptive (Hammersley 
& Atkinson, 2007: 4) rather than systematic, and included a lot of general 
information that appeared of interest in order to grasp the complexities of 
Venezuelan reality as detailed as possible. Such 'context-specific' notes comprised 
observations and eyewitness accounts of all sorts in all lived environments (e.g. 
taxi, local police station, restaurants, shops, newspaper vendor), \vhen speaking 
with people's perceptions of the revolution, including other international visitors 
(voluntary workers, students). Systematic notes were taken during and after the 
interviews and more spontaneous interview-conversations when recording was not 
possible. The notes often served as a basis for discussion, as well as for 
communication with my mentors In Bristol. The notes also contributed to 
developing and refining the research agenda. As the research progressed, the notes 
became more concrete, selective, and focused on the subject matter, and analytical 
comments were added with increasing specialist knowledge. 
Gathering documentary evidence 
A range of document types have been used for analysis in this thesis. Firstly, 
newspaper articles and commentaries are crucial in a rapidly changing revolutionary 
context, to stay 'on top' of all important developments. Especially in the first field 
period, they also served to stimulate analytical ideas. Secondly, government reports 
and official policy and strategy papers, above all the national development plans 
NESD-2001 and NESD-2007. Thirdly, the CBRV and laws relevant to the 
research issues, such as the Community Councils Law. Fourthly, about 160 
ALBA/UNASUR-related declarations and agreements from 2000-2008. They are 
listed and summarised in ~-\ppendices 12 and 15, and have served to theorise LAC 
integration in Chapter Six. Fifthly, UBV-Falc6n and UBV-i\1iranda \vorking 
papers, memoranda, and reports, as well as UBV -PAR student reports (group 
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assignments). Sixthly, e-mail correspondence with UBY -PAR students and the 
facilitators in times of absence from the field. 
Seminars in UB Vand Banio Cruz Verde workshop 
As stated, I regularly participated in the UBV-PAR theory classes and in a range of 
Legal Studies units in the municipalised UBV Aldea Juan Crisostomo Falcon, as well as 
in a Bam'o Cruz Verde citizen workshop. In dialogue with the other participants, 
combined with the respective course and workshop materials, I could acquire 
substantial theoretical and historical knowledge in a structured fashion and 
environment. Moreover, it added to my insider knowledge of the barrio and the 
community, and intensified my relationships with UBV students and community 
members. I also organised a ten-session interdisciplinary 'conversational seminar' 
Globalisation and Education at UBV-Falc6n (punto Fijo), in which about 15 
participants (staff and students) from Education, Social Communication, Social 
Management of Local Development, and Legal Studies participated. Primarily 
driven by ethical motives - in order to give something in return - the dialogical 
relationship also improved my status as "outsider within". 
UBV-PAR 
Although PAR per se is a methodology, in my case it became a research technique 
as I joined the UBV-PAR group Bam'o Cruz Verde as a participant obseryer rather 
than as a PAR-researcher myself (although the two are not strictly separable). 
Specific activities of the UBV -PAR-group are sketched out in Chapter Six, as well 
as in the Photographs Section 4 and 5. Beneficial was my theoretical knowledge of 
PAR, as I had dedicated my MEd Research Methods dissertation of the first year 
of my '1 + 3' studentship to exploring the critical theoretical and philosophical 
rootings of PAR in the context of globalisation (Muhr, 2004). 
Interviews 
I conducted 30 recorded semi-structured intelTicws as well as seven not-recorded 
intervicw-conycrsations between July 2005 and July 200-;-, with community actors, 
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policy coordinators, UBV students, academics, and government officials (see 
Appendix 16b, c). Semi-structured interviews or the "interview guide approach" 
allow a conversational atmosphere while providing space for probing, exploring, 
clarifying and re-phrasing questions (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992; Patton, 1990). 
Interviews and interview-conversations lasted between 20-60 minutes and most of , 
them were conducted one-to-one. In conventional research terms, the participants 
were selected through a combination of 'convenience', 'purposiye' and 'snowball 
sampling' (Cohen et al, 2000: 102-4; Ruane, 2005: 117-18). This means that 
especially in the beginning it was rather accidental who exactly the interviewee(s) 
would be in a nevertheless strategically selected and relevant setting, and often new 
interview opportunities developed through referrals. The major exception were 
four UBV-PAR student group interviews. They were consciously devised as group 
interviews, for mainly two reasons: on one hand, for purposes of efficiency, i.e. to 
be able to interview the entire Bam·o Cruz Verde PAR-group under students' time 
constraints. On the other hand, the purpose of the interviews was to develop a 
discussion about the students' work in the community and to yield a wide range of 
responses (Cohen et al, 2000: 287). The difference between 'interview-
conversations' and semi-structured interviews is that the former occurred more 
spontaneously and could not be recorded, and notes were taken instead. Generally, 
they also served a more exploratory purpose during the first field period. 
As Appendix 16b shows, not all interviews were fully transcribed. Due to their 
often exploratory character in the absence of an interview guide in the first field 
period, often the interviewees reproduced general information that was also 
contained in the official documents, which I then gave preference as the more 
reliable source. After all, the purpose of interviewing was to increase understanding 
rather than probing discourses against each other in order to, for instance, identify 
discrepancies between discourse and practice. Neither did I conduct a systematic 
analysis, such as (pattern-)coding in order to identify regularities, as in grounded 
theory (Miles & Huberman, 1994).37 \'V'ith the increasingly focussed research 
Ii I previously conducted a systematic interYlcw analysis of this kind in an :'fEd dissertation on prim.lry· 
school exclusion in Nicaragua (;\fuhr, 2002). 
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agenda that emerged over time, the research questions developed in the upgrading 
report served as the basis for interview guides from the second field period on (see 
Appendix 16a). I prepared an interview guide specifically for each inten"iew 
situation, by selecting appropriate research questions as guidance, complemented 
or modified in accordance with my developing knowledge. 
All interviews were conducted in Castilian. Despite my good command of the 
language, I paid several 'trustworthy' Coro UBV -students for transcribing, both to 
save time and for accuracy. I also sought the collaboration of a Latin American in 
Bristol with respect to those interviews that could not be transcribed in Venezuela. 
In accordance with the 1998 Data Protection Act, the tapes were anonymised 
(coded) to ensure confidentiality. I then reviewed the transcripts for yerbatim 
accuracy. Both time and organisational constraints, however, did not permit to 
present the transcripts to the participants for verification. On the \'ery rare 
occasions that I cite participants by name, these consented during the 
interview / conversation, and again afterwards via email. Translation was carried out 
by myself and only on those sections of interviews that have been used for citation 
in this thesis, publications or conference presentations. I often include the original 
Castilian term in square brackets for purposes of authenticity. 
Documentary analYsis 
The transcribed interviews and the documentary materials, including my field 
notes, were treated as texts. They were evaluated recognising that each may offer 
only partial insights into the situation under investigation, and that their contents 
may, to differing degrees, be biased, inaccurate or distorted. Often, however, 
statements or descriptions of events (especially from interviews) could be 
compared to an objective reality, and different sources as well as my deepening 
knowledge of the context combined in judging the information obtained (see 
Lilleker, 2003). In the case of contradictory statistical figures with respect to the 
same phenomenon, I generally present diverse sources, or at least point the reader 
to potential discordance. Different document types sen'ed different purposes, and 
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were analysed accordingly under different criteria. This IS to some extent 
underscored by the thematic structure of Part II of the thesis. 
Texts, however, do not have a single authoritative meaning (Codd, 1988). Texts are 
socially constructed and produced for an intended audience, which requires 
locating them in the social, cultural, local and global context within which they 
were produced (van Dijk, 1997: 29). A government policy paper, a newspaper 
article, and my fieldnotes, were all produced in a particular place at a particular 
time, and therefore cannot be taken at face value. Rather, they require critical 
analysis. For this purpose, I drew on Norman Fairclough's method of critical 
discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1995; 2003). As Fairclough states, 'discourse' 
is a way of representing an aspect, or theme, of the social world from a particular 
ideological angle, where 'ideology' contributes to asymmetrical social relations of 
power. Texts therefore "have causal effects upon [ ... J people (beliefs, attitudes, 
etc.), actions, social relations, and the material world" (2003: 8-9; 129). 
In order to analyse the relationship between discourse, ideology and power, 
Fairclough has developed a three-dimensional framework for CDf\. It builds on 
the dialectical relationship between discourse as text (the properties of the text itself), 
discourse as practice, and discourse as socio-historical context. The three levels correspond 
with three types of analysis: descriptive text analysis (content, form, linguistic 
features, such as grammar, phonology, and semantics); processing analysis (text 
production and consumption/interpretation); and explanatory social analysis 
(institutional contexts, ideologies) (Fairclough, 1995: 96-111). The importance is to 
understand that words are politicised, as they "carry the power that reflects the 
interests of those who speak" (McGregor, 2003), and that discourse assumes a 
hegemonic function in the "engineering of consent" (Codd, 1988: 235). 
I developed CDi\ skills in the '1-part' of my studentship (the ~1Ed Research 
l'v1cthods). Through three modules and the respective series of assignments, I 
conducted CD:\ of _-1 Ell"" Globali::;.ation: Creating Opportunities For ~,,111, by the \X'orld 
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Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004).38 I also delivered a 
presentation of this research project at the Workshop on Critical Discourse Ana!ysis, 
University of Bristol, on 3 February 2005. In that work, I used quantitatiye 
Wordsmith software to support the systematic, descriptiye text analysis, upon 
which I based the interpretative and explanatory analyses. As regards CDA in this 
thesis, such a systematic approach was impossible due to the amount of 
documents used. However, the different techniques - description, interpretation, 
explanation - were applied in a partially systematic way to different documents to 
differing degrees, with respect to their hegemonic or counter-hegemonic 
functions and purposes which they were constructed to achieve. Likewise, the 
positionality of interview participants was recognised in the analytical processes. 
The data gathering process contained a number of ethical issues that should be 
discussed. In the following and final section of the chapter, I counter-pose ethical 
with moral concerns in research ethics. This will draw attention to some 
limitations of the Extended Case Method, and lead into a brief outline of my role 
as a public sociologist. 
Moral concerns in research ethics 
Pat Sikes (2001) usefully distinguishes between ethical and moral dimensions in 
research ethics. The former has become concerned with protecting the rights of 
the researcher(s) and participant(s) in a legal sense. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that the research itself is 'moral' in a wider sense. This idea has 
further been elaborated in collaboration with Ivor Goodson, as "research as moral 
practice" (Sikes & Goodson, 2003). Phillipe Bourgois has raised a similar concern. 
He exemplifies how a researcher's moral obligation to uphold human rights can 
collide with the narro\,v, largely methodological principles of research ethics 
(Bourgois, 1990). The ethical/moral distinction lends itself to illustrating some 
concerns in my o\vn work. 
311 Tbe seminars were: Da/a Collection and f111ab'sis I + II (EDUC~I1 ~03; EDlTC~f321 q I and /ldvanced 
Quali/a/itle Jft'lhodJ and Da/a Anab'sis in Eduo.':o): (EDUC~f 1208). 
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In the course of the research process, I arrived at distinguishing between two 
contexts of political sensitivity. By this I mean potential dangers to the research 
participants, which I view in my work as primarily emerging from the production 
and publication of politically sensitive knowledge. Firstly, immediate individual 
participants' physical, social and psychological well-being may be adversely 
affected, be it through pro- or counter-revolutionary forces and actors, for instance 
in the form of an assassination. I associate this danger with the ethical dimension 
in research ethics. Secondly, the 'collective context', as certain knowledge produced 
may be used against the progressive government(s), and thus large parts of the 
nation's population, for instance through a coup d'etat or war. This, to me, 
embodies the moral dilemma. I'll explore each in turn. 
In my research, I found it relatively easy to control the potential dangers to the 
individual participants, by way of using the formalised principles and mechanisms 
as established by the British Educational Research Association (BERA, 2004), the 
British Sociological Association (BSA, 2002) and the ESRC (2005/2006). 
Voluntary informed consent, confidentiality, anonymity, privacy, and the right to 
withdraw at any moment were guaranteed. Consent was sought orally rather than 
in the written form because my prolonged participation facilitated and required 
iterative discussion and re-negotiation of ethical issues at the different levels and 
moments of the research process - UBV-Falc6n, UBV-Miranda, UBV-PAR 
participants, and individuals in Bam·o Cruz Verde. Most of the information used in 
this thesis is/was available in the public domain, and the collection of personally 
sensitive data was consciously avoided. With respect to interviews, I view 
academics, coordinators and policy makers as public actors with the necessary 
awareness of their political role and the implications of their statements. Similarly, 
the UBV -PAR students, as well as community leaders, can be viewed as public 
actors. They are in the media, as the newspaper clip in the Photographs Section 5b, 
evidences ... \s stated, I have also adopted the practice of re-checking (yia e-mail) 
\vith the participants in the case of publishing a statement under their names. 
Chapter Two 106 
The 'collective context' has to be viewed within the reality of counter-re\'olution, as 
knowledge produced may be used against the processes and actors by national 
and/ or international forces. This is a paradoxical situation, in straight opposition to 
the purpose of my engaged ethnography. Two tensions emerge here: frrstly, as 
Burawoy concludes (1998: 17), 'impartiality' can neither release us from "the 
dilemmas of being part of the world we study" nor "from the unintended 
consequences of what we write". The questions I started asking myself included 
how careful do I have to word any critical comments regarding the revolution, as 
constructive criticism has evidently been politically misused through 
decontextualisation and distortion? Or, should I rather not make certain findings 
public? This relates to the second tension I have felt. If 'moral research' implies 
consciously abandoning value neutrality (Sikes & Goodson, 2003), the dilemma of 
keeping the balance between advocacy and critical analysis arises. Helpful in this 
respect has been the fact that critical discussion of the revolutionary practices is 
widespread in Venezuela, both in government circles and society, and certainly 
within my research environment. Additionally, as stated, the periodic breaks from 
the fieldwork were supportive to critical distancing. And, finally, the strong 
theoretical grounding of the thesis aims to safeguard it from simplistic 'pro-or-
contra' bias. 
Limitations of the Extended Case Method 
Extending theory, however, bears its own hazards, which draws attention to the 
inherent limitations of the ECM. Just as positive science finds its limitations in the 
context effects, so is reflexive science limited by power effects. Burawoy identifies 
these as domination, silencing, objectification, and normalisation. They correspond 
with the four dimensions of the ECM, intervention, process, structuration, and 
reconstruction, respectively. Rather than attempting to ignore these effects, 
recognising them may help containing them. Power in the form of domination -
both dominating and being dominated - is always present in dialogical action, as 
Habermas argued with respect to his ideal speech situation .. \lthough one has to be 
cautious not to generalise, being a Northern, white male researcher in a 
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traditionally colonial environment is problematic, certainly in the bam·o. Speaking 
with the director of UBV, or with a group of politicised revolutionaries, contains 
power relations of a rather different nature. In either case, domination is likely to 
distort the mutuality of exchange and affects the knowledge produced (Burawoy, 
2000: 27). Similar to Luke's second face of power, silencing means privileging 
contributions of certain agents over others in the process of reducing situational 
observations to social process. For instance, the process of community action 
(squatting) described in Chapter Six does not capture the voices of individual 
community members. When extending out from micro processes to macro forces, 
the o,?jectijication of global structural forces makes them appear as unchangeable. 
One of the purposes of my meta-theoretical framework, however, is precisely to 
challenge that notion. Finally, with respect to extending theory, normalisation points 
to the danger of "strai~acketing" the world we study to fit theory and, conversely, 
to force theory to fit context. Anomalies that might challenge our theories may be 
cut out or downplayed, and dialogue with other theorists decisively contributes to 
countering this limitation (Burawoy, 2000: 28). 
Publit'sociology 
Since 2006, the PhD process has included the production of eight publications in 
three different languages, the delivery of eight papers in international conferences, 
as well as 12 presentations in invitational seminars in the U1<, US, and the 
Netherlands (Appendices 18a, b, c). Although I view dissemination in academic 
(i.e. educational) environments as an indispensable part of political engagement, 
the other dimension, referred to as 'public sociology', is at least equally important. 
The aim of public sociology is to share sociological research and theory with the 
wider society in order to stimulate and enrich public debate about political and 
moral issues (Burawoy, 2004). Burawoy distinguishes between traditional (elite) 
public sociology (e.g. through books), and organic (grassroots) public sociology. 
Both are important, as "each feeds off the other" (2004: 1608). 
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The organic public sociologist enters into an unmediated relationship (dialogue) 
with the public - neighbourhood associations, labour movements, and other 
(progressive) communities. Doreen Massey strongly associates public sociology 
with a particular political commitment (Massey, 2008). By joining the question of 
Knowledge for What? with the ethical imperative of Knowledge for Whom?, Burawoy has 
developed a typology of sociology that categorises 'public sociology' as the extra-
academic counter-part of critical sociology (fable 2.2). 
Table 2.2 Knowledge in Public Sociology 
Instrumental knowledge 
(most efficient means) 
Reflexive knowledge 
Academic audience 
ProfessIonal sociology (Research 
Programme) 
''Puzzle-solvin g" 
Critical (critiques profeSSional 
SOCIology). Discussion among 






Discussion about values. direction of 
society ','ith a pu\)lic audience 
Source: Reproduced from Michael Burav,oy Semmar on Pubk Sociology. Univers'ly of Bath, 20 November 2007 
After my return from Venezuela in autumn 2006, I joined the Bristol Solidarity 
with Venezuela and Bolivia Solidarity Groups and started to engage in a range of 
traditional and organic public sociology activities. The more traditional forms 
comprise contributions to the GlobafHigherEd blog operated by my mentor Susan 
Robertson and our colleague I<ris Olds (University of Wisconsin-Madison) 
(http://globalhighered.\,vordpress.com/), which is visited by people associated 
with an array of institutions world-wide. I also launch comments on Latin 
American politics in German newspapers, websites, and blogs, such as die 
tageszeitung (http://\vw\v.taz.del), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(http://W\V\.v.faz.net/). Siiddeutsche Zeitung (http://www.sueddeutsche.de/).as 
well as the independent, alternative LAC news port amerika21 
(http://\v\'vw.amerika21.de/). 
Organic public sociology has included regular talks and informational e\'ents in 
public forums and cultural/community centres, primarily in Bristol and within the 
context of the solidarity group work. In Germany, I haye organised more formal 
e\'cnts in collaboration with 'Third \\7orld' Solidarity Groups, political parties, 
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and civil socIety sectors (e.g the Protestant Church). ~\ppendix 18d lists these 
activities. 
Some conclusions 
The critical case study methodology adopted in my investigation of the Boliyarian 
revolution and counter-hegemony facilitates combining two major concerns and 
objectives of this thesis. On one hand, critical theory's and my own political and 
ethical commitment to global transformation for a more just world advances the 
idea of 'research as moral practice' or as a 'practice of solidarity'. In contrast to 
conventional ethnography and its objectification and domination of 'the Other', 
critical ethnography contributes to cultural justice, i.e. the recognition of those who 
are researched. This is underscored by the acknowledgement of issues of power in 
the extended case method. In this respect, by acting in solidarity with the 
progressive potential, I consciously rum to 'silence' the dominant counter-
revolutionary discourses. On the other hand, theory improvement is the declared 
objective of the extended case method. Through the method, I could research the 
politics of scale and the processes of de- and reterritorialisation by linking the 
micro with the macro, and theory with practice, in my multi-scalar analysis of the 
Bolivarian revolution, in an attempt to contribute to developing a counter-
hegemonic globalisation theory. In short, to reconcile the production of critical 
academic knowledge with social responsibility. 
PART II 
Counter-hegetnony in Atnerica 
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Chapter Three 
Constructing counter-hegemony in LAC 
Yesterdqy, together with the Bolivian president Evo Morales Ayma, we said that the homeland 
has to live, even if it means for us to die. 
Fernando Lugo, President of Paraguay39 
Introduction 
This chapter draws on elements of the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 
One in order to integrate them in a discussion of LAC's restrengthened Left 
generally, and the Bolivarian revolution in particular. The objective is to identify 
and theorise fundamental aspects and concepts in the construction of counter-
hegemony in Venezuela and in the region. Importantly, the concepts introduced in 
this chapter are not exhaustively discussed, and will be further elaborated in the 
chapters to follow. In particular, I draw attention to the 1999 Constitution of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (CBRV, 2000) as providing the counter-
hegemonic legality, of which Santos speaks and to which I drew attention towards 
the end of Chapter One. I discuss the role of ideology in Venezuela's counter-
hegemony, the formation of a revolutionary class, and Bolivarian 'grand-
nationalism'. I also develop a critique of a recent paper by William Robinson in 
order to counter-argue the commonsensical, but inherently counter-revolutionary, 
claim to two Lefts in LAC. 
Constructing counter-hegemony 
In the early 1990s, Gill observed that the contradictions between "the logic of 
globalising forces" and the local political conditions for the operation of these 
.\9 Lugo as president-elect, in a public appearance in Quito together \\i~ Ecuad~nan, President Corrca, when 
visiting SC\Tral ;\LB.\ countnes t\\TO months before taking office (.\B~, 16/06/_l10SI. 
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forces were creating the conditions for counter-hegemony by generating new 
political parties and social movements (Gill, 1993: 12). Their struggle is commonly 
dominated by resistance to accumulation by dispossession (Han'ey, 2003). 
Examples include the "Lula phenomenon", i.e. the coalition of grassroots 
democratic forces under the leadership of now-president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva 
in Brazil (Gill, 1993: 12), and Bolivia's Movement to Socialism (MAS), led by now-
president Evo Morales, which according to Harris (2007) developed out of the 
resistance of the indigenous coca growers against the US' militarised "anti-drug 
campaign". By following Daniel Chavez (2004: 1-4) and other contributors in 
Chavez & Goldfrank's (2004) The Left in the City, it may be argued that polyarchy 
and political decentralisation under neoliberalism have produced a conjuncture of 
factors that have not only facilitated the participation of left-wing parties in 
elections, but have lent their victories legitimacy and contributed to the rise of 
LAC's new Left from the municipal level to the presidencies. Electoral victories by 
the Left, to Poulantzas, are a counter-hegemony in the state apparatuses as they 
counter-balance the dominant-class hegemony in civil society (Carnoy, 1984: 74). 
The Bolivarian government identifies capitalist profit-maximisation as the root 
cause of the asymmetric relationships within and between countries and, by 
pointing to regressive social mobility in Venezuela since 1982, names inequality, 
inequity, poverty and exclusion (social, economic, political, cultural) as the nation's 
most salient social problems (MCT, 2005: 61). Fighting these would require "giving 
power to the poor" (Chavez, 2004b), so that the victims themselves become 
transformers of the unequal power structures and the century-long exploitation: 
the power of knowledge, health, and organisation (MINCI, 2005b). Associating 
democracy with rights and social justice, and equality as a principle of justice 
(Marshall, 1950: 24), provides the legitimisation of the revolution and the 
philosophical cornerstones of the CBRV. According to the American Association 
of Jurists, the CBRV establishes ... 
.. the most modern constitutional principles and rights and institutions whose 
~aterialization would constitute an important advance in social justice and in 
overcoming the levels of poverty, margi~ati.on and li.mitation tha~ [ ... ] a very high 
percentage of the population suffer (Asoclacl6n Americana de JUristas, 2000). 
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The CBRV has become a normative benchmark for the LAC revolutionary 
processes, and can be viewed as underlying the idea of a 'new' LAC Left. The 
following reflections on the resurgence of Latin America's Left complement the 
Venezuela-specific historical overview in Chapter One and provide a contextual 
framework for analysing counter-hegemony in this and in the subsequent chapters. 
Although poverty in Latin America appears to be lower than ever since 1980 -
stated at 36.5% in 2006 - in absolute terms the number of poor people has 
increased from 136 million in 1980 to 194 million in 2006 (ECLAC, 2007: 9). With 
a Gini coefficient of 0.58 (UNDP, 1999: 39)40, by the late 1990s LAC had became 
the world's most inequitable region, and 55% of Latin Americans have questioned 
the legitimacy of polyarchy on grounds of socio-economic apartheid (UNDP, 
2004: 33, 39). The inability of polyarchy to resolve or defuse the political, 
economic and social contradictions and struggles that itself produces, explains the 
system's "long-term fragility" (Robinson, 1996: 179; Gills et ai, 1993: 27). However, 
while socio-economic contradictions may create favourable conditions for a crisis 
of hegemony, economic crises by themselves do not automatically lead to 
revolution, and decisive are the political and ideological relations of forces 
(Gramsci, 1971: 184-85; Forgacs, 1988: 190). I shall first look into the possibility of 
transnational revolutionary class formation as a major political force, before 
exploring the role of ideology in the Bolivarian revolution. 
The making of a revolutionary class 
In Chapter One, I established that the changed global relations of production 
require a non-essentialist understanding of the working class. Neither has the 
working class brought about 'the revolution', as I<arl Marx & Friedrich Engels 
anticipated (Hobsbawm, 1999: 27-31), nor has it become Gramsci's "fundamental 
social group" that would integrate subordinate classes in the construction of 
counter-hegemony (see Gramsci, 1971: 161,181-82; Cox, 1999: 15) . .As (in the 
North) the working class and other oppositional forces have successfully been 
~o a = absolute cqualtty; 100 = absolute inequality. 
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integrated into the consumer culture, Marcuse anticipated the "outcasts and 
outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races and other colours, the 
unemployed and the unemployable" who "exist outside the democratic process" to 
bring about revolution (Marcuse, 1964: 200). This is, in Santos' tenus, the 
underclass of the excluded who would from within uncivil society challenge the 
conception of the interests of global capital being the general interest (2002a: 459). 
Even if there is a working class in the orthodox sense, constructing hegemony 
requires abandoning "proletarian purism" in order to construct a "national class" 
that represents the numerous social groups (Mouffe, 1979: 197). In Venezuela, this 
class, which I refer to as revolutionary class, has been "happening with awesome 
intensity" over the past decade, as Raby (2006: 159) states with reference to E.P. 
Thompson. Important in this process has been the "repoliticization of social 
inequality" through the government's emphasis of social, economic and cultural 
rights, i.e. the development of people's political consciousness, which has 
particularly included the "historically unorganised poor" (Santos' underclass of the 
excluded) (Roberts, 2003; Troudi et al, 2005: 34). It is, as Haiman El Troudi and 
Juan Carlos Monedero state, a class conception based on oppression of any kind, 
and with an emphasis on unequal consumption (Troudi & Monedero, 2007: 91; 
Troudi, 2007: 3741). This is important to recognise, because counter-revolutionary 
forces incessantly blame Chavez for the (unavoidable) political polarisation in the 
country, claiming that in the 4th Republic all of Venezuela had lived happily 
together. Underlying such claims is the idea of "consensual politics" and the 
controlled resolution of conflict through hegemonic institutions and procedures, 
and a fear of class struggle initiated from below (rather than the class war from abo\'e, 
which we have become so used to) (Bachrach & Botwinick, 1992: 152). To recall, 
since class struggle is a power relationship and, as discussed in Chapter One, if a 
power relationship is most effective (potent) the more covert (non-obselTable) it 
is, then the absence of o\rert class struggle does not necessarily mean that there is 
4\ Troudi has been Director of the Presidential Office (2005-06), a member of the :-foral & Enlightenment 
Presidential Council, and researcher with the Centro Intemacional \1iranda, Caracas 
(http://centrointemacionalmiranda.go?.ve!), in charge of the progranune on 21 Sr century socialism: He was 
appointed i-IIinister of Popular Power tor Planrung and De\-elopment 111 January 2008, succeedmg GlorJa!1l. 
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no latent class conflict (cf ibid.: 150). However, rather than national class fonnation, 
this thesis proposes that the Bolivarian revolution seeks the fonnation of a 
tranmational revolutionary class. 
The role of ideology 
A simple class alliance neither fonns a historical bloc nor creates hegemony. 
Required is ideology, as the "cement" to achieve unity and moral and intellectual 
leadership, i.e. a "higher synthesis", so that all elements of hegemony "fuse in a 
'collective will' which becomes the new protagonist of political action" (Mouffe, 
1979: 184). I<ey to constructing a "collective will" based on a common worldview 
is a process of transformation (Gramsci's "intellectual and moral refonn"), in the 
course of which existing ideological elements of the hegemonic system are 
rearranged (see Gramsci, 1971: 195): 
The objective of ideological struggle is not to reject the system and all its elements 
but to rearticulate it, to break it down to its basic elements and then to sift through 
past conceptions to see which ones, with some changes of content, can serve to 
express the new situation (Mouffe, 1979: 192). 
Moreover, as stated in Chapter One, successful hegemony has to incorporate the 
diverse popular interests in the construction of the "national-popular collective 
will", which includes "national-popular ideological elements", especially 
"nationalism" and "patriotism", as well as other elements rooted in the history of a 
country and the contributions made by the diverse social movements. These 
ideological elements often move to centre stage in the struggle for hegemony, 
provide a link between leader and people, and change meaning as they are 
appropriated by different fundamental classes and articulated to different 
hegemonic principles (Mouffe, 1979: 195). 
In Venezuela, constructing Bolivarian hegemony has involved rearticulating 
resistance and liberation heroes, of which three are foundational (the "three-root 
tree" [drbol de los !res rakejj): Simon Rodriguez (alias Samuel Robinson) (1769-1854), 
Simon Bolivar (1783-1830), and Ezequicl Zamora (1817-1860). The three ha,'e, 
respectively, been referred to as 'the teacher', 'the leader', and 'the warrior' (Guerra, 
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2007: 32). Rodriguez, who once was Bolivar's educator, integrated Rousseau's 
Emile and Defoe's Robinson Crusoe in his popular education philosophy and stood 
up for LAC's cultural independence. His oft-cited epigram 'We either invent, or 
we err" referred to a reconciliation of traditional indigenous cultures \vith 
modernity in order to create a new model of development, including institutions, 
on which grounds he rejected representative democracy in favour of popular 
power Gorge, 2000: 181-83; Miller, 2006). Bolivar's emancipatory republicanism is 
constituted by resistance to imperialism through Latin American integration. 
Zamora stands for federal revolution against the domestic oligarchy, by forming 
civic-military unity to fight for radical agrarian reform, as expressed in his slogans 
"Land and free men", "General elections" and "Horror to the oligarchy" 
(Rodriguez, 2004; Pereira Almao, 2004; Gott, 2005; MINCI, 2007a). It is probably 
reasonable to suggest that within the revolutionary project, the articulation of 
Bolivar and other resistance heroes aims to construct a Bolivarian identity - a self-
image of bolivancmo, rather than chavista (Chavez-follower). 
Transnational 'war of position' 
To Mouffe, (1979: 197), the process of disarticulation-rearticulation in a class's 
struggle for hegemony forms part of Gramsci's "war of position", as one type of 
political struggle. While a war of manoeuvre (frontal attack to overthrow and capture 
the state) is only viable when a system's power is concentrated in one or a few sites 
(the state as represented by the palace, military etc.), a war of position (trench warfare 
for working-class consciousness) is strategic collective action when the power of 
the dominant group(s) is diffused, in the form of cultural (ideological) processes 
(Gramsci, 1971: 229-39; Carnoy, 1984: 80-5). A 'war of position' is grounded in the 
principle of dialectic in critical theory, which opens up revolutionary potential 
through the development of a rival structure \vithin the hegemonic superstructure 
"by seeking out" the counter-structure's "possible bases of support and elements 
of cohesion" (Cox, 1981: 1-t-t). Forming a counter-hegemonic historical bloc withill 
national boundaries, howevcr, will not suffice, as for instance l\Jicaragua'~ failed 
revolutionary experience showcd because, even if state power is taken, counter-
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revolution operates through inter-, trans- and supranational, disciplinary 
arrangements (in addition to coercion). To reiterate, the institutional patterns, 
political practices and policy processes associated with meta-governance imply the 
active re-making of not only state apparatuses and governmental practices, but also 
of the institutions of civil society (Gill, 2001: 47, 51). Therefore, in recognition of a 
relational approach to the state and meta-governance, revolution, as Poulantzas 
argued, is not a "straight choice" between war of position and frontal war of 
movement because of the relationship of forces within the state apparatuses, 
national and transnational civil society and the governance regimes, which all 
become strategic sites of political, ideological and economic class struggle 
(2000[1978]: 254, 258). To be successful, counter-hegemony would thus have to be 
upscaled and involve the formation of a transnational revolutionary historical bloc 
of forces. The Venezuelan strategy, as this thesis argues, appears to embrace such 
an attempt by either aiming to radically reform existing hegemonic institutions, and 
by creating new counter-hegemonic institutions. Simultaneously, the above-stated 
'transnational revolutionary class' is acting across scales through an emergent 
transnational organised society, as Chapter Six will further show. 
Bolivarian 'grand-nationalism' 
As became evident during the April 2002 coup d'etat against the Bolivarian 
government, the threat to, and target of, the TCC is not Chavez per se, but the 
CBRV and its parameters for "refounding" the Republic. The principal action by 
the 3-day dictatorship in 2002 was to annull the CBRV, dissolve all associated 
institutions and re-institute the 1961 constitution. To be sure, the CBRV does not 
only provide the normative grounds for all government and popular action, but 
above all epitomises counter-hegemony by blocking the power of transnational 
capital or, conversely, accumulation by dispossession: firstly, by constitutionalising 
the national oil company PDVSA as public property; secondly, by putting rights 
oyer profits through a comprehensiye social, cultural, economic, en\rironmental, 
indigenous-intellectual and political rights agenda; and, thirdly, by declaring the 
national resources "public goods" (subsoil, air, maritime, genetic nlJterial, \,rater) 
Chapter Three 118 
(CBRV, Articles 10-15, 73, 303-304). The implications of this must not be under-
estimated, as thus the CBRV outlaws the transnational ideological and juridico-
political superstructure that had been sought to be established \~ia the FT~\'-\ 
(Aguilar & Carrillo, 2005; Mora, 2006). Put differently, the CBRV impedes the new 
constitutionalism Gill speaks of, and its attempt to "lock in" neoliberal governance 
in national legality (2008: 161). 
To Mora (2006), the fonn of nationalism constructed upon the CBRY is not a 
revival of methodological nationalism - which takes the national scale as the 
ontologie ally primary locus of social relations, and political power in an inter-state 
system (Brenner, 2004: 38; 74) - but a new, "Bolivarian neo-nationalism" which 
"dissolves the national-international binary". This, to Mora, came out into the open 
at the 3rd Summit of the Americas in Quebec in 2001, when Venezuela declared its 
reservations with respect to the implementation of the FT.AA by December 
2005.42 On that occasion, according to Mora, Chavez recognised the permeation of 
the national space of state power by inter-, supra- and transnational actors, 
organisations and processes, whilst acknowledging that countering phenomena 
such as inequality and conflicts would require a global framework of analysis and 
action (Mora, 2006: 51). This insight provides the backdrop for the ALBA strategy 
analysed in Chapter Six. Noteworthy for now is that Mora's "neo-nationalism" has, 
since the 5th ALBA Sununit of April 2007, entered the Bolivarian discourse as 
grand-nationalism, which is institutionalised across the region as 'grand-national 
projects' (GNPs) and 'grand-national companies' (GNC). GNCs, as Chapter Six 
will show, are the Bolivarian response to MNCs/TNCs. Historico-ideologically, 
the concept is rooted in Bolivar's vision of a 'Grand Homeland' [Gran Paln'a] or 
"the grand American nation" (Bolivar, 1971 [1813]), an idea that the CBRY 
contains as a "community of nations" (Art. 153), currently under construction as 
the South American Union of Nations (UN~-\SUR) and the ~-\LB~\ (Chapter SL'X), 
~2 f)('(/'''·d/f(}11 of Qllebe" City (p. 6) and Plan of .-\crion (point 6, p, 15), 
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Grand-nationalism must not be associated with imperialism and/or Germanic 
fascism. To the contrary. Mora (2007) ascribes the emergence of grand-nationalism 
to the region-wide grassroots-democratic rebellions and popular movements that 
have formed in response to hegemonic globalisation, such as Zapatismo in ~Iexico, 
the Landless Movement in Brazil (MST), the popular-indigenous-military uprising 
in Ecuador, the leadership of Bolivian coca grower (now president) rvforales, and 
the Argentinazo, the social protests during Argentina's neoliberal collapse in 2001. 
Grand-nationalism is anchored in LAC liberation philosophy and theology, in 
which the ritualisation of Bolivar, as possibly the epitome of an Andean culture of 
resistance, and of the national symbols have assumed a legitimisation function. 
While this in itself is not new, key to Mora (2006: 50) is a redefinition of these 
national symbols under Chavez, where the historically "hypostasised" BoliYar 
ceases to "symbolise the power of the privileged classes" and becomes "the leader 
that inspires those 'from below', the ragged, the 'outcast' [a£Dargatudos], ultimately 
those to whom historically a dialectics of negation has been applied".43 This has, in 
Gramscian terms, been a process of disarticulation and re-articulation of the 
national-popular ideological elements to the revolutionary discourse. To reiterate, 
in itself the national popular is not class-related, but constitutes "the terrain of 
ideological struggle between two classes confronting each other for hegemony" 
(Mouffe, 1979: 195). 
Semiologically, since March 2006, this rearticulation is present in Venezuela's newly 
introduced Bolivarian flag, which represents the indigenous and peasant peoples' 
cultures and knowledges by depicting bow, arrow and a machete (see Appendix -t-). 
As the CBRV is the first constitution since Bolivar that explicitly recognises 
Venezuela as a "multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society" (preamble), i\Iora (2006: 
53) argues that Bolivarian neo-nationalism has not only vindicated liberation 
philosophy and the cultures of ethnic resistance, but simultaneously contributes t<) 
overcoming the "complex of bastardisation" - that is, overcoming internalised 
~., F ill t tl'on I add: in the :\ndean countries (Boli\;a, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, \'enezuela), Ie. those 
or us ra , . d . th Lib 
liberated by Bolivar, virtually each city, town and \illage hayc thcll central square name alter e er.ltor 
Since, hist~rically, it were the ruling classes that occupied t~ose places (e.g. colorual gO\'emment), they 
became constructed as elite spaces in the process of which Bou\'ar was coopted. 
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embarrassment and reclaiming the concept of mestizaje as a condition to take pride 
in, a condition that has to be promoted counter to "racial purity [that] has always 
been the banner of the Westerners and the source of the supposed right to 
conquer" (Este cited in Mora, 2006: 52). 
Class and race 
As the above suggests, race and cultural identity are important subtexts to the 
Bolivarian revolution and class formation therein (Hellinger 2003: 49). About 64% 
of Venezuelans identify themselves as non-white - which means, considering the 
element of stigmatisation in mestizqje, the real figure may well be over 80% (Gatt, 
2007). Based on correlations between racial category, social strata and '.'oring 
patterns, Cannon (2008: 737) views a "high probability" that Chavez-supporters 
are located in the poorer and more dark-coloured sectors. Despite the denial of 
class and race, i.e. the 4th Republic myth of Venezuela's "racial democracy" (Ellner 
& Tinker Salas, 2007a: xiv), the antagonisms have always been there - in the media, 
as well as in the political economy, in the form of unfairly structured employment, 
taxation, wealth and in the distribution of social goods, which aggravated under 
neoliberalism and constituted the root cause for political polarisation (Cannon, 
2008). 
Gott (2007) shows that historically in LAC, raCIsm and classism have been 
inseparable phenomena of "settler colonialism". The white settler elites, who were 
the most racist and violent in the colonial project, managed to combine the 
simultaneous oppression of two different groups in their territory: the indigenous 
peoples, through the primitive accumulation of their land, and the black peoples, 
through the appropriation of their slave labour .. A.fter nominal independence, these 
elites have identified more closely with their counter-parts in Europe and the US 
than with the masses, \'vho remained excluded from 'nation-building'. The 
"ingrained racist fear and hatred" of those elites comes out into the open when the 
expropriated underclass challenges the social order (Gott, 2U07: 273). Racism is 
reflected in the tem1 'Latin America' itself, which successfully replaced Bolivar's 
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and Marti's emancipatory projects of a Confederation of Spanish American Nations and 
Our America, and the concepts' clear distinction of the southern from the northern 
hemispheres (Gott, 2007: 270). In this sense, Chavez has proposed "our sub-
continent" to be called "Indo america" (Aporrea, 13/08/2008). 
Race and class have, in opposite ways, remained important ingredients in Cha\'ez', 
the opposition and global corporate media discourses: Chayez, himself pardo 
(mixed race) of African, European and Amerindian descent, and from an under-
priviliged background, uses race and class in a confirmatory and popular identity-
building way, as indicated in the previous section. In the 1998 electoral campaign, 
Julia Buxton (2003: 123) recalls, Chavez' colloquialisms and commitment to 
indigenous rights could not have encountered a starker contrast than in the figure 
of his opponent, Yale-educated Governor Henrique Salas Romer, "the white, 
upper-class 'oligarch"'. Accordingly, the opposition uses their private media power 
for both subde and overt racism to raise sentiments against the President and the 
lower classes. Examples from the media include the construction of the people as 
irrational and easily manipulated "hordes", and reference to the president simply as 
a "monkey" (Cannon, 2008). In Bolivia, Morales and his indigenous supporters are 
exposed to even more extremist defamation. Among the popular classes, however, 
such ingrained misrecognition is increasingly challenged. Stereotypical routine 
maligning and disparaging (Fraser, 2003: 13) is fended off, as is reflected in the 
following popular class UBV student's testimony with respect to the common 
association in LAC of poverty ("the village") with "immorality": "Before, in order 
to be president, you had to be son of the rich - first of all. Not now. Now -look, 
Chavez comes from the village. No-one believes that a child born in a village would now be 
teaching morall' (Interview 28, Appendix 16b). 
The resU1;gence of the Left 
The paradox of polyarchy consists In the fact that employment of formal 
democratic processes has de-legitimated a war of manoeuyre, here taken to mean 
anned resistance or revolution, while the widening of the ciyic-political legal space 
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has facilitated a war of position, in the sense of counter-hegemonic organisation in 
civil society with the objective to win elections. Acquiring constitutional legitimacy 
appears to have been a strategic objective by the post-1992 1\fBR-200 (see Chapter 
One): after reading Gramsci in prison, Chavez speaks of the creation of a "popular 
Bolivarian bloc", and paraphrases Gramsci (see 1971: 57) by stating that "a party 
that aspires to lead society must be a leader before coming to power" (Chayez 
cited in Harnecker, 2002: 82). This strategy has been employed by Latin America's 
new Left generally, in the course of which the two organisational forms of political 
party and social popular movement have coalesced with the underclass of the 
excluded around a "reconstructed left identity" (cf Robinson, 1992b; also Hylton & 
Thomson, 2005). Electoral victories at the sub-national levels since the mid-1980s 
- including major cities such as Sao Paulo, Porto Alegre, Bogota, 1\fontevideo, 
Caracas, Mexico City, Managua - have laid the basis for the Left to assume 
presidential offices, often after experimenting with new kinds of participatory 
politics at those levels (Chavez, 2004: 1-2; Green, 2003: 190-91). Convening 
constituent assemblies to draft new constitutions ratified by popular referendum, 
first by Venezuela and followed by Bolivia and Ecuador, serves to transform the 
political-juridical superstructure (existing institutions and procedures) and allows a 
dismantling of the bourgeois colonial state. It also protects the project from easy 
reversal. The simultaneity of these processes in various countries bears implications 
for regional and global counter-hegemony (see Chapter Six).44 
As a historically unprecedented conjuncture, concerted action by the increasing 
number of new Left governments poses an inacceptable challenge to the 
hegemonic interests. In this context, a 'two-Lefts thesis' has emerged: on one hand, 
a tolerable, reconstructed, free market polyarchic left, presented as "pragmatic", 
"sensible" and "modern", including above all Michelle Bachelet and her 
predecessor Ricardo Lagos (Chile), but also 'Lula' (Brazil) and Tabare Vazquez 
.f.f On a tentative note, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Honduras may be added to this list: Ortega has mtroduced 
tl 'd f u1 r direct democracy bv decree as 'citizen power councils' (epC). Paraguayan preSident-elect 1e 1 ea 0 pop a, . J' . . . ' 
F d I 0 has announced constitutional reform to mtroduce parttopatory democracy (Aporrt:a, eman 0 ,ug . . bl .. 02/05/200~). Honduran president ~Ianuel Zelaya announced a referendum on a consntuent a~sem ) m 
November 2008 (;\porrca. 22/11/2008). 
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(Uruguay); on the other hand, an apparently eyer-growtng supposedly 
"demagogical", "nationalist", "populist" left "without ideological foundations", 
such as Chavez (Venezuela), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Fidel Castro (Cuba), Daniel 
Ortega (Nicaragua), Nestor Kirchner (Argentina), Rafael Correa (Ecuador), as well 
as (ex-)presidential candidates Manuel L6pez Obrador (i\lexico) and Ollanta 
Humala (peru) (Ramirez Gallegos, 2006; Petkoff, 2005). Ardent anti-Left 1\lexican 
ex-foreign minister Castaneda pushes the demagoguery even further by 
distinguishing a "right" from a "wrong" Left, the latter supposedly being 
"resistant" to "modernizing influences", "speaks loudly but carries a small social 
stick", and perceives economic performance and democratic values as 
"bothersome constraints" (Castaneda, 2006). In unison, the White House (2006: 
37) states with respect to Venezuela that the "deceptive appeal of anti-free market 
populism must not be allowed to erode political freedoms and trap the 
Hemisphere's poorest in cycles of poverty". While the extreme right inevitably 
promulgates such a discourse, of greater concern is the adoption of the 'two-lefts 
tale' by generally progressive sectors in the North, including the more doctrinaire 
Marxists and anti-globalisation activists. The tale is frequently complemented by a 
reduction of the revolution to Chavez, and a supposed "rift" between Chavez and 
Lula, for which there is no evidence at all. To the contrary, since September 2007 
Lula and Chavez convene quarterly meetings, in which Morales and Correa 
participated for the ftrst time in September 2008 (VTV, 30/09/2008; ABI, 
30/09/2008):+5 
I propose to view the 'two-Lefts thesis' as a counter-revolutionary divide-and-rule 
strategy - a myth that has to be deconstructed, not so much in a (futile) attempt to 
'educate' the Right, but to emancipate the Left from reproducing a discourse 
detrimental to progressive objectives. Since Castaneda's unsubstantiated claims 
have systematically been disproved by Geraldine Lie,'esley and Steve Ludlam 
(forthcoming), I concentrate on the latter group by taking a recent publication by 
45 Fl' Lula has "consistently defended Chavez" (\Veisbrot in The ~at1on, 06/12/200~) and Lula 
or exarnp e. , . . .,,' d EI""'" al ')- '04 / ' ))7. 
'd CI " "'z "an exceptional political and commerCIal alh' (Lula ate lfl ...... aaon , -. _t ( . const ers 1.\\ '- • , • 
also: :\porrea, 20 nl)/2007. 07/12/2(07). 
Chapter Three 124 
William Robinson as an exemplary case. In Transformative Possibilities in Latin 
America, Robinson (2007) rejects Castaneda's "ideologically-driyen absurdities" but 
nevertheless maintains "that there are two lefts" (Robinson, 2007: 8, italics original). 
Robinson bases his judgement on a political economy analysis which, as I will 
show in this section as well as in Chapter Six, is reductionist, methodologically 
nationalist, and poorly informed. To Robinson, a "reformist left" - Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Nicaragua - with a "mild redistributive component" would 
dominate over a "more radical" minority (Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela) that "seeks 
a more substantial transformation of social structures class relations and , , 
international power dynamics" (Robinson, 2007: 8). The "reformists" are "allied 
with global capital", of which Robinson considers Ortega and the FSLN to be "the 
most illusory" case (2007: 6). Robinson continues to insist that inequality would 
not decrease under the "reformist left" (which could even be claimed about the 
'radicals', i.e. Venezuela, see Chapter Five), and that the "reformist" poverty 
reduction measures would not be financed through taxing capital, but labour and 
the middle classes. 
These are bold statements, considering that, for instance, Ortega had not even 
been in power for half a year when Robinson published his paper, and that the 
FSLN administration apparently has started reclaiming hitherto unpaid taxes from 
MNCs (ESSO, Uni6n Fenosa, Barcel6).46 Analytically more important is that 
thinking in binaries suggests a static, ahistorical ,riew, which Robinson contradicts 
himself: in a paper published in 2004 - i.e. jive years into the Bolivarian revolution, 
and apparently completely ignorant of the socialist potential contained in the 
CBRV and NESD-2001 - Robinson referred to the Bolivarian project as 
"populist", without further qualifying the concept (Robinson, 2004c: 1-P). \\'hcn 
using a highly ideologised and therefore contentious concept such as 'populist', it 
has to be defined, because otherwise the hegemonic discourse, which takes 
'populist' as "opportunism", "demagogy", "manipulation" and even "dictatorship" 
(Raby, 2006: 17, 231), is likely to be reproduced ... \11 the morc surprising is that 
-16 ~\ccording to the achievements of the first 18 months of the Ortega administratlon ~feso-.\mencan 
Social 0,lovement Forum in Radio La Primerisima, 16/07/2008). 
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Robinson's 2007 paper suddenly classifies Venezuela as "radical", "revolutionary" 
and "socialist" (whilst Nicaragua now is 'populist', 2007: 5) .. As I argue in the 
Introduction to the thesis, 'populist' does not equate it with 'socialist', and 
apparently Robinson views a difference between the concepts, because otherwise 
the shift in labelling would be unnecessary. In other words, Robinson himself 
suggests change, i.e. process, which contradicts his fixed binaries. 
Robinson's argumentation, however, contains further inconsistencies. On the one 
hand, he points to the transnational structural (capitalist) constraints in any national 
redistributive project and rightly highlights that Chavez was "barely able to modify 
[the state] during his ftrst few years" (Robinson, 2007: 12, 15). Formal power, as 
stated in Chapter One, does not automatically translate into real power, as action is 
constrained by the embeddeness of neoliberalism in programmes and the state 
apparatus. Now, if Chavez, who governs in a resource-rich country with a solid 
60% majority and a large part of the population highly mobilised, was struggling to 
extend real power, what radicality can there be expected of, for instance, Ortega, 
with a 38% minority government in the second poorest nation in the hemisphere, 
whose economy is ftrmly in the grip of global capitalism, and a large part of the 
population traumatised by decades of military, economic and psychological 
warfare? Similarly, Robinson argues that the "reformist" governments hayc 
"abandoned earlier programmes of fundamental structural change in the social 
order itself' and are "unwilling or simply unable to challenge the global capitalist 
order" (2007: 6). There is, I would argue, a crucial difference between "un\villing" 
and "unable". Therefore, despite the superficial appeal of, for instance, counter-
posing Chile with Venezuela, a more differentiated and empowering analysis that 
transcends the divisive and static 'either-or' is necessary. 
My counter-argumentation follows Ecuadorian scholar Franklin Ramirez Gallegos, 
as well as Lievesley & Ludlam (forthcoming), \vho speak of "multiple lefts" and a 
"continuum", respcctivel}'. This is, however, only one dimension of ffi\' 
argumentation. The other one enters in Chapter Six, in the form of .-\LB.\'s 
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counter-hegmonic regionalism, which is either completely absent or significantly 
under-estimated in the 'two-Iefts'-accounts. Chapter Six will show that L~-\C's left 
under Venezuelan leadership is becoming increasingly interconnected, and that a 
process-based analysis using New Regionalism Theory allo\vs seeing the longer-
term transformatory potential, regionally and globally. By employment of direct 
and participatory democratic practices, under ALBA a complex inter-scalar web of 
counter-hegemonic spaces and institutions across the entire L~-\C is being 
constructed. 
Rather than one or two lefts, Ramirez Gallegos (2006) speaks of multiple Lefts. He 
convincingly argues that LAC's Left is highly heterogeneous due to their historical 
trajectories, organisational composition and programmatical agendas. In each 
country, the Left - whether in government or not - is conditioned (and 
constrained) by a combination of forces: the country's international and global 
position, as well as its domestic power constellations, not only between Left and 
Right, but also within the leftist parties, movements and coalitions themselves. 
Decisive too, however, is not to look for differences, but to see the common 
ground, which is a "normative readjustment" towards recuperating the state and 
increasing equality, within the longer-term objective of overcoming neoliberalism, 
irrespective of how fast this agenda is, or can be, advanced in each country 
(Ramirez Gallegos, 2006). In this respect, Robinson (2007: 1) argues that an anti-
or post-neoliberal consensus by far does not equate with anti-capitalism. While this 
is certainly so, the possibility of neoliberalism having come to be used as a 
euphemism for capitalism should be considered-+7; and, perhaps more importantly, 
the consensus among virtually all (not only "radical" left) governments in the 
region on integration, in which Venezuela has taken the lead - a Venezuela that 
Robinson, as stated, views turning socialist. So, if \T enezuela is becoming 'socialist', 
and Venezuela drives LAC integration, then - as Chapter Si.-x \\li11 propose - wc 
may well be witnessing the formation of a counter-hegemonic bloc that bcars the 
potential for more radical, anti- and non-capitalist transformation in all LAC 
-17 For instance, President Correa, PhD in Economics, speaking of an "epochal change" trom 
"neoliberalism" to "socialism" (cited in .Aporrea, 16/08/2008). 
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countries. And here the circle closes: the momentary degree and trajectory of this 
transformation is conditioned by the national and historical configuration of 
forces, cultures, and so on. 
The divide-and-rule principle forms part of the larger effort to reinforce the 
hegemony of political liberalism. From Valenzuela's (1989) NED-funded 
recommendations for Chile's post-1988 "redemocratisation", Robinson (1996: 
179) extracts three functional mechanisms and organisational forms designed to 
ensure a well-structured polyarchic system: 
1. A less fractious right/ centre party structure, unified against the Left. 
2. Strong institutional links between the state and elite-controlled ci\"il socIety, 
. 
through which the popular sectors' operational space to challenge hegemony 
can be curtailed. 
3. Parliamentary over executive power. 
As stated, these mechanisms have increasingly proven unfit to maintain hegemonic 
rule in LAC, as for instance in Nicaragua, where the strategy to unite the Right 
failed to produce the intended results in both the 2006 presidential and the 2008 
municipal/ departmental elections. Easily unnoticed goes (3), which is of utmost 
relevance. As I argued in Chapter One, parliamentary power is associated with 
party politics at the service of elite hegemony. Almost by definitional fiat, 
polyarchy has to discredit charismatic leaders, where a military background - as in 
the case of Chavez - is particularly welcome to paint a "vainglorious", 
"megalomaniac dictator", "populist" or "terrorist", "awash in oil money [ ... ] 
undermining democracy and seeking to destabilize the region", with "no \"iable 
development model" (White House, 2006: 15; Shifter, 2006).48 If a significant 
presence of Chavez can be perceived, it should be ascribed to his exceptional 
capacity as a revolutionary leader rather than to suddenly increased personal (i.e. 
illegitimate) power. 
48 .--\150 see \Valler (2005), Shannon (2005) and l'S (2006; 2007). For a cOWlter-perspectn-e. e.g. Golingcr 
(2005) on US-involvcment in the 2002 coup d'etat and the CS-goverrunent's refus.ll to cxtradtte 
internationally requested ex-CL\ terronst Posada Carriles. 
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Some conclusions 
This chapter has analysed and theorised a number of concepts fundamental to 
understanding the construction of regional counter-hegemony. I haye drawn 
attention to the Bolivarian ideology, the formation of a national and possibly 
transnational revolutionary class, and the idea of grand-nationalism. While 
discussing these concepts, I have introduced relevant contextual information in 
order to provide a basic understanding of contemporary LAC reality with respect 
to my research issues. A recent paper by Robinson lent itself to deconstructing the 
'two-Lefts myth' as a divide-and-rule strategy, and I have argued that the Left in 
LAC should rather be conceived as a continuum in motion rather than as a fixed 
binary. My discussion also involved identifying the discreditation of charismatic 
leaders as a mechanism of polyarchy. In this respect, as a kind of 'prelude' to the 
next chapter, it should be added that historically, Venezuela has had a "tradition of 
a very strong presidency". The 1961 constitution already conferred "considerable 
decree powers" to the president, including the capacity to suspend constitutional 
rights. According to Levine, such powers were used "extensively" by Chavez's 
predecessors (1989: 276, 288). While especially the "enabling law", which is a 
constitutional mechanism that transfers to the president the power of passing laws 
by decree49, has been under considerable attack by bourgeois and reactionary 
forces, an evaluation of Bolivarian democracy has to consider the newly introduced 
division of powers combined with economic democratisation. These will be the 
core issues of my discussion of revolutionary democracy in Chapter Four. 
49 TI bling law confers to the president from parliament the authority to legislate. Although the 
le ena 'al 1 '). limi' d 
I · 1 d . ext'sted in the 1961 constitution (there referred to as 'spec! aw, It was te to mec larusm a rea ~ . . . . 
di ,. ures ill' the economic and financial spheres. :\.n enabling law has to be sanctioned by a l'xtraor nary ml.1S . . ". . . 
th fif I li mentan
' ma,'orin' clearly define the area of application and the penod durmg \\ hich It IS U1 
ree- t 1 par a " . ' " ,r 
C ('T" 0 & 'f'lrtln' ez "'001'1"75 196,' CRY, 1961, .\rt. 190-t\; CBR\, .\rt. 203). lorce IClan ,\ . , ~ . , 
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Chapter Four 
Democracies and Socialisms 
Ma,!), people have said: "Let's go to the indigenous communities and help them. " We should say 
instead: {'Let's go and ask them for help and to cooperate with us in the construction of the 
socialist project of the 21 sf amtury. " 
Hugo Chavez Frias, President ofYenezuela (2007a: 48) 
... and they said that nationalii:!ng the fydrocarbons is a violation of the human rights. Rather. 
the historical piffage of our natural resources is a violation of the human nghtJ ... 
Evo Morales Ayma, President of Bolivia (cited in RBY, 2008a: 51) 
Introduction 
This chapter theorises Venezuela's 'revolutionary democracy' within the 
framework of the CBRV, the Five Constituent Motors, and the seven development 
axes of the 2007-2013 national development plan (NESD-2007; see Appendix 3c). 
If Bobbio (1987: 98) is right, that historically any transition to 'socialism' has 
involved Qarge-scale) internal or external violence (with the exception of Chile's 
thwarted attempt under Allende), then Venezuela is the fltst case of a democratic 
transition to socialism and, therefore, of utmost empirical significance. I argue that 
the Bolivarian conception of democracy provides the definitional foundation of 
21 st century socialism, which means it also constitutes the distinguishing feature to 
hitherto 'really existing socialisms' in which, as Gill (2008: 26) states, the state-ciyil 
society relations were co-ordinated by a paternalistic and authoritarian structure of 
political power. 
The Bolivarian government considers the reduction of popular participation to the 
\'otc as "negating the people the possibility of directly acting upon the alienating 
social relations that impoverish them" (lYnNeI, 2007a: 19). "Protagonistic 
revolutionary democrac/', therefore, stands for a counter-hegemonic political 
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economy culture that complements representatIve democracy with direct 
democracy and participatory democracy, in which the exercise of political po\ver 
aims to achieve "political-economic justice" and social well-being for all members 
of society (RBV, 2001: 8; RBV, 2007a: 19). The focus of this chapter consists in 
the different conceptualisations of democracy, while issues of social justice are 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
My analysis of revolutionary democracy draws on Held's (1996) distinction of two 
major types of democracy: liberal, representative democrary, with its chief yariants of 
'protective democracy' and 'developmental democracy'; and, direct demof-rary. 
According to Held (2006: 5), participatory democrary has been inspired by 
developmental democracy and direct democracy. Roussopoulos & Benello (2005) 
state that 'participatory democracy' ftrst appeared as a concept in the 1962 Port 
Huron Statement of the Students for a Democratic Society (Appendix 6a). At the 
time, Daniel C. I<ramer (1972) reminds us, the "anti-statist" radical Left referred to 
'participatory democracy' interchangeably as 'decentralist socialism'. However, in 
contrast to Marx's socialist direct democracy, the Port Huron Statement contains a 
strong individualist focus with respect to political and economic participation in 
society. Likewise, C.B. Macpherson locates participatory democracy in the liberal 
tradition. Therefore, while 'direct and participatory' are often treated as a singular 
concept, or one used interchangeably for the other (e.g. Avritzer & Santos, 2003; 
Dieterich, 2005), t he Venezuelan case of 'revolutionary democracy' suggests a 
distinction between 'direct' and 'participatory', as two distinct, albeit closely 
intertwined sub-concepts of revolutionary democracy, as the former emphasises 
political-economic collectivity, and the latter human rights for human 
development. Throughout the discussion, two fundamental questions that frame 
an interrogation of democracy should be kept in mind: who is the demos, the 
people, or a citizen?; and what exactly does cratos, rule or power, refer to, and how 
should it be exercised? (Held, 1987: 2). Both questions refer back to Fraser's global 
justice framework, and will culminate in an attempt to circumscribe Boliyarian 
citizenship at the end of the chapter. 
Chapter Four 
From polyarchy to democracy 
Two strands of representative democrary 
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Held (1987; 1996; 2006) shows that both direct democrac\' and partlClpatory 
democracy are anchored in ancient Greek philosophy, while liberal representative 
democracy is Roman-Christianity-derived. Antiquity's homo politic:us, the "active 
citizen" of the Greek polis - the 'city state' or 'city republic' - found their anti-thesis 
in the passive homo credens, the 'true Christian believer', which implied a transfer of 
wisdom and authority from the citizen to "other-worldly representatives", or a 
submission to God's will (pocock in Held, 1987: 36-37). The two traditions 
underlie two leading forms of Renaissance republicanism: 'developmental 
republicanism' and 'protective republicanism' (Held, 1996: 45). Despite risk of 
over-simplification, Held chronologically outlines the two threads as follows: 
ancient-Greek-rooted developmental republicanism is associated with Aristotle 
(384-322 BC), Marsilius de Padua (1275/80-1342), Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-97), 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78), Marx (1818-83) and Engels (1820-95). In a 
nutshell, developmental republicanism emphasises the intrinsic value of political 
participation in order to enhance decision-making and to develop the citizens as 
human beings. Both political and economic equality are viewed necessary for 
"equal freedom and development" (Held, 1996: 61). Protective republicanism, 
derived from Rome and its historians, primarily stresses the instrumental value of 
political participation in order to protect citizen's objectives and interests, i.e. their 
personal liberty, and is associated with Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), Charles 
Louis de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu (1689-1755), and James Madison (1751-
1836), a key architect of the US constitution. Needless to say, there are significant 
differences among theorists within each strand, and cross-fertilisation between the 
strands (Held, 1996: 45). 
Both Boliyar and Simon Rodriguez appear to be closer to Rousseau, which 
suggests locating the Boliyarian philosophy and ideology in deyelopmental rather 
than protectiyc republicanism. 50 ... -\ssociated with the two traditions Jrc the 
50 I 't f selectivelY drawing on Roman law, Locke and i-.!ontesquieu, accorcling to ~[ora (19981. Bolh'.1f 
n Spl eo. , , "h 'th al " 
c 11 d R 'eau ;n I..:s conceptualisations of sovereignty and liberty. which toget er \\1 mor PO\\ er .ue 
10 o\ve OUSS. J..u IU " 
Chapter Four 
132 
competing models of 'developmental' and 'protective' democracy (!\Iacpherson, 
1977). Brief consideration of both is necessary for the discussion of \T enezuela's 
revolutionary democracy to follow. 
Protective democracy, which underlies modern Western democracy and its 
pluralist elitist (polyarchic) version, integrates the rationale of a competiti\'e market 
society and its class antagonism, as advocated by Adam Smith (1723-1790), with 
Jeremy Bentham's (1748-1832) and James Mill's (1773-1836) Utilitarian model of 
the human being as a "maximizer of utilities" (a consumer and accumulator of 
"wealth without limit") and a model of society as a "collection of individuals with 
conflicting interests [ ... J incessandy seeking power over and at the expense of each 
other" (Macpherson, 1977: 24-6; 77-83). Democracy is thus deprived of its pre-
industrial potential as a "morally trans formative" or emanciaptory force and 
becomes a tool for the governance and protection of self-interested individuals in 
an inevitably inequitable society (ibid.: 43-44, 78). By accepting unequal distribution 
of income and wealth, 'equality' became increasingly defined in political terms 
(universal franchise): with Bentham and Mill, "there was the first formal separation 
between the organisation of the State as a political democracy and the organisation 
of the economy as class-based, unequal, capitalist production" (Carnoy, 198~: 32). 
T.H. Marshall's Citizenship and Social Class suggests that this separation can be 
viewed as the origin of the liberal limitation of (human) rights to the traditional 
individual civil liberties and political "freedoms" at the expense of social, economic 
and cultural, as well as collective rights (and, therefore, their partition through the 
liberal state institutionality) (Marshall, 1950; Arat, 1991). 
Developmental democracy, which goes back to John Stuart Mill (1806-73), is a 
"moral model of democracy" concerned with human development for a "free and 
the foundation of his concept of democracy. Despite such concepts being fundamental to both Bolivar's and 
Rodri ez's philosophies, Jorge (2000) warns against simplification. \\'ith respect to Rodriguez, Jorge (2000: 101-2~ refutes the common ascription of Rodriguez' philosophy to Rousseau's Emile and So",;,' Con/rd,:. To 
J R driguez has s)'nthesised a ''liberationist thinking" that was aLro expressed by Rousseau. Rodnguez orge, 0 . , ,. hi ' 'lib aI' . 
should neither be categorised as a 'contractualist nor an enlightened monarc st, nor ~ er or a utopIan 
socialist'. In bct, Jorge aims to show that Rodriguez, due to his li\'ed expenence 10 .-\menCl. 10 many 
respects transcended Rousseau. 
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equal society not yet achieved" (M:acpherson, 1977: 47-8). \X1hile both models 
pursue the maximisation of "happiness", the meaning of this could not contrast 
more starkly between the two. To Bentham, the "aggregate greatest happiness" of 
society was to be attained through the maximisation of productivity for individual 
material wealth; to J .S. :Mill, it required individual self-development for higher 
pleasures which, as :Mill acknowledged, was denied to most members of society 
due to social injustice O.S. :Mill in Macpherson, 1977: 52, 62). However, by 
accepting the standards of the market society, and blaming inequality on the 
"original feudal forcible distribution of property", Mill failed to see the 
contradiction between his developmental ideal and capitalist social relations 
(M:acpherson, 1977: 55, 57, 70). It is this contradiction that 21 st century socialism 
would be expected to resolve. The following overview of the basic ideas of 21 st 
century socialism provides the basis for my analysis of revolutionary democracy. 
Ideological roots and basic ideas of 21st century socialtim 
A range of government sources state that a "re-developed" socialism would 
assume a "broad meaning of social experiences", and integrate multiple elements 
from a range of philosophies and practices. Within the anti-imperialist tradition, 
Antonio Jose de Sucre, Jose Gervasio Artigas, Jose Marti and .Augusto Cesar 
Sandino should be mentioned; Marxism in all its offshoots, including the Cuban 
revolution 0 ulio Antonio Mella, Fidel Castro, Ernesto 'Che' Guevara) and 
Farabundo Marti (El Salvador); Christianity, certainly in the tradition of Latin 
American liberation theology (Camilo Torres, Monsignor Romero, etc.), but 
supposedly also biblically-rooted, through which a link to moral and distributive 
justice is created (see MINCI, 2007a: 30-1; Chavez, 2007a: 41--t-); the experiences of 
the indigenous peoples which, crucially refers to Fraser's recognition, as expressed 
at the 1 st International Congress of the Indigenous Peoples of America-Abaya 
Yala, held in Venezuela in August 2007, whose Declaration of Kumarakapay 
(Bolivar state) recaptures Peruvian ~farxist Jose Carlos 1fariategui's (189-t--1930) 
idea of an "Indo-American socialism" (Becker, 1998; 2006; Chavez, 20lFa). 
Cultural flTolution, i.e. "the construction of a subjectivity that subverts the 
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bourgeois values", is probably best expressed in the project's feminist dimension 
and in the Indo-American socialism, which incorporates the knowledges of both 
indigenous resistance and the Afro-American "runawav slave" and resumes the 
., , 
socio-cultural heritage of communitarian cooperativism, a harmonious relationship 
with nature, and the "public as a citizen meeting space" (Lanz Rodriguez, 2006: 5-
6; MINCI, 2007a: 22-7). 
Derived from a critical analysis of 20th century 'really existing socialisms', which in 
their majority were more of a bureaucratic state capitalist nature (Callinicos, 1996: 
182), direct democracy, and new forms of participation, are identified as key to any 
liberating project in order to emancipate labour from the relations of submission 
(surplus value production; profit maximisation; commoditisation; diyision of 
labour), to overcome political alienation and to re-absorb the political society in 
civil society through the construction of a new nexus between the state and the 
citizen, in the pursuit of a new hegemony that would permit to overcome 
consumerist alienation and the monopoly of knowing (Lanz Rodriguez, 2006; 
RBV, 2007a: 24; also Harvey, 2006: 1-38). While private ownership of basic utilities 
(especially housing) is actively promoted, the socialisation of the means of 
production is understood in Marx & Engels' (1942[1848]: 219-20) sense as the 
"abolition of bourgeois property", rather than of property per se. The thus created 
"social property" means popular control over the 'resources' in a broad sense, i.e. 
natural resources, industries, infrastructure, finance institutions, shopping centres, 
etc. (froudi & Monedero, 2007: 93-4). 
j-\t the heart of the new political econOffilC rationale are social production 
companies (SPCs). As the economic "vanguard" of 21 st century socialism, they are 
"deliberative processes" organised by the workers in constant interaction with the 
organised community (froudi & l\Ionedero, 2007: 134,216). The relati,'e \\Tight of 
participation is based on the person, not the contributed capital (RBV, 2007 a: 25). 
NESD-2007 defines SPCs as: 
economic bodies, based on participatory and protagonis~ic planning, ~evoted to the 
production of goods or services in which work has Its own Significance, non-
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without privileges In the work related to the hierarchical position with sUbstantive 
equality between its members (RBV, 2007a: 25). ' 
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Within the economic transformation, private capital in a production-based (rather 
than rentier or stockholder) economy will persist at least in the medium range 
(Figure 4.1). However, both the origin of investments and the gains are intended to 
be subject to control and subordinate to the collective interest (froudi & 
Monedero, 2007; Chavez, 2007a: 50). 





Source: Malave B. (2007: 26), RBV {2D07a: 2S} 
Envisaged Situation 
Illustrated is the pursued medium-tern1 transition from an economy domina ed by pnvate capitalist compames 
(Empresos Gapitalisras Privadas) to a more diversified and balanced one, in the course of whim state capitalist 
companies {Empresas Capitafistas de Estado} would become (non-<:apitalis ) state comp31lies (EmpreSfJs del Estado) 
and the sh~lIe of Social Production Companies (Empresas de Economia Soda!) would considerably increase. Any 
mixed organisational form is viewed possit})e. 
SPCs pursue a break with the paternalistic state and its bureaucratism and 
undoubtedly constitute an attempt not to copy the state capitalist economies of 
most of the 'really existing socialist' experiences. Instead, 21 t century socialism 
would have to be collectively constructed by the people's creati e and associati,~e 
capacities, where the tate 
cannot impose its view, restricting the population 's freedom and rights, negating 
the traditional substratum of the peoples. Rather, it has to person ify the popular Will 
and watch over the consolidation of unity based on the recogn ition of difference 
(MINel, 2007a: 23). 
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Contrary to a common criticism of Marxism, as Che Guevara (2005[1965]: 1-+9-51) 
reminds us, that socialism would mean the "abolition of the indiyidual" or the 
"subordination of the individual to the state", the above statement explicitly 
recognises individual rights and development, which is also present in 1farx's 
principle of justice (see Chapter Five). As Marx & Engels (1942[18-+8]: 228) 
proposed in the Communist Manifesto, the "free development of each is the 
condition for the free development of all". To reconcile the individual with the 
collective, Guevara uses the Cuban experience to speak of a "close dialectical unity 
between the individual and the mass, in which both interrelate and, at the same 
time, in which the mass, as an aggregate of individuals, interrelate with the leaders". 
The individual, as an actor in the construction of socialism, then assumes a "dual 
existence" in being both unique and a member of the community (2005[1965]: 
152-53). 
What has become referred to as the "revolutionary state" pursues a "reinvention" 
of the inherited liberal state, where useful liberal features (division of powers, 
juridical guarantees) are incorporated, but transcended by popular participation, 
experimentalism, and co-responsibility. The colonial state structure is aimed to be 
replaced by the "community state", which conceives of the state as a "political 
participatory space" where the political takes place also outside the institutional, 
administrative state or party environment, i.e. in the organised communities, 
districts, regions and military zones ('civic-military alliance'), the endogenous 
development nuclei (NUDEs), SPCs and cooperatives, and the social missions 
(froudi & Monedero, 2007: 163-66). Protagonistic revolutionary democracy thus 
aims to dissolve the modern-liberal public-priyate binary, approaching the classical 
Greek inextricability of state and society (cf Held, 1987: 17; RBV, 2007a: 17). 
Establishing the juridical framework for a politico-administrative reorganisation of 
the Republic as a community state is at the heart of the reform of the CBRY 
which, despite its rejection by popular referendum on 2 December 2007, has not 
been abandoned. 
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Transition to socialism 
Venezuela's revolution is an illustrative example of how transition occurs within 
the constraints of the existing structures which it attempts to transform. Four 
dimensions in Venezuela's transition to socialism have been identified which , 
should not be understood as stages but (despite the predominance of one or 
several at a given moment) as interacting processes. I sum up the main points as 
developed by Troudi (2007) and Troudi & Monedero (2007). 
• The "palliative phase", primarily concerned with paying the accumulated 
social debt in the most urgent spheres. This "voluntarist" period was 
governed by good will, naivety and inexperience, based on the assumption 
that the inherited state could serve the 5th Republic. However, the shift 
towards a more integral and structural approach is reflected in the launch of 
the missions from 2003 on. (Troudi & Monedero, 2007: 24-5; Troudi, 2007: 
23). 
• The "creation of the structural foundations" to counter the oil rentier and 
import-biased (unproductive) economy, i.e. 'endogenous development' 
(Chapter Five) (Troudi & Monedero, 2007: 25). 
• A combination of "state capitalism" (the state administers the social 
property) and "market socialism", where socialist premises and actiyities 
operate within the constraints of capitalist structures whilst attempting to 
overcome them. Socialist state enterprises are important in this phase, but 
more crucial are the SPCs. The socialist principles of exchange are applied 
to the international and global economy via ALBA (Troudi & l'v10nedero, 
• 
2007: 25-6). 
"True socialism", in which "each will give to SOCIcty according to their 
possibilities and ask from it according to their needs" ~Iarx's principle of 
justice under communism, see Chapter Fiyc), would require internal 
transformations, new forms of thinking and feeling resulting in new forms 
of social organisation bcyond the national at least at the regional scale 
(froudi & i\Ionedero, 2007: 26). 
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Revolutionary democrary 
As elaborated in Chapter One, polyarchy is a two-fold reductionism of democracy: 
fIrstly, it restricts democracy to the political, and therein, secondly, to 
representation through an institutional process, a method and procedure in the 
selection of leaders. The limitation of liberal representative democracy to 
encourage political participation beyond the vote and to promote social justice, 
provides the ra tionale for Venezuela's "revolutionary democracy", which 
complements representative with direct democracy and participatory democracy. 
Due to their philosophical inextricability, the concepts of 'direct' and 'participatory' 
are often used indiscriminately as "direct or participatory democracy" or, as by 
Bachrach & Botwinick (1992), who (in the post-Soviet Union context) content 
themselves with 'participatory democracy' as simply a democratisation of the 
workplace. However, against the backdrop of the Yugoslav experience, 
democratising the means of production or industrial property alone do not make 
for full participation, and workers' control has to be wedded to community control 
(Hunnius, 1972). Therefore, Venezuela drives a course as proposed by Benello & 
Roussopoulos (1972), who recognise the anarchistic tradition by calling for the 
democratisation of all (key) institutions of society. 
While Marxist-rooted direct democracy consists in the "twin themes" of worker 
and community control (Benello & Roussopoulos, 1972: 4), i.e. social control of 
the means of production and people's grassroot organisation in councils (Marx's 
'pyramid structure' of direct democracy), I theorise participatory democracy as 
people's social, political, economic and cultural participation and protagonism 
derived from individual liberties and rights, especially in connection with basic 
needs satisfaction (cf RBV, 2007a: 24). It is the integration of liberal rights 
('bourgeois freedoms') with a socialist political economy that makes Venezuela's 
democracy 'revolutionary'. It accords with Poulantzas' and Bobbio's conviction 
that the '''hard lessons' of history" - i.e. Stalinism - inyalidate the oft-perceived 
mutual exclusiveness (or tautology) of 'socialism' and 'democracy' (Bobbio, 19H7: 
57). Poulantzas suggests (2000[1978]: 25-1) that the \larxist rejection of 
Chapter Four 139 
representative democracy derives from the instrumental conception of the state, 
which considers the state as a monolithic bloc controlled by the bourgeoisie and 
free from internal contradictions (Chapter One). Rejecting the simple Leninist 
equation of "representative democracy = bourgeois democracy = dictatorship of 
the bourgeoisie" (poulantzas, 2000[1978]: 252) involves recognising that 
democratic gains "from the right to strike to universal suffrage" have been fought 
for to the death by working-class movements (Bobbio, 1987: 57). I introduce 
Bobbio's philosophical key thoughts in this respect, followed by Poulantzas' more 
political proposals, which together illuminate Venezuela's revolutionary democracy 
on the road to democratic socialism. 
Bobbio views different forms of democracy on a continuum, with no one form 
being in absolute terms 'good' or 'bad'; the 'problem' is not representative 
democracy per se, but that "it is not representative enough" in a context of 
"rampant capitalism" (1987: 83, 112). The democratic decision-making process 
("power from below") requires more than an extension of the suffrage, and would 
have to spread collective decision-making (decisions that affect the whole of 
society) - whether directly or indirectly - to areas outside the strictly political 
sphere, especially to those spaces where economic decisions are made. This is 
necessary because in capitalism formal equality is contradicted by substantiyc 
inequality as the exercise of bourgeois liberties is conditioned by differentials of 
wealth and social position (1987: 66, 84, 111, 114). 
To Bobbio, any "practical synthesis" between socialism and democracy has to 
recognise two major historical "illusions": firstly, that social democracy would 
gradually lead to socialism and, secondly, Marx's belief that a socialist society would 
inevitably be democratic (1987: 87-8, 106). In fact, Bobbio yicws the potential for 
power abuses in societies where socialist control of the economy has come to 
mean state control as greater than in a capitalist society. For this reason, the 
democratic method (thus pluralism) is all the more relcyant to a society in 
transition to socialism (1987: 91, 9-+, 97), provided that the "set of rules" truly 
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provides for real alternatives and for the right of a minority to become a majority 
(1987: 65-6, 99). The latter is a problematic aspect in Bobbio's work, as he appears 
to under-estimate the possibility of polyarchic tendencies in the elite model of 
democracy (Bellamy, 1987: 27). The potential contradiction that this bears may be 
difficult to resolve theoretically, and Bobbio instead points to probably the major 
difficulty involved in a democratic transition from capitalism to socialism: how 
would a series of non-decisive piecemeal reforms bring about the necessary 
"qualitative leap" in changing the mode of production? Even if presumed that 
minor reforms may accumulate in this decisive leap, at what point would the 
system stop accepting them? How can a revolutionary government stay in power 
democratically while transforming the state apparatus? If those whose entrenched 
interests - domestic and internationally - are curbed react violently, what 
alternatives exist but to respond violently? (1987: 100-01). 
Both Bobbio and Poulantzas acknowledge that a blueprint for a democratic 
transition to democratic socialism would neither be feasible nor desirable. Some 
fundamental principles, however, can be stated. In this respect, as Carnoy (1984: 
171) concludes, Poulantzas goes 'beyond' Bobbio's restriction to existing 
institutions by promoting a combination of "a transformed representative 
democracy" with "popular movements", "democratic organs at the base" and 
"self-management networks and centres" participating politically inside and outside 
the state apparatuses to condition and control the state itself (2000[1978]: 256, 260, 
262). 
The 'real alternatives' in a 'transformed' representative democracy, of which 
Bobbio speaks (above), could probably not be more radical than in Venezuela. Far 
from reproducing a polyarchic regime (so far), in the 2006 presidential election, 
Venezuelans voted between 21 st century socialism and a return to 4th Republic 
politics, the latter personified by the opposition candidate and governor of Zulia 
state, Manuel Rosales, a participant in the 2002 coup against Chtiyez.51 It is the 
51 74.7% of the electorate participated in the election. Out of 22 candidates, Ch.h'ez received 62.8° 0, Rosales 
36.9% of valid votes (http://www.cne.gov.ve/divulgacionPresldenclal/resuJtado nagonal.php). 
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transcendence of liberal, social democratic and authoritarian, orthodox left 
approaches to democracy that defines the new Left, as "new institutions of 
democracy" are designed, that "re-invigorate and complement rather than 
substitute for the vote" (cf Wainwright, 2004: ix; Benello & Roussopoulos, 1972: 
3). In fact, Rosa Luxemburg already attacked Lenin for his exclusi,"e reliance on 
council democracy (the soviets) and the complete elimination of representative 
democracy: 
Without general elections, without unrestricted freedom of press and assembly, 
without a free struggle of opinion, life dies out in every public institution, becomes a 
mere semblance of life, in which only the bureaucracy remains as the active 
element (Luxemburg, 1961: 71). 
Combining different models of democracy - as has also been promoted by t\vo key 
proponents of participatory democracy, C.B. Macpherson (1977) and Carole 
Pateman (1970) - evades what is probably the most powerful argument against a 
'democratisation of democracy', that is recognised by advocates and opponents 
alike: that direct democratic mechanisms (e.g. citizens' assembly) were only 
operational in "small and primitive communities", while in densely populated and 
complex societies polyarchy would be the only option (Rousseau, 1993: 240; 
Schumpeter, 1976[1942]: 245-46; Dahl, 1971: 2; Huntington, 1989: 12-13). Indeed, 
complex decisions and those that require certain competences (e.g. macro-
economics, industrialisation, foreign policy) can hardly be taken through direct 
democratic mechanisms alone (if at all), and the institutions of representative 
democracy may be needed "to simplify the multiplicity of opinions" (Bobbio, 1987: 
72, 79-80, 96; Macpherson, 1977: 95-7) . .I.-\t the same time, however, Pateman 
follows G.D.H. Cole who suggested that the size of the modern state, \\"hich 
displays the powerlessness of the individual, is in fact an important reason "for 
enabling the individual to participate in 'alternative' political areas of society" 
(pateman, 1970: 38). These would include the workplace to counter the 
commodification of labour and reduce the contradiction bet\veen capiulism and 
democracy (Cole in Pateman, 1970: 38-9). Underlying these demands is the 
dC\"clopn1ental democracy ideal, ~ccording to which participation in decision-
making would assume an educative role, a process through which the individual 
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learns that the private (individual) and public (general) interests are linked; that is, 
"the individual is educated to distinguish between his o\vn impulses and desires", 
and to accept collective decisions more easily (pateman, 1970: 25-2~). ~rost 
importantly, participation at the local level could develop the qualities necessary for 
exercising democracy beyond the local, as it changes the context \vithin which all 
political activity is carried on. Even if the ordinary person remains more interested 
in affairs concerning their immediate environment, as chauvinist Schumpeterians 
would postulate, the central message of Pateman's book is that participation in 
local politics is an educative process and a condition for participation at other 
levels, be it directly or through representation. Private individuals thus could 
approach the ideal of the educated (knowledgeable) and acti\~e "public citizen" 
(pateman, 1970: 110). As Nicaraguan vice-president Sergio Ramirez reiterated in 
1983: "a daily democracy and not one that takes place every four years ... [But] 
when formal elections take place, the people ... consciously elect the best candidate 
[via] a vote freely made and not manipulated by an advertising agency" (cited in 
LaRamee & Polakoff, 1999: 141). 
Before examining Venezuela's revolutionary democracy in more detail, I now want 
to look more closely into 'participation' as the substance of democracy. 
Partitzpation' 
By the 1970s, 'participation' had become "part of the popular political vocabulary" 
(pateman, 1970: 1). The Port Huron Statement understood by 'participation' that 
"the individual share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction 
of his life". From the 1980s on, the concept has been coopted by the neo-colonial 
development community, and for capitalist ends (e.g. Chambers, 1995; Jordan, 
2003). In the respectiyc discourses, 'participation' can be more or less passive or 
active (Cracknell 2000), and more or less political or non-political (e.g. Feeney, 
1998) (see Appendi.x 5). For instance, someone may 'participate' through 
attendance at a meeting but remain silent (DFID, 1995). Pretty el a/ (1995) sugge~t 
a typology of participation as a continuum, comprising pd.uil't' f'irt/aralio 11 , 
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participation in information giving, participation by consultation, participation for material 
incentives, junctional participation, interactive participation and self-mobilisation. 
In Venezuela, Troudi et al (2005: 15) recuperate and radicalise the concept's original 
political substance by characterising 'participation' as "a dynamic through which 
the citizens get involved in a conscious and voluntary way in all processes that 
directly or indirectly affect them", of which the power to participate in decision-
making and in the control of the execution and long-term maintenance of 
measures taken is considered most important. NESD-2001 associates participation 
as a "new condition for citizenship" (RBV, 2001: 91). Out of the 350 articles that 
compose the CBRV, Yolanda D'Elia states that 130 refer to various forms of 
direct or indirect (representative) participation, which in their entirety are to 
transform the state-society relationship towards one characterised by 'joint 
responsibility' (D'Elia, 2006: 194; see Appendix 6). 
The normative framework for participation 
While CBRV's predecessor, the 1961 Constitution of the Republic of Venezuela 
(CRV) , treated participation as synonymous to voting, Article 5 CBRV lays the 
foundation for the co-existence of different forms of democracy, i.e. the people's 
direct and indirect exercise of sovereignty, which state institutions are obliged to 
facilitate. The fundamental principles are specified in a comprehensive set of civic-
political, social, economic, cultural and educational, as well as indigenous and 
environmental rights (CBRV, Art. 62-129). The latter two categories - indigenous 
and environmental rights - have, for the first time ever, been integrated in a 
Venezuelan constitution (Lander & Lopez Maya, 2000). 
The CBRV was conceived through a constituent process that started with a 
referendum on 25 April 1999, about convening a national constituent assembly in 
charge of drafting a new constitution. At an abstention rate of 62° ° - a historical 
record at the time - 85% voted in favour of convening the assembly (Viciano & 
Martinez, 2001: 113-17). Since 21 commissions developed the specific areas oyer a 
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short period of time, the final text differs in many important respects from the 
original presidential proposal, and it contains irreconcilable contradictions. For 
instance, Venezuela is defined as a federal republic, but the chamber that would 
represent the federal states was - against Chavez' proposal - abolished (ibid.: 1-+6, 
163). Although the organised society actively participated (Union of Black \\'omen 
of Venezuela, indigenous movements etc.), the process has been criticised for not 
integrating the non-organised popular sectors. Despite these shortcomings, Viciano 
and Martinez conclude that the CBRV should be considered a constitution 
democratically drafted by people who know the Venezuelan reality (ibid.: 167). 
A 71% majority ratified the CBRV via referendum on 15 December 1999, from 
which, however, 56% of the electorate abstained. The high abstention rates in the 
constitutional process starkly contrast the high participation rate of 6-+° 0 in the 
presidential elections of 6 December 1998, when 56% voted for Chavez for the 
fltst time (Viciano & Martinez, 2001: 110, 163-73). Table -+.1 lists electoral 
participation over the past 20 years. While, with the exception of the presidential 
elections, the trend of abstention in the 4th Republic has continued in the 5th 
Republic, noteworthy is that the participation in November 2008 was the highest 
ever in a sub-national election in Venezuela. While abstention could be interpreted 
as a lack of support for the Bolivarian project, or as continued distrust in 
representative democracy, Eduardo Galeano perceIves the conventional 
understanding of democratic governance as being superseded by substantially 
increased social and political-participatory democratisation in today's Venezuela. 
After all, Galeano continues, a large number of those Venezuelans who decide not 
to vote exercise democratic participation through other mechanisms, such as the 
social missions and projects related to endogenous de'\-elopment (health, education, 
nuclei of development) (cited in Ultimas Noticias, 11/12/2005). 
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Table 4.1 Venezuela: Rates of Electoral Participation 1988-2008 
Type of election Participation rate (~') 
1988 National (Presidential and Parliament) 81.9 
19,39 Federal state & m"n!Clpa 4:,6 
1992 Federal ():ate & muni~lpai 4~,:) 
1993 National (Presidential and Parllament) 60.2 
1995 Federal state & rnunlClpa 4e, ~ 
Nov. 1900 Fecem: state 8. municipal :'4.4 
Dec. 1998 National (Presidential and Parliament) 63.5 
Apr. 1999 P.e'erencJf11 Consiituent Assernbly 37,7 
July 1Er:f:l National Constituem A.ssembly 4:.3 
~c. 1999 P,e'erencv11 C3R',I ~.4 
July 2000 'Megaelection' (incl. Presidential and Parliament) 56.2 
Dec.2C<>J Labor referenduT, 'e:;eriJ 5ta:e 8. ITJ')ic pa 23,8 
Autl· 2004 Referendum on President 69.9 
Oct. 2004 Federal state 4: 7 
Aug. ~D:'5 Munic;pa S CilfTcqJial 3:'],0 
~. 2W5 Poorament 25,0' 
Dec. 2006 Presidential 74.7 
C.ec.2oo7 Re'ererdJn1 col';stltJt:Y1al reform 58 ~ 
Nov.20:::B Federal state 8. rnuniclpa 1:,5,5 
* T G de-legitimate the December 2005 par . amentarl e ectio'1S, all o::,oosi:lon ;:,1't es except ~.'10' .. el'ren: T o.,;Jr:: s 
Socialism (MAS: withdrew their cancidates in the days preceding t1e elections (OEA ::06 :D-51). 
Sources: Conse)o Nacional Electoral tt1q/>\WNt' roe "qt ye/policj.J';)ei9l1ada pr;;7Id-j;,C4, 
hto"/\'I'N\'(,r:.ne. oo'>!,vetnvticiaDe!al ad::l. ;)ro?id-4e,e2, I-tto /'\'l'iNi.C1e COv.veies:a::;ls:k.Js:eC'C'': ,pdf. UI:i1K1S Netic 3S, 
001 Z,'2005, :J.:, to,8 m:iiones tie 'lotJ'7tes no ejerc,'erc/1 S0 d-5rfccho', I/iciano & Martire:: 120: 1). 
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Survey findings appear to prove Galeano right: Venezuelans' satisfaction with 
democracy grew from 35% in 1998 (Latinobarometro, 2006: 74) to 59°'0 in 2007, 
and despite a sharp 10 percentage point decline in 2008, the country has been 
ranging second-best and substantially above the regional average for several years 
(fable 4.2). As the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) finds, 
diminished confidence in the political system often originates in "the increasing 
frustration with the lack of opportunities, combined with high levels of inequality, 
poverty and social exclusion" (UNDP, 2004: 25). 
Table 4.2 Satisfaction with Democracy (in %) (top three LAC) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 
Uruguay' 63 66 66 71 
Venezuela 56 57 59 4'j 
Dominican Republic 43 49 49 47 
Averaqe LAC 31 38 37 37 
) 
Sources: Latinobar6metro (2005: 52; 2006: 74; 2007: 8B; 2008: 109). 
Table -1-.3 shows that, despite a decline, for seyeral years Venezuelans haye voted 
their country in the top-three most democratic countries in LAC .. -\lthough it 
could be argued that the 63% that elected Cha,'ez in DeccIl1ber 2006 only 
represent 45% of the total electorate, once contextualised with, for instance, 
Colombian President Uribe, who can only count on 28% of the total electorate's 
support, Chavez in fact farcs best in the region (Latinobaromctro, 2007: -1- 7). 
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Table 4.3 How Democratic is the Country? (top three LAC) 
2005 2006 2007 
Uruguay 7.1· 7.2 7.1 
Venezuela 7.6 7.0 6.9 
Dominican Republic 6.1 6.4 6.7 
Average LAC 5.5 58 5.8 
• On a scale of 1-10 (1 - not democratic; 10 - fully democratic). 







The CBRV states that "refounding the Republic" IS a process In which the 
Venezuelan people use "their creative powers" to ... 
... establish a democratic, participatory and protagonistic, multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural society in a state under the rule of law, federal and decentralised, to 
consolidate the values of liberty, independence, peace, solidarity, the common 
good [ ... ] the right to education, social justice and equality, without any 
discrimination and subordination; to promote peaceful cooperation between the 
nations and to drive and consolidate the Latin American integration in accordance 
with the principle of non-intervention and self-determination of the peoples, the 
universal guarantee of human rights, the democratisation of the international 
society [ ... ] (CBRV, Preamble). 
Articles 1-9 further elaborate the "fundamental principles" of the "social and 
democratic state under the rule of law" (Diaz Ortiz, 2006: 14). Guided by the 
premise that the democratic challenge today is a social and human challenge, 
Article 2 establishes the relationship between democracy, social justice, equality and 
human rights, which subsequently frame the socio-economic regime's objectives of 
integral human development and a dignified existence ( .. \rt. 299). The CBRV 
broadens the liberal (civil-political) rights agenda to incorporate socio-economic 
and cultural rights by, as Amnesty International (2000) states, constitutionalising 
the major international human rights treaties and covenants (see Art. 22, 23, 350), 
such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the 1995 
Declaration on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy. The CBRY 
juridifies Fraser's three dimensions of justice: for instance, cultural justice, i.e. 
institutional patterns that foster parity of participation (Fraser, 2000: 115), cultural 
and ethnic diversity and the associated plurality of identities are positively \'alorised, 
as for the first time a Venezuelan constitution recognises the "equality of cultures", 
upon which bilingual education for the approximately 2.3% of indigenous 
population is guaranteed (preamble; Art. 9, 100, 119, 121; '\lI~CI, 2005e). ~\rticlc 
88 recognises housework as an "economic activity" that gcneratcs social wcll-
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being" which, in the eyes of Nora Castaneda, President of Venezuela's \\'omen's 
Development Bank (Banmujer), makes the CBRV "probably the most 
revolutionary constitution in the world in terms of gender equity" (cited in Lopez, 
2006: 53). 
In education, the legal framework transcends the international normatlye 
instruments and agreements, such as Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the 1990 'education for all' declaration, the 2000 Dakar Framework 
for Action, the Millennium Development Goals (11DGs) , and UNESCO's \\'orld 
Declaration on Higher Education for the 21 st Century (UNESCO, 1998). ~\rticles 
102 and 103 define "permanent integral quality education" as a human right, an 
essential root of democracy, and a "public service" for whose provision the state 
assumes primary responsibility at all levels and in all its forms. Education is geared 
towards the full development of the personality in a democratic society grounded 
in an ethical valuation of work and the "active, conscious and solidarian 
participation" in the social transformatory processes. Since social segregation in the 
4th Republic started at the pre-school level (Albornoz, 1999: 23), in order to ensure 
equal opportunities, education is obligatory from the nursery to the medium 
diversified level (age 18), and public education is free up to the undergraduate 
HE/university level. "Equal conditions and opportunities" for all, with explicit 
reference to people with a disability, special needs, and inmates, refers to no access 
restrictions other than those derived from ability, vocation and aspiration. As 
regards indigenous groups, Article 121 guarantees the right to a "suitable 
education" and an "intercultural and bilingual educational regime" which "sctyCS 
their socio-cultural particularities, values and traditions". 
The CBRV is a very specific constitution, for which reason it has been judgcd as 
being, in places, "excessively regulatory". Ho\veyer, such explicitness was yiewed as 
a guarantee that the secondary legal norms (both organic and non-organic laws) 
would not produce the same defects that had reigned public life in the prc\'ious 
four decades (Viciano & i\Iartinez, 2001: 176, 190). 
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Public power, citizen power & popular power 
Revolutionary democracy is anchored in Article 136 CBRY, which distinguishes a 
territorial from a functional dimension of public power. The politico-territorial 
comprises "municipal power", "[federal] state power" and "national po\ver"; the 
functional expands Montesquieu's classical three-dimensional distribution52 of 
national public power Gudiciary, legislative, executive) by the newly created 
"electoral" and "citizen" powers, both derived from Bolivar's philosophy. 
'Electoral power' was part of Bolivar's draft constitution to the Congress of Bolivia 
in 1826, together with the proposal of a president for life (BoliYar, 1971 [1826a]). 
Rather than attempting to "crown himself king", as sometimes claimed, a power 
structure around a life president would have intended to support the "political 
maturing" of a people who had no democratic tradition (M:ora, 1998: 38). The 
parallel creation of electoral power would have provided a counter-weight to the 
executive, to ensure popular sovereignty, which to Bolivar constituted the highest 
political good, or the "sole legitimate authority of any nation" (Bolivar, 
1971 [1826aJ: lOS). Accordingly, every ten citizens would elect one "elector" who 
would directly exercise power. Contrary to liberal thinking at the time, Bolivar 
(1971 [1826a]: 96) rejected making the "right of representing popular sovereignty" 
subject to ownership of property. Inspired by Roman organisation of power, 
electoral power in Bolivar's sense would sometimes be bestowed with legislative 
and judicial functions (Vitale, 1984). In stark contrast to Bolivar's idea, electoral 
power in the CBRV (Art. 292-98) is not directly exercised by the citizens, but by 
the National Electoral Council (CNE) and its subordinate organs. ~\s a separate 
branch of the state, electoral power was introduced as a "corrective to electoral 
fraud" in the 4th Republic (Ellner & Tinker Salas, 2007b: 13n3). ~-\s from 1999 on, 
the CNE's extended responsibilities include organising elections in trade unions, 
professional associations and political parties, as well as investigating their funding 
sources (Viciano & Nfartinez, 2001: 201). 
52 Diaz Ortiz (2005: 13-20) argues that ~lontcsquieu nen~r referred to ,;: "un;sion" of powe~~, b~t .1 
"distribution" of powers, which implies a "wutarr conceptIon of state power as established U1 the CBR\ . 
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Citizen power, also referred to as 'citizen's branch', does not mean 'power of the 
citizen', but is structured, formalised power exercised by the Republican ~foral 
Council (Consejo Moral Rcpublicano) , which consists of the Ombuds(wo)man 
(Defensoria del Pueblo), the Comptroller General (Contraloria Genera~ and the Public 
Prosecutor (Fiscalia General/Public Ministry). The office holders are elected by the 
National Assembly. The three organs are in charge of protecting individual rights, 
liberties, and the public interest, and to oversee "public ethics" and "administrative 
morals", or the "application of the principle of legality in all administrati\T 
activities of the state". Moreover, citizen power should promote education as 
"citizens' creative process", as well as solidarity, liberty, democracy, social 
responsibility and work (CBRV, Art. 273-91; UN, 2001).53 Citizen power is not 
understood as given or transferred power, but as the creation of a new power 
"capable of legitimately asserting the participation of the society, communities and 
families in the formulation, execution and evaluation of public decisions, and in 
accountability and public control" (RBV, 2001: 92). 'The public' is defined as the 
locus of citizen power and as a space of collective interest and citizenship 
construction (RBV, 2001: 106). 
It is the moral dimension in citizen power that establishes the philosophical link 
with Bolivar who, in The Angostura Discourse (1819) and A Letter to Guillermo White 
(1820), follows Rousseau by proposing morality as a fourth power. In The Social 
Contract, Rousseau (1993: 49) identifies morality as "a power unknown to political 
thinkers, on which none the less success in everything else depends". However, 
while to Rousseau (1993: 297) morality is the product of legislation, Bolivar \'icws 
"proper morals" (rather than force) as the "basis of law", as law alone does not 
suffice to govern (Bolivar, 1971 (1819]: 49, 55).54 Moral power would be exercised 
through a combination of the .;\thenian .. -\reopagus ("the guardians of custom and 
law") and the Roman censors (Bolivar, 1971 (1819]: 63). According to Rousseau 
53 For example, the Ombudsman's office is responsible for .citizens' complaints ab~ut huma.l~ righr.~ 
. 1, 11' '(UN 2001) In ')008 Ombudswoman Gabnela Ranurez charactenses the (llhel' as a bndge \10,1 ons , . - , 
betwel'n the different institutions (~\porrea, 22/06/2008). 
" \1 R "'au (1993' 184 "'00-') "l-:'-:') on morals and consent. Bolivar, howen'r, in .\[u..-,,"e 10 the .,~ : so see OUs~(, ., - -, -. , ~ -
( . orB J' pe'lrs to be more closeh' following Rousseau by stating 'The moral de\'dopmcnt 01 man .01lgreJJ 0; 0/11'1.1, ap , . , . 
is the legislator'S first concern" (Bolivar, 1971 [18263]: 104). 
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(1993: 297), censorship "upholds morality by preventing opinion from gro\ving 
corrupt", while to Bolivar the censors were the "prosecuting attorneys [fiscales] 
against the government in defense of the Constitution and popular rights", i.e. to 
ensure compliance with the laws (Bolivar, 1971 [1826a]: 97). While 5th Republic 
citizen power is congruous with Bolivar on this point, as well as with respect to the 
censors being in charge of safeguarding not only morality but "the sciences, the 
arts, education, and the press" (Bolivar, 1971 [1826a]: 97), Viciano & ~Iartinez 
(2001) criticise the dismissal in the CBRV of Bolivar's earlier proposal of 1819, 
when Bolivar characterised the Areopagus as an independent institution composed of 
any morally distinguished persons (Bolivar cited in Viciano & ~Iartinez, 2001: 171). 
Viciano & Martinez detect contradictions and historical incoherences in the CBRV, 
from which they conclude that reference to Bolivar should not uncritically be taken 
as literal (2001: 172). This appears particularly true with respect to moral power, for 
which Bolivar has been accused of "intellectual and moral despotism" and 
"paternal tyranny over feelings, conduct and passions" in his attempt to impose 
"the good manners" (Garcia Calderon, 1914: 164). While in our times, and perhaps 
to observers in the North in particular, "moral power" sounds alienating, Mora 
contextualizes the concept's normative spirit: the fact that 50% of school age 
children did not complete compulsory basic education, as he stated in May 1998, 
with respect to the 4th Republic, to him constituted an act of immorality in a 
country where "it appears that no-one is responsible for anything" (Mora, 1998: 
40). 
More recently, the territorial dimension of public power has been expanded by 
"popular power"55. Independent of suffrage and elections, 'popular power' refers 
to the instances and mechanisms of participation and is exercised by the organised 
society, such as the community councils, workers' councils and student councils 
(Chavez, 2007b). Today, the formalisation of citizen participation as a resource for 
public power, as was already observed in 2005, by far exceeds the standards set by 
55 See, c.g., the 5 Constituent :-'Iotors, ~ESD-2007, .lnd the Law on Popular Pawn (currently lJ1 the !11.lkmg). 
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the CBRV (Maingon, 2005: 535). This has been one reason for the proposed 
constitututional reform of 2007, because a reformed Article 136 would haye 
constitutionally anchored public power (Chavez, 2007b), which currently is not the 
case. As I will further elaborate in the final section of the chapter, popular power 
embodies an inclusive and holistic concept of citizenship, largely independent of 
nationality. Table 4.4 sums up the power distribution as practiced in today's 
Venezuela. 
Table 4.4 Bolivarian Distribution of Power 
PUBLIC POWER 
Territorial Distribution Functional Distribution 
Popular Power • Legislative Power • 
Municipal Power • Executive Power • Judicial Power [Federal] State Power • • 
National Po'.ver • Citizen Power • Electoral Power • 
<' ~ ;)ource. Developed from Chavez: (20071), ArtIcle 130), 
Printtples of revolutionary democrary 
Three of the normative concepts enshrined in the CBRV require explanation as 
they circumscribe Bolivarian 'active citizenship' which, in Hannah Arendt's sense, 
expresses the "value and importance of civic engagement and collective 
deliberation about all matters affecting the political community" (d'Entreves, 1992: 
146): 'social control' (contraloria soda~, 'protagonism', and 'co-responsibility' 
~·orresponsabilidad). As articulations of direct and participatory democracy, they are 
rooted in the classical Greek understanding of exercising citizenship, where citizens 
not only had rights but also the responsibility to participate in public affairs. As 
Pericles, Athens "leader of the democracy" (Sabine, 1951: 24), states: "Here each 
individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as 
well [ ... ] we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man who 
minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all" (pericles cited 
in Held, 1987: 17). Accordingly, Article 132 CBRV requires "everybody" - i.e. not 
only Venezuelan nationals - to "comply with their social responsibilities and jointly 
participate in the political, civil and communitarian life of the country", as well as 
to "promote and defend the human rights as the basis of democratic conviviality 
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and social peace"56. In this sense, social control, as the "maximum expression of 
participatory democracy"57, corresponds with classical Athen's direct democracy 
principle of 'governing the governors' (see Held, 1987: 18), i.e. citizens holding 
their representatives accountable (CBRV, Art. 66). Incorporated in a number of 
laws, such as the Organic Law of Municipal Power, the Law of Citizen 
Participation, the Organic Law of Public Administration, and the Organic Law of 
Public Planning (MINCI, 2005a: 12), the purpose of social control is to 
simultaneously fight corruption and bureaucratism through popular planning, 
execution, control and evaluation of public policy, management and administration 
(CBRV, Art. 62, 141).58 According to Chavez, social controL .. 
... is fundamental to the new society that we have to construct, because socialism 
has always had the problem of the state handling resources, without the population 
ever having had control over those resources (Chavez cited in MINCI, 2004a: 62). 
State-cooperative co-management, self- and collective management, as well as 
dynamic and transparent social production chains/networks also constitute social 
control mechanisms (Lanz Rodriguez, 2006; Troudi & Monedero, 2007). 
Deconcentration and political, administrative and financial decentralisation are 
viewed as initiatives to contribute to curbing bureaucratism (Troudi et al, 2005: 20; 
Diaz Ortiz, 2006: 30). Currently, the national territory is structured into federal 
states, the capital district, federal dependencies, and federal territories (CBRV, .Art. 
16). The latter consist of municipalities which are defined as the primary political 
unit of social organisation and participation (CBRV, Art. 168; LOPPi\I, Art. 7). 
Nevertheless, the CBRV (Art. 173) provides the legality for sub-dividing the 
municipalities into parishes or other units, such as sectors. This is important 
56 Farias & Perdomo (2004: 26) translate convivencia ('conviviality') as ''living together as a collective body". 
57 Cited from http://\Vww.constitucion.ve (04/04/2007). ,-\lso, CBRY, ,-\rt. 62/66/128/141/178/184/299. 
58 See http://www.constitucion.ve (04/04/2007). The government distinguishes 'bureaucracy' from 
'bureaucratism'. The former is considered necessary: historically, extending democracy is paralleled by a 
growth of the bureaucratic apparatus in order to guarantee equality of rights (especially with respect to equal 
conditions and means for a secure life), whlch to Bobbio constitutes a paradox of democracy as the 
hierarchical organisation of bureaucratic p~\Ver is essentially anti-de~ocratic (1987: ~O). Social control 
tl1erefore subjects bureaucracy to democratic control. 'Bureaucratlsm, on the other hand, IS \1e'wed ;IS 
"W1neCeSSary formalities" that "block or prevent the achievement of an administration's aims", paves the 
wa\' for clie~telist and nepotist practices (corruption) and is the "anti-thesis" of citizen protagorusrn ill public 
ma'nagement (froudi et al, :2005: 18-19). 
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because, as one of the intellectual authors of the commuruty councils, ':'Iarta 
Harnecker (2005: 2) states, experience demonstrates that "true popular 
participation and protagonism occurs in smaller geographical spaces, which the 
people have identified as the community". Neither social organisations nor state 
institutions, the community councils are the "fundamental instances" (spaces and 
structures) of popular power (Diaz Ortiz, 2006) - a process in which the organised 
communities are expected to become the "new subjects of decentralisation" in 
order to "deepen democracy" (CBRV, Art. 184, 185). 
Article 70 CBRV and Articles 261-79 of the Organic Law of Public Municipal 
Power (LOPPM) (RBV, 2005), derived from Article 184 CBRV, define the major 
political, social, economic and cultural mechanisms of individual and collective 
participation and protagonism in the exercise of popular sovereignty. The political, 
which most directly epitomises the concept of protagonism, i.e. an active role in 
the political processes, includes elections, referenda (consultative, revocatory, 
abrogating, approving), legislative initiative, popular consultation, the open town 
council assembly, the Citizen Assembly, and participatory budgeting; the social and 
e(;onomic comprise instances of citizen attention, social control, self-management, 
co-management, the cooperatives (services, production, financial), saving banks, 
community enterprises and other associative forms "guided by the values of 
mutual cooperation and solidarity"; cultural participation can be excercised via 
alternative social communication media. 
Co- or joint-responsibility (CBRV, Art. 4) is key to redefining the state-Clt1Zen 
relationship, individually or collectively ('the society'), and requires that under the 
principle of solidarity, both share the responsibility to fulfil the constitution and the 
laws, to defend the national sovereignty (CBRV, Art. 326), and to construct the 
new model of the Republic as outlined in the CBRY.59 ~-\s the follo\ving 
mechanisms of direct and participatory democracy demonstrate, such responsibility 
59 ~cc ~anz (200.+: 45) and http://www.constitucion.\,e (04/04/ 2ULll· 
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can be assumed under multifarious forms of organisation, with or without state 
involvement (RBV, 2001: 91). 
Direct democracy 
As argued, a major heritage of Athen's polis consists in conceptualising citizenship 
as direct participation in the affairs of the state, in a process of self-government 
and associated with the values of self-fulfilment and equality among citizens (Held, 
1987: 15-18; 1996: 36, 44). Athen's highly restrictive concept of legal citizenship, 
where the demos comprised males of strictly Athenian origin exclusively, should 
not distract from the normative contents of political equality. In contrast to the 
modern-liberal conception of the private-public binary and human beings as 
'individuals' with 'rights' (and obligations), in Athens the private (civil) and public 
(political) were intertwined as private life was subordinate to public affairs and the 
common good (Sabine, 1951: 19-25). 
To Marx, 'freedom' entailed the full democratisation of society and the state, i.e. 
the abolition of class power in all its forms (Held, 1987: 121-22). Often taken at 
face value, the "dictatorship of the proletariat" should not be understood as 
dictatorship of a party or clique, but as "unlimited democracy", or the "most 
active, unlimited participation of the mass of the people" in a socialist society 
(Luxemburg, 1961: 76-7; also Macpherson, 1977: 100; Held, 1987: 128).60 NESD-
2007 associates direct democracy with a sovereign people who can "by themselves 
run the state"; they may delegate their power, but not their sovereignty as this 
would mean losing "their liberty and their right to a dignified life" (RBV, 2007a: 17, 
19). Venezuela refers to Rousseau, who did not challenge private property as an 
individual right per se, but rejected an "unlimited property right" as morally 
unjustifiable: a society where some are so wealthy that they can buy others, and 
where others are so poor that they have to sell themsekes, cannot consider itself a 
60 The "revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat" refers to the s~~te in the transition from captLdist t~ 
communist society (Marx, 19-1-2[1875]: 577). \\lwe this statement unplies the. recogrutlon of the state 
W1der socialism, communism would imply the "withering away" of the state, I.e. the. dcstructlon of the 
repressive state apparatus (perceived as being at the exclusive service of the bourgcOl,tc' 10 a classless sOC1e~· 
(Lenin cited in .\1arx, 1942(1875]: 555, 5 ~ .. \ editor's footnotes). 
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democracy (Troudi & Monedero, 2007: 72; see Rousseau cited in Pateman, 1970: 
23). To Pateman (1970: 22), Rousseau's point was not absolute equality, but that 
existing economic differences should not lead to political inequality. i\Iacpherson 
adds that Rousseau viewed neither assistentialist welfarism nor re-distribution as 
adequate equity mechanisms; rather, everybody would have to be depriyed from 
the possibility of accumulating wealth (1977: 16-17). 
Derived from the expenence of the Paris Commune, direct democracy would 
replace the liberal state by a pyramidal commune structure, with directly elected 
committees at the base (company, community), and delegates at the upper levels 
(districts, towns, national) (Marx, 1942[1871]: 498-501; Macpherson, 1977: 108). 
Although this structure departs considerably from the polis model and Rousseau's 
'self-governing republic', organised around a general assembly (i.e. face-to-face 
discussions) in which all citizens would participate (Bobbio, 1987: 80), the strength 
of 'direct democracy' as a form of government may well be its principle of 
combining local autonomy with a system of directly accountable and revocable 
delegates (Held, 1996: 146n8). Limitations in the effectiveness of such a pyramidal 
council system, to Macpherson, result from "sets of circumstances" rather than the 
scheme itself: the threat of counter-revolution, which may limit the devolution of 
responsibility at the bottom; an underlying class division and opposition, which 
would require centralised power to hold the society together; and, crucially, apathy 
at the base (1977: 109-12). These considerations should be kept in mind 
throughout my elaboration of Venezuela's mechanisms of direct democracy, which 
are the recall referendum (referendo revocatorio) , social street parliamentarism 
(parlamentarismo social de mile), the community councils (consejos comunales) , and the 
social production companies. 
Remll referendum 
Article 72 CBRV facilitates the revocation of all publicly elected office holders 
once half their term in office has elapsed . .A minimum of 20% of the regi~tered 
electorate is necessary to call up a referendum, and an office holder is recalled 
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when, with a minimum 25% turnout, the votes against him/her equals or exceeds 
the number of votes with which s/he was initially elected. Only one recall petition 
can be flied per office holder per term. The mechanism was used for the first time 
against Chavez on 15 August 2004, won by Chavez with a 59.1 % majority61; and at 
the sub-national levels against eight mayors and a member of a Regional Legislative 
Council on 7 October 2007.62 Troudi et al (2005: 123, 126) consider revocation to 
be the "main weapon" of social control, with respect to the legitimacy of leaders. 
Social street parliamentarism 
'Social street parliamentarism' is a form of popular co-legislating that follows the 
antique philosophy of citizens' direct participation in judicial and legislative 
functions, as well as Rousseau's "self-government", i.e. "freedom" defined as 
"obedience to a law one prescribes to oneself". The idea is that the people 
themselves make the laws that rule them (Rousseau cited in Pateman, 1970: 25; 
Rousseau, 1993: 266; Held, 1996: 18, 57-8). However, it seems as if only those laws 
considered of substantial social relevance are subjected to popular consultation, 
such as the laws for the Protection of Children and Adolescents, the Right of 
Women to a Life free from Violence, for People with a Disability, the Education 
Law, the National Police Law, the Community Council Law as well as the Law for 
Popular Power. Experience has shown that the law-making process can extend 
over six months to two years, or possibly longer, and may comprise several public 
consultations on the same law. Other social issues, such as the non-renewal of the 
concession of the private TV company Radio Caracas Television (RCTV) to use 
public air space, can be subjected to the procedure (ABN, 24/05/2007). In 
addition to nation-wide consultation in the communities, which are announced in 
the media of all political colours, the mechanism makes use of internet 
questionnaires (Appendix 6b). In the course of the consultation process of the 
National Police Law, 70.000 people participated \'ia community workshops alone 
(Minister Chacon cited in ABN, 17/11/2006). 
61 Figure retrieved on 28/09/200:, from http://\\'\\'\\',cnc,~o\',\'e!referendwn presidencu!2 lli q , 
62 Four m;I\'or~ and the legislator were recalled C\atlonal Electoral Council mtormatlon leatlers, 
ht : /\\'\\'\\'~'nc 'm',n'! elccci nes r y cat 00s2007 lind x 'ci al. h ,retrie\'ed 28'09/ 2UU-). 
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On Saturday, 11 February 2006, I participated in a social street parliamentarism day 
in Coro, convened in an assembly room attached to a hotel (Salones Karibbean). It 
was the third out of 12 of such consultations that year, and was publicly 
announced in, for instance, Diario Vea (10/02/2006). About 300 persons 
participated, however, ahnost exclusively pro-government. After a general 
declaration by the local representative in the National Assembly, three legal 
proposals were put to discussion: the Reform of the L.aw of the Special Allowances den"ved 
from Mining and Hydrocarbons for the States and the Metropolitan Distn·ct of Caracas, the 
Constitution, Autonomy and Functions of the Communiry Councils; and, related to the 
former, the Proposal for the L.aw for the Reform of the L.aw of the Local Publit: Planning 
Councils (CLPPs). A plenary overview of the fundamental aspects of the respective 
laws was followed by group work (10-15 persons) of about two hours. Each group 
discussed the new proposals in relation to the existing law, thus generating group 
consensus, as only one collective recommendation could be entered in the 
provided consultation document. Each group submitted their consultation form to 
the member of parliament. It would require further investigation to determine the 
extent to which the communities' inputs really impact on the fmal version of a law. 
In the case of the Community Councils Law, popular participation seems to have 
considerably contributed to legally defining the councils as politically independent 
of the state (Diaz Ortiz, 2006: 7-8). The participatory mechanism is also employed 
in the revision of the law from mid-2007 onwards, to integrate grassroots 
experiences so far. 
Communiry councils63 
Prior to the Community Councils Law of April 2006, the Organic Law of Public 
Municipal Power (LOPPM) (RBV, 2005) defined the community councils as 
instances of the Local Public Planning Councils (CLPPs), which had been created 
within each mayoralty. This way, the community councils were integrated in the 
formal power structures (CBRV, .Art. 182; LOPPi\I, Art. 112). It was expected that 
in the CLPPs, the representatiye would converge with the direct-participatory; that 
63 .\ppendix 6c provides a community- council organisation chart. 
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is, formally elected authorities (constituted power) and delegates of the organised 
communities (constituent power) would jointly execute public policies (Reinoso et 
al, 2003: 19). This model has been referred to as "reformist, radical-democratic" 
approach to local politics, in which radical democracy (direct popular decision-
making power) joins community-based representative democracy. This has been 
the predominant form of direct democratic experiences in Latin America under 
neoliberalism (Schonwalder, 2004; Baierle, 2005). However, as part of the state 
structure, and with the mayors presiding the CLPPs (RBV, 2005, Art. 113), the 
constitutional idea of the community council as an autonomous body had been 
violated, as they had been deprived of receiving and administering public funding 
for their own projects independent of the mayoralty (Diaz Ortiz, 2006: 27; 
Asamblea Nacional, 2006). After national debate, which included the social street 
parliamentarism day I attended, the contradiction was resolved in the parliamentary 
session of 6-7 April 2006: there, the Community Councils Law was ratified and, 
simultaneously, the Law of the CLPPs was reformed. Now a legal entity, the 
community councils are an autonomous instance of popular power which, as 
"mechanisms of self-government", connect with st ate organs or neighbouring 
communities, with which they can form associations (Diaz Ortiz, 2006: 27-31). 
While the CLPPs still exist, an important reason why they did not become the 
major direct democracy mechanism is the resistance of officials and state 
bureaucrats - independent of political affiliation - to "abolish themselves". That is, 
their functions would be dissolved in the anticipated "community" or 
"constituent" state governed by something like an 'Assembly of Citizens of the 
Community Councils' (Interview-conversation 7, Appendix 16c; Interview 25, 
Appendix 16b). In contrast to the reformist, radical-democratic approach to public 
policy-making, within a revolutionary approach, the community councils - as a 
direct democracy mechanism outside the formal structures - embody a countcr-
hegemonic conception of decentralisation driving state restructuring. Additionally, 
the councils are not simply about public policy management but, as an exercise of 
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citizenship, a process of politicisation, i.e. the creation of political consciousness 
(Troudi et ai, 2005: 15, 34). 
The Community Councils Law defines 'the community' primarily as a place, 
without disregarding the relational dimension, the social processes, or interactions, 
that produce social cohesion and develop a community feeling - the "overall 
feeling of belonging, of solidarity and trust in the value of the collective 
dimension" (Sanchez, 2004: 9): 
Community [is the] social conglomerate of families and citizens who live in a 
determined geographical area, who share a common history and interests, who 
know each other and relate to each other, use the same public services and share 
similar economic, social, town planning and other needs (RBV, 2006, Art. 4.1). 
The formation of a community council follows a combination of technical and 
sociological criteria: in indigenous communities, a minimum of ten households; in 
rural communities, at least 20; and between 200-400 families in urban 
environments are necessary to form a council. The community's geographical 
boundaries are determined by the Citizen Assembly in accordance with the local 
particularities.64 As the highest instance of community decision-making power65, 
the Citizen Assembly is composed of any person over 15 years of age who lives in 
the community. This example of Venezuela's inclusive conception of citizenship 
integrates the constitutional right of young people to be "active subjects" in their 
development (CBRV, Art. 79; RBV, 2006, Art. 4, 6). Further responsibilities of the 
Citizen Assembly include the approval of the Community Development Plan as 
well as projects presented by the community council. 
64 This represents a fundamental qualitative shift in the formation of the community councils. InitIally, when 
the community councils were integrated in the CLPPs, the geographical spaces of the coun~ils were 
detennined top-down by the mayoralty (l\laingon, 2005: 551). In the mwuClpality of ~1iranda (Falcon), WIth 
approximately 190.000 inhabitants, 2-1- community councils were created in this process of "zonification". 
This means that anyone council would have integrated several sectors and on average about 8000 PL'f'( ms; 
therefore, the co~cils as they are presently formed are considerably smaller bodies facilitating more 
substantial participation (Interview 22, :\ppendix 16b). . . . 
65 .\ltl1Ough the Community Councils Law limits the power of the CItiZen :\ssem~ly to. the council, the 
LOPPi\1 _ which, as ;U1 organic law stands above tl1e former - declares the :\ssembh· s deaslOm as b1I1di~1g 
for tl1e municipal authorities, providing they .Ire in accordance WIth the law (:\rtlck 266 LOPP~[; DlaZ 
Ortiz, 2110eJ: -1-2). 
Chapter Four 160 
The councils consist of three organs: the executive, a communal bank, and the 
social control units (see Appendix 6c). Indigenous communities can detennine the 
organs of their community councils in accordance with their customs, traditions, 
and the Organic Law of Indigenous Peoples and Communities (RB\T, 2006, .Art. 
12). The executive organ plans and carries out the decisions taken by the Citizen 
Assembly, and promotes and articulates the organised participation of individuals 
and community groups and committees, most of which haye been formed in 
recent years: health, education, housing, land and popular economy committees; 
technical water boards, cultural groups, sports clubs, women's groups, unions and 
workers' organisations, youth, student and third age clubs, cooperatives, and ciyil 
associations such as the 'neighbourhood associations'66. The Communal Bank is 
owned collectively by the community, defined in geographical terms. It has 
financial and administrative functions in support of the development of the local 
popular economy (alternative forms of exchange, micro-financing system, etc.), as 
well as in the participatory community diagnosis and budgeting processes. To date, 
community projects have concentrated on housing and basic utilities infrastructure 
(water, sewage, gas, sports grounds, libraries, pharmacies, community centres) -
the areas most neglected during the uncontrolled urbanisation of the previous 
decades. They complement the national programmes in these areas (Interview-
conversation 7, Appendix 16c). Reinoso et al (2003: 66), from the Centre for the 
Promotion and Analysis of Public Policies, remind us for instance that during the 
entire 4th Republic regime the state had constructed only one million homes, as 
compared with three million built by the poor themselves in slum-like suburbs 
(ranchos) with little to no infrastructure. About 20.000 community councils had 
registered within the first year after the ratification of the Community Councils 
Law (Interview-conversation 7, Appendix 16c). Photographs 3b document a 
community council election in the municipality of Miranda, Falcon state. 
66 Throughout the 1970s/80s, the neighbourhood associations were genuine gra~~roots entlt1es makIng 
political demands. \\'ith increasing success, Goldfrank .(20U-t) st~ltes, AD and CO~EI started to 
undermine, coopt and fragment the neighbourhood aSSOCIations mon~ment from the 1980~ on. 
Chapter Four 161 
The community banks receIve their funding from the Finance ~linistry's 
Autonomous National Community Councils Fund Service (SAFON .. ACC) (RBY, 
2006, Art. 28, 29). This direct link between the executive and the organised society 
circumvents political sabotage and corruption within the sub-national state 
apparatus. The social control exercised, which is integral to the Community 
Development Plan rather than an a postenori check-up (11INCI, 200Sa: 6-7), 
naturally concentrates on the municipal and sub-municipal levels. However, the 
changing dynamics of power relations comprise two qualitative dimensions: the 
diminution of constituted power in state institutions is accompanied by the 
creation of constituent power in the organised communities; simultaneously, it is 
possible to speak of a re-scaling of power, as control is exercised upwards over 
federal and national office holders, including the president. The bottom up exercise 
of power is likely to increase once the local is transcended through the intended 
structuration of community councils In "areas", "zones", "territories", 
"federations" or "communes" in the process of building the community state (e.g. 
Consejos Comunales, 10/01/2008). Moreover, local social control initiatives can 
join up with the government's National System of Social Control, of which the 
Comptroller General, as one of the organs of citizen power, is part (froudi et al, 
2005: 119-27). 
The Venezuelan case is nourished from two conditions that previous experiences 
have shown to be crucial to the building of direct democracy (see Chavez & 
Goldfrank, 2004)67: firstly, communities' executive power depends on control over 
sufficient recources in order to produce solutions to people's real problems. As ex-
mayor IstUriz's experience in 1990s Caracas demonstrates, participation alone often 
is not enough, as people expect concrete results associated with improvements in 
their living conditions (Gold frank, 2004). Secondly, related to the former, 
community or municipal self-goyernment is constrained by power structures that 
transcend the local, which is most explicit in fiscal dependence on central 
government funds. In many cases in Chavez & Goldfrank's yolume, participatory 
67 F tl " 'lph see especially the contributions bv Schonw;llJcr, Ch~I\"ez, GoldfLlOk, Dan; & or us paragr., -.. .. 
;\h-arado. 
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budgeting failed because ideologically adverse national administrations simply cut 
municipalities' budgets. In addition, national governments have also used legislative 
leverage against popular power, as in the case of Mexico City (Davis & Alvarado, 
2004). Therefore, direct democratic efforts have to transcend the local and aim to 
operate (at least) at the national scale - that is, taking state power, as protagonists 
in both Lima and Montevideo suggest (Schonwalder, 2004: 26; Chavez, 2004: 94). 
Relying exclusively on grassroots organisation and resistance, as Raby (2006: 3-4, 
57) criticises John Holloway's Change the World Without Taking Power, e\rades 
questions of leadership, representation, organisation and structure, and leaves the 
essence of capitalism untouched - the power of corporations and the capitalist 
state. Under globalisation, as the subsequent chapters will argue, an emancipatory 
project will have to transcend the national. 
Social production companies 
A final direct democracy mechanism are the SPCs. The "fundamental principles" 
of democracy and social justice, as articulated in Article 1 CBRV, fonn the basis of 
economic democracy, joined by the values of "environmental protection", 
"productivity", "efficiency", "private initiative", "solidarity" and (somewhat 
contradictory) "free competition" (CBRV, Art. 299). As in political participation 
(CBRV, Art. 168, see above), the municipality and sub-municipal units are the 
prioritised spaces for developing the social and popular economy. There, workers' 
and communities' econonuc participation Via aSSOCIatiOns, orgarusatIons, 
cooperatives, community enterprises, as well as mechanisms of self- and co-
management of public enterprises, are to be promoted (CBRV, Art. 184). ~\ social 
and popular economy produces "goods and services that satisfy the needs of the 
population" and pursues a fair distribution of the created wealth (Art. 112), and 
thus rejects the capitalist profit-making interest, as the economy should be 
designed to serve the collective needs. While the state is responsible for promoting 
private initiative (Art. 112), Article 308 implicitly specifies 'priyate' as family-owned 
businesses (rather than ~rNCs/TNCs), as well as micro-, small and medium-sized, 
socially and popularly-owned cooperatives and community enterprises, or any 
Chapter Four 163 
other alternative economic activity, such as "specially protected" artisan practices 
(Art. 118, 309). 
spes eXIst 1 n the areas of production (primary and secondary sectors of the 
economy), utilities, and distribution. As the constitution suggests, they may operate 
in different sizes and modalities: large spes could be state-run or mLxed 
(state/private), for reasons of financial necessity, technology transfer or strategic 
political alliances with other states; small spes could comprise "community 
production units" and "community service units", both giving an immediate 
response to the needs of the population and to rearticulate the community in direct 
relation with the community councils and the UBV a/deas (froudi & Monedero, 
2007: 155, 185). 
Participatory democracy 
Theorisingparticipatory democrary 
At the beginning of the chapter, I drew attention to conflicting conceptions of the 
human being in protective and developmental democracy: in the former, society is 
constructed as a "collection of competing, conflicting, self-interested consumers 
and appropriators", while in the latter it should be "a community of exerters and 
developers of their human capacities" and participation would aim for "the 
achievement of a higher, more socially conscious set of human beings" 
~acpherson, 1977: 51,79). In order to advance to this form of society, democracy 
would have to give "all the citizens a direct interest in the actions of the 
government" and "an incentive to participate actively" (ibid.: 51). Rather than 
imposing a utopia on the people, the people would have to reach the goal 
themselves through active participation: 
[E]very instalment of participation leading to an impr~vement in their political 
capacity, as well as their all-round development, and making them capable of more 
participation and more self-development (Macpherson, 1977: 60). 
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As the idea of 'self-development' came under liberal (counter-)attack for its 
vagueness, Bachrach & Botwinick proposed to conceiye of 'self-development' as 
intersubjective processes through which individuals gain a "sense of personal 
identity" and augmented clarity concerning their individual and collective interests 
(1992: 29). Self-development can thus be viewed as a counter-concept to the 
Freirean culture of silence (see Chapter One). The point about ~Iacpherson's 
proposal for democracy is that it bears a demarcation of the politico-economic, i.e. 
direct democracy, and the socio-psychological which, by following ~Iacpherson, 
may be regarded as the essence of participatory democracy. By drawing on the 
developmental democrats, Macpherson identifies the following two inter-
dependent conditions for participatory democracy: firstly, a "change in people's 
consciousness (or unconsciousness)", from an individualist consumer identity to 
exerters and developers of their own capacities which, due to its collective spirit, 
brings with it a sense of community; and, secondly, by implicitly following 
Rousseau, who stated that "equality of rights and authority" depended on "equality 
in rank and fortune" (1993: 240), a substantial reduction of social and economic 
inequality (J\1acpherson, 1977: 99-100). Precisely this message is expressed when 
the Bolivarian government declares that the "full development of the citizen" in 
relation to the exercise of democracy requires to raise the "collective well-being" 
through income and wealth redistribution (RBV, 2001: 8). In the following I will 
ftrst introduce Venezuela's integral set of social, political, economic and cultural 
programmes, called missions [misiones]. As the institutionality of participatory 
democracy, they drive the necessary "reciprocal incremental change" in 
consciousness, social equality and democratic participation (cf ~1acpherson, 1977: 
100-1). The question of 'Who can participate' is central to citizenship, which will be 
the subject of the final section of this chapter. 
The miJJions 
Launched by the government since 2003, in 2008 a set of 27 universally accessible 
missions operate nation-wide across sectors in areas relevant to endogenous 
sustainable and human development (see Appendi'X 6d). Fundamental has been 
i\ firion lden/idad [Identity], which has contributed to political justice (framing) as by 
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2007 over five million people had been provided with legal citizenship (ID cards), 
including 600.000 foreign long-time residents.68 Disenfranchisement, especially in 
the South, is a common mechanism to reduce the popular sectors' electoral clout 
and strengthen middle class and elite rule (Gills et al, 1993: 22). In addition to 
subsidised food distributed through about 15.000 supermarkets and 6.000 soup 
kitchens (Misi6n Alimentaci6n/ Merca~, as well as comprehensive free health care 
through missions Bam'o Adentro and Milagro Q\1iracle], some of the less referenced 
examples include: free dental treatment in Misi6n Sonrisa [Smile], through which 
functional and aesthetic-psychological damages are mended so that - as the name 
implies - "the poor can smile again"; integral support to the most excluded (people 
living in the street, victims of HIV / AIDS, etc.) through Misi6n Negra Hip6lita'J 
mobile care centres; women's and indigenous people's rights are translated as 
Misi6n MadreJ del Bam'o [Mothers of the Neighbourhood], designed to counter the 
'feminisation of poverty' in its various dimensions69, and Misi6n Guiacaipuro for 
cultural justice (recognition), "ethno-development" and "indigenous socialism". 
Environmental efforts have been accelerated since 2006, in j\1isi6n Arbol [free] 
(reforestation) and Misi6n Rtvoluci6n Energetica [Energy Revolution] (energy saving 
and alternative technologies).7o Elementary and fundamental education are 
provided by Missions Robinson I, II, III and Misidn Ribas, complemented by AliJidn 
Che Guevara (work-oriented education and training) and MiJidn Sucre (higher 
education). The missions form a network, often complementing each other, 
depending on the purposes and context. 
68 Sec http://w\Vw.menpet.gobxe/misionespndex.php Qast accessed ~2/0?/2008); also \lI:\CI: 20(n~ ~:. 
69 Some years ago, according to ~ora Castaneda (BanmuJeri. about 60 Yo ot poor homes ~ the countn \\t:re 
. I fi I I d d hou'eholds and 70% of poor \'enezuelans were women (CIted 111 Lopez, 2006: 52). smg e ema e- 1ea e s , , . .. . . -
7() TI .' - mplemented b,' other government lfUtlatl\'es such as the mtroductlOn ()t lead-free 1e ITllSSlOl1S are co. ' . . _ 
petrol in 2005, the construction of a national.railway network, the s~'s~em~tlc clearung ot waters (e.g. Lake 
~Iaracaibo, related to the rights of mdigenous livelihoods) (e.g. \L\R.. '\.;. _00 ). 
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Table 4.5 Objectives of the Missions within the Bolivarian Project 
Objectives of the Bolivarian Pro;ect Objectives of the Missions 
Reduction of the deficit in basic sooal rights attention. 
Sodal inclusion and equality guaranteed social indusion and increasing the qua rty of 
life of the popLdar sectors. 
Recogniiion and deliberatp. e participation of the 
Social popular and participatory democracy exduded sectors in the public policies and in the 
allocation of stale resources. 
Prefiguration of a new de .... !)ureaucratised public 
Constituent sodalOst] state institutionality aligned :0 the interests and demands of 
the popular sectors. 
Development of collective productive community 
projects based on relations of solidarity and 
I\ew endogenous development model sustainable conditions from the economic. ecological 
and social point of view. 
Source: D'Elia (2000: 9). 
As Table 4.5 shows, the nusslons are not conventional assistentialist or 
compensatory welfare schemes. Rather, as both a process and a system of 
inclusion, they combine short .... term poverty alleviation with long .... term structural 
transformation (MED, 2004: 125). In this respect, the missions - at this point -
join afftrmative with transformatory remedies in the different dimensions of 
Fraser's justice framework. They also contribute to re-defining the state-society 
relationship: as expressions of the new institutionality of the revolutionary state, 
which appeals to the collective rather than the individual, the missions become a 
mechanism of co-responsibility which allows the excluded themselves to reverse 
their condition through protagonistic participation (Maingon, 2005: 536; MINCI, 
2005b: 11; D'Elia, 2006: 212, 217). Moreover, the missions circumyent counter-
revolutionary sabotage in the inherited state apparatuses. As Cox (1996) states, a 
new institutionality is key in a war of position in the transition to socialism, as 
counter-posed with social democratic "gains within the established order": 
To build up the basis of an alternative state and society [ ... ] means creating 
alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources within existing society 
and building bridges between workers and other subordinate classes. It means 
actively building a counterhegemony within an established hegemony while 
resisting the pressures and temptations to relapse into pursuit of incremental gains 
for subaltern groups within the framework of bourgeois hegemony (Cox, 1996: 128-
9) . 
. :\s Chavez stated in 1996, the democratisation of education, culturc, science and 
technology requires "placing them under the responsibility of the entire social body 
and not leayc it in the hands of the leadership" (Cha\"ez, 2007[1996]: 2'7). Social 
participation seeks to impact on the politico-economic (direct detl10cracy), the 
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institutional (changes in the view of the state and the role of its institutions), and 
the cultural (changes of values, identities and behaviour), with the objectiye of 
social equality and a Bolivarian identity (cf D'Elia, 2006: 212-13).71 In the (re-
)construction of a national identity, cultural transformation is centred around 
strengthening a sense of belonging and rootedness in values and traditions 
characteristic of the (above all poorest) communities, as a form of \1.ndication of 
the essence of 'the popular' in the face of its historical negation and the impact of 
globalisation (Alvarado Chacln, 2004; see Chapter Three). It involyes an 
emancipatory process where negative individual and collective self-images (class, 
race, ignorance etc.) are overcome through the missions' contribution to new 
socio-psychological and socio-political imageries, such as: a "new solidarity" 
through subsidised food, and reafftrmation of people's capacities through the 
educational missions's slogans of the "new victorious citizen" [vencedores, j\Iisidn 
Ribas] and "I can Do It!" [Yo Sf Puedo!, the Cuban literacy method] (D'Elia, 2006: 
219-20). In this sense, social participation (free health care) in Misidn Bam'o Adentro 
has driven the formation of the health committees (D'Elia, 2006), which form part 
of the organised society (community councils) structure. Likewise, Misidn Madres del 
Bam'o not only provides economic support to impoverished women, but tries to 
strengthen their organisational capacities through Mothers of the Neighbourhood 
Committees (Comites de Madres del Barrio), which organise socio-political education 
and participation (e.g. to exercise social control). In early 2008, the mission was 
operating in 70 municipalities, where 3700 committees were being formed.7 2 
Table 4.5 points to a further contribution of the nusSlons to direct and 
participatory democracy, namely that of deliberative participation. 'Deliberation' has 
come to be associated with 'deliberative democracy', which is a "communicatiyc" 
or "discursive" approach to democracy that rose to prominence in the post-1989 
era (\V'arren, 2002; Gould, 2004: 6). Philosophically grounded in Habermas' theory 
71 Here I depart from D'Elia (2006: 213), who states that the political (part1Clpatory-prot;l~()Ill~tlC 
democr;cy) and institutional (social state and new instttutionality) would be "required imp~~ts and Ideals" to 
achieve the social (inclusion and social equality) and cultural (Bolinnan Identity) as the ultlm~lt(' unpKts 
and ideals". 
72 See http://www.misionmadresde1barrio.gob.ve/quees.php (05/ ()2/ 2(08). 
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of communicative action and the ideal speech situation - the "ideal of rational, 
informed discussion of public policy" (Outhwaite, 1994: 8) - deliberation pursues 
informed debate and opinion formation through rational and impartial dialogue to 
improve the quali!J of really existing democracy by supplementing it by a range of 
procedures (e.g. deliberative polls, citizens' juries, feedback by use of ICT) (Held, 
2006). I explored Habermas' theory of communicative action in relation to PAR in 
my MEd Research Methods dissertation (Muhr, 2004). Understood as an empirical 
counter-factual, Habermas' ideal speech situation shows that power relations in 
micro contexts (e.g. community councils) systematically distort communication, 
and that such "deliberative deficits" constrain effective participation and 
democratic decision-making (e.g. Morrow & Torres, 2002: 51; Ray, 1993: 26-8; 
How, 2003: 180; Gould, 2004: 26-7; Fishkin in Held, 2006: 237). lntersubjective 
processes of this kind, however, are not the concern of this thesis. Of greater 
interest is this: while Held (2006) remains inconclusive whether deliberative 
democracy constitutes a new (alternative) model of democracy, Avritzer & Santos 
(2003) attempt to elevate it to counter-hegemonic status. What Avritzer & Santos 
term "participatory proceduralism" (which they counter-pose with the 
Schumpeterian democratic method) undoubtedly is a condition for democratic 
decision-making in what Arendt would consider "public spaces of action and 
political deliberation" (d'Entreves, 1992: 146). However, the authors' 
argumentation is problematic, not only for their arbitrary (inconsistent) use of 
different conceptions of democracy, which I shall not further discuss here. rvfore 
importantly, participatory proceduralism, as in Avritzer & Santos' examples, 
operates within the 'reformist, radical-democratic' approach to local politics 
referred to above in my section on community councils. What .A. vritzer & Santos 
blatantly ignore is the vulnerability of the procedure to structural (fiscal and 
legislative) state power, which substantially reduces its counter-hegemonic 
potential, as the many frustrated experiences in Chavez & Goldfrank's (2004) 
volume show, as well as I(en Livingstone's Greater London Council-experience, at 
the time reportedly referred to by Thatcher's "right-hand man" ~orman Tebbit as 
"the modern kind of socialism" that "we will kill" (\\rain\\Tight, 2004). ~-\nd they 
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did. The state, as Poulantzas suggested, does not disappear through an 'anti-state-
wishful-thinking-self-management' -policy that disregards the real role of the state 
(2000[1978]: 38-9). The limited constituent power that can be exercised through 
participatory budgeting procedures may ultimately be little more than instrumental 
devices at the service of constituted power to increase the legitimacy (consent to) 
of the hegemonic regime in times of voter abstention and citizens' feeling of not 
being represented by those they vote for in the absence of any real choice in most 
countries (Maingon, 2005: 551; Warren, 2002; Held, 2006). Furthennore, 
deliberation may be the prerogative of the more articulate, i.e. educated (usually the 
more affluent) (Stokes, 2002: 44). Conclusively, the institutionalization of 
discursive procedures hardly amounts to counter-hegemony, and would depend on 
a larger direct and participatory political project that includes a non-bourgeois state. 
Bolivarian citizenship: towards the 'active social citizen' 
I here introduce Linda Bosniak's typology of citizenship to discuss with more 
explicitness the Bolivarian notion of citizenship that has been underlying the 
discussion throughout the chapter. Like democracy, citizenship is a contested 
concept for which there is no objective definition, and similar to global justice as 
discussed in Chapter One, the key analytical questions refer to the substance ('the 
what') , the subjects ('the who'), and the location of citizenship ('the where,) 
(Bosniak, 2000: 453, 489). Accordingly, Bosniak distinguishes four mutually 
dependent and reinforcing dimensions of citizenship, as: a) fonnal legal status; b) 
rights; c) political activity; and d) a fonn of collective identity and sentiment 
(solidarity). As will be seen, this multi-dimensional framework captures the holism 
and (relative) inclusiveness of Venezuela's revolutionary citizenship, which 
emphasises recognition on the basis of personhood, as accorded through the 
international human rights regime, rather than by national affiliation. 
Legal dli-:;.enship means "nominal membership in an organised political community", 
whose site is the territorially-bounded nation state (Bosniak, 2000: 456). Although 
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Venezuela is democratising such formal citizenship through the above-stated 
MisirJn Identidad, the exclusionary character of nationality is preset\?ed in this 
dimension. Nevertheless, with the exception of a limited range of political rights -
primarily the right to vote and eligibility for formal political office (see CBRY, Art. 
32-42) - citizenship as rights and entitlements is dissociated from the conventional 
liberal nationalist-legal framing in Venezuela's 'revolutionary citizenship'. The 
notion of citizenship as rights was advanced by T.H. Marshall's 'three generations' 
of rights: civil rights (e.g. freedom from slavery, torture; freedom of speech, faith, 
expression, ownership, assembly); political rights (to vote, nominate for public 
office, political organisation); and social and economic rights (to education, work, 
food, clothing, housing, health) (Arat, 1991). However, by reference to the 
international human rights regime, Manfred Nowak presents an expanded 
classification, which is taken on by Venezuela's NESD-2007: accordingly, the first 
generation of human rights comprises civil and political rights; the second, 
economic, social and cultural rights; and the third, collective rights, which include 
the right of peoples to self-determination, the protection of minorities and 
indigenous peoples, the right to a healthy environment and peace, and the right to 
development, which internationally replaced the previous more political right to a 
new international economic order (NIEO) (Nowak, 2003: 1,23-5; RBV, 2007a: 9). 
The concern here is not with the 'global politics of human rights' (T. Evans, 2005), 
i.e. the power and neo-imperialist interests involved in human rights promotion 
touched upon in Chapter One. Rather, several observations regarding rights and 
citizenship in Venezuela should be emphasized: by territorialising the 
international human rights regune, CBRV transcends citizens' rights (for legal 
citizens) with human rights (for everyone affected). Most fundamentally, the 
inviolability of the right to life by outlawing the death penalty is laid dO\\'n in 
.:\rticle 43. Although internationally most political and civil rights are formally 
enjoyed independent of legal citizenship (Nowak, 2003), the distinction benveen 
'citizen' and 'personhood' certainly remains relevant \\ith respect to second 
generation rights in most countries (Bosniak, 2000: 503). \\fhile in Venezuela the 
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national sets the territorial frame, legallY the principle of "universal personhood" 
applies with respect to the social, economic and cultural rights agenda. This 
includes, as I will substantiate in Chapter Five, that the missions, as the major 
human rights mechanism, are universally accessible in the national territory, i.e. 
there are no restrictions on grounds of nationality. As an integral system of 
inclusion, they simultaneously translate the inter-dependence, thus indivisibility, of 
the various human rights dimensions. This starkly contrasts the neoliberal regime 
which uses the hegemonic conception of different generations to "wilfully" 
prioritise civil and political rights, suggesting that the others would follow later 
(Santos, 2002a: 293). Their general absence, however, produces the 'uncivil society' 
pointed to in Chapter One. 
This is by no means accidental, as protective democratic citizenship is founded on 
the nonnative principle of formal political and legal equality as a means for 
facilitating political participation, rather than on rights to social justice (Stokes, 
2002: 29; Brighouse, 2002; Amin, 1993: 63; Bobbio, 2005[1988]). Held, by drawing 
on Pateman and Macpherson, sums up that with the exception of the 
developmental democrats, liberals have "failed to explore systematically the ways 
asymmetries of power and resource impinge upon the meaning of liberty and 
equality in daily relations" (Held, 2006: 209-10). As Marshall notes, "the right to 
freedom of speech" or "expression", which is commonly associated with the 
freedom of the press, for instance, "has little real substance if, from lack of 
education, you have nothing to say that is worth saying, and no means of making 
yourself heard to say it" (1950: 21). That is, when structural constraints, such as the 
transnational infonnation monopoly, preclude such 'freedoms' (Gill, 2008: 69). 
The means to exercise one's fonnal rights thus are an essential condition of 
substantive political equality (Brighouse, 2002: 59). 
Citi:;;,enship aJ'political udivity is defined as "active engagement" and "membership" in 
a political collecti\'ity or community (Bosniak, 2000: 470). As previously indicated, 
antique political philosophy viewed participation as a "privilege" and "higher 
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good", rather than a duty, through which 'the public' and 'the private' become 
intertwined (Sabine, 1951: 19-25). The dualistic counterposing of political life and 
social life is a modern phenomenon that emerged with i\fachia,~elli and Hobbes, 
and was driven by a perceived need to protect the citizen against "state tyranny" 
(Bachrach & Botwinick, 1992: 127-40). Dissolving this separation appears to be a 
conscious objective of 21 st century socialism, in which the community councils 
emerge as the principal sites of collective action based, as stated, on residence 
rather than legal status. Within such a "pluralist conception of politics and 
citizenship", rooted in the local but transcending it, political action - "the exercise 
of effective political agency" (d'Entreves, 1992: 160) - is not confined to formal 
interactions between citizens and the state, and includes social movements 
(Bosniak, 2000: 476-77). 
Finally, citizenship as identity and/or solidarity refers to citizenship'S affective 
dimension; as shared experience and the formation of a common identity (Bosniak, 
2000: 479). Rather than confining the associated social and political practices to the 
national polity ('patriotism'), the sites of citizenship can be non-state communities 
of a political nature. At the sub-national level, Venezuela's community councils 
spring to mind. Such political communities are not simple alliances of given 
individual interests that seek their self-interest (as in the liberal concept of 
'association'), but are constructed through participation in shared public spaces and 
political institutions, which permits the development of relations of "civility" and 
"solidarity" (Arendt in d'Entreves, 1992: 151-53; Mouffe, 1992: 236). In contrast to 
legal citizenship, which is empirically given, citizenship as political identity is 
constructed upon voluntarily shared norms of conduct, which create a "common 
bond", or a "public concern", among the community's members who as 
indi\riduals are engaged in many different enterprises. The idea of 'public concern' 
replaces the abstract notion of a universalist "common good" or "public interest" 
(one single goal for all members), which is often \riewed as oppressive and 
incompatible with individual liberty. Thus, 1\fouffe hopes to dissolYe the underlying 
public/private dichotomy: wants and decisions are private, and polincal action is 
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public (Mouffe, 1992: 233, 237-8; cf Stokes, 2002: 39). Importantly, such political 
communities can never be fully inclusive, because "the common recognition of a 
set of ethico-political values" implies a "constitutive outside", accompanied bv 
conflict and division (Mouffe, 1992: 235). 
It is the combination of political and social empowerment that may allow us to 
speak of a kind of Bolivarian 'active social citizenship'. With this in mind, we can 
turn to Bosniak's main point, which is the construction of transnational citizenship 
identities through cross-border political activity and affiliations: "the collective 
identifications and commitments" that "exceed the bounds of the national society 
and its members". Examples include a possible "Euro-consciousness", 
communities emerging from transborder migration, denationalized fellowship that 
link the TCC and, above all, the phenomenon of a 'transnational civil society' 
associated with social and political movements (Bosniak, 2000: 482-92). Fraser, as 
stated in Chapter One, identifies these as the primary actors in trans formative 
politics of framing which, to recall, target the structural injustices at the supra- and 
transnational levels by challenging the predator states' and TCC-monopoly of 
frame-setting. I shall resume this point in the conclusions of the chapter. 
Some conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the Bolivarian Republic's model of revolutionary 
democracy, in which representative, direct and participatory democracy 
complement each other in a democratic transition to democratic socialism. While 
liberal representative democracy and Marxist direct democracy have historically 
been established as distinct models of democracy, the chapter has used the 
Venezuelan case to argue against viewing direct democracy and participatory 
democracy as interchangeably usable concepts, and rather to theorise the former as 
associated with political-economic collecti"ity and the latter with human rights for 
human development, in which individual 'growth' benefits the community. Based 
on the three types of democracies, I proposed a holistic Boli,'arian, revolutionary 
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citizenship, with the 'active social citizen' at its heart. By advancing a concept like 
'active social citizenship' I aim to make explicit, and emphasise, the joining of 
antiquity's active political citizenship, as in direct democracy, with traditional 'social 
citizenship' associated with social rights, which in Venezuela's human rights-based 
participatory democracy transcends the conventional notion as recognition is based 
on personhood (universality) rather than legality (nationality). Grounded in my 
proposals of a transnational revolutionary class and a transnational organised 
society, this thesis will also advance the idea of 'transnational active social 
citizenship (identities)" driven and facilitated by ALBA. 
The reduction of social inequality by the missions is not limited to the material, but 
includes knowledge and information as an important cause of non-participation 
(e.g. Schonwalder, 2004). While there are many reasons for what is often referred 
to as 'apathy' - Troudi et al (2005: 17-32) accumulate 18 possible barriers, which 
include individual power imbalances (rivalries, intolerance, etc.) "vithin the 
community, and only the already organised or those 'with the process' participating 
(Harnecker, 2005: 6) - a salient reason may be a lack of time and income 
combined, as for instance the functions in the community council are exercised on 
an honorary basis (RBV, 2006, Art. 12). Spending time on unpaid "voluntary 
work" is the privilege of the wealthy, the rentiers, Weber stated (1948: 86). 
Recognising this, a reform of the labour law has for several years been discussed 
with the objective of reducing the working day from eight to six hours for the 
"physical, spiritual and cultural development of the workers" (CBRV, Art. 90; 
.A.porrea, 15/10/2008). 
The envisaged 'community state' with its anti-bureaucratic institutionality (the 
missions) and the instances of popular power (councils) may resemble the early 
20th century idea of 'Guild Socialism', primarily theorised by S.C. Hobson and 
G.D.H. Cole. The decentralised guild structure would, depending on function, be 
simultaneously verticalk and horizontally organised to dispense socialism from the 
, . 
"freedom-threatening superstate", i.e. from excessiyeh- increasing state powers 
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(Kramer, 1972: 27-30; Pateman, 1970: 41). As a re-scaled form of state territorial 
power, the community state would be constituted by a horizontal (networks of 
spatial connectivity) and vertical forms of inter-scalar relationships, as real powcr is 
re-scaled from the state and private capitalist sector to the sub-national, organised 
communities. The predominant local spatial-scale form is the council (community, 
workers, students councils), and the various forms of social economy organisation. 
However, in contrast to hegemonic globalisation and its objective of maximising 
competitiveness between territorially delimited spaces of capitalist production (e.g. 
"world cities"), the Bolivarian agenda pursues a redistribution of economic and 
political power across the social space of society to balance out une\Tcn 
development or, ultimately, for democratic ends (cf Brenner, 1999: 445). This is a 
core issue of Bolivarian endogenous development, discussed in Chapter Fiyc. 
Chapter Five 
Chapter Five 
Bolivarian Development and Higher Education 
For All 
176 
... and presidents of the sister nations, don't pqy attention a'!}more to the economists { . .J the I ,,"tal 
decisions, the public policies, have to be taken l?Y political persons, who have an integral vision, not 
the economists { . .J and above all not those semi-autistic economists, who believe ez'erything would 
be resolved l?Y supplY and demand, that often doesn't even e:\~ist. 
Dr Rafael Correa Delgado (PhD Economics), President of Ecuador73 
Introduction 
Guided by the question What education for what development?, this chapter explores 
Venezuela's endogenous development which underlies 21 st century socialism. I will 
trace the emergence of the development paradigm in order to underscore the 
revolution's historicity and systematicity. The declared objective of "sustainable 
endogenous development" is the government's response to the revolution's 
recognition of both a global social and ecological crisis which requires 
"fundamental structural changes" and where education assumes a key role in order 
to achieve changes in the attitude of the entire society (MCT, 2005: 59). 
The General Strands of the Nation's Economit' and Social Development Plan 2001-2007, 
NESD-2001, establishes five "equilibria", which articulate the CBRY's normati\·c 
framework - the political, eamomit; social, temtorial, and international. W'hile they 
epitomise the democratisation of the stated spheres and the corresponding 
structures, social justice can be identified as the unifying principle and objectiye of 
the strategic parameters (see RBY, 2001: 25). Although reference to socialism has 
come to dominate the official discourse, endogenous development remains a 
B Correa during the signing of the Ecuador- \' enezuela energy agreements, Quito, 16/01 nOO- Correa 
bt ' 'd his PhD from tbe Uniyersitv of Illinois at Urbana-Champ;ugn (See o ;un( . 
http:;' /\\'\\"\\".alterna t1nholivariana.OJ;g/modules.php?name-Content&pa=showpage&pid = 1412. ,lccessed 
:20 101 120()~') 
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central concept 1n NESD-2001's successor, NESD-2007 (RBY, 2007a). This 
chapter continues my discussion of political and economic democracy of Chapter 
Four by analysing NESD-2001 's social and territorial equilibria. They haye entered 
the 'Five Constituent Motors' as "morality and enlightenment" (A1om!), Llc,t'.IJ 74 
and "new power geometry", respectively, and NESD-2007 as a "new socialist 
ethics", "greatest social happiness", and a "new national geo-politics" (see 
Appendices 3a, b, c). The international dimension will be discussed in Chapter Si.x. 
NESD-2007 states "justice" as the highest moral principle in the Boli"arian 
Republic, coming "before the rights and the law", nevertheless presupposing them 
(RBV, 2007a: 19). My discussion of the Bolivarian principle of justice will show 
that in analogy to revolutionary democracy, the Bolivarian conception of social 
justice joins Marxist with liberal philosophy. From this follows an analysis of 
different dimensions of the previously sketched out HEFA strategy (Chapter Two) 
- the philosophical, the quantitative and the qualitative - and the role of the 
municipalised UBV in the construction of the organised society at the community 
scale, as the basis of revolutionary democracy. My case study of the UBV-PAR in 
Bam'o Cruz Verde illustrates aspects of the re-scaling of power to the organised 
communities, as theorised in Chapter Four. 
The Plans 
The integral character of Bolivarian endogenous development is reflected in the 
dynamic inter-dependence of the five equilibria: the political (construction of 
participatory democracy), economic (development of a social economy), social 
(achievement of social justice), territorial (efficient occupation of the national 
territory), and the international equilibria (strengthening national sovereignty whilst 
promoting a multi-polar world order). This development paradigm historically 
cyolved from position papers and revolutionary declarations of the prcyious 
decadc (RBV, 2001: 7), as the origin of Chavez' conspiratotyr moyement, the :'IBR-
7-1 In accordance \\1th official translatiom of Bolinr's work, I translate '1uces' as 'enlIghtenmcnt' (e.g. 
Fitzgerald, 1971: 63). 
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200 (see Chapter One) coincided with the armed resistance of Venezuela's Left in 
the 1960/70s, including several other revolutionary groups within the army 
(D'Elia, 2006: 195). When serving at an anti-guerrilla post, Chavez (2007) states, 
"listening and [ ... ] reading" had made him sympathise with the declared objectives 
of the guerrilla movements. In 1977, at the age of 23, he swore four army soldiers 
into his Venezuelan People's Bolivarian Liberation ~-\rmy (EBLPV). On 1-
December 1982, the Bolivarian Revolutionary Army (EBR-200) was founded, and 
renamed MBR-200 in 1983. At the time, Chavez' brother Adan75 played a key role 
in building a "civic-military movement" through liaising with other political groups, 
such as La CausaR, the People's Electoral Movement [Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo] 
and Red Flag [Bandera RoJaJ. With Chavez' release from prison in 1994, the 
constituent assembly project was initiated and, as the use of Bolivar's name in a 
political party is prohibited, 'MBR-200' was renamed '5th Republic Movement' on 
21 October 1997 (Movimiento V Republica, MVR76) (pereira Almao, 2004; Chavez, 
2007a). The newly formed socialist party PSUV, according to Chavez (2007a: 30), 
is another phase in the ongoing transformation of the revolutionary movement in 
response to historical context and circumstances. 
The 1991 Plan de Operaciones (Ezequiel Zamora", the 1992 Programme of the 
Revolutionary Government (Programa de Gobierno Revoludonario), Chavez' 
(2004[1992]) semi-clandestine writings from prison and his How to get out of the 
Labyrinth (1992) were early articulations of the 1996 Alternative Bolivarian Agenda 
(Chavez, 2007[1996]), which challenged the government's neoliberal Agenda 
Venezuela. Chavez' anti-neoliberal proposal announced the 5th Republic to be based 
on constituent power and a "restructuring of the state, [ ... J the entire political 
system, from its very philosophical foundations to its components and the 
relations that regulate it" (Chavez, 2007[1996]: 13). Prior to the 1998 elections, the 
Proposal for a Tran[formation of Veneif/ela: a democratic ret'olution (Chavez, 1998) \\"as 
75 Adin Chavez a confessed ~farxist, is a physicist who has taught in the Uni\"ersidad de los .\ndc~ m 
Merida (Gott, 2005). He has been ambassador to Cuba, .\1.inister of Education Qanuary 2007 - ;\pril 2008), 
and has been elected governor for the PSl1\" of Barinas state m the NO\"ember 2008 electlOflS.. _ 
76 I C tili· the consonants 'B' and '\"' are almost identically pronounced (unless .It the begmrung ot a 
n as an, . h 
word). Therefore, 'i\fBR' did not change the original pronunciation of ''\f\ 'R', thus, .Irguabl~·, prc~c[,\"Ulg t e 
original meaning. 
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released which articulated the five equilibria further elaborated in NESD-2001. The 
New Strategic Map of November 2004, which proclaims 10 Strategic Objectives 
following Chavez' victory in the recall referendum of 15 ~-\ugust that year, marked 
the beginning of declaring the Bolivarian revolution socialist (see ~-\ppendi"{ 3d; 
MINCI, 2004a; Troudi, 2005). The radicalisation of the endogenous development 
model recognizes that capitalism cannot reconcile the disjuncture between the 
politico-economic and social regimes, and it was Chavez' speech at the 5th World 
Social Forum in Porto Alegre (Brazil) on 30 January 2005 that is remembered as 
the first occasion on which he openly called for a 21 st century socialism. 
Sustainable, endogenous development 
NESD-2001's five "equilibria" synthesise the endogenous development 
dimensions as conceptualised by Osvaldo Sunkel and collaborators: equity, social 
justice, and productive employment; science and technology; capital formation; 
environment and natural resources; industrialisation and agriculture; 
macroeconomic equilibria; and international integration (Sunkel, 1993a; see 
Appendix 3b for the five equilibria and the role of HE therein). Accordingly, 
endogenous development aims to replace the traditional "imitative-dependent", 
sectoral approach to development, i.e. the customary classification into sectors (e.g. 
industry, agriculture, energy, transportation, health, education) by a "creatiyc-
independent", science and technology-based "spatial-regional approach", in which 
the "rational utilisation" of "resources and external economies" was expected to 
facilitate positive inter-connected benefits (Sunkel, 1993b: 55). 
As an integral, holistic development paradigm, the five equilibria's objectives and 
strategies are intertwined, mutually dependent and reinforcing. For instance, in 
accordance with my discussion in Chapter Four, the political sub-objectiyes of 
"consolidating political and social stability" and "contributing to the establishment 
of participatory and protagonistic democracy" are inseparable from the soci~ll sub-
objectiycs of "guaranteeing the universal and equitable enjoyment of the social 
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rights", "improving the distribution of income and \vealth", and "strengthening 
social participation and generating citizen power in public decision-making spaces" 
(RBV, 2001). Guided by the principles of universality, equity, participation and co-
responsibility, the social equilibrium is envisaged to be achieved through a strategy 
of progressive inclusion, which involves decentralisation as well as a reduction of 
social inequities through the prioritisation of social needs, for the "full 
development of the citizen" in relation to the exercise of democracy (RBY, 2001: 
8, 108). The concept of "social equity" dissolves the traditional dichotomy of the 
social and the economic, where the former is subordinate to the latter. lvforeover, it 
means rejecting the "'poverty-fighting" and "vulnerable-groups-protection" 
policies, which do not tackle the structural root-causes of injustice and poverty 
(RBV, 2001: 91). Politically, social equity as the guarantor of social rights means the 
restoration and/or strengthening of 'the public' as a space of appropriation of, by 
and for the collective interest, which is a form of collective empowerment. 
Venezuela's endogenous development pursues a diversified economy in order to 
progressively transform the oil rentier dependency into a productive, humanist and 
ecological economy (RBV, 2001: 97). Recognising that the poor are most affected 
by environmental degradation (RBV, 2007 a: 41), the idea of a small, locally 
embedded industry directly controlled by the people - rather than an 
environmentally hostile large-scale industry - evokes economist E.F. Schumacher's 
landmark statement Small is Beautiful. Schumacher (1973) criticised an economic 
system whose philosophy of materialism had made humankind the sen'ants of 
capital (rather than the economy serving the people), and proposed a community-
based "people-centred" form of sustainable development that would abandon 
capitalism's short-term rationality of reckless natural resource exploitation. 
The stated notion of 'sustainable development' emerged from the 'Club of Rome' 
Limits to Growth statement of the impossibility of infinite growth in a finite, 
integrated system. Originally a radical idea, 'sustainable development' fused 'red' 
and 'green' ideologies and confronted the modernist dC\'elopment olodel and its 
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associated 'laissez-faire' capitalism "at the very heart of its purpose" (O'Riordan, 
1993: 39) - that is, it called for global redistribution (intra- and inter-generational 
needs-based social justice) and environmental conservation, both of which would 
require abandoning the economic growth dogma and the associated resource 
consumptive lifestyles. In addition to financial and technological resources, "true 
sustainability" would, according to O'Riordan (1993: 39), crucially depend on two 
structural requirements: "a form of democracy that transcends the nation-state and 
the next election", and "guarantees of civil rights and social justice to oppressed 
peoples". However, cooptation by the mainstream development community, such 
as the Brandt (e.g. ICIDI, 1980: 240) and Brundtland (e.g. WCED, 1987: 3, 8) 
commissions' "comfortable IZeynesian reformism" (Adams cited in Reid, 1995: 65) 
and, subsequently, by the IFIs, quickly perverted sustainable development from an 
ethical guiding principle concerned with democracy and justice into a 'greening of 
the status quo' (at best), 'resource management improvement' and/or 'sustained 
economic growth' (at worst). Although in practice sustainable development in 
Venezuela is "still an ideal" (Interview-Conversation 7, .L-\ppendix 16c), normatively 
the Bolivarian government reclaims the concept's original radicality as the 
"democratic socialist society", which resynthesizes the precepts of 
intergenerational responsibility, environmental sustainability, social equity, and its 
construction through popular action (see: Lele, 1991; O'Riordan, 1993; Reid, 1995; 
MCT, 2005: 66, 79). 
Endogenous development, or "development from within", as conceptualised by 
Sunkel (1993a), takes a country's own developmental potential and producti\"e 
resources (capital, labour, natural resources, technology, knowledge and skills) as 
the basis of a long-term, strategic orientation towards specific domestic and foreign 
markets. It is rooted in 1980s/1990s neostructuralist theory which attempted to 
respond to the shortcomings of structuralist, inward-oriented political economy 
(i.e. import substitution industrialisation, IS!), and neo-liberal, export-led 
economics. It intends to reconcile the neoclassical concern with the short-term 
equilibrium of economic flows, markets and prices, \\ith dependency and world 
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system theoretical long-term structuralist analysis, the latter shifting the analytical 
focus of national development from the state to processes and factors such as 
international/ global historical relations, wealth and mcome distribution, 
environment, and control over the means of production (Lustig, 1991; Gills & 
Palan, 1994). Neostructuralism follows structuralism in considering the global 
economy being a hierarchical and asymmetric power system, and that further 
liberalisation would benefit the Tee and exacerbate inequality (Gwynne & Kay, 
2000). Accordingly, social justice and equity are central concerns, whose 
achievement would reqwre enhanced state control over strategic enterprises 
especially in the basic utilities and services sector, to repay the historically 
accumulated 'social debt' (Sunkel, 1993b: 51; Ffrench-Dayis, 1988; Ramos & 
Sunkel, 1993; Lustig, 1993). 
It is important to emphasise that endogenous development does neither stand for 
nationalist 'self-sufficiency', nor for lSI. In essence, lSI assumed that local 
production of formerly imported goods for the domestic market would eventually 
generate an expansion of industrial exports (Sunkel, 1993b: 28; Lustig, 1991). 
However, while goods produced at relatively low capital cost and with simple 
technology (mainly consumer durables - cars, TV s, etc.) were successfully 
substituted, a new dependency was created as capital goods (more sophisticated 
technology) had to be imported to produce those substitutes (Frank, 1969: 205-7). 
Moreover, protected by import tariffs to facilitate the development of domestic 
industries, commonly controlled by transnational capital, the absence of 
competition provoked inefficiency.77 In contrast, neither endogenous deyelopment 
nor 21 st century socialism have (yet) resorted to protectionist measures (Green, 
2003: 25; RBV, 2007a: 25), and both pursue capital accumulation, technical 
progress, and a productive, needs-based economy rather than the local 
reproduction of imported consumption patterns (cf Sunkel, 1993b: 46). This is 
implicitly socialist, or certainly non-capitalist, because Yenezuela's human nccds-
77 For comprehensi,·e analyses of (the failure of) lSI, see Lustig (1991), SWlkel (1993a). Gwynne &. Kay 
(2000). Green (2003: 19-38). For comparisons of neostructuralis~ \\1th neoliberali:ffi. see f' fren~h-D;I\1s 
(1988) and Bitar (1988). Green (2003: 2()2-66) prov1des a :;y~tl'manc compmson of I~I, neoliberal. and neo-
structural development thinking. 
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based economy is motivated by and organised around the use value of products, 
with the purpose of reproducing society. Production in capitalism, on the other 
hand, serves the reproduction and expansion of capital by employment of the 
exchange value and ultimately (and solely) the production of surplus value for priyate 
appropriation (Gruffydd Jones, 2001: 5-6; Troudi & Monedero, 2007: 134). 
Furthermore, endogenous development seeks to reverse the inherited socio-spatial 
polarisation produced by lSI -modernisation, under which the urban zones were 
privileged by public investment in industrialisation and social utilities (Ramos & 
Sunkel, 1993; cf Brenner, 2004: 101). 
In Venezuela, the urban population increased from 21 % in 1950 to around 90% in 
2003/04 (Viciano & Martinez, 2001: 40; UNDP, 2005; 2006), and migration to the 
northern-coastal regions left the rest of the country virtually unused (MINCI, 
2005d). Troudi & Monedero (2007: 186) add that over 80% of the national 
population is concentrated in approximately 30% of the territory (see Appendix 
2a). The urbanisation 'pull' factor was complemented by a 'push' factor in the form 
of the extremely high Gini index for access to land, stated at 0.88 in 1996/97 
(World Bank, 2005: 281). During the neoliberal decade, the cultivated area fell by 
30% (parker, 2007) as the economic elites had set Venezuela on a 
deindustrialisation course, which implied abandoning production (food, building 
materials, textiles) in favour of a more lucrative import business (rvfINCI, 2006a). 
When Chavez took office, 60% of Venezuela's industrial capacity was 
unproductive and 70% of basic agricultural products were imported (Viciano & 
Martinez, 2001: 40-41). 
In the government's public information booklets on endogenous deyelopment, the 
original reference to Sunkel has been omitted in the second edition (see ;\IINCI, 
2004b; 2008). Unchanged, however, has remained the definition of deYelopment 
'from \vithin' as "an economic model in which the communities deYelop their own 
proposals", which includes needs satisfaction under community leadership and the 
community transcending the local towards the national, regional and global 
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(MINCI, 2004b: 4; 2008: 4). The onusslon of reference to Sunkel's orthodox 
model may be explained by the substantial redefinition of endogenous 
development as the basis for 21 st century socialism (RBV, 2007a: 27). The 
Bolivarian model departs from Sunkel's (1993a) proposals in at least four 
fundamental respects: 
• It develops and radicalises the political dimension. Although Sunkel (1993b: 
34) recognises the economic, social, political and cultural dimensions of 
democracy, a critical discussion of the concept is avoided in favour of a 
mainstream, at best representative democracy conception. 
• The Ricardian principle of 'comparative advantage' (competition through a 
functioning price mechanism, see Green, 1993: 121-23), which has become 
a key feature of neoliberalisation (fickell & Peck, 2003), is replaced by a 
"cooperative advantage" (MICE/BANCO EX, n.d.). SPCs, NUDEs, 
micro-enterprises and recuperated factories78 become organised in 
Innovative Socialist Production Networks (RSIPs) or Social Economy 
Networks (RBV, 2007a: 28), that operate across scales under the rationale 
of solidarity, complementarity, reciprocity and cooperation (see Appendix 
11). 
• Therefore, counter to propos1ng individual or subregional groups of 
countries seeking vertical, competition-based integration in the global 
TNC/MNC-controlled economy - as proposed by Fritsch (1993: 325-30), 
and termed "open regionalism" (CEP AL, 1994) - the emerging socialist 
rival structure is formed through horizontal integration which competes 
with global capitalism (see Chapter Six). 
• Rather than depending on external sources ('aid' and debt relief) (Ramos & 
Sunkel, 1993: 9), and in contrast to other socialist reyolutions adyanced in 
peasant society contexts with a strong dependence on raising agricultural 
7R 'Recuperated factories', such as Venepal/lnvepal in Venezuela, but also companies in other L\C countnes 
(e.g. Uruguay, .\rgentina, Brazil), are factories that were abandoned an~/ or dismantled under neoliberalism 
or elite economIC sabotage (e.g. \'enezuela 2002/2003 and tl1e Ar;gentrnazo, 2001), have been l:"\j'l< Tn.lted, 
and now are state-worker owned at, for example, shares of51/-+9°0 respecti\'ely ~fl~CI, 2006b: 16-1-; also 
\ ' I I· '1" 25/ l) t '''''(07) Other stratecnc sectors where r~-nationalisations ha\'e occurred arc enezue ana , ~ ~, -t -' t;>-telecommuni~atiom, electricity, and cement. 
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productivity to be able to finance industrial development (Cox, 1996: 218), 
Venezuela is among those countries with one of the largest oil reseryes 
worldwide (PDVSA, 2005). The government's adoption of Arturo U slar 
Pietri's slogan of 1936 "Sowing the Oil" [Siembra del Petroleo] refers to the 
strategic use of the resource as the "locomotive" for the "new productive 
model" (MCT, 2005; RBV, 2007a: 39). 
Although each of NESD-2001's five development dimensions contributes to 
transforming the inherited geographies of inequality, the territorial dimension 
explicitly drives the strategy of "deconcentrated decentralisation". Within the 
rationale of the new power geometry, i.e. the geopolitical restructuring towards the 
'community state' (Chapter Four), improved territorial occupation (production in a 
diversified economy) integrates with direct democracy, participatory democracy 
and social equity - that is, homogeneous utilities and service provision in order to 
balance out the urban-rural disequilibrium (MPD, 2001: 7-8). The new territorial 
development structure manifests itself in axes, poles and NUDEs, and involves 
land reform and a micro-finance system to reactivate the productive apparatus and 
revitalise strategic economic activities (agriculture, industry, trade, tourism) with the 
objective of food sovereignty. Infrastructure development (water, sewage, gas, 
electricity, transport) is crucial, and the probably most ambitious of the massive 
transport infrastructure projects is a national railway network, ultimately to become 
part of the continental integration strategy (CBRV, Art. 305-7; RBV, 2007a: 27, 33; 
Parker 2007; see Appendix 2 for maps). 
Although it is too early to speculate about the long-term economic viability of the 
development model, Table 5.1 presents relevant World Bank indicators that point 
to a positive trend regarding the set objectives. In addition to drastic annual GDP 
growth-rates and per capita gross national income (GNI) since 2000, the export 
sector has grown ahnost 10 percentage points since 1998, while imports have been 
slightly reduced, \vhich suggests increased national sovereignty. \\bile the exact 
composition of the import sector would require a more thorough analysis, it 
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should be mentioned that imports include scientific kno\vledge transfer to counter 
technological under-development and dependence; a strategy that is complemented 
by Mision Ciencia [Science]. Most important, however, appears to be the increase in 
merchandise trade in relation to total GDP over the past ten years, which suggests 
an InCipient reversal of the predominance of oil revenues oyer other export 
activities. 
Table 5.1 Venezuela· Selected Economic Indicators 
Indicator 1990 1998 2000 2005 2006 
GDP growth (annual %) 6 0 4 10 10 
GNI per capita, Atlas method (current USS) 2570 3360 4100 4940 6070 
EXlX)rts of goods and seriices (% of GDP) 39 21 30 40 37 
Imports of goods and sefVices (% of GDP) 20 23 18 20 21 
Merchandise trade (% of GOP) 53 37 42 55 54 
Source. Wol1d Development Indicators (http.lIQo.worldban~,.orgI6H,4,YAHGBHO (accessed 2010512008) 
Bolivarian social justice 
As argued earlier in the chapter, in accordance with NESD-2001, NESD-2007, and 
the 'Five Constituent Motors', social justice emerges as the core of Venezuela's 
development paradigm. Moreover, Chapter Four showed that the CBRV Preamble 
normatively links the re-foundation of the Republic as a participatory and 
protagonistic democracy with the right to social justice. Such legal commitment to 
justice, as I suggested in the sub-section on global inequality in Chapter One, is a 
political act and challenges the 'global poverty reduction consensus' that leaves 
power asymmetries as the root causes of poverty untouched. Chapter Four 
strongly suggested that the Bolivarian revolution adopts the democratic principle 
expressed in the Statutes of the International: that the "emancipation of the 
working class must be the act of the workers themselves" (cited in i\Iarx 
1942[1875]: 568). Analogously, the Venezuelan government states that social equity 
requires the victims of oppression themselves to transform the unequal po\vcr 
structures (MINCI, 2005b). The remainder of this chapter will aim to illustrate the 
realisation of these premises with respect to the HEFA policies and the practice of 
PAR, grounded in an analysis of Bolivarian social justice. 
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As with the concept of revolutionary democracy, Bolivarian social justice attempts 
to reconcile socialist with liberal philosophy. That is, productive, appropriative and 
distributive justice, which George DeMartino (2003) subsumes as "class justice", 
and bourgeois rights, which Mehmet Tabak (2003) refers to as "political justice". 
De Martino argues that one normative principle - which commonly is distributive 
economic justice - cannot adequately be applied to all social affairs, and "plurality" 
would require going beyond 'class' in order to combine different normative 
principles. 
Class justice: productive, appropriative and distributive justice 
In his Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx formulates two principles of justice: one 
for the lower (socialist) phase of communist society, i.e. the transition phase from 
capitalism to communism, where "the individual producer receives back from 
society - after the deductions have been made - exactly what he gives to it"79. For 
the communist higher phase of communism, he devised "from each according to 
his ability, to each according to his needs" (Marx, 1942[1875]: 563-66; Callinicos, 
1996: 50). The two normative principles bear three co-existing, non-hierarchical 
moments of class justice: 'productive justice' (from each), which refers to the 
allocation of the labour required for social surplus production; 'appropriative 
justice', which is the fairness by which individuals or sectors of the society 
appropriate the surplus produced by others or by themselves (in capitalism, this is 
where exploitation occurs); and 'distributive justice' (to each), the distribution of the 
share of the social surplus destined for consumption (DeMartino, 2003). 
NESD-2007, which refers to the three elements as "new forms of generation, 
appropriation and distribution of the economic surplus" within a "socialist model 
of production", applies Marx's socialt:rt principle to the social production companies 
(SPCs). Their "resultant economic surplus" is to be appropriated by the workers, 
and "divided up in proportion to the amount of contributed work" (RBY, 200"7 a: 
79 According to J\farx (1942[1875]: 562), from the total social product of labour have to be deducted: cover 
for replacement of the means of production .used up; ad~tlo~al portlon f~r expansion of productIOn; CO~!~ 
of administration not belonging to productlon; that which IS desttned tor the communal satlsfactlon ot 
needs; funds for those unable to work. 
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24-5). As regards productive justice, i.e. the distribution of the labour effort that 
generates the surplus, both the CBRV (Art. 87) and NESD-2007 (RBV, 2007a: 10) 
establish not only the right, but also the duty to work. 'Duty', as I shall further 
elaborate below, should not be equated with coercion. This is important, because 
to Lenin work was the reference point for distributive justice, in its crudest fonn as 
"He who does not work, neither shall he eat" (Lenin cited in Marx, 1942[1875]: 
566). As such, Lenin's principle was incorporated in the 1936 and 1977 
constitutions of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), albeit toned down 
in the latter ("From each according to his ability, to each according to his work") 
(Mooney, 1986: 232,n9). 
Marx's primary concern, as indicated in the context of class fonnation in Chapter 
One, however, was not distribution, but appropriation, which is determined by the 
mode and the ownership of the means of production: "A radical change in the 
mode of production would automatically bring about a similar alteration in 
distribution" (McBride, 1975: 206). According to William L. McBride, Marx thus 
viewed distributive injustice as coherent with the system, i.e. the capitalist practice 
of extracting surplus value from workers would not be unjust as it corresponds 
with the mode of production (1975: 208). Therefore, communal control of the 
means of production would be "the ftrst condition of a just post-capitalist society" 
in the socialist phase of communism (Schedler, 1978: 227; Marx, 1942[1875]: 
567).80 This largely corresponds with Marx's and Engels' notion of egalitarianism, 
grounded in a "umversalisation" rather than abolition of private property to do 
away with class differences, and thus classes per se (McBride, 1975: 211-12). 
However, as Chapter Four has shown, the Venezuelan economy is far from being 
a fully socialized economy, which suggests that the application of the socialist 
principle of justice, with its emphasis on collective ownership of the means of 
so It is for this reason that 0.farx never developed a theory of justice: a communist society would be "beyond 
justice", i.e. justice/injustice would be non-issues (Rawls in i\IcBride, 1975: 206, and in Schedler, 1978: 223). 
McBride (1 l)75: 209) thus distinguishes "justice \\;thin a given ethico-Iegal system" from "justice _from a 
perspective external to that syste_m". TIus distinction rewals the linUted emancIpator\' po~~ntIal ot liberal 
theories of justice, such as that ot John Rawls (2001) and ;\martya Sen (1992), as they seek JustIce \\ltrun ;1_ 
given etlllco-leg.tl s~·stem". They take the particular socio-econonUc system that perpetuates structurc' ot 
inequality and injustice for granted. 
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production, is restricted to SPCs, NUDEs, micro-enterprises and recuperated 
factories. In such a mixed economy context, Robert J. van der Veen and Philippe 
van Parijs propose that Marx's principle of a communist society could assume a key 
role in a transformation from capitalism to communism. Accordingly, From each 
according to his abilities, to each according to his needs "does not entail the collectiye 
ownership of the means of production by the workers", but the "collective 
ownership of the social product by society as a whole" instead 01 een & Parijs, 
1986: 653n3). Viewed this way, communism implies a distribution of the whole 
social product - essentially a social income - in such a way that everybody's basic 
needs are satisfied irrespective of each individual's (freely provided) labour 
contribution (and through which Marx's "alienation" would be abolished, i.e. the 
need for external rewards to prompt productive activity) (ibid.: 636-37). With this 
in mind, we can look into Venezuela's 'political justice'. 
Political justice 
Although Marx viewed the socialist distributive principle of justice as necessary in 
the transition to communism, to him it also exemplified the unjust nature of 
"bourgeois right", whose principle of equality disregards differences between 
individuals (strength, intelligence, skills, number of dependents and, as discussed at 
the end of Chapter Four with respect to citizenship, the lack of means for 
exercising ones rights), as well as structural constraints. To Marx, an equal right 
thus becomes "a right of inequality in its content, like every right" (1942[1875]: 
564). In contrast to Marx's contempt for liberal rights, Venezuela fuses the 
communist principle "giving to each according to their needs" (RBV, 2001: 92) 
with the CBRV's commitment to all 'generations' of human rights to achieve 
"greatest social happiness" (RBV 2007a, 8-10, 12-13). In other words, unabated 
rights (needs satisfaction) are prioritised over contribution, or obligation (work). At 
the 5th ALBA Summit in April 2007, Chavez applied the principle also to foreign 
policy, with respect to Venezuela's oil supply under preferential conditions (1\13:\, 
29/04/2007; see Chapter Si..x). In so doing, Venezuela rejects neoliberalism's 
"uni\rcrsal laws of development", i.e. the employment of the same set of rules of 
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economic development irrespective of a country's structural conditions and the 
considerable degree of heterogeneity of the region's economies (cf ~littelman, 
1999: 44). As Fidel Castro (1999: 35) states with respect to the difference between 
equity (fairness) and equality: "It is not fair to treat all nations equally, as there are 
marked differences in their levels of development that cannot be ignored". 
To Tabak, the limitations of liberal rights should not be a reason to reject rights 
altogether, because rights "can be instrumental in ending/diminishing oppression 
and exploitation and in promoting a more equitable distribution of goods (needs 
satisfaction), all of which can be linked to more substantive freedom than 
liberalism has been able to advocate" (Tabak, 2003: 523). Moreover, Tabak 
continues, many of Marx's emancipatory proposals ('freedom') have become 
human rights (2003: 524), and Harvey adds that to Marx, 'freedom' begins only 
after "the realm of necessity" has been left behind (2003: 536). However, although 
NESD-2007 defines human rights as integral to the "social conscience" within the 
"new socialist ethics" (RBV, 2007a: 9), which suggests that rights will remain a key 
pillar of 21 st century socialism, a potential danger is looming with respect to 
Venezuela: the 'higher phase' distributive principle is anchored in Marx's 
conviction of future material abundance through unrestricted industrial progress, 
which is inseparable from accelerated resource use and consumerism. Abundance, 
then, "was not only a sufficient but also a necessary condition of equality" (Cohen, 
2000: 114). Today, such "materialist optimism" is unsustainable against the reality 
of ecological collapse, which is why Cohen (ibid.) argues that persistent scarcity 
requires demanding equality - impossible without a solid legality (equal rights). 
However, Venezuela's current policies and practices resemble more a 'growth with 
equity' strategy rather than a real redistribution from top to bottom. If the 
Bolivarian government implicitly presumes a long-term 'evolution' towards a 
'higher phase' of communism - as could be surmised considering the recurring, 
almost notorious, celebration of successiye economic grO\vth - then the social 
equity policies would be caught in an irreconcilable contradiction with sustainable 
development. 
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U niversaliry 
The universally accessible nusslons discussed ill Chapter Four are the pnmary 
mechanism for the distribution of the social product irrespective of individual 
contributions, as all inhabitants of the national territory are equally entitled to enjoy 
the provided social utilities free of charge (RBV, 2001: 91-2). Although they are not 
a cash grant, the missions are a form of unconditional, universal in-kind social 
income; an "absolute right" through which to approach communism if defined as 
"distribution according to needs" 01 een & Parijs, 1986: 642-44). De-linking basic 
consumption shares from work is a key feature of transformative remedies of 
distributive injustices in order to "undermine class differentiation" and 
misrecognition effects (e.g. social stigmatisation) that accompany affirmative, 
welfarist (means-tested) remedies, and instead foster social solidarity (Fraser, 2003: 
65, 84). NESD-2007 states that justice means guaranteeing "the material conditions 
for the actual exercise of the rights to education, health, work, recreation, even 
though the citizen may not have the money to pay for them" (RBV, 2007a: 19). ~\s 
my elaboration of the HEF A strategy below will further substantiate, the missions 
support the project of national territorial equalisation, i.e. socio-spatial equality, 
within the parameters of the "new power geometry" and the "new national geo-
politics". 
Social justice in perspective: some evidence 
The social income provided by the food, health and education nusSlOns IS 
considerable: at least 48.3% of Venezuelan households benefited from the 
missions in 2005 (63.4% of the poorest three deciles of households, 28.0% of the 
top three deciles) (BCV, 2007). According to the Venezuelan Central Bank's 3rd 
National Family Budget Survey, the country has moved from "medium well-being" 
in 1997 to "high well-being" in 2005 (BCV, 2007).81 This evidence may still under-
estimate the reality, because the survey considered six missions onh": 
Alimentad6n/1.\1ercal, Bam'o Adentro, Robinson, Rivas, SlhTe, and Che Guez'ara. To state 
81 The government's Life Conditions Index differs in ~ethodologYT from l'~DP's HDI to ulclu~e. the 
hi ents of the missions (for methodologlcal details, see BC\ . 2007: -t -9) .. -\ccording to L :\DP ac evem . - . ,., - Th' .. . (2007), \'cnezuela's HDI value increased from 0.776 u: 2000 to 0 .. C)~ 1fl _2)lb~ e go\ernmcnt ~t.ltcs .10 
HDI-increase from 0.751 (2000) to 0.829 (2005) and 0.8,9 (2006) (RB\, 200,b; _008c). 
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just a few examples: Bam'o Adentro has improved the ratio of primary health care 
physicians from 1:14.373 persons in 1998 to 1:1.380 in 2007 82 ; the number of HIY 
patients receiving free antiretroviral treatment from the government climbed from 
335 in 1999 to 18.538 in 2006 (RBV, 2007b). As regards gender equality, in the 
educational missions (Rnbinson, Rivas, Sucre, Che Guevara) female participation 
ranged between 67.1% and 73.1% (BCV, 2007: 39). The selected indicators in 
Table 5.2 further support the positive development trends. 
T bl 52 V II e I Sid D enezue a: eecte eve opment Indicators 
Indicator 1990 1998 2000 2005 2006 
Ufe exnei:tancv at birth, total ('{ears) 71 73 73 74 74 
Mortality r3te, under-5 (per 1.000) 33 .. 24 21 21 
Primarl (jower bastc) completion rate (% of rel€vant aae qroup) 79 .. 83 91 96 
Fixed Ime and mo!)ile phone subscribers (per 10D people) 8 20 33 61 85 
Internet users (per 100 people) 0 1 3 13 15 
Reserves including gold (USS millions) 9,876 15,228 .. 29.637 36.672 
(1986) (1996) 
MilitarJ exnenditure (% of GDP) .. 1 1 1 1 
, ~ Source. World Development IndIcators (httpJloo.worldbank.orafo HAY AHC,8HO; htto:lIgo .... lOrtdbank.org/JVXV ANWYYO 
(accessed 2010512008) 
According to economists Mark Weisbrot and Luis Sandoval, total social spending 
increased from 8.2 percent of GDP in 1998 to 20.9% in 2006. In real (inflation-
adjusted) terms, social spending per person increased by at least 314% percent over 
the period 1998-2006 (Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2008). CEP AL states a reduction of 
poverty from 48.6% in 2002 to 30.2% in 2006, and indigence from 22.2% to 9.9°0, 
which "significantly increases" the probability of fulfilling the first lYlillennium 
Development Goal of halving extreme poverty by 2015 (2007a: 11). More recent 
statistics can be expected to present even more impressive results, for two reasons: 
firstly, many missions only developed their full potential over the past 2-3 years; 
secondly, the decline of real GDP due to the political destabilisations throughout 
2002/2003 (Figure 5.1) directly impacted on the social development: Figure 5.2 
shows that extreme poverty almost doubled as GDP dropped, and it was only in 
late 2005 that the pre-coup level was reached again . 
.. \s previously indicated, a point of concern, howe\'er, is the apparent 'growth with 
equity' strategy, rather than real re-distribution from top to bottom in order to 
112 C 1 ul' d from ;\!inistrr of Health cited in \\'eisbrot & Sandoval (2008 10): 10 19l)~. Y cnezuela had 1,628 
a c ate : . ......, 7 - ,.,..., nilli 
primary health Clfe phYSKLlI1s for a populatlon of 23.4 million; 10 200 . 19,5. 1 doc{( lrs tor - ( on 
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create a more equal society. Figure 5.3 illustrates the wide gap of income inequality 
between the poorest and richest deciles. Likewise, CEP AL states an only 
marginally improved Gini index, which measures income and/or consumption 
(expenditure) inequality, from 0.5 in 1999 to 0.49 in 2005 (2007b). gain, ho\Ve,~er 
more recent figures may indicate a different trend, as the government state a Gini 
index of 0.42 in 2007, as compared with 0.47 in 2005 and 0.49 in 1998 (REV, 
2008). 
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Figure 5.3 Income distribution per decile in % (2005) 
Source: BeV (2007: 90). 
Table 5.3 Socio-Economic Groups 1997-2005 (distribution of households in %) 
Strata 19-97 2005 Difference 
I 6.6 5.8 -0.8 
II 16.5 20 .1 3.6 
III 44.7 44 .8 0. 1 
IV 29.0 27.4 -1 .6 
V 3.0 1.9 -1.1 
TotaJ 99.8 '100.0 0.0 
Source: BCV (2007: 102} (Method: Graffar) 
Table 5.4 Socio-Economic Groups 2005 (income) 
Strata Housholds % Individual income 
(total) (average/month in 8s *") 
Household income 







357.776 5.8 1.314.039 
1.232.906 20:1 758.295 
2.750.668 44.B 422.265 
'1.682.369 27.4 220.000 
"'19.378 1.9 96.230 
6 . 143.097 100.0 587.905 
Source: BeV (2007: 100) (Method: Graffar) 
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Nevertheless, although Table 5.3 suggests that the extremes of socio-economic 
disparities are being levelled out (as suggested by the growing middle strata), Table 
5.4 confirms the persistent income inequality, as average individual incomes of 
Strata I are 14 times higher than those of Strata V. 
Higher education for all (HEF A) 
This section builds on my initial 0 erview of the HEF trat g) in Chapt r Two. 
I r trict the eli cussion to the socio-political relevance of uniy r al H In th 
tran ition to sociali m. On other occa ion, I explor d (with T ni "\ r) th 
r 1 of Bolivarian ducation generally and HE in particular th 
10 trat glC bj cti, es of 2004 and HE .J. a a count r-pr po 'al t th gl bal 
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commodification and privatisation of HE pluhr & Verger, 2006). In a follow-up, 
we also analysed the unequal impact of the 4th Republic's neoliberal education 
'decentralization', to which HEFA is a response (1luhr & Verger, 2009). Space 
constraints do not permit a repetition of these discussions here. Similarly, while 
education, morality, work and knowledge are integral and mutually dependent and 
reinforcing elements of Bolivarian justice, the interrelatedness of sustainability and 
'the endogenous' with scientific, technical-productive and ancestral (indigenous 
and folk) knowledges, and the elimination of the social diyision of labour through 
combining education and work, cannot explicitly be discussed here (see BoliYar, 
1971[1820]: 69-70; Lanz Rodriguez, 2006: 8,23; MCT, 2005; RBV, 2007a: 24-31; 
Troudi & Monedero, 2007: 177). Rather, this section is structured around three 
dimensions of the HEF A strategy: the philosophical, the quantitatiyc, and the 
qualitative. As the philosophical in the sense of moraliry and enlightenment refers to 
"education with socialist values" (MINCI, 2007c), the strategy of municipalisation 
aims to reconcile "quality with equity" (UBV, 2004: 95; Presidential Decree 3,444), 
in order to ... 
... hand down a country of equals to its future inhabitants, to build a new model of 
society, with its own citizens; and the only instrument possible to achieve such 
goals is through an education which enables growth in consciousness (MINel 
2005c: 9). 
The philosophical.- a 'new socialist ethics' 
Bolivar's morality and enlightenment (Chapter Four) are also central to Simon 
Rodriguez's popular education philosophy, literally as "enlightenment" and 
"virtues" and as "social conscience". These concepts are the corner stones of 
, 
NESD-200Ts new sodalist ethics, \vhich literally states "moral", "ethical" and "social 
conscience". Virtually unknown in the anglophone North, Rodriguez has bcen 
considered the "first socialist of the Americas" ~1iller, 2006; see Jorge, 2( 100: 148-
59). His work can be approached from a sociological and pedagogical angle, and it 
is the sociological that appears more relevant for the purposes here. In this respect, 
his advocacy of 'popular education' - i.e. education for the masses - is related to 
his rejection of representative democracy. For him, exercising direct popular power 
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was the defining feature of 'the Republic' and inseparable from education: 
representation keeps the people in ignorance, and the less representation, the more 
the people would have to know how to exercise political control Oorge, 2000: 181-
84). Education, however, does not only form the civic but also the economic basis 
of citizenship, because only an educated and skilled people is able to build the new 
nations (Miller, 2006). The "egalitarian promise of republicanism", to Rodriguez 
implied compulsory state education, mixed-race for girls and boys alike (a claim for 
which he was considered "immoral" and "mad"), so that women "would neither 
have to prostitute themselves out of necessity nor to turn marriage into a 
speculation to ensure their subsistence" (Rodriguez, 2004: 28). Popular education 
also meant "education for revolution", understood as non-violent transformation 
to resolve inequality, and for "the freedom of America" a orge, 2000: 2, 103; 
Rodriguez, 2004: 111-15). As Bolivia's first education minister, Rodriguez outlined 
his vision thus: 
My project at that time was a well-thought-out scheme designed to colonise 
America with its own inhabitants. I wanted to avoid what I feared might eventually 
happen one day; that's to say, the sudden invasion of European migrants with 
more knowledge than our own people; this would result in them becoming 
enslaved once again, and subjected to a worse tyranny than that of the old 
Spanish system. I wanted to rehabilitate the indigenous race and to prevent it from 
being entirely exterminated (Rodrfguez cited in Gott, 2005: 106-7). 
"Social education" in Rodriguez' terms meant to teach children to live in (the 
republican) society, whose pillars are the economic, moral, civil and political, to 
cultivate a sense of the public and a "social conscience" - that is, citizenship and 
the "common good" (Rodriguez, 2004: 41-2, 67-9; Jorge, 2000: 111, 177; ~1iller, 
2006). Associating education with life in society promotes education as an ongoing, 
"life-long process" (Miller, 2006; Jorge, 2000: 179). However, Rodriguez' 
revolution fell at the elites' resistance who, at the closure of one of his schools, 
declared that they refused to see their children surrounded by "thic\Ts" and 
"prostitutes" - by which they meant the indigenous children (Rodriguez, 2004: 29). 
To Bolivar, the "most perfect systcn1 of government is that which results in the 
greatest possible measure of happiness and the maxin1um of social security ano 
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political stability". "Morality and enlightenment" are "the foundations of a 
republic" in two senses: on one hand, they refer to ethical education to counter 
corruption and to "denounce ingratitude, selfishness, indifferent love of country, 
and idleness and negligence on part of the citizens". On the other hand, "morality 
and enlightenment" are the origin of "national prosperity", \\Thich itself depends on 
work and knowledge: "By activating these two powerful mainsprings of society, we 
can achieve the most difficult of accomplishments among men - that of making 
them honest and happy" (Bolivar, 1971[1819]: 54,63-4). 
In accordance with Rodriguez and Bolivar, the Bolivarian education philosophy 
rejects the reduction of knowledge to skills and competences to "function" in the 
capitalist economy, and instead views life as a holistic experience that includes lived 
and felt needs, expectations and aspirations (Leal, 2006: 10). To achieve the 
"ethical and moral re-foundation" of the nation, intrinsic motivation and non-
capitalist humanist values, principles and incentives fuse with Bolivar's thinking, 
where social justice, equity and solidarity are supposed to reign the relations 
between individuals and state institutions, with the ultimate objecti\Tc of the 
"greatest happiness for each citizen" (RBV, 2007 a: 7; Lanz Rodriguez, 2006; 
Troudi & Monedero, 2007: 66, 94, 123). NESD-2007 refers to Che Guevara to 
identify "love" and "moral co-responsibility" as "inalienable \'alues", "because wc 
all are ethically and morally responsible for what happens in society", and "such 
co-responsibility derives from the knowledge that poverty is not only a problem of 
the other or the state, but a problem of each citizen" (RBV, 2007a: 9). "0.Iorality 
and enlightenment" requires both formal and popular education, for ethical and 
cultural growth with knowledge-production in all spaces, from the street and thc 
field to the classroom C1'lINCI, 2007c). 
To education sociologist Eduardo Leal, who developed the curriculum of thc 
PNFE (Mision Sucre's national teacher education progranunc, scc Leal, 2004a, b, c, 
d, e), the personal and individual needs hayc to link themsch'es \\;th colicctiyC 
expectations, and thus acquire a social meaning to becomc a "tnccting place for 
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social learning" (Leal, 2006: 11). This strongly resembles IYan Illich's ideas as 
expressed in his "de schooling society" or "de schooling education", by \\'hich Illich 
meant a separation of learning from the social control as exercised by the 
educational apparatus, and turning "all of life" into an "educational experience" so 
that "education for all" would become "education by all" (Illich, 1973[1971]: 15, 
27, 29). Leal (2006: 11-13) therefore wants to see the curricular contents linked to 
the reality of the 'learners' and the experiences and knowledges they bring into the 
process, because ... 
... the contents of the curricula and programmes of the courses or university 
professions that prevail in the traditional universities, designs organised by means 
of subjects with pre-established contents, also come from the economic power 
centres that impose their needs, visions and ideology (Leal, 2006: 11). 
Integral education then means transcending specialisation and professionalisation 
by relating education with personal, integral development, work (production) and 
justice, thereby dissolving the separation of work and study (Leal, 2006: 16, -1-7). 
For Leal, a liberating pedagogy integrates de-learning to "revise the established", 
learning to learn, and learning by doing, to foster the trans forma tory capacity of the 
communities (2006: 17). Although the purpose of Leal's book (2006) is to criticise 
discrepancies between discourse and practice with respect to the PNFE 
curriculum, a truly constructionist element is contained in all UBY PFGs in the 
form of PAR. While I will explore the philosophical underpinnings of P~\R in the 
final sub-section of this chapter, for now it is important to understand HEF..:\ as a 
democratisation of education for the "democratisation of knowledge", upon which 
the transformation of the political culture from representation to participation 
hinges (Leal, 2006: 47). Developing cognitive sovereignty in the struggle against the 
hierarchisation and monopolisation of knowledges is, therefore, a constitutive part 
of citizenship construction, as political sovereignty is inseparable from cognitiye 
sovereignty, by \vhich Leal means "thinking with one's o\vn head, constructing our 
knowledges and fullY partiapating in fonnulati!1Jy planning. e:,:e,1Iling and el'a/llating !be i.l-.l1Ie.l· 
com.rponding to the common intereJI q( !be citi;:;.em" (Leal, 2006: -1-7; italics original). 
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Many of the discussed ideas are also contained in Santos' work, especially in his 
proposals for a "popular university of the 21 st century" or a "popular university 
of social movements" - an "emancipated", anti-colonialist uni,"ersity (2006). 
However, Santos appears to successfully ignore both the Bolivarian revolution 
and, as before with respect to democracy (Chapter Four), state and elite power, as 
well as the mechanisms of meta-governance, in a kind of 'wishful-thinking' 
reformism (see Santos, 2006). Nevertheless, Santos certainly adds a number of 
useful concepts, for instance by referring to the imperialist disqualification of 
knowledges alternative to the dominant western scientific knowledge as 
"epistemicides" (Santos, 2004): "There is no democracy without a democracy of 
knowledges" and, as a form of misrecognition, Santos adds to Fraser's justice 
framework by insisting that "there is no global social justice without global 
cognitive justice" (2003). The stigmatisation and destruction of much of non-
scientific knowledge contributed to the marginalisation (and genocide) of the 
social groups that only pertained of such knowledge (Santos, 2006: 68). _,\n 
"ecology of knowledges", rather than a "monoculture of scientific knowledges", 
can only develop from a "sociology of absences" through which discredited, 
marginalised and suppressed knowledges are made visible and credible. 
Alternatives to the status quo and alternative knowledges, or an "epistemology of 
the South", are a precondition for alternative sociabilities and societies (Santos, 
2001; 2006: 103). An "ecology of knowledge" is an "extension" of knowledge "in 
the contrary sense", from outside the university into the university, in the form of 
"dialogues" between different knowledges: between the scientific and humanist 
knowledges that the university produces, and lay, popular, traditional, peasant, 
urban, indigenous knowledges, etc. (Santos, 2006: 68). Ecologies of kno\\·ledge 
are situated in the context and transformative practices in which "the 
protagonists in social action also become the protagonists in knowledge creation" 
(Santos, 2006: 103-4). 
Chapter Five 200 
The quantitative: 'access for all' 
To the Bolivarian government, the determination of life chances, such as access 
to HE, starts with birth. HEFA therefore is a holistic and integral education 
system that includes all educational levels and is supported by the preyiously 
outlined social justice mechanisms (the missions). Although pre-school education 
became compulsory with the 1980 Education Law, the sub-sector was dominated 
by private enterprises, which denied access to the majority of Venezuelans on 
material grounds. Likewise, although the same law redefined the compulsory 6-
year primary schooling to a 9-year "basic education" cycle, structural exclusion 
along race and class lines occurred especially at the upper basic education level, as 
under neoliberal 'decentralisation' about 90% of schools offered grades 1-6 only 
(pucci & Mund6, 1999: 65; Muhr & Verger, 2009). Eduardo ~lorales Gil's 
comprehensive quantitative doctoral study, upon which the government has 
drawn, confumed that inequitable access to HE originated in pre-tertiary education 
(Morales Gil, 2003: 368). It is useful to note that 4th Republic Venezuela had not 
followed the regional trend of HE neoliberalisation (creation of a quasi-market). 
Although a respective law was presented to Congress in 1998, the political 
turbulences around the electoral campaign that year impeded its approval (Garcia 
Guadilla, 2005: 25), and the proposal was dropped after Chavez' electoral victory. 
However, a powerful mechanism to systematically exclude the dispossessed was 
the university entry examination, conducted by both state-funded and private 
universities (Leal, 2004a). As indicated, coming from 'second class' public schools 
reduced chances to pass the entry examinations, while the wealthy, having attended 
private institutions, could additionally afford special preparatory classes. ~Ioreover, 
several research participants stated that it used to be common knowledge in the 
late 4th Republic that university/college places were often allocated according to 
socio-geographical criteria, i.e. place of residence, on which grounds applicants 
from poor bam'oJ were excluded by definition. Also, as UBY-Falc6n director Jose 
Berrios highlighted in a presentation in ~Iarch 2006, a dress code, for instance, had 
excluded the poor from studying law as they simply could not afford the 'rlf.-':ht' 
clothes. 
Chapter Five 201 
As stated in Chapter Four, the CBRV has both extended compulsory education 
to include the medium diversified level, and guarantees free state-provided 
education from the nursery to the under-graduate HE level inclusively. Table 5.5 
displays the different levels of the formal state education system and the 
-
corresponding missions. 
Table 5.5lnteqral Bolivarian Education 
Level Fonnallnstitutions (aQej grade/year) 
Pre-SchooJlNursery Simondto (Q..6) 
Lower Basic Escuela Bolivariana (7-12: 1-6) 
Upper Basic Liceo Bolivariana (13-15; 7-9) 
Medium Diversified/Technical Escuela Tecnica Robinsoniana (16-18: 1-3) 
Higher UBV 
Missions 
Robinson I. II. III 
Ribas 
ehe Guevara 
SUcre. Cienda. A1nkl Mate-r 
The government's prioritisation of education is reflected in a progresSlye 
expansion of the respective budgets: general education expenditure increased 
from 3.38% of GDP in 1998 to 5.43% in 2007 (RBV, 2008c); between 2003 and 
2006, the HE budget was raised 3.6 times, making up 7.3% of the total national 
budget in 2006, as compared with 6.2% for security and defence ~fF, 2007: 364, 
366). Venezuela's 22 state universities ~ES, 2007) are complemented by HE 
programmes offered in Misi6n Cultura [Culture] and Misi6n Ciencia [Science], 
launched in 2005 and 2006 respectively.83 Additionally, since late 2006 Misi6n Alma 
Mater is set to create another 28 universities and to transform the existing 29 state 
university colleges/institutes into poly technical universities by 2012, as well as to 
establish the University of the South, which is a regional, LAC popular university. 
Nevertheless, although considerable progress has been made in recent years with 
respect to pre-school net enrolment - from 40.3% in 1998/99 to 54.6% in 
2005/06 (RBV, 2008d) - the government is far from complying with the right to 
universal access. As regards lo\ver basic education, Figures 5.-+ and 5.5 show that 
the historically high access, \vhich steadily increased since the early 19"70s, has 
further been boosted under Chavez and, considering a 96% completion rate (fable 
83 i\1iJirf" Cllllllra offers an under- and a post-graduate course in Education and Cultural Developm~nt 
(http:,! h\\\·w.misioncultura.gQb.ve/). Misioll Cienda offers. ~cien.ce ~d technology programmes (e.g. tor 
teacher education, technological literacy, see http://\\"Ww.nusl0nC1enC1a.~ob\"c ~. 
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5.2 above), Venezuela is approaching universality at that level. This achieyement in 
the formal sector is complemented by Mision Robinson, which reduced a 6.12% 
illiteracy rate, on which grounds Venezuela was declared illiteracy-free in 
accordance with UNESCO standards on 28 October 2005. In 2008, J.\1ision 
Robinson is still operating at all three levels (basic literacy; lower basic education; the 
promotion of reading, known as "reading circles"), and the beneficiaries increased 
from 1.482.543 persons in October 2005 to 1.575.040 by 1fay 2007.84 
Table 5.6 Beneficiaries of Education Missions according to Socio-Economic Group (2005) 
Income Robinson I Robinson II Ribas Sucre Vuelvan 
Quartile Caras 
I (poorest) 39.1 41.5 35.5 19.9 28.1 
1/ 33.3 30.3 29.8 25.2 40.3 
III 20.6 18.3 24.4 32.3 18.0 
IV (tichest) 7.0 9.9 10.3 22.6 13.6 
Source: BCV (2007: 40) 
Table 5.6 shows that participation in the education missions at the lower levels 
(Robinson, Ribas) is biased towards the poorer strata, which corresponds with the 
historical exclusion of these strata from basic education. In Misi6n Sucre, 
participation is more balanced, with a concentration in the middle strata. 
Considering that the above-stated data were surveyed in 2005, only two years 
after the missions were launched, the under-representation of the poorest 
(Quintile I) in Mision Sucre may gradually be reversed as they graduate from the 
lower levels over the years. Also in 2005, the majority (61.1%) of Misi6n Sucre 
participants was between 18-30 years of age, and 33.4% between 31-50 years 
(BCV, 2007). By 2006, 77% of the hitherto excluded 472.363 bachilleres of all ages, 
as nationally surveyed in 2003, exercised their right to HE in l\[ision Sucre, of 
which 57% were women (MES, 2007: 116). 
H.I Infoon-ltion received in print from the national ~1isi6n Robinson Coordination, ).1iniqry of Education, 
C. .. 3'() /n~/')007. The documents also state that between 1990 and 1998, a total of ~3.649 Vene7uel.llb .lraC.IS, ! ... . ., 1 f 
acquired literacy Y1a the government's ":\bajo Cadenas" programme ['Do\\"J1 \\1th the Chams, .1 p 1r.l~C rom 
the national anthem), and another 3.299 through pm'atc programmes. 
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While Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate the steep increase of education participation at 
all levels during the Chavez administration, Figure 5.6 delineates the educational 
discrimination against the poor strata at the upper basic and medium di,~er ifi d 
levels in the late 4th Republic (1981-1997). Figure 5.7 and Table S. how that 
these tendencies were by and large paralleled at the HE level throughout that 
period. However, as all strata enjoyed improved access to HE between 199 and 
2006, it can also be seen that stark inter-class inequalities persist. In fact, HE acce 
is still more unequal after a decade of 'revolution' than in the early 1980 . 
Figure 5.7 
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Table 5.7 HE Attendance of 20 24-year-Olds according to Social Strata (in -10) 
1981 1997 2002 
Quinta 1 (poorest) 28.5 16.4 20.8 
Quint~ 2 23.7 20.0 27.8 
Quint~ 3 23.9 24.5 29.7 
Q . t;'4 25.9 31 .1 39.3 u~n ~ . 54 7 QUlnt11 5 (richest) 33.3 43.8 . 
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the average Venezuelan of 15 years and older received 9.25 ,'ears of education as 
. , 
compared to 8.17 years in 1998.86 
HE equity-enhancing mechanisms compnse free public student transport and 
targeted studentships. In 2006, MES and ministry-affiliated foundations awarded 
almost 240.000 studentships of between US$80-100 (per month) to low-income 
students (MES, 2006). The figure included 5000 Misirin Ciencia studentships, and 
signified a 339% increase as compared to 2005 (11ES, 2007: 10). Over 2500 
student loans were converted into grants by the MES-financed foundation 
FUNDAYACUCHO, and over 23.000 loan debtors had their debts cancelled 
(l'vfES, 2007: 10). Academically, the 'Initial Semester' [Semestre Inicia~ (which 
replaced the 20-week 'University Initiation Programme' in 2006) supports students 
to re-enter the world of studies by revising key knowledge prior to starting their 
actual programme. Additionally, MES has created centres of technical support for 
students with a visual disability, and organises workshops for the sensibilisation of 
ministry and university staff towards disability (11ES, 2007). Finally, the university 
entry examinations were abolished in 2008. 
Municipalisation supports NESD-2001 's (socio-)territorial equilibrium by the 
establishment of about 2000 aldeas in educational institutions, prisons87, military 
garrisons, and libraries in all 335 municipalities. In the factories, an announced 
special law would entitle workers to four hours per week of education during their 
working hours (ABN, 17/04/2007). There are conflicts between popular 
imageries of 'university' and a certain dissociation from the municipalised 
university because an aldea without air-conditioning in, say, a primary school (e.g. 
,-1ldea Crisostomo Falcon in Coro) is often not accepted as a 'real' university. 
Likewise, tensions exist between the endogenous de,-elopment ideal of local 
embeddedness (architecture, materials used, etc.), and the current construction of 
well-equipped but nationally standardised aldeaJ. The objective ob,"iousl" IS to 
86 SISOV, at http://W\v\V.sisoY.mpd.gob.\"e!indicadores!ED~6ilO:OOOOOOOOI (23/05/~O(l8). _ . '") 
87111e reportedly first penitententiary l'B\" was the Centro PenJle!h7anO de los Lianos (.-\porrea, 12/0 i _(08). 
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combine "equality of opportunities" with "equality in conditions" (UBV, 200-+: 
59, 96; MES, 2007: 30, 63). 
The qualitative: 'social relevance' 
With respect to 'quality', the positivistic notion of quantifiable standards is 
complemented by "political quality", which refers to the "social relevance" of HE. 
The concept of 'social relevance' contains two dimensions: a) in a problem-soh1.ng 
sense, for "concrete economic or social demands", i.e. professional and academic 
development for the labour market and "research strictly associated with the 
solution of local and regional problems"; and b) for "social development in the 
local", i.e. revolutionary democracy and "the creation of cultural and symbolic 
goods" (RBV, 2001: 93; UBV, 2004: 17, 60). As a "community that creates 
community", UBV's "politics of knowledge" conceives of a "reciprocity" between 
knowledge and social responsibility, expertise and citizenship, the private and the 
public, which requires a "totality of knowledge" - scientific, technological and 
humanist knowledges (UBV, 2004: 8, 14, 18). 
In the following and final substantive section of this chapter, I will present my case 
study of the UBV-PAR in the marginalised urban Bam'o Cruz Verde. The 
experience sheds light on the idea of the social relevance of HE, with respect to 
community organisation and trans formative knowledge creation, which in 2006 
culminated in an act of popular power through which the community appropriated 
an abandoned building non-violently for communal use. The case study thus 
points to UBV's potential to create political subjects and organic intellectuals -
"citizen professionals" - in the democratic transition to socialism. The 
Photographs Sections 4 and 5 illustrate and document the process described. 
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The PAR-groups are interdisciplinary research teams that produce 
transdisciplinary knowledge, which means they are formed according to students' 
geographical origin (preferably their own bam'os) rather than according to their 
respective study programmes (pFGs). At the time of the research, the UBY-PAR 
was structured into four "moments", which corresponded with the years of fu11-
time study: Project I (CommunityDiagnosis) consisted of quantitative research into 
the community's general geographical, cultural, social, economic, historical and 
environmental characteristics to identify problems and potentialities; Project II, 
Organisation and Planning, promoted community organisation and critical problem-
solving processes which would, in Project III (Management and Contro~, lead to 
community action; and, Project IV, Systematization and Evaluation, for the 
dissemination of the produced knowledge beyond the community. The project 
thus contained a methodological shift from quantitative through qualitative 
research to PAR, and employed as the main techniques survey, interview, 
observation, 'SWOT-analysis' (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats), 
the 'problem tree', and ranking exercises. 
However, in 2007, UBV-Falc6n restructured the UBV-PAR: previously, both the 
2-hour theory and the 4-hour practice were of an interdisciplinary nature, and 
both were imparted by the same facilitator(s). While the principle of 
interdisciplinarity has been maintained with respect to the practice group 
composition, theory came to be taught according to discipline as, for instance, a 
curricular issue such as 'conflict resolution in the community' may bear different 
implications for lawyers and social communicators (Interview 2-+, A.ppendix 16b). 
Theory and practice are now taught by different facilitators, and the separation of 
theory and practice is furthered by the fact that students now get immersed in the 
community only towards the end of the second year of study, after acquiring 
. . 
theoretical knowledge beforehand. This change was, to some extent, based on the 
realisation that there is no need for consecutiye UBV-Pi\R groups to conduct the 
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initial community diagnosis in the same commurutles again, especially as such 
tasks are increasingly perfonned by the communities themselves - the councils 
and, more recently, 'social observatories', which are linked to the l'\ational 
Institute of Statistics (INE). As will be seen below, the group I had integrated in 
was affected by the restructuring as it contributed to a disruption of the group's 
work in the barrio. 
As laid out in Chapter Two, between March-September 2006, and again in July 
2007, I accessed Barrio Cruz Verde as a participant in a UBV-PAR group 
approaching the end of their first year of study in Aldea CriJoJtomo f"alajn. This 
means that at the time I joined the group, they had conducted the Community 
Diagnosis (project 1), and a PAR-day in the bam·o [DiagnoJtico Partldpativo 
Comunitario] was scheduled for 12 August 2006. Bam"o Cruz l/erde is a depriycd 
neighbourhood of 7400 inhabitants in 1580 households (in 2006/07), in the parish 
of San Antonio in the municipality of Miranda in Falcon state (see maps in 
Appendix 9). Both Falcon and the municipality of Miranda were/are governed by 
political forces that pertain to the Bolivarian revolutionary movement. In 2006, in 
bamo and parcelamiento together, 19% of residents had completed primary 
education, while 31 % had not; 25% held the bachillerato, and 6% a HE degree, while 
13% had dropped out of HE. In 1993, the first households in the bamoo received a 
telephone line. 
By July 2007, 1018 community councils had registered with Fundacomunal in 
Falcon state, and 418 community projects were being financed. In the municipality 
of Miranda, 78 community councils had fonned, none of which howeyer in Barrio 
Cruz Verde. This may not be as discouraging as it may sound, because regular 
meetings and discussions within the emerging community about the fonnation of a 
council took place, \vhich may in fact be more beneficial to a sustained functioning 
of the mechanism than a rushed set-up (IntelTicw 19, AppendLx 16b). 
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Research participants in both Coro and UBV Punto Fijo characterised ern:;. I Terde 
as "difficult", for different reasons, such as drugs and related criminality, and for 
the barrio's reputation of non-organisation. The four sectors - urbani"'eJc'tOn \; , 
parcelamiento, bloques, and bam·o - are geo-historically divided (built in different 
periods), which translates into social and human hierarchies: the barrio is the most 
deprived of the four, and rivalries exist between the different sectors. Such issues 
lend the UBV -PAR particular importance. As I stated in Chapter Two, the UBY-
PAR group I had joined was split in two, with one part working in the parcelamiento, 
and the other part in the bam·o (which I accompanied). In an attempt to contribute 
to a 'unification' of Cruz Verde, the PAR-day of August 2006 was convened for 
barrio and parcelamiento on the same day and in the same location (in separate 
rooms) - the newly constructed nursery school. In the following, I layout the P .:\R 
process and events. 
Preparing the PAR -dqy 
By March 2006, the PAR group had conducted their community survey, and from 
May on, with the new semester, the PAR-day was being planned. Several \"isits by 
the group to Bam·o Cruz Verde between March and July 2006 had facilitated the 
identification and establishment of contacts with 33 'natural' bam·o leaders, such as 
members of the land, water, and health committees, and other public figures (e.g. 
shop owners). The key personalities act as intermediaries between the students and 
the community. Over the weeks, several community meetings were convened to 
elaborate the research day agenda, either with UBV involvement or autonomously 
by the community leaders - not always with encouraging results. On one occasion 
(29 July 2006), only six community leaders attended, out of 33 who had originally 
committed themselves. On the weekend preceding the P.-\R day (06 ~\ugust 2006), 
we _ UBV students, community leaders and myself - went from house to house to 
inform and mobilise the people to participate. To increase the project's \Oiability 
and legitimacy, the inclusiye nature of the community \vork - as try the C0ffi111Unity 
for the community, rather than for partisan ends - was explicitly pointed to (sec 
Photographs Sa). 
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1 st UB V-Community Meeting 
On Saturday, 12 August 2006, between 8am and 4pm, 60-70 inhabitants of both 
bam'o and parcelamiento, and of all ages, participated in the PAR-day - a number that 
the activists considered a success, First, a participatory ranking exercise established 
individual hierarchies of residents perceived community problems, which 
subsequently were discussed in working groups for about four hours, organised 
around different topical areas (community organisation, health, security, land, 
education, culture, sports), The formation of such thematic groups anticipates the 
community council structure. The group work was followed by a plenary session in 
which the group results were presented (see Photographs Sb), 
From analYsis to action: squatting in the community interest 
The PAR diagnosis produced immediate collective action in the days following the 
event: a group of teenagers working on culture in the community had raised the 
need for a cultural space, and the senior citizens recalled that in the past a 
communal cultural house had existed in the bam'o (in fact next to the nursery 
school where the PAR-day took place), which at some point had been transformed 
into an ambulatorio (clinic), Next to the ambulatorio, however, there was an 
abandoned building, and the idea of using those facilities, which was linked to the 
plan of expanding the ambulatorio, had been discussed in the barrio for some time, 
However, it was the UBV-PAR-day that provided the impetus for the bam'o's 
senior citizens to engage in an act of community solidarity by a) starting to organise 
the occupation of the empty building in order to move the ambulatorio there, and b) 
returning the thus freed space to its original use as a communal house, which was 
named "The House of Intergenerational Meeting Cruz Verde", i1.t 8am on i\Ionday 
14 August 2006, two days after the UBV-PAR-community day, the occupation 
occurred in full compliance with the legal parameters: the Bam'o Cn'~ l/t'!r1e citizen 
assembly used the CBRV and various laws, including the community council law, 
to peacefully expropriate the building in the collective interest. .-\ declaration, 
formulated and signed by eight groups of the organised society and 98 individual 
commuruty members, was delivered to the relevant institutions: the police, to 
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underscore the pacificity of the actIon; the Ombuds(wo)man's Office; the 
Governor's Office; the Falcon representation of the ;"1inistry of Health (which 
funds the clinic); and the Fundaci6n del Nino (a child charity), the legal owner of the 
occupied building. Moreover, the media were informed, and a house-to-house 
collection was organised to cover the cost of materials for repairs in the formerly 
abandoned facilities. Within two weeks, the community had renovated the building 
and moved the ambulatorio. 
In the process, the UBV students assumed a crucial role in two respects: while 
the PAR-day triggered off the action, the law students supported the community 
with advice regarding the legal procedure. It is this kind of active citizenship that 
UBV associates with the objective of forming "community lawyers" - lawycrs 
who defend the popular interests against the "oligarchic sectors" (Interyicw 26, 
Appendix 16b). Moreover, as my interviewees highlighted, the action truly was 
"by the entire community, for the entire community" (Interviews 19, 20, 21, 
Appendix 16b; Photographs Sc). Importantly, the Neighbourhood Association, an 
mechanism introduced in the 4th Republic which is frequently associated with the 
opposition in the country, also participated (photographs 4c). The fact that the 
former owner of the squatted building, the children's foundation, was presided by 
the governor's wife, which probably avoided a lengthy court case, does not reduce 
the value of the stated example: namely, UBV's key role in generating popular 
power and constructing the organised society. 
2nd UB I/-Communiry Meeting 
When I returned to Cruz Verde in July 2007, the new ambulaton·o had established 
itself as a self-managed focal point in the bam·o, "vith several groups forming 
around it, such as the 'Third Age Club' and the 'Club of the Diabetic'. The 
enlargement had facilitated employment of an additional (third) doctor, longer 
hours of attendance, and intensified collaboration with seycLll local tertiary 
institutions, abovc all the National Experimental Uniycrsity Francisco \Iiranda 
(UNEFlv1) and T\1issions Sm;re/ Bam·o ~"1de!1/ro, with respect to student placcmC!1b 
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(students of medicine and nursing) . .J\foreover, the clinic's increased capacity has 
nourished the idea of integrating the Cuban Barrio Adentro doctors in the 
ambuiatorio, and use the new Bam'o Adentro building for different purposes, for 
instance as a laboratory (see Photographs 4). 
Under the Ministry of Health guidelines for "preventive integral primary health 
care", a boules lane for old and young was built in the garden of the ambulatono, 
therapeutic traditional dance is offered for the senior residents Goining culture \\;th 
health), and a piece of fallow land between the ambulaton'o and the House of 
Intergenerational Meeting had been converted into a basketball ground 
(photographs Sd). The funding for the latter came from the governmcntal Falcon 
State Sports Foundation (FUNDEF ALC), and the Municipal Institute of Sports 
Mirandino (IMUDEMI), to which the organised society applied through the Local 
Public Planning Councils (CLPPs) - the participatory budgeting mechanism 
integral to the formal municipal structure, as discussed in Chapter Four. The 
communal house itself had started offering cultural activities, such as theatrc for 
social rehabilitation of drug-using street youth, as well as nutrition workshops, and 
a small community museum had been established. Also, cooperation between the 
bam'o and the pandamiento had increased with the opening of a jointly-run soup 
kitchen [casa de aiimientos]. 
As stated, the "awakening of the community", i.e. autonomous community action, 
as the students would put it, can be ascribed to the UBV-PAR. Howcyer, as no 
community council had been formed, the core protagonists remained the same 
ones that had led the occupation. J\Ioreover, although indiyidual students had 
maintained contact with the bam'o community, the UBY-P~\R students had not 
been back as a group since the 1 st UBY -comn1unity day in _-\ugust 2006, Thc main 
cause for this was the restructuring of the UBY-P~\R, combined \\;th students' lack 
of orientation and initiative of their own (Interviews 26, 27, 28, 29, Appendix 16b). 
As the commuruty had not receivcd an\' formal feedback on the l,r UBY-
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community PAR, a 2nd Community Meeting was scheduled for 28 July 2U07 to 
disseminate the findings of the PA.R day. 
After several preparatory meetings (14, 18,21 and 23 July 2007), the 2nd P~\R-day 
was again jointly convened between bam·o and parceiamiento this time howeyer in , , , 
the new ambulatorio, which underscores the centre's socio-political significance. 
Popular participation lagged behind the expectations, as instead of the expected 
200 citizens, only about 70 participated, as the year before, although other 
interested visitors were coming and going throughout the day. Photographs Sd 
document the event, which was divided into an informal socio-cultural part, and a 
formal presentation and award ceremony. 
Parttdpatory action research: 'education I?Y all' 
My case study has shown that in the UBV-PAR, teaching, research and local social 
insertion fuse in the diagnosis of the social, economic, political and cultural reality 
(UBV, 2004: 15, 17). Moreover, the PAR is expected to directly contribute to the 
creation and functioning of the community councils. As "ethical in\Testigation", 
the university is expected to link with social issues, such as: exclusion, the social 
economy, the new world order, the society under the rule of law, the resignificance 
of politics, democracy and the citizenry, the new cultural logics and practices 
associated with lCT, public health, education, ecology and sustainable 
development (UBV, 2004: 61-2). Methodologically, the UBV-PAR tntegrates 
andragogical principles for a liberating and emancipatory education: 
Andragogy provides the opportunity for the adult wh? decides to ~tudy to acti~ely 
partiCipate in their own learning and to intervene In the plann,lng, schedulm,g, 
realisation and evaluation of the educative activities under conditions of equality 
with their fellow partiCipants and the facilitator (UBV, 2005: 5), 
PAR draws on a range of philosophies, including social psychology, 
phenomenology, feminist theory and postmodernism, and critical theory is 
probably the most important one. The methodology pursues the transformation 
of the oppressive structures of the inequitable society, and depends on people's 
own endogenous process of consciousness raising and knowledge generation 
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(Rahman, 1985: 119-20). As stated in Chapter Two, critical (self-)reflection 
becomes a form of action (Freire, 1996[1970]: 109), as theory and practice inform 
each other in dialectical fashion, in the combination of research and direct 
involvement in processes of social action (Fals Borda, 2001: 29-30). Relational 
knowledge, which transcends Habermasian epistemology based on discursiye 
consensus and Enlightenment's mind-feeling dichotomy, and its omission of 
emotive content, assumes an important role (park, 2001; 1\ I aguire , 2001). It is 
relational knowledge in all its facets - empathy, love, laughter, tears, body, and so 
on - that substantially contributes to the creation of relationships and the 
community from which, conversely, it grows (park, 2001: 84) . .As Freire states, 
conscientisation and transformation are group processes in which people become 
"beings of relation" (1996[1970]: 52). Relational knowledge is indispensable for 
solidarity (park, 2001: 85), which is a prerequisite for the construction of political 
community and collective action. 
Some conclusions 
Centred around the issue of the Bolivarian conception of social justice, this chapter 
has analysed the role of HEF A in Venezuela's endogenous development. ;\lthough 
the nation's poorer strata have substantially increased their social participation, the 
data available so far are (at best) ambiguous as to whether a real re-distribution 
from top to bottom is occurring, as the wealthy - certainly with respect to HE -
appear to have equally gained under the revolution. While a radicalisation of the 
revolution might thus stand to reason, it would also be worth exploring whether 
the composition of the upper strata has changed over the past few years, 
considering the possibility of the formation of a new elite. 
1\Iy analysis strongly suggests that Boliyarian endogenous deyclopment and HEFA 
constitutcs an emerging counter-hegemonic knowledge-based economy. One that 
rejects "skill drill", in which Illich views not only a capitalist economic function, 
but also a 111cans of social control as it restricts the "unlinutcd opportunity" for 
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people meeting and discussing shared issues which for them are of social, 
intellectual and emotional relevance (1973 [1971]: 25). I t also rej ects the hegemonic, 
instrumentalist notion of 'lifelong learning', and promotes "integral education 
throughout the entire life" [educaci6n integral a 10 largo de la vida], itself defined as a 
"democratic exigency" (UBV, 2004: 67-68, 74; World Bank, 2003b; Robertson, 
2008; Brine, 2006; Coffield, 1999). The UBV -PAR thus lends HE For All a double 
meaning, as access for all is joined by HE at the service of all - the society, or 
collectivity, in the form of the community, the nation and the region, rather than 
for a global capitalist elite. The next, and final chapter of Part II of the thesis, 
analyses the regionalisaton of the revolution, which involves an upscaling of 
popular power into a transnational space that I refer to as 'transnational organised 
society'. 
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Chapter Six 
Regionalising the Revolution: the ALBA 
... but the best defense is counter-attack, and that's what we've been doing ... 
Fidel Castro Ruz88 
We have no choice but to accelerate our pace, they [the US] are doing one step, we are doing two. 
Hugo Chivez89 
Introduction 
While the thesis so far has concentrated in the transformation of the historical 
geographies of inequality within the national territory, this final chapter of Part II 
examines the regionalisation of the revolution, which seeks a socio-spatial, 
cohesion-oriented (re)distribution to alleviate intra- and international territorial 
inequalities (cf Brenner, 2004: 14-15), and involves an upsacling of power from the 
local to the transnational scales. Against the backdrop of the argument that 
globalisation and regionalisation are dialectically related processes of global 
structural transformation (Hettne, 1999a: 2; 2003: 359), this chapter argues that 
ALBA is becoming an increasingly hegemonic idea that is shaping LAC integration 
beyond the concrete geo-political project. A "counterforce to capitalist 
globalisation", Cox states, "will also be global, but it cannot be global at once", and 
the most favourable terrain for counter-hegemony will be the regional level (Cox, 
1996: 310). ALBA was constituted by Venezuela and Cuba in 2004, and has since 
then been joined by Bolivia (2006), Nicaragua (2007), Dominica (2008) and 
Honduras (2008), while Ecuador has observer status. I aim to show that the 
relevant 'traditional' L\C integration projects - the Group of Three (G-3), Andean 
Community (CAN), and the Caribbean Community (C~-\RICO~I) - are in decline, 
while the Southern Common ~farket 0fERCOSUR) is being strengthened but 
88 Castro during Bolivia's ALB:\ adherence on 29 .-\pril 2006 (cited in Chh'ez e/ ai, ~006 25). 
89 Ch,lvez when signing the .. -\LB.-\ agreement between A\[l'~IC and PETROC\RIBE I,Clted ill Panoram~l. 
2() / 04/ 2U(16). 
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becoming subject to re-definition. Simultaneously, the South American 
Community of Nations (CSN), created in 2004, has been re-constituted as 
UNASUR under Venezuelan leadership. Although in geo-political terms .[\LB~-\ 
appears to compete with UNASUR and MERCOSUR, only ALB~-\ is a genuine 
regionalism that integrates the entire LAC. 
Within the scope of this thesis, my analysis of Venezuela's foreign policy 
concentrates on LAC, which means that the official relations with the US and 
counter-hegemony at the global scale cannot be considered here. I introduce New 
Regionalism Theory as a useful framework for analysing the ALBA processes in 
the construction of a "region state". Three case studies - the emergence of 
UNASUR, PETROAMERICA, and ALBA in Nicaragua - support my claims that: 
a) ALBA integrates virtually all LAC countries, although to differing degrees, for 
which reason b) the 'two-lefts tale' (Chapter Three) is flawed and the notion of a 
continuum is more appropriate; c) that, in contrast to conventional regionalisms, 
the social assumes a key integrationist role; and that d) the interplay of state and 
civil and organised society actors through bottom-up, transnational processes 
across scales, democratises the region. 
I base this analysis on 160+ ALBA-related and UNASUR integration declarations 
and agreements from between 2000-2008, to which I refer throughout the chapter 
in the form (A12 or A15, dd/mm/yy), so that they can be consulted in Appendices 
12 or 15 respectively. 
Contemporary sub-regionalisms 
The following brief outline of the Bolivarian revolution's impact on the major L. \C 
integration attempts of the past two decades - G-3, CAN, CARIC00.1, 
MERCOSUR - intends to provide a foundation for the chapter. Firstly, the G-3, 
which was formally launched behveen Colombia, i\lexico and \T enczuela on 1 
January 1995 (G-3, 1995), has \TItually ceased to exist due to Venezuela leaving in 
J\1av 2006 on grounds of political and economic incompatibilities. Secondly, a 
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month earlier, in April 2006, Venezuela also left C~-\N, formerly known as the 
Andean Pact (1969-1997) between Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela. After Venezuela's abandonment due to Colombia's and Peru's 
continued negotiations of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the US, Chile 
became an associate member in September 2006.90 Thirdly, as "vill be shown in the 
case studies, the 15 CARICOM member states are gradually becoming absorbed 
into ALBA (e.g. A12, 17/02/2007). Finally, MERCOSUR, which was launched 
with the Asuncion Treaty between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay on 26 
March 1991, was joined by Venezuela on 4 July 2006. A "new i\IERCOSUR" is a 
declared Venezuelan foreign policy objective (RBV, 2007a: 48). Bolivia and Chile 
are associate members, and Ecuador signed up for several MERCOSUR 
instruments in July 2008. However, while the four MERCOSUR presidents 
support Venezuela's full membership, its ratification by the Brazilian and 
Paraguayan parliaments has been pending. In terms of population, MERCOSUR is 
the third-largest trade bloc in the world, after NAFTA and EU. Venezuela's 
membership raises the total to about 270 million inhabitants, which is around 70° () 
of the South American population. Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela constitute the 
three largest economies in South America. 
CARICOM CAN G-3 and MERCOSUR are neoliberal trade blocs that follow , , 
the neo-structuralist strategy of "open regionalism", which in essence was also 
advocated by orthodox endogenous development (Ramos & Sunkel, 1993; Fritsch, 
1993; Gwynne & IZay, 2000: 154). CEP AL defines 'open regionalism' as 
"extensive liberalisation" and "deregulation" of markets, promoted by preferential 
intra-regional agreements "and by other policies [ ... ] geared towards enhancing the 
competltlveness of the countries of the region and, in so far as possible, 
constituting the building blocks for a more open and transparent international 
economy" (CEP.L-\L, 1994, Introduction). For Duncan Green, 'open regionalism' 
stands for an "expanded domestic market", as an "export platform" [l) outside 
markets, principally the US (2003: 1-+1). Far from rivalling the globalist project, 
90 See wh ::tJ2;..I'..Ei!Y\~YW~. cQol!.l!nl!ltuw;udllia~d.ill.an!.!>ldi:!.!..!· n~a .~() ~~. e.!..!.'nc=..,,:~-,' l~T ~=T=n;=\. h.....,tl=n (accc s sed 10 / 08 / 2008). 
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open regionalisms are integral to the global competitiveness as promoted through 
meta-governance, pointed to in Chapters One and Four (Gamble & Payne, 1996: 
253; ECLAC cited in Cammack, 2007a: 12). 
Some intermediate conclusions would suggest that out of the three sub-regional 
blocs, both CARICOM and CAN appear to be in a process of decline, despite 
Chile's (renewed) interest in the latter, which may above all be a strategic move to 
counter-balance Venezuela's regional influence. The decline of CAN may 
accelerate once ALBA-member, Bolivia, and ALBA-associate, Ecuador, have 
ratified their new constitutions (which seem to follow the CBRY in "dismantling" 
neo-liberalism) (e.g. Aporrea, 01/10/2007; 30/09/2008).91 The conflicting 
ideological, political and economic positions of Bolivia and Ecuador on one hand, 
and Colombia and Peru, on the other, would suggest the former would follow 
Venezuela in leaving CAN. Anticipating this scenario may explain the rising 
interest of all affected states (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico) in 
MERCOSUR as an alternative (see MERCOSUR, 2008a, b), which then could 
become a central arena in the struggle for regional hegemony. 
MERCOSUR, which according to a resolution by the House of Representatives of 
the Province of Buenos Aires has never got beyond an "imperfect customs union" 
(proyecto de Resoluci6n, 2004), however, is already undergoing some re-definition: 
Venezuela's Adherence Protocol refers to "integral rural development" and 
recognises intra-bloc asymmetries by granting differential treatment to the smaller 
economies (Uruguay, Paraguay). Moreover, in the Commission of Pennanent 
Representatives of MERCOSUR, Venezuela has concentrated on promoting a 
social agenda and, in the Final Declaration of the J\1ERCOSUR Social Summit of 
13 December 2006, has effected a replacement of "civil society" with "social and 
popular organisations and movements", a special mention of the indigenous 
91 Ed" ne'" constitution was approved bv 63.9°'0 of the electorate, and \\ith a partlClpatlOn of -6.6°", 
cua or ~ '" , d B li ' 
on 28 September 2008 Owp:.! 1\\\\\\·.begO\·t'C Rt'~lllf.ld()~Refe')llll~ 0· The referen tun on 0 na s ne\\' 
constitution is scheduled for January 2009. 
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peoples, and acknowledgement of communication and infonnation as crucial for 
integration and "regional citizenship fonnation" (MICE, 2007: xiv; X\;U; 34-35). 
The complexities of LAC power relations further increase with the new 
regionalisms ALBA and UNASUR. Their emergence, intertwinedness and 
convergence, forms the core of this chapter. ALBA, which is guided by the 
principles of solidarity, reciprocity, cooperation and complementarity, was 
formalised in 2004 (A12, 14/12/2004), only a few days after the South American 
Community of Nations (CSN) was created (A15, 08/12/2004). CSN was re-named 
UNASUR in 2007, and a year later re-constituted through the UN~-\SUR 
Constitutive Treaty (A15, 17/04/2007; 23/05/2008). Since the beginning, 
CSN/UNASUR integrates 12 members, which are all South .c\merican nations, 
except French Guiana. We explore the premises of Venezuela's foreign policy 
before further discussing ALBA and UNASUR. 
Bolivarian foreign policy 
Legal groundings and development objectives 
"Latin American and Caribbean integration" leading to a "community of nations", 
and ultimately a common LAC foreign policy, are constitutional mandates, 
accompanied by a "democratisation of the international society", the promotion of 
the "peaceful cooperation" between "equal states" under the principles of "non-
intervention and self-determination of the peoples", guided by nonnati,'e 
imperatives such as "human rights" and "solidarity bet\veen the peoples" (CBR\T, 
Preamble, Art. 152-5). These principles and objectives were already contained in 
the Proposal for a Transformation of Venezuela (Chavez, 1998: 88-97), and entered 
NESD-2001 as the "international equilibrium" and its counter-hegemonic agenda 
of multi-polarity and regional sovereignty: "reversing the traditional concentration 
of power in the international organisations", "concerted action by the dcycloping 
countries", "equitable interaction in global decision-making" (c.g. in the U:\ 
Security Council) the intcrnational promotion of "participatory dcmocr.lcy" and "a 
, ' 
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common Latin American security and defense policy" (RBV, 2001: 155-()2,i. In 
comparision to NESD-2001, the 10 Strategic Objectiyes 0 II:\,'CI, 200-t-a) along 
with the NESD-2007, reiterate the original objectives of the "international 
equilibrium" with increased explicitness: 
The construction of a multi-polar world implies the creation of new power poles that 
br~ak ~he hegemony of North American imperialism, in search of social justice, 
solldanty and guaranteed peace under the deepening of fraternal dialogue 
between the peoples, the respect of the freedoms of thinking, religion and self-
determination of the peoples (RBV, 2007a: 46). 
In Bolivarian foreign policy, NESD-200Ts two strands Venezuela: Ener;gy W"orld 
Power and New International Geopolitics fuse as the strategic use of oil becomes "an 
instrument of liberation and cooperation" (Chavez cited in Chayez et ai, 2006: 2-t-; 
see Appendix 3). Venezuela's foreign policy, however, makes an important 
distinction between LAC and South-South cooperation, on one hand, and a 
diversification of international relations, on the other. The former is governed by 
solidarity in the ALBA spirit, with such countries as Mali, Malawi, India and the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam; the latter is of a pragmatic, geo-strategic nature in 
the national interest, and may (with respect to Europe and US) include trade 
relations with private capital interests. Cooperation \vith China, Belorussia, Iran, 
Syria and Russia are a combination of "common anti-imperialist interests" and the 
strategic objective of technology import, rather than political affinity per se (see 
RBV, 2007a: 48-9). 
Put into historical perspective, Venezuela's foreign policy is less radical than it 
appears in today's political and economic climate. In fact, Chavez (1998: 90) relates 
to the needs-oriented 1974 UN Declaration on the Establishment of a 0:ew 
International Economic Order (NIEO), and the 1976 Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States should be added in this context. The latter enshrined for the 
ftrst time the right to nationalisation and any associated regulation of compensation 
in international law (Fagerlind & Saha, 1989: 116-17: Hoogvclt, 2()()1: -t-2, 1~-:-). The 
NIEO principles of "equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, COIl1mon interest 
and cooperation among all States" included other premises, such as "the 
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permanent sovereignty of every State over its natural resources and all economic 
activities", and a democratisation of the international trade regime ('fair trade') 
(UN, 1974). The ALBA principles and practices accord with the 1986 C~ 
Declaration on the Right to Development, especially Articles 3, 4 and 7, which 
reiterated the call for the NIEO, national sovereignty and "sovereign equality" 
(OHCHR, 1986), as well as with the 2002 UN Office of the High Commissioner 
of Human Rights Draft Guidelines on a Human Rights Approach to Poverty 
Reduction Strategies, which subjects both governments and MNCs/rnCs to 
accountability: "a host State has a responsibility to ensure that rncs operating in 
its jurisdiction conform to the national and international human rights obligations 
of that State", and "developing States should endeavour to enhance their 
negotiating capacity in relation to their dealings with rncs" to fight poverty and 
curb TNC power (UNHCHR, 2002, Art. 220, 249). To Cox (1996: 136), the 
NIEO was a potential forerunner of a Third World counter-hegemony, which was 
underscored by increasing Third World solidarity, as reflected in the formation of 
OPEC and the Group of 77/Non-aligned Movement (NAM). However, the 
challenge posed was inacceptable to the TCC. According to Walden Bello (1994), 
the NIEO was the primary target of the Reagan and Thatcher-led "economic 
warfare" against a "fundamental redistribution of wealth on the global level". 
The hzstonco-ideological.- Bolivar vs Monroe 
As discussed in Chapters One and Three, ideology is the 'cement' in the 
construction of hegemony that binds together diverse social forces and classes by 
incorporating historical traditions and contributions made by social movements. 
With the exception of the Cusco Declaration (2004) (.A15, 08/12/2004), the 
CSN/UNASUR discourse has so far been free from historico-ideological contents. 
In contrast, the ALBA discourse honours the century-long resistance to 
colonialism, imperialism and capitalism, and even appears to have become 
radicalised over the years. While the .ALB .. \ foundation declaration (.A 12, 
14/12/2004) rather moderately refers to "the thought of Bolh'ar, \ latti, Sucre, 
O'Higgins, San l\fartin, Hidalgo, Petion, l\forazan, Sandino and man\· (l{ her 
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founding fathers", the La Paz Declaration from Morales' presidential inauguration 
(A12, 23/01/2006) states that the "refoundation of Bolivia" serves to "vindicate 
the forgotten conquests of the liberators and fighters", such as .. \ymara leader 
Tupac Katan. Another year on, Ortega's ALBA Adherence Declaration ( .. \ 12, 
11/01/2007) adds further explicitness: 
This act symbolises the independence aspirations of the American peoples, whose 
roots go deeply through the history of America, from the indigenous resistance to 
the conquistadores undertaken by Tupaj Amaru, Tupaj Katari, Guaicaipuro, 
Diriangen and Miskut, passing by the lights of sovereignty lit by our founding 
fathers Francisco de Miranda, Sim6n Bolivar, Antonio Jose de Sucre, Francisco 
Morazan, Jose Marti, Eloy Alfaro Delgado, Augusto Cesar Sandino, until our days, 
when Latin America rises taking up the flags of freedom and justice from those who 
preceded us. 
So, what then did the "founding fathers" enVlsage with respect to regional 
integration? Bolivar's lifetime call for "one great political unit" is laid out in a 
number of writings: The Cartagena Manifesto (1971[1812]), Ideas on the Union of all 
America (1971[1813]), The Jamaica Letter (1971[1815]), The Congress of Panama 
(1971[1824-1826]) and Letters to Sucre on Federation of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia 
(1971 [1826b]). Throughout these documents, the conceptions of integration 
change from a "single national body" with "central government" (1971[1813]: 24) 
to a "league", "federation" and "union" of American States (1971[1824-1826]; 
1971 [1826b]: 93). Bolivar's rationale for unification, however, remained unchanged: 
independence would only be possible in the collective, as a precondition for multi-
polarity, or a "world balance of power" (1971[1815]: 31; [1813]: 19-26). 
The closest Bolivar's vision of the 'Grand Homeland' or "the grand American 
nation" (1971 [1813]) ever came to realisation was with The Congress of Panama - the 
antithesis to the Monroe Doctrine - where Bolivar promoted a common foreign 
policy legal framework, pennanent military alliance, national sovereignty, and 
equality among its members, as the key criteria of integration (1971[1824-1826]). 
The failure of the Congress, according to Pedro Ortega Diaz (200-:': 48) can, at 
least to some extent, be attributed to the US' anti-Bolivarian 'dividc-and-ruk' 
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diplomacy, which contributed to the abstention of some countries and reservations 
about finn commitment on part of others. 
Bolivar always distinguished between two Americas. His "American federation" 
was based on the common origin, language, religion and customs, \vhich by 
definition excludes North America. It is Bolivar's America that ;\farti refers to in 
Our America (pividal, 2006: 123-27): "[T]he pressing need of our America is to 
show itself as it is, one in spirit and intent". Marti's call for unity is expressed in: 
"N ations that do not know one another should quickly become acquainted, as men 
who are to fight a common enemy" ()\1arti, 1891, paras 2, 11). To George Lipsitz, 
Marti's thinking has not lost its "subversive functions". This is so because ;\Iarti 
(1853-1895), who died in action for Cuban liberation against the Spanish, 
combined the roles of an intellectual and activist, agitator and artist, and nationalist 
and internationalist, who condemned the oppressive North American materialism 
and insisted on profound social reform (Lipsitz, 1998: 294). 
With reference to Bolivar and Marti, Nicaragua's anti-imperialist guemllero ~-\ugusto 
Cesar Sandino's (1895-1934) Plan for the Realisation of Bolivar's Supreme Dream 
(Sandino, 2005[1929]) called for a Conference of Representatives of the then 21 
states of "our America", with the objective of an alliance and one Latin American 
nationality. In addition to the chief objective of declaring as abolished the :\Ionroe 
Doctrine, Sandino's 44 proposals included a common army, which would have to 
integrate teachers to impart law and social sciences, and to encourage tourism in 
the region as a tool for "mutual understanding". As Marti had warned, "The scorn 
of our formidable neighbor who does not know us is our America's greatest 
danger" ()\1arti, 1891, para 11). J\fy discussion of the various ~\LBA dimensions 
further down will implicitly integrate some of the outlined historico-ideological 
aspects. 
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Presidential diplomacy 
The key role of foreign policy in the Bolivarian project is manifest in "presidential 
diplomacy", which ex-foreign minister/ex-vice president Jose Vicente Rangel 
views as a complement (rather than replacement) to more orthodox processes of 
foreign policy formulation and execution (in LOpez Martinez, 2000: 15). By 
identifying three phases of Bolivarian foreign policy between 1994 and 2000 
Ramon Alfredo Lopez Martinez' (2000) demonstrates that the Chavez diplomacy 
already started with his release from prison in 1994. Table 6.1 shows the spectrum 
of options for strategic alliances explored in that period, which testifies to an 
independent foreign policy through which both a global role for Venezuela and 
counter-hegemonic LAC integration was sought. In 1999, Chavez, both at the 11 th 
Andean Presidential Council (Cartagena, Colombia) and in Brazil, already 
emphasized that a regional union would primarily have to be political, including the 
military and cultural, rather than purely economic. And, by meeting Castro 
regularly from 1994 on, he signalled his intention to reintegrate Cuba in the 
international community (Lopez Martinez, 2000: 58-69). 
Table 6.1 Chavez' diplomatic visits 1994-2000 {frequency in brackets) 
Phase Period Countries 
1 26 Mar 1994 - 06 Dec 1998 Argentina. Brazil. Colombia, Cuba, Chile, EI Salvador, France, Panama. 
Spain, UK. Uruguay. 
2 07 Dec 1998 - 02 Feb 1999 Argentina, Brazil, canada, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican RepubflC. France, 
Gemlany ItaIv Mexico Spain. US. 
3 03 Feb 1999 -18 Aug 2000 Algeria, Brazil (3), China, Colombia (3), Cuba (2), Dominican Repubic, 
France, Germany (2), Hong Kong, Indonesia. Iran, Irak, Jamaica (2), Japan. 
Kuwait, Lybia, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Ouatar 
(2), Saudi Arabia, Silgapore. South Corea Spain (2), Trinidad & Tobago, 
Uruguay, United Arab Emirates, US (2), Vatican. Multilateral Summits (11). 
. Source: CompIled from Lopez Martinez (2000) 
Chavez integrationist agenda appears always to have been dominated by 
pragmatism, i.e. the common regional interest, rather than by ideology .. :\s 
president-elect (phase 2 in Table 6.1), he started promoting Venezuela's full 
membership in MERCOSUR, as well as a PETROAMERICA-project envisaged to 
include Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela as the largest regional oil producers (LOpez 
Martinez, 2000: 33-4). The need for PETROAl\1ERIC~-\ further to integrate Cuba 
and Ecuador, and regional leadership to be exercised by the G-3, were raised and 
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reiterated throughout that period at multilateral meetings such as the 13th Group of 
Rio Summit in Mexico (May, 1999) and the 1 st G-77 Sununit (~-\pril 21InO), where 
Chavez also proposed a "Confederation of Latin American and Caribbean States". 
Calls for a political, social, and military "Confederation of Republics" were 
reiterated at the 12th Andean Presidencial Council Oune, 2000), followed by 
proposing a Latin American Monetary Fund at the 14th Rio Group Summit in June 
2000. The staunchest resistance, however, came from the I\Iexican government's 
rejection of Venezuela's rather moderate proposal of extending the San Jose 
Agreement (A12, 03/08/1980) (preferential oil supply) to the entire Central 
American/ Caribbean sub-region, which Chavez had proposed to be accompanied 
by the creation of a "University of the Caribbean" (Lopez ~Iartinez, 2000: 73, 160). 
Still today, the Mexican case (despite being an extreme one) exemplifies the 
difficulty of integrating energy-independent and economically relative strong 
countries governed by the radical neoliberal right. 
Visits to all OPEC members, as well as non-OPEC oil producers l'vforocco, 
Ukraine and Singapore, pursued a revitalisation of OPEC in order to recuperate 
the world oil price as well as to encourage economic cooperation, including an 
OPEC development bank for OPEC and non-OPEC developing countries alike 
(Lopez Martinez, 2000: 192). Then, Chavez' "most ,'isible success" was the 2nd 
OPEC Summit of Heads of States and Governments in Caracas, September 2000, 
whose Declaration of Caracas ... 
'" reaffirmed OPEC's commitment to leadership of the entire underdeveloped 
world, sought substantial reduction of ,th,e developing countries' de~t" and cal,le~ for 
the 'just and equitable treatment of 011 In the world ~nergy market In negotiations 
over environmental, fiscal and energy problems (Hellinger, 2003: 46), 
As Bernard Mommer (2003: 140), vice-Minister of Hydrocarbons and governor for 
Venezuela in OPEC, confums, the Chavez administration "played a crucial role" in 
the recovery of the "worst price collapse in world petroleum markets in ()\'er tifty 
years", achieving a price hike for Venezuelan crude from about U~S lOin 1998 to 
US$26 in 20UO (Gott, 2005: 171; Buxton, 2003: 127). 
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By recognising that the existing mechanisms were "no system of integration" 
(Chavez cited in Lopez Martinez, 2000: 170), and that powerful adyersaries such as 
Mexico would obstruct rather than collaborate, Venezuela adopted a unilateral 
integration strategy, which started with the Caracas Energy Cooperation 
Agreement (A12, 19/10/2000). Before taking off, however, the domestic 
turbulences from late 2000 to mid-2004 impeded an accentuated foreign policy 
(Gonzalez, 2003: 76). It was only after winning the recall referendum in ~-\ugust 
2004, that the November 2004 High-Level Workshop with its 10 Strategic 
Objectives (see Appendix 3d) facilitated a new foreign policy offensive leading to 
the formation of concrete geo-political alliances (Gonzalez Urrutia, 2006: 165). In 
his speech at the Workshop, Chavez distinguished between the 'Monroe ~-\xis' 
(Bogota-Quito-Lima-La Paz-Santiago de Chile) and the 'Bolivarian Axis' (Buenos 
Aires-Montevideo-Brasilia-Caracas-La Habana), with the task ahead of 
"breaking" the former and "creating South American unity" (l\IINCI, 2004a: 25). 
The substantial shifts in the continental power relations since then can certainly to 
some degree be attributed to Chavez' diplomacy. In 2006, for example, he realised 
33 visits to 23 countries, 11 of which in LAC (MD, 2007: 78-81). On 28 January 
that same year, he was awarded UNESCO's International Prize Jose 1-Iarti for 
outstanding contributions to LAC unity and the preservation of the region's 
identities, cultural traditions and historical values.92 
Global reon'entations 
Table 6.2 underscores Bolivarian Venezuela's increasing international presence. 
Although the table does not provide figures for the category 'other' with respect to 
the pre-1999 and 1999-2004 periods (which could be relevant because the US is 
not listed as a category of its own), between 1999-2005 more bilateral cooperation 
agreements were signed than in the preceding 27 years (1971-1998) (r\IICE, 2006: 
38). 
92 See http:/, portal.une~coorg , ~h~ / en 'c\'php-
URL ID 9139&URL DO-DO TOPIC&URL SECTIO~=201html and 
http://portal.ulll'~co.org en ('\'.php- ,., ') ) 
URL ID 31212&l1RL DO-DO TOPIC&URL ~EC nO~=201.html Oast accessed 16/09/_lUl 
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Table62V I S' af Ie enezue a: In lona _ooperatlon Instruments 
Country -1999 99-04 2005 2006 Total '99-'06 
South America Argentina 15 36 38 10 84 Brazil 17 20 58 13 91 
Uruguay 9 1 28 14 43 
Caribbetln Cuba 8 29 12 5 46 
Asia & Middle China 19 95 22 33 150 
East Iran 5 26 49 44 119 
European Spain 28 17 16 0 33 
Union (EU) Italy 20 2 18 3 23 
Other 
-" 
~ ... 40 95 135 
Total 121+ 226+ 281 217 724 
C' . ! ;jI)Urce. Adapted and ComPIled from MICE (2006. 36) and MRE (2007b. 977-97) . 
The table further shows that under Chavez a diversification of the international 
trade relations has occurred, which has involved a shift away from Europe towards 
LAC, Asia and the Middle East. Considering that in the early years Chavez had 
sought to establish relations with European powers, as Table 6.1 suggests, the 
European governments' reluctance (with the recent exception of Portugal and 
Spain) to establish equitable relations has possibly driven a re-definition of 
Venezuelan-European relationships in NESD-2007, where geo-strategic interests 
in Europe now appear to concentrate on sub-national entities and actors (RBV, 
2007a: 49). In 2006, Russia (21 agreements) and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 
(16 agreements) joined as Venezuela's strategic allies (M:RE, 2007b). 
ALBA: the idea 
The acronym ALBA means 'dawn', and counter-poses ALCA, the Castilian 
abbreviation of Area de Libre Comercio para las Americas, the FTAA. ALBA evolved 
from the Cuba-Venezuela Integral Cooperation Agreement (A12, 30/10/2000), 
and was frrst articulated as such by Chavez at the Association of Caribbean States 
Summit, Isla Margarita (Venezuela), on 10 December 2001. Then, 'ALBA' stood 
for Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas, the name under which it was formalised 
between Cuba and Venezuela via the ALBA Integration Agreement (A 12, 
14/12/2004), which was followed by the Implementation .. -1.ccord (~-1.12, 
28/04/2005).93 During Bolivia's accession meeting in La Habana (.\ 12, 
29/0--1-/2(06), l\LB.\ was complemented by ~Iorales' proposal of bilateral Peoples' 
'13 .\ppendi..x 14 swnmarises these docwnents, whose principles and general regulatIons constitute the 
reference poi.nts for the subsequent ALB.-\. declarations and agreements. 
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Trade Agreements (PTAs) , characterised as a "fair trade" alternative to the US-
promoted Ff As. 'ALBA' was changed to mean Bolivarian Alternative for Our America 
(Nicaraguan adherence documents, A12, 11/01/2007) and, finally, Bolivarian 
Alternative for the Peoples of Our America, at the 5th ALBA Summit in Barquisimeto 
01 enezuela) on 28/29 April 2007. 
ALBA is the regionalisation of Venezuela's endogenous development and 21 st 
century socialism and is nourished by a form of moral legitimacy that challenges 
capitalist globalisation. As stated in Chapter Five, ALBA builds on the cooperative 
advantage around the values and principles of solidarity, complementarity and 
reciprocity. The fair trade principle includes fixed rates above world market prices, 
as well as the guaranteed purchase by Cuba and Venezuela of export products 
from partner countries that have been deprived of a market as a consequence of 
US/EU free trade agreements (e.g. Bolivia, A12, 29/04/2006). It could be argued 
that in the war of position, fair trade deals (e.g. Nicaraguan beans) undermine the 
capitalist economy by diverting exports that otherwise would go to the North (US) 
at lower world market prices (Muhr, 2008: 154). 
Commonly, ALBA is portrayed as a purely multi-state bloc of (currently) sIX 
members (Cuba, Bolivia, Dominica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Venezuela). However, 
the benefit of a globalisation theory approach lies in transcending methodological 
nationalism in order to recognise ALBA as an integration project that employs 
transnational processes across scales in order to integrate the entire L"-\C. More 
explicitly, in addition to regionalist inter-state agreements, ALBA employs four 
other mechanisms: a) bi-national instruments between Venezuela and almost all 
LAC states, especially Argentina, Brazil and Ecuador; b) multi-national agreements, 
between any three or more states in region; c) sub-regional agreements among three 
or more states belonging to the Caribbean, Andean, or Amazon/Southern Cone 
sub-regions. Venezuela can be vie\ved as the nerve centre, as it belongs to all 
three;94 and d) tranJnational mechanisms, which transcend international relations by 
9-1 Only Colombia is in a more pri\'ueged geo-strategic position, as it additionally has access to the PaClfic 
Ocean, and a land connection \\;th Central "\merica. 
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bypassing (adversary) national governments. The co-existence of these mechanisms 
makes ALBA a counter-hegemonic globalisation project that competes with 
'globalisation' across the global, regional, national and a range of sub-national/local 
scales. 
Organisationally, ALBA conSIsts of three councils - the Presidential Council, the 
Council of Ministers / Chance/lors, and the Social Movements Council - as well as a 
permanent secretary, and several commissions (see Appendix 10). In late 2008, 
ALBA's institutional consolidation as well as the designation of permanent 
representatives in ALBA's Coordination Headquarters in Caracas were advanced 
(A12, 26/11/2008). While the presidents appear to dominate the scene, much of 
the background work is done by mixed ministerial (bi-/multi-state) commissions 
that also set up executive inter-institutional working groups. In addition to these 
inter-/ multinational councils, the Social Movements Council appears to be of a 
transnational nature as it aims to integrate LAC's organised societies, which is of 
particular strategic relevance with respect to those countries that are not full 
members of ALBA. The Social Movements Council, therefore, appears to 
transnationalise direct and participatory democracy through a politics of scale. It is 
the mechanism for the bottom-up construction of ALBA, and may include 'old' 
and 'new' national and transnational popular, indigenous and other social 
movements as well as the emergent worker, student and community council 
structure in the entire region, of which cooperatives and organised workers in 
recuperated factories become key allies outside Venezuela. Troudi & :l\lonedero 
(2007: 179) point to SPCs and recuperated factories as "socialist beachheads" in 
the respective countries. To date, the Social Movements Council has released 
se\Teral political declarations (A12, 29/04/2007; 26/01/2008; 02/05/2008). 
However, its exact composition (e.g. delegate or direct democracy) and working as 
well as its relation to the other councils will require further research ... \ccording to 
one source Social :l\lovements Councils are established in each ALB~\ member , 
state, and representatives appear to be involved in de\Teloping gund-national 
projects (GNPs) (Congreso Bolivariano de los Pueblos, 09/10/2007). 
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As regards the state-organised society relationship, popular movements (e.g. A12, 
29/04/2007; 09/08/2007) have repeatedly expressed their full support to L~-\C's 
new left governments, and strategic alliances between state and movements have 
systematically been developed, for instance through and with the World Social 
Forums (porto Alegre, Caracas), the Summit of the Peoples in ~Iar del Plata 
(Argentina, November 2005, where the ¥fAA was rejected), in discussion forums 
on ALBA at the Bolivarian Congress of the Peoples, and the Mothers of the Plaza 
de Mqyo (Argentina) (j\1ICE, 2006: 35-40). In sum, I identify the following 
transnational relationships between Venezuelan national and sub-national state 
entities, and: 
• federal states (e.g. Parana, Brazil, A12, 20/04/2006). 
• municipalities, e.g. Nicaragua, EI Salvador, Peru, US. 
• social-popular movements (e.g. Movimiento Sem Tierra, i\IST, Brazil, see 
A 12, 27/09/2005). 
• organised society (e.g. community councils; in July 2007, three Venezuelan 
community councils had integrated in the Social Movements Council) 
(Interview 30, Appendix 16b). 
• SPCs, cooperatives, recuperated factories (e.g. Uruguay, A12, 09/12/2005). 
ALBA dimensions and institutions 
The increased complementation of material capabilities and ideas by institutions 
points to the formation of a counter-hegemonic bloc. Table 6.3 delineates nine 
dimensions and the respective institutions, to which I add 'the legal' as a tenth 
dimension, although the construction of a supranational arena, to which important 
sovereign powers would be transferred, is not explicitly on the .ALB.-\ agenda yet. 
However, a supranational legality or regulatory framework and the corresponding 
institutions may emerge from the congruences among the various member states' 
legal systems (the new constitutions) (see Chapter Three), and Venezuela's foreign 
policy objective of international participatory democracy promotion, stated at the 
beginning of this chapter. l\Ioreover, Chavez' proposal of an ALB.-\ Defense 
Council (ABN, 27/01/2008; ;\porrea, 29/01/2008; Chave7, 20U-h: see ()t~lhl lr.!, 
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2006; J~kome, 2007), as well as the announcement of the creation of an economic 
and monetary ALBA-PTA zone (A12, 2/11/2008), further underscore 4--\LBA's 
supranational potential. 












ALBA Houses. TELESUR. 
TELESUR. ALBA Houses. RADIOSUR. 
PETROAfl.1ER!CA {pETROANDINA PETROSUR, PETROCARIBEl. 
OPPEGASUR. South American Energy Counal. . 
M1NERSUR. EPS chainsinetworXs. Gr.md-National Companies (GNC). 
ALBA Bank. Bank of the South. Macro-economic Stabilisation Fund. 
South American Reserves Fund. 
South American Security Council. ALBA Defense Council. 'S.4 TO' 
Unrversif'/ of the South. ALBA Energy Training Centre. 
Mission Energy Revolution International. 
IntemationaUGlobal MissiDns {health, food, literacy, housing). 
PETROAMERICA (Social & Humanitarian Funds. e.g. PETROCARIBE 
Fund; South .4,mefican Social Fund). 
[10] Legal ... 
Source: Analysed from AppendL~: 12 (nalicized institutions have to date only been in the discourse) 
Currently, the "joint definition" of "common political action between states that 
share the same vision of the exercise of national and regional sovereignty" (RBV, 
2008b: 2-3) - i.e. efforts towards a concerted foreign policy - include a "political 
consultation and coordination mechanism" [Memnismo de Consulta y Concertadon 
Politim] , established with countries in LAC, but also world-wide (e.g. Cuba, A 12, 
09/05/2007; Barbados, A12, 25/10/2006; Panama, A12, 22/06/2006; Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam; IZenia). With Argentina, an agreement has been signed for 
the cooperation of the diplomatic institutes (A12, 21/02/2007). Abo\'e ail, 
increasingly ALBA foreign policy statements are issued. In the Political Declaration 
of the 6th ALBA Summit, representatives from countries such as Ecuador, 
Uruguay, Honduras, and St Kitts & Nevis joined the .:\LBA presidents in rejecting 
the "disqualification of the progressive and revolutionary governments" by US 
government spokespersons, and in warning the world of the increasing threat 
posed by the US to peace in the region (~--\LB.L-\, 2008a; .. -\12,26/01/2008; ;\12, 
22/04/2008). ALBA has also expressed its solidarity with the goycrnmcnt of 
Nicaragua in fending off external interference \vith respect to the 0:oycmber 20(lH 
municipal elections, in which the FSLN achieved a landslide \'ictory, and with the 
government of Ecuador in its decision to audit all internal and external debt, with 
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the possibility of unilaterally declaring any debt as illegal. Concerted action in the 
2006 UN Security Council elections meant the entire C~\RICO)'I voting for 
Venezuela instead of US-promoted Guatemala (Muhr, 2008). In the follo\\ing, I 
draw attention to central issues regarding the ALBA dimensions and institutions. 
In reality, the stated dimensions and institutions are not strictly separable. In the 
construction of hegemony, the politico-ideological and cultural are intermingled, 
and TELESUR and the ALBA Houses deserve particular attention. The .\LB~-\ 
Houses [Casas del ALBA] form a regional network of socio-cultural and political 
centres, currently established in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Nicaragua, Haiti 
and other Caribbean countries. TELESUR - the "television of the South" - is a 
multi-state, non-commercial TV network launched in 2005 by Argentina (20%), 
Cuba (19%), Uruguay (10%) and Venezuela (51%), and since then joined by 
Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. The channel, which can be received in about 20 
LAC countries, as well as via internet, pursues "information sovereignty" through 
the "democratisation" and "pluralisation" of the LAC communication structure, to 
counter the corporate media monopoly: according to Alvarez (2006), traditionally 
70% of TV programmes in LAC are North American. As 'television by the South 
for the South', the organised communities (alternative media) contribute to the 
programme.95 In addition to the political (information), TELESUR is crucial to 
constructing regional identity by challenging the "transnational imagery" of a 
supposed "superiority of the US way of life and political system" which, by 
downgrading LAC cultures and values, poses an obstacle to constructing the new 
identities necessary for genuine integration (Suarez Salazar, 2007: 105). Viewed this 
way, TELESUR may also contribute to cultural and cognitive social justice, both 
individual and collective, by countering the reproduction of misrecognition. 
l\S previously stated, energy is the principal tool of integration, and the 
construction of PETROAI\IERICA \\ill be subject of Case 2 below. ~Iost 
importantly, Venezuela supplies oil under a long-term, low-interest financing 
9; See http://www. tl'k~mt\·.I1l't /notiC1a~/cU1alli.ndex.php. 
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scheme, and the building of PETROAMERICA follows a "sequential" strategy, 
through which the three sub-regional blocs PETROCARIBE, PETRO~\~DIN~\, 
and PETROSUR to constitute PETROAMERICA (see ~\ppendix 13a). Some 
years ago, Ali Rodriguez Araque, then Venezuelan Secretary of State (finance 
minister since June 2008), stated that common interest prevails over ideology: "The 
policies of energy integration are not an issue of right or left. If it was like that, 
OPEC would long have disappeared" (cited in Diario Yea, 03/08/2005). 
Nevertheless, the politico-ideological is implicit through the logic of the solidarity-
based development paradigm and the type of social and economic projects into 
which countries' accrued savings go. In this respect, as Case 2 will elaborate, it is 
important to highlight that the social-humanitarian emerges as an equally important 
integration mechanism. It comprises basic utilities (water, electricity, transport 
infrastructure), food, housing, health, sports, basic education and disaster 
prevention/ emergency aid. The most important social programmes are the Yo 5 i 
Puedo! literacy and basic education campaign, currently active in 14 LAC countries, 
and the Misi6n Milagro ophthalmology programme through which Cuba and 
Venezuela provide free operations and from which 1,27 million people in 31 LAC 
countries (plus 7,681 in Angola and Mali) benefitted between 2004 and August 
2008.96 Similar to the promotion of tourism, which has been integral to ALBA 
from the start (A12, 14/12/2004), Misi6n Milagro also assumes a cultural function in 
the regionalisation process by taking patients to Cuba and Venezuela for 
operations, to foster transnational contacts for trust- and identity-building.97 
The new ALBA and UNASUR institutions evolve from a cumulative process of 
bi-Iateral agreements. An illustrative example for this is the Bank of the South, 
which IS a cornerstone of the envisaged "new regional financial architecture" 
96 Source: http:!hvww.cubacoop.com/cubacoop mi~ionmib~TO:;htm; 
http:lhvww.cubacoop.com/cubacoop/yosipuedo.htm (17/08/2008). , .. T .'. 
97 In 2005, I travelled on a lorry-bus from San Juan de las Galdonas to Rio Canb~ 111 \ enezueb s ~orth­
Eastern state of Sucre, finding myself in a group of patients on their way to Cuba tor operanons, alongs1de 
other locals. The cultural aspect of J.\hridn .\!/Iagro could not come more 1I1to the open but thr( )ll~h th~ 
conversations: "Is it true that they don't have shops there [in Cuba]?" "One can't buy ,\mthing there' 
"\\11at do they eat in Cuba?" "\\11:1t's the weather like there - is it cold?" "In Cuba the~· are not allo\~'~d to 
speak against the government" "Castro is worse than Somoza!" ~e ffilSSlOn had beco~e.;\ major e\ L n t U1 
the arca: when passing through settlements, and at amyal 111 Rio Canbe, the w.\d was ~ed _\\lth people 
saluting, and I could hear an old woman shouting "Greetings to Fidel!" (Field Diary, lS/09/_L)())). 
Chapter Six 
designed to challenge the various 'development' banks as well as the power of 
globally mobile capital. Initially referred to as "Development Bank of the South" in 
a bilateral agreement with Brazil (A12, 14/02/2005), Chavez, when assuming the 
temporary presidency of CAN in 2005, proposed (unsuccessfully) the creation of 
the Bank of the South (alongside PETROANDINA, TELESUR, Uniyersity of the 
South) at the 16th Andean Presidential Council (A12, 18/07/2005). \Vhile the 
project was discussed in a ministerial meeting at the 30th MERCOSUR Summit 
(Cordoba, Argentina, July 2006), it only regained momentum with a joint 
declaration by Chavez and Correa (A12, 21/12/2006), agreements between 
Kirchner and Chavez (A12, 21/02/2007), and a memorandum between Venezuela, 
Bolivia and Argentina (A12, 09/03/2007). Subsequently, Argentina, Bolivia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela were joined by Brazil and Paraguay (A15, 03/05/2007; 
22/05/2007), Uruguay (A15, 08/10/2007), and finally Colombia in the 
Foundation Charter (A15, 09/12/2007). The Bank's headquarters are in Caracas 
01 enezuela), with sub-offices in Buenos Aires (Argentina) and La Paz (Bolivia). 
Before laying out the more complex processes in which ALBA has been shaping 
LAC integration far beyond the concrete geo-political project, I introduce New 
Regionalism Theory (NRT) as a framework for analysis of this new regionalism. 
Analysing ALBA through NRT 
NRT as conceptualised by Bjorn Hettne and Frederik Soderbaum demonstrates 
compatibility with my critical theory framework in at least two respects: firstly, 
rooted in social constructionism98, NRT argues that regions are not exogenously 
'givens', but are socially constructed, or created and re-created ("region in the 
making") in the process of global structural transformations .. -\s regions are the 
product of the interplay of structure and reflective action, an obserycr of 
regionalisation also becomes a participant in their construction (Hettne & 
Soderbaum, 2000: 460). Secondly, Hettne & Soderbaum (2000: ·f/O) arc keen to 
98 Hettne & Soderbaum refer to cOflstmdivism, which they characterise in congruence \\ith my Jcfuunon of 
constnlCtionism in the Introduction to the thesis. 
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emphasize that NRT contains a normative element through \vhich it distances 
itself from "negative regional scenarios", such as - and especially - open 
regionalisms. NRT supports the idea of multilateralism which is as stated the , , 
overarching Bolivarian foreign policy objective. 
Hettne & Soderbaum (2000: 461) define regionalisation as "the process whereby a 
geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable 
of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region". Regional 
coherence and community is defined by five "levels" of regionness: 
1. Regional space: a region is rooted in territorially bounded space (a 
geographical unit). 
2. Regional complex, or region as a social system: progressively widening trans-local 
social relations based on historically derived identities, nevertheless 
constrained by the nation state system. 
3. Regional sodery: a multi-dimensional, rule-based pattern of relations 
(organised cooperation) in an interplay of state and non-state actors (inter-
and/ or transnational society). The various dimensions occur at different 
spatial levels, and the relationships differ in time and space. In these 
processes, the relationships between the de jure (formal) region (the full 
members) and the real region (the de facto regionalisation) deepen and widen, 
in which formal organisations and social institutions playa crucial role. 
4. Regional communiry, or regional dvil sodery: the region becomes an active subject 
with a distinct identity, which includes the convergence of national interests 
and the compatibility of ideas, organisations and processes, conflict 
resolution by non-violent means, a transnationalised regional society, social 
equality mechanisms, and social learning to construct a regional collective 
culture and identity created by common fundamental values. 
5. Region .rtate: a political entity grounded in fundamental values and cultural 
and ethnic heterogeneity (plurality). A. forced standardisation, as in the 
former Soviet Union, is not viable. 
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Despite a certain evolutionary logic, the five phases of regionness are not a series 
of stages (Hettne & S6derbaum, 2000: 470). Especially in the case of ~\LB~-\, a 
sense of urgency requires all levels to occur simultaneously. In addition to the 
geographical boundaries, ALBA's 'regional space' is defined by LAC's peoples' 
shared territoriality, their historical and cultural roots, as well as their common 
interests, needs and potentialities (11ICE/BANCOEX, n.d.). As I indicated \\ith 
respect to the various ALBA councils and commissions, the trans-local and multi-
dimensional processes that make a regional complex and regional society are 
undoubtedly occurring and forcefully driven. They include both the de jure and de 
facto regions, as Cases 2 and 3 will illustrate. Case 3 will further support the 
argument that a regional (transnational) organised society is being constructed, in 
which the social dimension has assumed a key integrationist role from the outset. 
This starkly contrasts with traditional regionalisms, in which the social is either 
non-existent or only occurs at a late stage (Hettne, 2003). In .ALB~-\, the social, 
however, is not only a normative end in itself, but also a means to equalise the 
uneven geographical development in order to achieve a "regional balance" which, 
as Hettne (2003: 361) suggests, is indispensable in the long-term transition from a 
community to a union of nations and, finally, to something like a region state -
which is, in Bolivarian terms, the grand-national. 
The 'region state' is anticipated in the 2006 La Paz Declaration as a "multi-national 
state", characterised by "cultural diversity" and "harmonious conviviality" (1\12, 
23/01/2006). A year later, the Political Declaration of the 5th ALBA Summit (A 12, 
29/04/2007) literally states the "objective of constructing the Grand Homeland". 
Ideologically, as I elaborated in Chapter Three, the geo-political concept of grand-
nationalism is tied to the appropriation and re-articulation of Bolh'ar. Bolh'ar 
alone however is not enough to construct a L~-\C common culture, identity and , , 
the fundamental values upon which a regional complex or community would 
depend. Therefore, the reference made to an array of regional, national and local 
L.-\C resistance heroes in the ALBA discourse suggests an attempt to construct a 
regional, popular-revolutionary collective consciousness and identity (a 'culture of 
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resistance,) based on a "collective memory" and a "shared cultural tradition" to 
counteract the historical monopolisation of external relations ("who is friend or 
foe") by the countries' national elites (cf Hettne & Soderbaum, 2000: -1-63, -1-6-;-). 
Institutionally, as stated in Chapter Three, since 2007 'grand-national projects' 
(GNPs) and 'grand-national companies' (GNCs) transcend the national to 
"confront the global through a strengthening of the local capacities br 
amalgamating them" (ALBA, 2008b). This mirrors the logic of endogenous 
development as defined by Venezuela's government (Chapter Five), where 
development 'from within' means extending the local to the regional and global. 
While each GNC would emerge from a GNP, not each project would have to 
convert itself into an enterprise. Both GNCs and GNPs may operate within and 
across all the ALBA dimensions, where GNPs can draw on already existing 
structures and capacities without necessarily increasing cost, as for example in the 
case of the literacy campaigns. As with the production of use value in Venzuela's 
social economy, GNCs' productive dynamics are oriented towards goods and 
services that satisfy basic human needs within the ALBA fair trade market. It can 
thus be argued that the multi-state GNCs counter-pose MNCs/TNCs as they 
break with the orthodox logic of capital accumulation. GNCs complement the 
regional production chains composed of mixed enterprises and SPCs. They may 
also link up with private enterprises at the service of ALHA as a totality, and may 
develop activities outside the de jure region in non-constituent ALB~\ countries 
(ALBA, 2008b). 
The first GNC, PETROALBA, was established through the ALBA Energy Treaty 
(A12, 29/04/2007) and is an oil company o\vned by all ~·\LB.\ states. It operates in 
Venezuela's Orinoco oil strip and guarantees oil supply to all .·\LB~\ metnber states 
for 25 years. By the same treaty, the GNe-Energy for gas, electricity, alternati\'e 
energies, energy saving, and petrochemicals was founded. Three .\LB.\-
En\'ironment GNPs "Integral i\Ianagement of Hydrographic Basins", "I'-orest", 
and "\,\'ater and Urban and Rural Clean-up" were concretised bctwcen 13oli\1J, 
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Nicaragua and Venezuela in May 2008, expected to extend oyer 3-10 years with an 
estimated budget of US$ 150 million (M:uhr, forthcoming). 
Case 1: From 'community' to 'union': shifting regional politics 
Parallel to Chavez' proposal of a "Confederation of Latin ~-\merican and 
Caribbean States" (see 'Presidential Diplomacy', above), the fonnation of a 
community of South American nations was set in motion by Brazil's ex-President 
Cardoso, who in 2000 started advocating a 'Free Trade Area of South America' 
as a negotiating platform for the FTAA (Briceno, 2007). In the following, I 
analyse the re-definition of CSN as UNASUR along the .ALB~-\ principles, in 
order to sustain my claim of ALBA becoming the hegemonic integration idea. 
The analysis further adds to dispelling the 'two-lefts' binary as it not only shows 
that, but also how the different new Left governments are involved in 
constructing the sub-regionalism to differing degrees at different moments. I 
identify three periods: the creation of CSN as an open regionalism (2000-2U04); 
the process of re-defining CSN (2005-2007); and the making of UN~-\SUR (from 
2007 on) (see Appendix 15). 
Creating CSN (2000-2004) 
CSN was created via three bi-annual presidential meetings and the respect1\'e 
declarations: the Brasilia Statement (A 15, 01/09/2000), the Guayaquil Consensus 
(A 15, 27/07/2002), and the Cusco Declaration (A 15, 08/ 12/2004). ~\ll three 
documents affirm the hegemonic agenda by conceptualising CSN as an open 
regionalism expected to build on the existing institutionality. That is, fusing and 
"perfectioning" (i.e. further 'liberalising') MERCOSUR, CAN, G-3 and Chile as 
the "most dynamic components" of L~-\C integration. ~\ccordingly, the 
documents reproduce the neo-colonial governance and development discourse of 
"human rights", "transparency", "sustainable de\Oelopment", "entrepreneurial 
social responsibility", "citizen participation", and the like. By reference to the 
O~\S- IDC, 'democracy' is defined as strictly "representatin~ dcn1ocracy". :\s 
stated in Chapter Three, :1t ~round that time - at the 3nl ~ummit of the .-\mc~·icas, 
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Quebec, 2001 - Venezuela had started to openly reject FT~-\'" -\ and, as a logical 
concomitant, also the hegemonic definition of democracy as "representati\-e 
democracy" exclusively (paragraphs 1 and 6 of the Declaration of Quebec City). 
In fact, Venezuela (unsuccessfully) proposed to add to the Declaration of 
Quebec City the concept of "participatory democracy", while indicating that 
Venezuela's incorporation in the FTAA could be subjected to national 
referendum (Bustamante, 2005: 288). 
&-dejining CSN 
The counter-hegemonic offensive for a qualitative redirection of CSN was 
strategically launched by presidents Chavez and Vazquez (Uruguay) on 10 August 
2005, the day Uruguay joined PETRO SUR (A12, 10/08/2005), and about sc\-cn 
weeks before the 1 st Summit of CSN Heads of State in Brasilia at the end of 
September 2008 (A15, 30/09/2005). In an open letter to the other CSN presidents 
- published in a Brazilian newspaper - they pleaded for a clear definition of the 
contents of integration and the institutional forms this should take (CSN, 2005a). 
As a result, in December 2005, a Strategic Commission for Reflection about the 
South American Integration Process was set up at the Extraordinary Session of the 
CSN Meeting of Heads of State in Montevideo (A15, 09/12/2005; CSN, 2005b). 
A year later, at the Cochabamba Summit (A15, 09/12/2006), the Commission 
presented its Final Document "A New Model of Integration of South America. 
Towards the Union of South American Nations" (CSN, 2005c). 
It is useful to pause for a moment and give some consideration to the yen of thc 
Commission's work, from December 2005 to December 2006. By the time of the 
December 2006 Cochabamba Summit, the regional power balance had crucially 
shifted: in January, Morales had assumed the presidency, and both Correa and 
Ortega attended Cochabamba as president-elects.99 The fact that Ortega attendcd 
as a representative of a non-South American nation itself points to the biKger 
(regional) significance of the meeting, as well as the ideolot,rical and political-
99 See ht: forosocl::llmundia1.or .ar/ii~cumbrl'~~lIlL\lnl'riClnJdl·n.luOnl'~~lU1 1l.1!11.ld() . - .1lnIJJ~ 
continental Qast accessed :26,1l8/2008). 
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G-3 , strategic stakes. Moreover, earlier that year Venezuela had left C~-\i'\ and 
which thwarted the option of fusing the existing open regionalisms. The 
Venezuelan Foreign Trade Ministry (11ICE) documents some of the power 
struggles and shifting alliances, especially with respect to Brazil, inside the 12-
member Commission, composed of one high-ranking official from each CS~ 
member country: while Brazil, Colombia and Paraguay upheld an integration 
model based on CAN-MERCOSUR convergence, Venezuela's and Bolivia's 
advocacy of a genuinely new and original institutional model prevailed. Likewise, 
the Bank of the South, supported by Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil, 
triumphed over the use of existing banks, such as the Latin American Export Bank 
(BLADEX). As regards the name itself, Colombia's and Brazil's proposal of 
"CASA" [Comunidad Suramericana de Naciones] competed unsuccessfully with 
Venezuela's "South American Union" (proposed as "UNSUR"). Venezuela's 
intention to subject the project, i.e. its Foundational Treaty, to popular referendum 
was rejected (11ICE, 2007: 27-37). 
In comparison to the final Cochabamba Declaration (2006) (A15, 09/12/2006), the 
Commission's background document is in many respects more explicit in its 
adoption of the ALBA agenda, especially in its emphasis on "energy security" and 
"local and regional actors' direct involvement in the process via horizontal and 
decentralised strategies" (CSN, 2005c). Nevertheless, the comprehensive .-\LB~-\ 
development agenda is present in the Cochabamba Declaration, which speaks of: a 
"new South American Social Contract", energy integration, infrastructure, 
economy and trade, finance, industry and production that emphasise the role of 
small and medium companies, culture, environment and defense. Progressi\"C 
advance towards "South American citizenship" would require "cultural identity" 
and the universal and mutual recognition of civil, political, labour and social rights. 
Finally, "coordinated action" in \XTorld Trade Organisation negotiations and other 
IFIs as well as South-South cooperation, are envisaged. .\bo\-e ali, the 
Cochabamba Declaration is a political statement that rejects unilateralism and 
explicitl), recognises regional integration as a means to counter the asrmn1ctncs 
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produced by globalisation. It pursues a "new" and "pluralist" model of integration 
to transcend the existing open regionalisms, and in which "diverse political and 
ideological concepts" could co-exist. The outlined concept of democracy is freed 
from any oppressive reference to the OAS-IDC and acknowledges the 
contributions of civil society organisations and social movements (.A 15, 
09/12/2006). 
Making UNASUR 
CSN was renamed UNASUR at the 1 st South American Energy Summit in 
Venezuela, where an Energy Council of South America (Margarita Declaration, 
A15, 17/04/2007) and an UNASUR Permanent Secretariat in Quito (Ecuador) 
were established (UNASUR, 2007). The UNASUR Constitutive Treaty (A 15, 
23/05/2008) comprehensively quotes from the Cochabamba Declaration, as for 
instance with respect to developing "an integrated regional space in the political, 
economic, social, cultural, environmental, energy and infrastructure dimensions". 
Although UNASUR is implicidy re-conceptualised as non-South American (i.e. 
Central America and Caribbean) states can join after having been associates for 
four years, UNASUR formally remains a sub-regionalism. Specific objectives are 
stated, such as the "eradication of illiteracy", "universal access to social security and 
health services", and the "regional recognition of courses and tides". UNASUR, in 
contrast to ALBA, appears more hierarchically organised with the Council of 
Heads of State and Government at the top and the Council of Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, the Council of Delegates and the General Secretariat as subordinate 
bodies. Legislative measures will be binding on member states once they have been 
incorporated in domestic law. Although Article 18 is dedicated to "citizen 
participation", the stated "innovative" participatory mechanisms remain unspecific, 
and 'participation' appears to be reduced to "dialogue". However, at this point 
judgement may be premature, as the treaty is open to amendments (UNASUR, 
2008) in an integration process that is extremely dynamic and subject to 
continuous change. For example, in August 2008 - three months after its 
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foundation - Correa called for a revision of the UN~"\SCR statutes in the meeting 
scheduled for October 2008 (Aporrea, 22/08/2008). 
The CSN-UNASUR transformation has been accompanied by institution-building, 
as I previously exemplified with respect to TELESUR and the Bank of the South, 
and the various processes probably reinforced each other. In the following, I 
analyse the construction of PETROAMERICA, which is the most important 
example to illustrate how the entire region is (to differing degrees) pulled into the 
Venezuela-driven integration dynamics. 
Case 2: PETROAMERICA 
As stated (see 'Presidential Diplomacy'), PETROAMERIC,,\ has from the outset 
been a top priority of Venezuela's foreign policy agenda. The principle, if not the 
idea, appears to be derived from the 1980 San Jose Agreement (.:\12, 03/08/1980), 
which Bolivarian Venezuela complemented by the Caracas Energy Cooperation 
Agreement with initially ten Central American/Caribbean states (~\ 12, 
19/10/2000). Subsequently, the initiative was joined by another fiYe Central 
American/Caribbean nations (A12, 22/11/2001; 12/12/2001), as well as by the 
South American states of Paraguay (A12, 18/11/2004), Bolivia ( .. \12,09/12/2004) 
and Uruguay (A12, 02/03/2005). Until then, the Caracas Energy Cooperation 
Agreement was the only energy integration mechanism, however joined by energy 
agreements of a more complementary nature, above all between Venezuela and 
Argentina (A12, 12/07/2000; 06/04/2004). Out of PETROA~IERIC.\'s three 
sub-regionalisms, PETROCARIBE is the most advanced. I \\ ill return to 
PETROCARIBE shortly to explain functional details that lay the foundation for 
discussing Case 3. For now, the focus is on the emergence of PETRO. \:\IERIC.\ \ 
South ;\merican sub-regionalisms. While, geo-politically, PETROCARIBE 
integrates CARICOJ\I and Central America, PETRO~"\NDI:\.\ and PETROSUR 
correspond \vith CAN and l\IERCOSUR respectiYely. 
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Appendix 12 shows that since 2000 Venezuela has signed energy agreements \\ith 
almost every LAC state, i.e. the respective state companies (French Guiana, 
Mexico and Peru seem to be the major exceptions). The bi-national agreements are 
steps towards building the larger blocs, and the majority of these agreements \\ill 
not explicitly be referred to here. Of greater interest are the multilateral and sub-
regional instruments. In this regard, the ftrst region-wide consensus on energy 
integration appears to have been endorsed in 2003, by the 19 member states of the 
Latin American Energy Organization and through Resolution ~~'\]y /D / -+20 
(OLADE, 2003: 14). That same year, Chavez and I<irchner issued The BuenoJ ,'lin'.I' 
Manifesto (A12, 19/08/2003), and Lula and I<irchner the The Buenos /lireJ' ConsenJIIJ 
(IRC, 2003). Neither of the two is an anti-capitalist declaration, However, despite 
contradictory messages in each of them, they both question the \X' ashington 
Consensus and call for integration, self-determination and egalitarian North-South 
relationships. It can probably be stated without exaggeration that the 'Caracas-
Brasilia-Buenos Aires axis', which in August 2008 regained publicity through 
discussion of a train connection, is in political economic terms as important as the 
'Managua-La Habana-Caracas-La Paz-Quito axis' is in politico-ideological terms. 
As regards PETROSUR, the sub-regional initiative started taking shape with the 
Argentina-Venezuela Iguazu Declaration (A12, 08/07/2004), followed by a 
ministerial declaration between Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Yenezuela in 
October 2004, the Uruguay-Venezuela Montevideo Declaration on PEllZ0SL'R 
(A12, 02/03/2005), a joint declaration by Chile and Venezuela in support of both 
PETROAMERICA and PETRO SUR (~\12, 21/04/2005), and was finally 
established by Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela defining the conceptual 
foundations of the PETROSUR Secretariat on 10 ~Iay 2005. Three months later, 
PETROSUR was joined by Uruguay (~\12, 10/08/2005). 
The creation of PETROSUR was paralleled by the creation of PETROC.\RIBE 
(.\ 12, 29/06/2005), and Venezuela presented the "PETRO. \\IERIC. \ stLltegy" 
later that year at the 1 ,r ~leeting of the CSN Energy \linistcrs in C.lraC;lS in 
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September 2005 (A12, 26/09/2005). Although Morales re-confirmed Bolivia's 
commitment to PETROAMERICA and PETRO SUR in early 2006 (4\12, 
23/01/2006), it would not be until a year later that PETROANDINA would 
return on the agenda through Ecuador's commitment (A12, 16/01/2007). 
Moreover, in March 2007, Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela created the 
Organisation of Gas Producing and Exporting Countries of South America 
(OPPEGASUR), intended to complement OPEC (A12, 09/03/2007). Since then, 
the dynamics have accelerated: at the 1 st South American Energy Summit, where 
CSN was re-named UNASUR (A15, 17/04/2007), re-newed consensus around 
(sub-)regional energy integration emerged with the decision to create a South 
American Energy Council. As previously noted, also in April that year, the first 
GNC, PETROALBA was created between Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela, under the rationale of energy security (A12, 29/04/2007). The concept 
of 'energy security' refers to guaranteed oil supply into the future through shares in 
Venezuela's Orinoco oil strip (Appendix 13b). A few months later, bi-national 
energy security treaties were signed with Argentina and Uruguay, in the context of 
which a GNC PETROSURAMERICA was created (A12, 06/08/2007; 
08/08/2007). This GNC is an important example of ALBA ideation ally 
transcending the de jure region and penetrating the de facto regional space, as the 
creation of the GNC PETROSURAMERICA followed the UNASUR Declaration 
of the 1 st Energy Council of South America (A15, 08/05/2008), which states as an 
objective the "evaluation and incorporation" of "universal and non-discriminatory 
access to energy", as well as of GNCs into the South American Energy Treaty, to 
be presented in late 2008. 
PEIROCARIBE 
Synchronic to these South American integration processes, PETROCARIBE has 
advanced at an incredible pace: founded in 2005 between Venezuela and 13 
Central American/Caribbean states, which is the entire CARICO~I except 
Barbados and Trinidad/Tobago (A12, 29/06/2005), PETROC4-\RIBE has been 
joined by Haiti (2007), Nicaragua (2007), Honduras (2007) and Guatemala (2()( lH), 
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while Costa Rica is in the process of adherence in December 2008. Both 
PETROCARIBE and ALBA are becoming increasingly intertwined, where the 
fonner is viewed as a first step in the transformation of L-\C into a political bloc 
(A12, 11/08/2007; 13/07/2008; 30/07/2008). 
Energy policies comprise oil and its derivatives, gas, electricity, as well as energy 
saving and the development of alternative, renewable power. Priority is given to 
those countries with the biggest developmental needs which, as argued in Chapter 
Five, reflects Marx's higher phase, communist principle of justice applied to the 
international sphere. PETROCARIBE is operated by PDV Caribe S.A. - a 
subsidiary of PDVSA - which is in charge of the logistics (distribution, terminals, 
storage, refinery) as well as knowledge and technology transfer and exchange. With 
the objective of a "Caribbean energy ring" (Appendix 13c), companies in the 
partner countries are created with Venezuelan assistance when no adequate state 
infrastructure exists. In fact, in the PETROCARIBE Energy Security Treaty (,,-\ 12, 
11/08/2007), the signatories have explicitly committed themselves to develop their 
infrastructure to "diminish the dependence on the transnational actors". This way, 
the capitalist structures are undermined as MNC/TNC monopolies and oligopolies 
are broken. However, while both the Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement and 
PETROCARIBE restrict oil supply to partner countries' domestic consumption, 
ALBA membership promotes the refinery and sales of oil and derivatives in the 
international market. Venezuela is actively supporting this policy by providing 
technical and logistical support to develop the countries economies. 
Savings accrue to the participating countries from the elimination of intermediaries 
as a by-product of the direct (state-state) relations and, more importantly, through 
a long-tenn, low interest rate financing scheme. Despite some minor regulatory 
differerences both PETROCARIBE and ALBA use the same principle. I draw on , 
the ALBA Energy Agreements 0-\12, 29/04/2007) rather than the 
PETROCARIBE Agreement to explain the scheme, because the former pn )\"idc:-; 
more detailed infonnation regarding how the sa,mgs are used: a partner country\ 
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oil bill is divided into a) an immediate payment to PDVSA within 90 days of 
delivery; and b) a long-tenn payment. The ratio between the immediate and long-
tenn payments as well as the repayment period, depend on the world market price 
of oil as laid out in Appendix 13d. As Appendix 13d shows, the deferred payment 
can make up between 5-70% of the total oil bill, and it is this share that serves 
regional development: half of it goes to the PDVSA-administered ALBA Fund, 
which is a structural fund that finances economic and social development projects 
in the member countries. By mid-2008, 15.4 million people in ten 
PETROCARIBE countries (one in three inhabitants) had benefitted from the fund 
(PDVSA, 2008a). The other half of the deferred payment stays in the respective 
country. In Nicaragua, for instance, this share goes to the National Rural Bank 
(CARUNA), a cooperative bank that gives low-interest micro-credits to small 
producers and cooperatives, from which about 50.000 persons in 57 productive 
rural cooperatives benefitted within the first year (Muhr, forthcoming). In sum, for 
instance, at an oil price of US$ 80.00-99.99 per barrel, 50% of the total oil bill is 
invested in the member countries in the pursuit of regional socio-geographical 
equalisation. 
According to PDVSA, between 2005 and mid-2008, PETROCARIBE's trade 
volume was US$ 4.7 billion, of which US$ 2 billion were financed under the special 
conditions. Member countries saved an estimated US$ 921 million. US$ 552 
million have been invested in energy infrastructure, and US$ 106 million have been 
spent from the ALBA Caribe Fund on social projects (PDVSA, 2008b). Inter-
governmental agreement decides on the exact destination of the funds, as displayed 
in Appendix 13e. Combining energy and social security, which PETROCARIBE 
stands for, has further been expanded by food security at the Presidential Summit 
Food Sovereignty and Security: Food for ufe, attended by representatiyes from 11 L:\C 
countries (A12, 07/05/2008). In response to the global food crisis, the emergency 
meeting in fact was a follow-up to the ALBA Agreement on the Implementation ~I 
Cooperation Programmes for Food Sovereignty and S ecun/), (A 12, 23/04/2008). 
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Case 3: Constructing ALBA in Nicaragua 
The Nicaraguan case exemplifies that the social in addition to energy integration 
assumes a key role in the ALBA regionalism, as well as the transnational and trans-
scalar interplay of state and civil/organised society actors in the bottom-up 
construction of ALBA. The Nicaraguan case is particularly interesting as three 
ALBA initiatives - the ALBA Petro/eos de Nicaragua (ALBANIC) oil supply scheme, 
the Yo S i Puedo! literacy campaign, and the Miston Milagro ophthalmology 
programme - were initiated, negotiated and/or coordinated by the organised 
society over the two years preceding the country's official membership in ALBA in 
January 2007 (A12, 11/01/2007). After almost 15 years of hard-line neoliberal rule 
at the national level, the country had entered a prolonged structural crisis in the 
social, political, energy, environmental and institutional spheres, which culminated 
in an "environment of ungovernability" from 2005 on (CENIDH, 2006; see Muhr, 
2008 for details). Despite national government attempts to obstruct the ALBA 
initiatives, they started establishing the counter-structure, which may further have 
discredited the neoliberal agenda and contributed to Ortega's electoral victory in 
2006. 
ALBANIC 
Within the context of an unprecedented energy crisis, ALBANIC was founded as a 
mixed company between the Association of Nicaraguan Town Councils 
(AMUNIC) and PETROCARIBE (A12, 25/04/2006). According to the 
agreement, all Nicaraguan municipalities irrespective of political representation 
should benefit equally. AMUNIC, a not-for-profit civil association constituted by 
all 153 municipalities and presided by Managua's FSLN mayor Dionisio Marenco, 
assumed a key role due to the FSLN being the strongest political force at that 
leve1.10o Strategic collective action through AMUNIC was further favoured by the 
fact that a number of non-FSLN mayoralties had also joined the initiative. 
However, the neoliberal national government and US-officials hea\-ily ideologised 
the initiative, and attempts to boycott ALBANIC included the forced \\;thdrawal 
100 The FSLN governed in those 87 municipalities where more. tha~ thre~-quarters of ~1C.lrJgumS 
live.Revista Envio, No. 272, November 2004, http://\\''.\"\\·.envio.org.ru/artlculo/ _656. 
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of the liberal mayoralties from the agreement as well as the denial of state 
infrastructure to store and distribute the Venezuelan oil. Despite logistical 
problems, oil shipments arrived from October 2006 on and immediately effected a 
~ 
17% diminution of bus fares in Managua (CENIDH, 2006). The socio-economic 
impact cannot be overestimated as, for instance, in the Southern Department of 
Rio San Juan the production of export and non-traditional crops had stagnated due 
to the doubling of transportation costs in 2005/2006. 
Misi6n Milagro 
Misi6n Milagro originally was launched as a bilateral health programme for poor 
Venezuelans to undergo complex operations (eye, heart, cancer, orthopaedic 
surgery etc.) in Cuba, where the Venezuelan state system lacked the capacity. The 
mission has been inter- and transnationalised through the Sandino Commitment 
[Compromiso Sandino], signed in Ciudad Sandino (Cuba) on 21 August 2005, in 
which Cuba and Venezuela committed themselves to undertake ophthalmological 
operations on six million low-income citizens from the entire region over a period 
of ten years. 
In Nicaragua, where the initiative started on 10 March 2006, the ftrst phase has 
been limited to treatment of cataracts and opacity, while other pathologies such as 
astigmatism, retinopathy and ocular paralysis may be included at a later stage. 
Qualiftcation for treatment does not follow any economistic "investment viability"-
rationale as there is no age restriction. While a cataract operation in a (priyate) 
clinic in Nicaragua costs close to US$ 2000101 , Misi6n Milagro patients are flown to 
Cuba and Venezuela for free-of-charge surgery and post-surgery treatment, which 
includes travel, visa, accommodation, food, and medicine, as wcll as 
accompaniment in 10% of the cases. 
While Nicaragua's right-wing neoliberal national government of the day ~Llntcd 
I ',' I departure tax exemptions as well as some post-surgery treatment and oglsnca 
101 Source: http: l/www.dpueblopresidente.com/ACTUALID:\D/1259.html (10/0-:-/2008). 
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support, the national coordination was with the president of ~-\...\fC~IC . • \lisioll 
Milagro offices, which were established in the participating municipalities, are in 
direct communication with the Cuban and Venezuelan embassies, and their 
coordinating commissions incorporate diverse local organisations and grassroots 
actors. In San Carlos (RSJ), for example, in 2006 the Catholic Church, ~Iedicos del 
Mundo, the Local System for Integral Health Care (SILAIS), the Communal 
Development Boards, the Friends of Rio San Juan Foundation (FU~D~\R), 
private doctors, the FSLN base structure and the mayoralty's manager of the 
mission collaborated to use scarce resources most efficiently. 
Yo Sf Puedo! 
In early 2005, the Carlos Fonseca Amador Popular Education ~\ssociation 
(henceforth: the Foundation) - founded in the aftermath of the FSLN's defeat in 
1990 -launched an international call for support to alleviate the national education 
crisis. The Cuban government was the only one to respond by providing the 
innovative Yo Sf Puedo! method, as well as logistical support in the fonn of the 
resources for 5000 "literacy points" (TV sets, video players and sets of 18 videos 
each, primers, facilitator guides). The campaign set out to declare Nicaragua 
illiteracy-free in 2008, and started by being implemented in several stages: fust, a 
survey was conducted, which in Managua relied on the cooperation of three 
national universities, where students collected the required data in the 
communities. A piloting stage was followed by massification, which in 2006 
included 30.000 learners in 75 municipalities, of which 11 were non-FSLI\ 
governed. 
While the Foundation's National Commission is responsible for coordination, 
training and evaluation, similar to j\lision Milagro local NGOs, the Church and the 
Community Women's Network participate in the campaign in the municipalities. 
Local actors view such grassroots support as an expression of democracy and the 
strong sense of solidarity among Nicaraguans. However, it is also a necessity given 
. d hi h h mme \"as runnin lt Despite the Cuban the resource scarcHy un er wet e progra .~ , , t"l., 
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donations, costs are incurred by training, monitoring, transport of the equipment 
and the graduation ceremony. However, the campaign was run by 0;icaraguans 
exclusively, with Cuba only providing a total of six consultants in the entire 
territory. All literacy facilitators, sometimes employees of the respectiye mayoralty 
or members of the FSLN community base organisation, \vere \'olunteers. 
Commonly classes were held in the facilitators' or community leaders' own homes, 
and occasionally in community centres or NGO and ecclesiastical premises. 
In Muhr (forthcoming) I analyse the impressive social gaIns for Nicaraguans 
during the fIrst 18 months of the FSLN government Ganuary 2007-July 2008), in 
relation to the country's membership in ALBA. Those issues are not the point 
here. The merit of the Nicaraguan case is that it demonstrates the transnational, 
bottom up construction of ALBA and the key role of social development therein. 
Section 6 of the Photographs illustrates aspects of ALBA in Nicaragua. 
Some conclusions 
By employment of NRT, this chapter has analysed the dynamics, processes and 
actors involved in LAC's structural transformation. Regionalisation can be \Tiewed 
as integral to the heterogeneity and contradictions of globalisation, and the case of 
ALBA seems to confIrm that "regional coherence" (socio-spatial equilibrium) and 
identity are of primary importance in new regionalism (Hettne, 1999b: xyi). ~\s the 
multiple integration dimensions suggest, ALBA and UNASUR challenge the "£i\'c 
monopolies" that according to Amin are expressed through globalisation: the 
North's control over technology, finance, access to natural resources, media, and 
military superiority (1999: 64-65). 
The borders benveen the different sub-regionalisms and ALIt\ are tluent, and 
despite contradictions and potentially conflicting national interests, the COn1Il1nn 
denominator seems to be a broad-based consensus on non-neoliberal integration 
\X'hile the d\"lurnics of among the progresSlye L~\C goycrnments. 
Chapter Six 
UNASUR/Bank of the South appear to be slowing down in late 2008, ~-\LB_-\ is 
developing at an incredible pace, which may eyen accelerate if _-\LB_-\ + Ecuador 
manage to establish a common monetary zone (see Epilogue). ~Ioreo\·er, with 
the UNASUR Permanent Secretariat in Ecuador, the Bank of the South 
headquarters and sub-offices in Venezuela, Argentina and Boliyia, and 
TELESUR run by ALBA, the institutional geography of LAC integration is 
decisively biased towards the ALBA members. 
ALBA means a transnationalisation of both direct democracy and participatory 
democracy. While Chapter Five argued that state power is re-scaled from the 
national to the local scales, the transnational processes in ALB.A suggest an 
upscaling of power from the local to the regional and the global. The 
reconstruction of scalar structurations of social space, to which I refer as a 
counter-hegemonic, 'revolutionary democratic politics of scale', imply the 
construction of a transnational revolutionary space, which is becoming 
institutionalised as the ALBA-Social Movements Council. It is there, in the Social 
Movements Council, where LAC's transnational organised societies become 
integrated for concerted collective action in the effort of de- and reconstructing 
the hegemonic structures, and where transnational revolutionary class formation 








Extending counter-hegemonic globalisation theory 
The thingJo.r us is the ~chievement that an idea was produced, and then thq [the community} 
obtawed an achzevement, that something has grown from that Jeed that was Jown t/Jere. 
UBV-P.-\R student (Interview .26, :\ppendi.x 16b) 
If our dreams ofyesterdqy are todqy's realities our dreams of todqy will be the realitieJ of 
tomofT()w. 
Fidel Castro 1tl2 
In this research I set out to increase our understanding of Yenezuela's Bolivarian 
revolution as a counter-hegemonic globalisation project. .At the core of the 
analysis has been the conjunction of projects, processes, structural forces and 
politics at work which, when mobilised through the strategic use of scale, explain 
the dynamics of the counter-hegemonic project. The thesis has also aimed to 
capture the systematicity, historicity and cultural embeddedness of the Bolivarian 
revolution. As an act of solidarity, the normative value of the thesis lies in naming 
the counter-hegemonic effort as such, in order to lend it visibility and to counter its 
distorted representation in the corporate media and much of bourgeois academia. 
This moral commitment is substantially supported by my theoretical commitment, 
which has consisted in developing a coherent theoretical framework for analysis 
of key pillars of the revolution. Such a theoretical grounding, I hope, increases 
the project's credibility, and faciltiates further theorising. 
By way of conclusion to the thesis, I \vill discuss the extent to which the research 
itself has provided insights in the complex multi-scalar sets of social relat1\ 1l1S 
involved in the construction of counter-hegemonic globalisation. This prlwides 
the context for the final section, where I draw on my initial set of research 
102 C:lstro by reference to lose Marti, in Castro addrmeJ ralb' on::6 jub'Annil'c'rJa,)', 26 July 19"~, .11 CISIW 
~ , ," I'J I . - . i1l'19""S ll)-"I))"C) (l.lsracccssed Speech Data Base, htt: \\,"\\,\",1. aruc.utexas.euu I r ca~tro u) , '-' 
.21 December 2008). 
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questions, in order to return to my overarching concern of producing knowledge 
and understanding of globalisation and counter-hegemony that permits an 
extension of existing theory. 
Researching counter-hegemonic globalisation 
As I stated in Chapter Two, I started this research \vith the objective of 
producing knowledge about the Bolivarian revolution from within the revolution. 
For this objective, I abandoned my original, relatively clearly defined and rather 
predictable research project which was to be conducted in a context vcry familiar 
to me (Nicaragua), in order to embark upon a research journey that was riddled 
with uncertainty and insecurities. The research process became ycry much a 
'learning by doing' experience, and many unexpected questions emerged along the 
way. This will be explored in more detail in the next section. The perils to the 
research project were also many. What, for instance, if the counter-rc\'olutionary 
forces had launched a successful coup half-way through my research? How 
would one deal with such a situation or, how easily could one adapt the research 
agenda to the new social reality, given the pressures with respect to both finance 
and time in a 3-year PhD? Also important was the issue of access ... -\rriving in an 
unknown country without having any contacts and building all relationships up 
from scratch, was a major, but very rewarding, challenge. In this respect, the 
openness of the revolution and their protagonists to integrate an outsider, in a 
context of continuous de stabilisation attempts, must not be taken for granted. 
Also, while power differentials and problems are inherent in all human and social 
relations, and certainly in research relationships, I fmnly believe that my research 
approach has enabled me to bridge many of these borders and boundaries. The 
award I received from my UBV-PAR group, to which I referred in Chapter Two, 
seems to testify to this notion. i\Ioreover, neither the relationships developed, nor 
the kno\dedge produced, will end with the completion of this thesis, as I am in 
regular contact with the UBY -PAR student group, and a return to Coro is 
scheduled for 2009 as part of a post-doctoral study grant. 
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To me, at the core of the critical case study methodology is that it has facilitated a 
theoretically informed and empirically grounded analysis of the multiscalar sets of 
social relations involved in the revolutionary project. Although action and 
reflection, i.e. theory and practice, rarely occurred simultaneously in 'real time', it 
is the dialectical relationship between the two, or overcoming the separation of 
them, that has produced the 'integrative knowledge' presented in this thesis. 
Burawoy's Extended Case Method provided the means to causally connect my 
local situational experiences in the different environments in Venezuela to theon' 
as represented by the University of Bristol, and to move back and forth between 
the two. An equally remarkable experience in this respect was 'living' the 
transnational ALBA processes decribed in Chapter Six, above all through my ,'isit 
to Nicaragua in 2006. In the chapter, this research trip does not receive the 
attention it actually deserves, as it crucially contributed to grasping the 
transnational logic of ALBA, i.e. the direct connection between the Venezuelan 
government and the construction of ALBA in the respective localities, with the 
Venezuelan embassy in Managua acting as intermediary. 
However, while the multi-sited nature of my ethnography facilitated revealing 
and explaining the structural features, political alignments and inter- and 
transnational dynamics of the counter-hegemonic project, this approach also 
contained the inevitable limitations to my research, as it impeded more profound 
engagement with the localities and actors at the different scales. Concentrating on 
the relations between sites and their multiple connectedness implied paying less 
attention to many other related issues, such as the phenomenon of a 'culture of 
non-participation' (Interview 18, Appendix 16b) or other widel\, discussed 
problems that challenge the revolutionary process from within, such as 
inefficiencies, clientelist and corrupt practices, as well as individual power abuses. 
Likewise, although my UBV-P-,-\R case study has managed to show that popular 
power is being generated and that networks are being created between different 
sectors and instances of the organised society and state institutions in \' enezueia, a 
different case may have provided results that would suit e'Tn better the objectiyc 
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of extending counter-hegemonic globalisation theory. I am thinking here of the 
fact that in 2007, Venezuelan community councils had started establishing 
transnational relationships (Interview 30, Appendix 16b), and analysing these 
would, I believe, be not only extremely fruitful but should be at the top of a future 
research agenda. 
Reconstructing theory 
As Appendix 16a shows, my research questions were organised in the four 
categories of 'education policy and governance', 'discourses', 'political, social, 
cultural and economic dimensions', and 'theory (re-)construction'. Formulating 
the overarching research question in an exploratory fashion - How are the 
Bolivan·an Republic's HEFA policies realised within the (ontext of globalisation? - suited 
the relative open-endedness of my ethnographic approach. However, while I 
believe that this thesis has, to differing degrees, addressed most of the specific 
questions in an adequate way, two points should be highlighted. Firstly, as stated 
in Chapter Two, the questions regarding discourse were not systematically 
pursued. This was not possible within the time constraints, especially given the 
need to analyse a large number of documents for the purposes of 
comprehensiveness rather than for specificity. A critical analysis of the 
revolutionary discourse based on key documents, such as the CBRV, ~ESD-
2001 and NESD-2007, by use of Wordsmith software, however, is scheduled for 
the post-doctoral fellowship I have been awarded. Secondly, HE policy and 
governance were not pursued in as much detail as the questions might suggest. 
This is due to the extension of my research from a rather narrow focus on 
Venezuelan HE to include the larger geographies of regional de\"elopment and 
counter-hegemony. After all, in late 2005, when I prepared the upgrading report, 
the integration dynamics were only incipient and I discovered their systematicity 
only during and after the second field period when analysing the . \LB.\ 
integration agreements and declarations. In methodological terms, I extended out 
from multiple situational knowledges to social processes oyer spacc and tin1c. In 
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sum, the set of research questions functioned as guidance, a 'menu' to select from 
depending on how the research would precisely develop. I yiew each question as 
contributing to the overall objective of theory reconstruction. Instead of 
attempting to answer the individual questions stated in Appendix 16a, the 
remainder of this Conclusion will present the main theoretical propositions while 
summing up the key arguments developed in this thesis. 
This study has advanced the thesis that the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is 
driving a counter-hegemonic globalisation project centred around the idea of '21 st 
century socialism', in which the regionalisation and globalisation of Venezuela's 
endogenous development finds its most advanced and explicit expression in the 
Bolivarian Alternative for the peoples of our America (ALB~\). For the sake of 
the argument, it was foundational to counter-argue the notion of two, apparently 
irreconcilable LAC lefts (Chapter Three). I argued that Robinson's misjudgement 
is based on his misconception of Bolivarian endogenous development simply 
being an "inward-oriented", import substitution-like national economy (2007: 16). 
Simultaneously, Robinson points to Venezuela not withdrawing from 
"international trade and economic integration" and in passing defines ALB.\ as a 
"transnational development project" and a "regional economic development 
plan" without, however, resolving the apparent contradiction in his statements 
(2007: 16). To reiterate, the contradiction consists in viewing Yenezuela's 
incipient 21 st century socialism through a methodological nationalist lens and 
separating it from the regional and global ALBA processes. On these grounds, 
Robinson and many other observers divide LAC's Left along national lines and 
blocs of states, rather than engaging with ALBA's transnational and multi-
dimensional operational mode. In response, I advance the notion of a 
continuum evidently not free from contradictions and differing interests on the 
, . 
part of the respective national governments, as can be concluded from the 
changing national alliances in the integration processes. 
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Based on this, I formulate this research's essential contribution to (counter-
hegemonic) globalisation theory thus: in accordance with a transformationalist 
approach and the repositioning of the nation state under globalisation, according 
to which both the capitalist state and capitalist private actors 01:\,Cs, DCS, and 
other TCC actors and organisations) are protagonists in hegemonic globalisation, 
the Bolivarian counter-hegemonic globalisation project is advanced jointly by 
'revolutionary' states and non- or anti-capitalist forces, i.e. the transnational 
organised society. In essence, this counter-hegemonic strategy has been proposed 
by, for instance, Peter Evans (2005), who has called for "new political alliances" 
that involve states and social movements and, in a more explicit way, by George 
Lipsitz: 
Strategies for social justice based solely on trapping capital in one place are now 
obsolete. Tomorrow's social movements will need to seek state power, to be sure, 
but they will also need to be local as well as global, mobile as well as situated, 
aimed at creating dynamic circuits and networks rather than establishing "free 
spaces" or "liberated" zones (Lipsitz, 1998: 298). 
However, most of counter-hegemonic globalisation theory appears to have been 
dominated by a theoretical either-or scenario. That is, that challenges to the global 
capitalist bloc would have to either come from (subordinate) states captured by 
"subordinate groups" or from "subordinate groups in transnational ci\i.l society" 
(Santos, 2002a: 180; Robinson, 200Sa: 9-10).103 Over the past two decades, the 
second scenario has been the predominant one. Against the backdrop of the anti-
TCC demonstrations (e.g. Seattle, Prague) of the 1990s and the \Vorld ~ocial 
Forum, many activist-scholars have advanced the idea of a "globalisation from 
below", constructed around trans-local alliances ("subaltern cosmopolitanism") 
and the globalisation of the "anti-hegemonic locale" (Santos, 2002a), in the process 
of \vhich transnational social movements were assumed to turn hegemonic 
globalisation's "own ideological and organisational structures against itself' 0)· 
Evans, 2005: -1-20-21) in an emergent global or international ciyil society I\e.g. Cox, 
1999; Stahler-Sholk, 2001: 13301; Colas, 2002; A \Titzer & 5antos, 2()()); Robinson, 
2007). As promising as these theories may ba\Te appeared ten years ag<), they .\ I"l 
. 1 th f d nunant ~roups who .uc In~ 
\03 Robinson (2005a: 10), however, states another optlon, name y . at 0 0 , 
integrated Into global capitalism (e.g. sectors of Chinese or RusslOn elites). 
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inherently hyper-globalist and unable to indicate how, for Instance, the 
"transnational institutions and practices that can place controls on the global 
market" (Robinson, 2008: 17) so desperately called for would come about. For a 
decade now, these theorists have consistently managed to ignore the fact that the 
geostrategic regions in the world have indeed been changing since Chayez' first 
election in 1998 and that it is time to (again) recognise capitalist state power and 
the implications of this. 
To be sure, I do not intend to downplay the crucial role of social and popular 
movements in generating normative challenges to globalisation, i.e. counter-
hegemonic ideas, imageries and the consciousness necessary for reyolutionarv 
" , 
change once a general crisis of hegemony occurs (Chapter Three). Howeycr, 
although the movements may have induced emancipatoy change in micro-cosmic 
environments - such as the Zapatistas in Mexico or in the form of local self-
sufficient economies (e.g. Gibson-Graham, 2005) - they haye not undermined or 
dissolved capitalist power either at the national or at the global scales (Rab)', 
2006: 4). Ignoring the importance of state power in favour of absolute popular 
autonomy (e.g. John Holloway's Change the World Without Taking Power) C\'ades 
questions of organisation, leadership, representation and structure, and ultimately 
means leaving "the power of corporations and the capitalist state untouched" 
(Raby, 2006: 3, 57). 
If the principal function of the capitalist state is to organise the dominant classes 
and to disorganise and divide the dominated masses, the revolutionary state 
organises the people. As collective popular action modifies the state-society 
relationship, it also contributes to changing state power itself through the radical 
transformation of the state (cf Poulantzas, 2000[1978]: 143). This is undoubtedly 
the objective of the community state as the Venezuelan manifestation of the 
'revolutionary' state. Law and the judiciary are central in the construction of the 
. d' . ~ nto" ('()tP'l) (JuestHH1 0: new state and, In or er to glvc a tentatIve answer to '- a s -. -, j , 
. h . d ce "ful appropriation (J! whcther law can be emancIpatory, t e occupatIon an suc ss 
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the ambulatono in the communal interest would suggest so. However, as Poulantzas 
states, a "dual power" situation - a "mere parallelism" or "juxtaposition" of fonnal 
representative and popular power - may create irreconcilable contradictions: "In 
what fields, concerning which decisions, and at what points in time should 
representative assemblies have precedence over the centres of direct democraC\": 
parliament over factory committees, town councils oyer citizens' committees - or 
vice versa?" (2000[1978]: 264). Competition and/or open opposition between the 
two appears to increase in Venezuela since the municipal and federal state elections 
of 23 November 2008, as popular organisation appears to be faced \\ith repression 
and political persecution in those states where the opposition has won 
government. By drawing on the Allende experience, to Poulantzas, the 
"continuous support of a mass movement founded on broad popular alliances" is 
decisive to prevent the internal dangers of "the social-democratic impasse" and 
"statism", as well as the external danger of "the reaction of the enemv" 
(2000[1978]: 263). The formation of the PSUV, the United Socialist Party of 
Venezuela, can certainly be viewed in the light of strengthening the rc\"olutionary 
base for the case of losing formal power at the upper state levels. 
The two pillars of counter-hegemonic globalisation - the community state and 
the transnational organised society - become inextricably intertwined at the 
community scale. As I have argued, the Bolivarian revolution means are-scaling 
of power from the bourgeois state and private capitalist sector to the sub-
national, organised society, and upwards to the regional and global scales. The 
former, the community state, is constituted by horizontal (networks of spatial 
connectivity) and vertical forms of inter-scalar relationships. The latter refers to 
the ALBA regionalism, which challenges TCC power through the de- and re-
territorialisation of power, in the process of which the organised con1munities in 
their different forms become counter-hegemonic 'sites of power' in both the cif jun.' 
d J £ . ( . I d· paru"e' 'LB \ Houses literacy an ue J ado regIon e.g. SOCIa pro uctlon com ~, ... 1. ~ .. , • 
spaces, recuperated factories, councils, grand-national companies and proJccts l . 
. \LB. \, thus, means 'scale jumping' by the organised society, as it circumyents or 
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dismantles historically entrenched scalar hierarchies and as its relatiye importance 
and power position is shifting decisively; the transnational organised society scale is 
produced through this process (cf Swyngedouw, 1997: 156-57; Herod & \\'right, 
2002: 10; Brenner, 2004: 57). ALBA also coincides with "struggle oyer scale", 
which is a particular historical-geographical condition "under \\'hich scalar 
hierarchies may become stakes rather than mere settings of social struggle" 
(Brenner, 2001: 608). The mobilisation of multiple social forces through such "new 
forms of inter-scalar articulation" may lead to the formation of a new historical 
bloc a essop, 2005b: 427). 
I would argue that ALBA resembles Mittelman's VISIon of a "transformativc 
regionalism", in which political cooperation and equity assume protagonistic 
roles. Although the state is an "active agent" of transformative integration, it 
derives its strength from bottom-up self-organisation (the organised socicty) 
through which ideas are transmitted, values universalised and consent clicitcd in 
the production and reproduction of hegemony (M:ittelman, 1999). The 
transnational organised society is becoming formalised or institutionalised as the 
ALBA Social Movements Council. While there is certainly the danger of the social 
movements and the organised society generally being coopted by the ruling partics 
and/ or the leaders, or of contradictions arising from the "dual pressures" of global 
and international constraints and grassroots mobilisation on the progrcssi\'c 
governments (Stahler-Sholk et al, 2007), the state/social movements alliance may 
be a very effective mechanism to exercise counter-hegemonic pressurcs on 
adversary (right-wing, neoliberal) states simultaneously from the inter-state or inter-
govcrnmental and the transnational scales. If popular power is re-territorialised in 
those states, as the Nicaraguan ALBA case study has suggested, organised countc[-
hegemonic resistance can be exercised from the bottom up. 
. ' d ()di 'b ti n to allcvi'He intr 1-ALBA seeks a socio-spatial, cohesl0n-onente re stn u 0 ,. . 
, 'I" I' ali' (f B er '100'+' 1.+-15) Thi" wa\', thc and Internationa terntona Inequ ties c renn, -' . - . 




becomes a mechanism of social justice, or a compensatory regional social policy to 
alleviate inherited uneven spatial development. While this is a necessary condition 
for successful regional integration, ALBA thus becomes a mechanism of global 
justice. As I have argued throughout this thesis, Venezuela's model of democracr 
addresses all three dimensions of Fraser's global justice framework (Chapter One). 
The inter- and transnationalisation of the missions, which includes linking the 
missions with corresponding national social programmes in, for instance, Uruguay 
and Argentina (A12, 10/08/2005; Aporrea, 18/10/2008), and the regionalisation 
of endogenous development and 21 st century socialism per se, can certainly be 
viewed as a form of global economic and cultural justice (in the latter case, through 
the recognition of the experiences of the indigenous peoples). 1\Ioreoycr, 
Venezuela has, since the Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001, been 
pushing for a re-conceptualisation of 'democracy' internationally through the 
promotion of a Social Charter of the Americas within the O.:\S. The Social Charter 
forms part of the counter-hegemonic project as it challenges the hegemonic notion 
of democracy and therefore complies with the constitutional objective of a 
"democratisation of international society" (CBRV, Preamble) and "international 
justice" (M:RE, 2007a: 89) by enshrining fundamental social rights (the right to a 
dignified life, housing, health, education, work, social protection) (1\ICT, 2005: G 1). 
Although universal personhood in the transnationalisation of social human righ b is 
limited as primarily the dispossessed are included, Venezuela's recognition of the 
global causes of poverty and injustice, as well as the representation of the world's 
poor, legitimate talk of an abandonment of a statist conception of citizenship (cf 
Bosniak, 2000: 508). 
Through ALB.-\, Venezuela is thus driving a democratisation of globalisati(lll, i.c. 
of trans- and supranational spaces, through a form of transnat10nal or 1".\ thcr 
grand-national, Boliyarian active social citizenship. This bears the idea cd- .1 
"multiple, pluralised understanding of citizenship identity and citizcn solidanty", 
. li ,,' n' t- possiblc sitcs of idcntit\· ~l!1d which regards natlona ty as one among a ,-anel,' 0 . . , 
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solidarity" (Bosniak, 2000: 506). It denationalises collective political identity as it 
dissociates citizenship from the nation state and its institutions (Bosniak, 2000: 
509). While a regionally-framed, grand-national legal citizenship is unlikely to 
become reality in the near or medium future, political citizenship is thus 
understood as "transnational political activity", exercised through the ALB_\ Social 
Movements Council as an institutionalised transnational political community. This 
community is bounded by grand-national class and citizenship identities and 
solidarities. 
Grand-national active social citizenship, despite its limitations, thus responds to 
second-order political injustice, i.e. misframing, as it shifts the boundaries from the 
national to the transnational as the unit of justice, and includes those who, under 
globalisation, often are negated participation. As stated in Chapter One, however, 
the decisions of who is a subject of justice, which refers to the boundary-setting 
process itself, are monopolised by states or transnational elites. Such meta-political 
misrepresentation requires a transformative politics of framing, above all, the creation 
of supranational institutions of global justice for effective claim-making. Although 
such institutions and a corresponding supranational legality have not been created 
in LAC, revolutionary democracy, the ALBA Social Movement Council, as well as 
the proposal to create an "Organisation of Latin American States" (an OAS 
without the US) (Aporrea, 08/03/2008) might contain such potential. For the time 
being, revolutionary state law may remain the principal mechanism for the 
underclass of the excluded to air justice claims. 
In this Conclusion, I have explored some theoretical implications of my research 
with respect to counter-hegemonic globalisation, including the ~\LB .. \ regionalism 
and issues of democracy, citizenship and global justice. Having prioritised theory 
reconstruction as the principal objective of my extended case method accords \\;th 
Burawoy, who states that any given study will inevitably concentrate on onc or two 
of the four dimensions that make up the extended case method, whilc neglecting 
the others (2000: 28-9). My rationale for concentrating on theory extension has 
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been the objective of contributing to the production of counter-hegemonic 
knowledges. The need for such knowledges, as I have attempted to show on 
several occasions throughout this thesis, is reflected in many progressiye SChOl.lts, 
who have a history of siding with the oppressed, to misrepresent the Boliyarian 
revolution and thus perpetuate injustice. In this respect, I hope that this thesis 
contributes to at least raise curiosity and make entrenched opinions question. 
Finally, the production of the kind of counter-hegemonic knowledge presented in 
this thesis required not to immerse myself fully in one environment or one 
particular community. Instead, I moved between sites and spaces across time and 
scales to 'see' structure happen (cf Lichterman, 2002), whilst producing knowledge 
about forms of social organisation that are emerging under the new regionalism -
educational institutions, local communities, social movements - and how they link 
up in new networks within and across scales. To some extent, I experienced the 
dynamics of regional integration, as I became a participant in different spaces and 
in the production of scale. However, based on my experience with this study, I 
believe that a major methodological challenge to researching space and scale in 
regionalism through critical ethnography consists in resolving the tension between 
understanding the local whilst experiencing the dynamics of the global. 
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Epilogue 
... to finish with the unjust system of exploitation, economic inequality, social injustice, the se/J-out 
of the homeland, corruption and impu11l"D'. 
FRE~.illESO 
FRENADESO is the National Front for the Defence of Economic and Social 
Rights in Panama, a kind of umbrella organisation that unites trade union, peasant, 
student, indigenous and social organisations and movements in rejecting the 
polyarchic regime by denying their support to any of the candidates and political 
parties in the upcoming national elections of May 2009. FRENADESO instead 
appears to promote the Venezuelan, Bolivian and Ecuadorian revolutionary agenda 
by calling for a people's constituent assembly to draft a new constitution (prensa 
Latina, 14/06/2008). Although very little is known about this and many other LAC 
grassroots, counter-hegemonic efforts, the message seems clear: there appears to 
be a dialectic relationship between the contemporary revolutionary governments 
and organised societies across the continent in which a transnational flow of ideas 
may effect a further radicalisation of the region. In this epilogue, I present some 
recent developments that support this notion and that underscore my argument of 
LAC becoming a subject with an identity of its own. In fact, considering the 
increasing interest of Iran, China and Russia in joining ALBA as associate 
members, we may be witnessing the emergence of a new, multi-polar world order 
While Ecuador's new constitution has been ratified by popular referendum, 
Presidents Lugo (paraguay) and Zelaya (Honduras) have reconfirmed their 
commitment to constitutional reform. In Venezuela, close to five million voters 
signed up in mid-December in support of a referendum to amend the constitution 
and legalise the unrestricted re-election of the president. This means that gi\'l~n the 
current support, Chavez is likely to stay in office at least until 2019. In the 9 
.' th FSL~ ld incrcJse it" November 2008 municipal elections 1n N1caragua, e .. COli ~. 
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leadership, as the party now governs in 105 out of 153 mayoralties, including 
Managua and 12 other departmental capitals, out of a total of 17. On a different 
scale, the increasing occasions on which the new regionalisms ALBA and 
UNASUR have exercised solidarity with the revolutionary governments are also 
noteworthy. On 15 September, UNASUR gave its full support to Evo l\lorales 
(A15, 15/09/2008) in the face of a series of de stabilisation attempts against the 
government, which included a massacre in which over 20 government supporters 
were assassinated, and UNASUR set up a commission to investigate the crimes. 
A press release by the ALBA member countries from 16 No\'ember rejects the 
intervention attempts on part of the US, EU and individual European 
governments with respect to the Nicaraguan 9 November election results 
supposedly being fraudulent. Also, ALBA backs the Ecuadorian government's 
decision to audit the nation's internal and external public debt and issued a 
warning to the multilateral financial institutions of concerted action in the case of 
sanctions against Ecuador for unilaterally declaring any debt as illegal (A 12, 
26/11/2008). 
In the second half of 2008, the strategic alliance between Russia and Venezuela, 
which has to a large extent been propelled by the US arms embargo against 
Venezuela, intensified. In September 2008, two Russian bombers TU-160 landed 
in Venezuela, and the following November/December a Russian fleet sailed the 
Caribbean waters, docking in Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba. These countries, 
as well as Brazil and Argentina, were visited by Russian delegations and/or 
President Medvedev, and comprehensive cooperation agreements have been 
signed with all countries involved (e.g. VTV / Aporrea, 17/09/2008; Radio La 
Primerisima, 19/12/2008). At the same time, in response to the global economic 
and financial crisis, as the dynamics of the UNASUR-Bank of the South project 
appear to slow down in late 2008, at the 3rd ALBA-PT~\ + Ecuador Extraordinary 
Summit on November 26, 2008, concrete decisions towards the con~titucion of 
. . tl T taken b\' ,,\LB.\'s six full 
an economic and monetary ALBA zone were Jotn ) J 
. d 1 ti n grc'ltl:r 
members and Ecuador. According to the respectlvc ec ara 0, . 
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independence from the world financial markets and the l'S-doliar is sough~ 
through the creation of a reserve stabilisation fund and a common currenc\', \\1th 
the highly symbolic name of sucre104 (A12, 26/11/2008; ~\porrea, 26/11J20{IS; 
Ultimas Noticias in Aporrea, 09/12/2008; 10/12/2008b). 
Finally, on 16/17 December 2008, a 'triple-summit' was convened in La Bahia de 
Sauipe, Brazil, under the heading LAtin American and Caribbean Summit. The sununit 
combined meetings of the Rio Group (a LAC political consultation mechanism), 
MERCOSUR, and UNASUR. The historical significance of the summit lies in the 
fact that it was convened by exclusion of the US and with the participation of 
reportedly all 33 LAC states, including Cuba. In the context of the summit, Cuba 
joined the Rio Group as its 23rd member; the UNASUR Defense Council \\"a~ 
created; and Venezuela, Paraguay and Bolivia joined Ecuador in promoting the 
auditing of foreign debt of the countries in the region (Aporrea, 16/12/2()()H; 
Panorama in Aporrea, 17/12/2008; Pagina 12 in ~-\porrea, 18/12/2(08). 
Moreover, also on 17 December 2008, the Brazilian parliament finally ratified 
Venezuela's full membership in MERCOSUR (ABN, 18/12/2008). If the Brazilian 
senate confltms the parliament's decision, then only the Paraguayan ratification i~ 
pending. 
I gIve the final word to President Chavez (cited In .AB0,' , 15/10/2()()0), 
paraphrasing a well-known political philosopher: 
A spectre is haunting Latin America - the spectre of socialism. Immateria.1 as it IS, this 
phenomenon asks for its incarnation, its material base. If we don't create that, In a process of 
integral transition, this spectre will be gone with the wind. 
18"' 0) h' praised in Sl)uth ,\ meri( a for 
104 'Sucre' refers to General Antonio Jose de Sucre (1795- j , W 0 IS hIS', ') I'll" sucre \\a~ 
. . .. d fi . tl Battle of \ \acuc 0 ( _-t. l inflicting upon the Spanish empire the deCISive e eat 10 le ' .. 
also the Ecuadorian currency prior to its substitution by the L1S-dollar 10 :WOO. 
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Appendix 1: Venezuela: Political Map (federal state, capital maJor ClO ~ 
EDO. (Est ado) = State. 
Distrito Federal = Federal District. 
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Appendix 2: Endogenous Development 
a) Population Density (inhabitants/km2) 
DENSIDAD DE LA POBlACION 
POR ENTIDADES FEDERAlES 
Hab/Km2 
• MAs DE 1.000 
DE 236 A 300 
o DE 159 A 229 
DE 20 A60 
o MENOSOE20 
o .. ~ ., 
MAR CARIBE 
Q MAR CARI8E 
OCEANO 
ATLANTICO 
The map displays the concentration of the population in the Caribb an c a , t area 
and the Andean region. 
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b) Axes of Deconcentration 
_ .. " 







Source: Draft version of NESD-2007 (the map is not contained in the final version), 
The three axes: the OecidentalAxis and the On'entalA>...-is, and th ortbem PlaiflL hiJ' 
in-between in the centre. They connect the three major 'front' (jat"badaJ): th 
Andean Front, the Amazonian Front, and the Can'bbean Front. The fr nt r fie t 
Venezuela's geographical position a a Caribbean, And an and Amazonian c untr}. 
Derived from this position is the regional energy integration trat gy: th cr u n 
the three sub-regional blocs Petrocaribe, Petro ur, and Petroandina which t ther 
fonn Petroamerica. 
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c) Envisioned Territorial Image 
./ 
I I 
Source: MPD (2001 : 67). 
Legend 
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- Railway Line (Proposed) 
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o Border Integration Zones (ZIF) 
... Front 
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d) National Rail System 
TRAMOS 
_ OONSTRUCOOH 






* PUfRTOS PR!JYfC1ADOS 
Source: Construcci6n del sistema ferroviario central "Ezequiel Zamora" Puerto Cabello-La EncruciJada, Estado 
Carabobo, p. 4, at http://archivos.minci.gob.ve/doc/sist ferrovlano ezeqUiel zampdf (retrieved 23/0812008) 
Lines in red: in construction. 
Lines in green: pre-investment. 
Lines in blue: proposed. 
Lines in white: long-term vision. 
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Appendix 3: Bolivarian Development Ideas, ObJ' ective & ' 
Th "F' C . M ". trategt a) e lve onstltuent otors [Cznco !vIotores Constitzgentes] 
Source: MINeI, retrieved 29/08/2007, http: //WWW.llliOCl.gm-.\.<.. ltbro ioill"to, / 6 
b) NESD-2001: Endogenous development and higher education 
Equilibrium Objectives Strategies Higher Education 
• Strengthen cooperatives, micro-1. Economic Develop the Productive diversification enterprises, and the Integration of 
productive economy productive chains 
• Guarantee food secunty 
• Integrate and adapt new technologies 
• Promotion of base organIZations 2. Social Achieve social justice Progressive sociallnciusion 
• Development of SOCial networks 
• Create new PFGs 
• Promote CitIZen's co-responslblhty 
• Stimulate social control 
• Contribute to the creation of a 3. Political Construct Bolivarian Protagonistic co- National Planning System 
democracy responsible participation 
• Promote the new laws of the Republic 
• Support the development of new 
public administrative systems 
• Contribute to Improving the 
4. Territorial Occupy & consolidate De-concentrated enVIronment and eco-sys ems 
the territory decentralisation • Promote the creation of Informa IOn 
and communication systems 
• Favour Latin Amencan and Caribbean 
5. International Strengthen national Multipolar pluralisalton integration 
sovereignty & promote • Strengthen national de ence 
a multipolar world 
n-dln 
-
orres The stated (principal) Objectives and Strategies contain 20 sub objectives and c fPO 
1 b b b t ves from which the ones re erring 0 sub-strategies, which subsume another 8 su -su -0 ~ec I I 
9 
education are selected . 
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c) NESD-2007 development strands "To\vards 2r t Century Socialism" 
-~~~ 
Objectives 
1. New Socialist Ethics 
Ethical and nonnative re.foundation of the nation. 
2. Greatest Social Happiness Zero misery and poverty reduction. Socialist relations of production based on social property. Strengthening basic capacities for productive 
work. Liberating and solidarian ethics, culture & education. Solidarity 
with the excluded of LAC. 
3. Protagonistic and Revolutionary 
The sovereign majority personifies the SUbstantive process of decision-
taking. Citizen participation in public management A new political culture 
Democracy based on citizens' solidarian consciousness, rights and responsibilities. 
Democratisation and use of mass media, infonnation & communication. 
4. Socialist Mode of Production 
Endogenous production & sustained growth. Food sovereignty/security. 
Science & technology for development Reduction of inequality in access 
to knowledge. Developing a basic non-energy-related industry and 
services. , 
5. New National Geo-politics 
Socio-territorial equity & cohesion. Deconcentration. The Inclusive city I 
with quality of life. Popular environmental consciousness. 
Environmentally sustainable productive system, water and biodiversity 
conservation and recuperation (cleaning of waters). 
I LAC energy integration. "Sowing the oil" for productive diversification 
6. Venezuela: Energy World Power and social inclusion. Energy use compatible with environmental I 
conservation. Radical change towards tennic electricity generation based 
on gas and alternative energies. 
7. New International Geo-politics 
Diversification of the political, economic and cultural relationships In 
accordance with geostrategic interests. Fraternal dialogue. freedom of 
thinking, religion and peoples' self-detenninatlon. National sovereignty, 
regional geopolitical bloc and multipolar world. 
NESD-2007 lists 57 strategies, through which the stated objecti\Tcs arc to be achicn~d, 
from which 216 concrete policies are deriyed. 
d) The New Strategic Map (10 Strategic Objectives) 
-
Strategic Objective Specific Objectives Tools and Objectives 
Configuration of the new Universalisation of the social rights for social equity and equality to eradicate National plans and policies in the respective areas. Social Missions (Vuelvan Caras; exclusion and poverty: education, health, housing, culture, sports, identity & self- Robinson; Ribas; Sucre; Barrio Adentro; Alimentaci6n). Participatory mechanisms at 
social structure management (esp. indigenous peoples), child/youth protection, traditionallindigenous municipal level (poverty assessment; service provision). 
histOries, cultures & knowledges. 
New communication Democratisation of the media: community media and indigenous cultural production. Think Tanks. Multi-level information networks (lV, community radio, information offices, A culture of information and public debate. Education (Bolivarian values, ethics, internet, public media centres for universalisation of ICn. School for media studies. Bolivarian 
strategy ideology, the New State structure). Dissemination of a favourable image of the News Agency, National Publishing House, Ley Resorte, TELESURllnternational News 
process at home and abroad to counter imperialism. Agency. 
Construction of the new Social justice through citizen partiCipation and co-responsibility in the exercise of Ministry for Popular Participation and Social Development (MINPADES). Laws (e.g. Law on government. Consolidation of the new grassroots social structure, where the social Citizen Participation). School curriculum. Instances of participation (e.g Consejo Federal de 
popular partiCipatory transformation of grassroots organisation into party structures has to be avoided. Gobierno; CLPPs). PartiCipatory mechanisms (budgeting, diagnosis, social control). Socio-
democracy model Conscientisation for participatory ethos. Improving the system of political political education (workshops). Committees for evaluation of public programmes. 
representation & democratisation of the internal life of the parties. 
New institutionality of the Redesign the functional structure of the state at all levels. Effectiveness, efficiency, Reform of public administration (Civil Service Law), the judiciary (Legal System Law), the transparency via citizen partiCipation. Eliminate bureaucratism. State as human rights National Assembly Regulation. Public expenditure control mechanisms (CLPPs; [CCs]). 
state apQaratus promoter. Municipalisation of the coordination of the missions. Institutionalisation of the missions. 
Integral and effective New moral~thical public consciousness and values (honesty). Terminate corrupt Institutional control systems (Public Prosecutor, Treasury Inspector, auditing units). behaviour in public administration. Transparency, information and citizen partiCipation Campaigns, workshops, formal education and the educational missions. Legal reform (penal 
anti~rruption strategy in the control of government. Study of causes and effects of corruption. Revision of code, Anti-Corruption Law). Contraloria social (participatory local budgeting). Anti-corruption 
the system of institutionality. ~olice. Confidential rej>orting. 
New electoral strategy 
Improve the electoral system to reduce abstention (transparency, trust; digital Programmes of documentation (e.g. Misi6n /dentidad). Electoral campaign legislation 
registration; coverage/access). Improve coordination of political organisations (financing, use of surveys). Adequate technological platform for processing of electoral 
supportive of the process. Democratization of the parties. information. Statistical information. 
New production model for 
A solid, popular economy within the endogenous development rationale for fiscal Ministry for Popular Economy & Misi6n Vuelvan Caras. Decrees/agreements for coordination 
stability and agro-independence: food security; integration of markets and productive of economic and productive policies; fiscal & administrative reform (decentralisation -
the creation of the new chains; self~mployment and enterprise creation (e.g. cooperatives); restructuring of regional/municipal offices}; national, regional and local planning conferences and workshops; 
economic system existing public and private financing systems; co-responsibility through joint fiscal mechanisms (e.g. taxes); definition of regional characteristics and joining with schools, 
management; consolidate regional potentialities (petro-chemistry, gas, metallurgy, technical colleges, universities; technological innovation; sustainable use of resources. 
timber, agriculture, fishing). 
Deconcentration & decentralisation (administration, production). Integrated rural Laws, national plans (e.g. for minimum managerial training: guiding, educating, problem-
development around regional development axes/poles: elimination of large solving). Creation of development axes: Northem-Coastal Axis; Northern-Llanos (Plains) 
New territorial structure landownership, productive use of idle land & identification of regional potentialities, Axis; Orinoco-Apure Axis. Creation of development poles according to regional potentialities 
physical and social infrastructure to counter rural-urban migration (basic services, (petro-chemical, gas, coal, aluminium, iron, agroalimentation & ranching, tourism, 
communication, National Railway Plan). hydroelectricity 
- ---,'-'-
New Venezuelan military thinking. National arms & shipping industry. Dismantling of Centres for strategic studies. OrganiC Law on the National Armed Forces. Modification of the 
Configuration of the new para-military/policial elements in the security forces. Integration of the people in Law on Conscription and Military Enlistment. Joint military exercises with foreign armies. 
national military strategy national defence. Military-civil union for defence, security, development, social work, Information campaigns. Creation of a govemment body for the promotion of the civic-miJitary 
.-v"""ity reduction. LA military integration. union . 
Multi-polarity. equity and democracy in diversified, foreign relations. ALBA and other PETROAMERICA, PETROCARIBE. TELESUR. Universidad del Sur. Internatronal legal 
New internatIonal multi- LAC integration processes. Defence of human rights. Improve the image of the instruments Intemational conferences and forums. Human resource development Republic. increase citizen and institutional support abroad, project the participatory- Intemational exchange of successful public policies. Organisation of the di"erse social actors 
I 
polar system protagomstic state model on the continent and the wor1d. Strengthen the economic, within the framework of the socio-popular endogenous development model. 
sooal. QJltural and communicational cooperative exchange networits internationally. 
~-------. ------
"" ...... r (.~ hum MI~(.1 (21nh) 
)( )1) 
Appendix 4: Venezuela National Flags (selection) 
a) Flag of the Independent State (14/07/1811-11/05/1817) (rt and 2nd Republic) 
(replaced in 1817 by the federal flag, 3rd Republic) 
de tvhrancia, Lino de Clemente and Jose de Sata y Bussy. Until the introduction of the Bolivarian flag in 2006, this had been 
In V cnczudan lustot) that represents the indigenous peoples, and in this case a woman fighter holding a pike or spear wIth a recJ, re\ olutlOnary Clq 
) ]( 
b) Flag of the Republic of Venezuela (17/02/1954 -12/03/2006) 
the emergence of the '4th Republic' in 1958, which means that a conscious symbolic break with the prevIOus n.:gJlne 
rship was a\oided by the poJyarchic regime. 
) 1 J 
c) Flag of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (since 13 March 2006) 
III contr:ast to irs pretIccessor, the Boliyanan £lag now represents all 24 federal states and bears an additional star for Guayana, the eighth province of lhe (;rrll/ 
P{llria, ~s J ecrccd by Bolivar in 1819. The top oght-hand (yellow) part of the coat of arms depicts bow, arrow and machete, which represent the ulciigcl1ou!-> 




Appendix 5: Participation as defined by 'developm' . ent agencIes (Source: Feeney, 1998: 7-8) 
World Bank Participation is the process through which stak h ld . fl d e 0 ers ill uence.lIT 
share control over development initiatives and the declS' l'ons d hi h 
affect them. 
an resources w c 
United Nations Development Proo-ramme /T TNDP'" Pam'cI'p tI' h 
, , o~· {~. /. a on mean~ t at 
People are closely mvolved m the economic social cultur" 1 and politI' al , ,. , c processes 
that affect their lives. ,. . 
Canadian Intern.a~o~al Development Agency (CIDA). Participation l~ a 
process whereby mdiVldua~s and community are actively involved in all phase~ 0 t" 
development. It therefore mvolves greater equity and political power, 
Inter-Amet!can Development Bank (IDB). Participation in development l~ both 
a way of domg development - a process - and an end in itself. ~\s a proce~~, it i~ 
based on the notion that individuals and communities must be in\~ohred in decision~ 
and programmes that affect their lives. As an end, participation in development 
means the empowerment of individuals and communities. It means increased self-
reliance and sustainability. 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD): Participation 
refers to an organised opportunity for citizens and public and private organisations 
to express their opinion on general policy goals or concrete decisions made about 
specific projects and to discuss them with decision makers. It includes the 
possibility of appealing against government decisions. 
Department for Intemational Development (DFID). Participatory approaches 
take into account the views and needs of the poor, and tackle disparities between 
men and women throughout society. 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
Participation has a central role in the development process. The individual IS positcd 
as the primary subject of development - with an emphasis on self-reliance, 
empowerment, and participation. The rights of individuals go beyond the level of 
mere entitlements to delivery of specific goods and beyond sen~ces. Thus the 
development process is conceived of as being an enabling process whereby 
structural impediments (both social and economic, on a micro and macro scale) are 
lifted to allow the individual to define and fulfil his or her material and non-material 
needs. TIlls is acknowledged in Article 2(i) of the Declaration on the Ri~ht to 
Development, which states "The human person is the central.subject ot , 
development and should be the active participant and benefiCIary of the nght to 
development" . 
Oxiam: Participation is a fundamental right. It is a means of cng;1~111~ poor pcople 
... f ' " I' ultim t > goal should be to m jomt analYSIS and the development 0 pnontIes. ts a e c • . 
1: h ., . , f I al omen and men and to 1I1crease their lOster t e eXIstIng capacltleS 0 oc ,poor \V . 
self-reliance in ways that outlast specific projects. The purpose of partICIpatIon IS to 
, . , ' Ii d pIc and une'tJltc them Into the gIve a permanent VOIce to poor or margma se peo .' " , 
decision-making structures and processes that shape their lives, 
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Appendix 6: Direct and Participatory Democracy 
CBRV articles that explicitly relate to participation' 5 6 55 62 67 -"\ -
81 84 86 102 119 125 . " , , " V, 2, 79, 80, , , , , , ,127,128,141,168,171,173 178 184 18- ..,-- "94 "99 (Troudi et a1, 2005: 137-40). ' , , I, _JJ, - ,-
a) Port Huron Statement (core values) (extract) 
As ~ s.oc~ system we seek the establishment of a democracy of individual 
pamClpatlon, governed by two central aims: that the individual share' th _:_1 
d .. d .. th 10 ose soua! eC1S10ns et~nmnmg e q~ty and directi~n of his life; that society be organized 
to encourage mdependence m men and proVlde the media for their comm 
.. . on 
pamClpatlon. 
In a participatory democracy, the political life would be based in several root 
principles: 
• that d~cision-making of basic social consequence be carried on by public 
groupmgs; 
• that politics be seen positively, as the art of collectively creating an 
acceptable pattern of social relations; 
• that politics has the function of bringing people out of isolation and into 
community, thus being a necessary, though not sufficient, means of finding 
meaning in personal life; 
• that the political order should serve to clarify problems in a way 
instrumental to their solution; it should provide outlets for the expression 
of personal grievance and aspiration; opposing views should be organized 
so as to illuminate choices and facilities the attainment of goals; channels 
should be commonly available to related men to knowledge and to power 
so that private problems -- from bad recreation facilities to personal 
alienation -- are formulated as general issues. 
The economic sphere would have as its basis the principles: 
• that work should involve incentives worthier than money or survival. It 
should be educative, not stultifying; creative, not mechanical; selfdirect, not 
manipulated, encouraging independence; a respect for others, a sense of 
dignity and a willingness to accept social responsibility, since it is this 
experience that has crucial influence on habits, perceptions and individual 
ethics; 
• that the economic experience is so personally decisive that the individual 
must share in its full determination; 
• that the economy itself is of such social importance th~t its n:ajor ~esources 
and means of production should be open to democratlc partlclpaUon and 
subject to democratic social regulation. 
Like the political and economic ones, major social institutions -- cultural, education, 
rehabilitative, and others -- should be generally organized with the well-belI1g and 
dignity of man as the essential measure of success. 
In social change or interchange, we find ,'iolence to be abhorrent because it requires 
. f th b' h n being or a commwuty of generally the transformatlon 0 e target, e It a uma , : 
. ' d b' f h It' un' peratl"e that the means ot people, mto a depersonalize 0 Ject 0 ate. IS , ' . 
violence be abolished and the institutions --local, nauonal, mternatlonal -- that 
di . f fli t be deYcloped encourage nonviolence as a con tlon 0 con c . 
I hun! (rctnl"n~d 12/(l':: '::1" IS 
Source: hnp:!lcoursesa.matrix.msll.edu/-hstJl)() I documents/lUron, 
Appendices 
b) Public Electronic Consultation Forms for the Reform of the Community 
Councils Law and for the Law of Popular Power 
2. 
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Appendices 31-: 
c) Community Councils Organization Chart (developed from RBV, 2006) 
Frequently, consejo comunal is translated as 'communal council', rather than 'community 
council'. To me, the latter appears more accurate, because comunal, according to the Royal 
Spanish Academy, is derived from fa comuna - 'the commune'. In its older, neutral sense, 
'commune' refers to the lowest unit of local government, e.g. in France and Germany. In an 
ideological sense, the concept is associated with the Paris Commune of lS70rl, or ~ 
"group of people living together and sharing possessions" (11cLean, 1996: 8,: J ary &: J ary. 
1995: 97). Neither of the two meanings apply to the contemporary \Tenezuelan consdo! 
comunales, as the councils are neither part of the formal government (state) structure, nor do 
they embody communal collective ownership (although they may well in the future). 
Moreover, the Community Concils Law makes reference to fa comunidad (the community), 
rather than to 'the commune'. In contrast, the communal banks are communal because they 
are owned by the entire community ('community' defined in geographical terms). Hunnius, 
however, defines 'commune' as "the political expression of groups of local communities. 
which implies a social and political structure of self-government that has been remoyed 
from state control" (1972: 164). 









Promotion of organised 
participation of individuals 
and community groups. 
Consists of the groups' 
spokespersons. Plans & 
executes decisions by 
Citizen Assembly. 
COMMUNITY COUNCIL 
Social Control Unit 
5 residents elected by the 
Citizen Assembly. Control 
of community council funds 
and control of public 
investment at national, 
federal and municipal 
levels. 
Regional Presidential Local Presidential 
Commission of 
Popular Power 
~ Commission of Popular 
Created by the National Presidential 
Commission in each municipality. 





Body attached to the Finance Ministry. 
Transfers the funds to the Communal 
Bank. The directors board is deSignated by 
the President in Ministers' CouncIl. 
Ministry of Finances 
Power 
Created by the National PreSidential 
Commission in each state 
National Presidential 
Commission of Popular 
Power 
Coordination and e\ aluatlon of the 
Community Councils Creation of 
mechanisms for education & training 
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Each of the groups/organizations integrated in the executive has one spokesperson 
voted into the organ by the Citizen Assembly. Tasks of the executive include 
organizing a Community Information System and promoting national defence, the 
exercise of legislative initiative, and participating in the processes of social street 
parliamentarism (RBV, 2006, Articles 2/4/6/8/9/21). The five community 
members in charge of the Communal Bank are elected by the Citizen Assembly and 
receive training. Courses are held in Schools of Communal Banks, run by the 
Micro-finance Development Fund (FONDEMI) of the Ministry for Popular 
Economy (MINEP) (see Panorama, 13/05/2006, p. 2-5, 'San Framisco), fa Canada 
integran plan piloto de bancos comunale!). (MINEP, created in September 2004, was 
renamed Ministry of Popular Power for Community Economy, 1HNEC, in ~Iarch 
2007, see http://www.minec.gob.vel). 
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d) The Missions 
Mission Launched Sphere of activity 
1 Barrio Adentro I, II, III, IV 16/04/2003 Health Care (all levels, basic to hospital) I 
2 Robinson I 01/07/2003 Basic literacy 
3 Robinson II 28/10/2003 Lower Basic Education (Qrades 1-6) 
4 Ribas 17/11/2003 Medium Education 8achillerato (A-Level) 
5 Sucre 10/07/2003 Higher Education 
6 Miranda 19/10/2003 Military Reserve Corps 
7 Alimentaci6n/Mercai 10/01/2004 Basic Food Security 
8 Vuelvan Caras, renamed 12/03/2004 Education & Training and Technical- Financial 
Che Guevara (24/04/2007) Assistance for Social Economy 
9 Habitat 20/08/2004 Access to land, housing and spaces of 
improved IivinQ 
10 Identidad 03/0212004 Universal Provision of ID cards 
11 Milagro Cuba-Venezuela 08/07/2004 Ophthalmology and other complicated 
treatment (cancer, heart, spine, uterine etc.) 
12 Guaicaipuro 12/10/2004 "Ethno-development": basic human and social 
needs satisfaction 
13 Piar 18/10/2004 Social and Legal support of the Small Mining 
Sector for Diversified Economy 
14 Zamora January Reclaiming Land and fight against large land 
2005 owner (/atifundio) 
15 Cultura, renamed Cultura 14/07/2005 Socio-Cultural Development (incl. Education) 
Coraz6n Adentro (26/04/2008) 
16 Milagro International 21/08/2005 Ophthalmoloqy 
17 Negra Hip61ita 14/01/2006 Integral care of the most excluded (e.g. 
people living in the street, with a disability, 
AIDS) 
18 Ciencia 19/02/2006 Knowledges & Science for Endogenous 
Development 
19 Madres del Barrio 23/03/2006 Integral attention to women and their families 
20 Arbol 04/06/2006 Reforestation 
21 Revoluci6n Energetica 17/11/2006 Rational use of enerQV 
22 Alma Mater 21/11/2006 HiQher Education Institutions 
23 Sonrisa 22111/2006 Dental Care 
24 Villanueva 18/03/2007 
Humane, inteqral housing 
25 Jose Gregorio Hernandez 11/03/2008 
People with a disability 
26 Ninas y Ninos del Barrio 15/06/2008 
Children living in social risk situation 
27 13 de Abril 24/08/2008 
Synthesis of the social, the physical 
infrastructure and the development of tr'e 
communal economy (creation of ·sOClalist 
communes") 
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Appendix 7: Regional UBV Headquarters 
Source: UBV (2008: 2). 
Most UBV headquarters are in charge of everal state : 
Sede Bolivar 
Bol ivar 
1. Western Andean Region: Zulia (M:aracaibo), Merida, Trujillo. 
2. Eastern Andean Region: Tachira (Tachira), Higher Apur . 
3. Metropolitan Zone: Caracas, Miranda, argas, Amazona ,Lo~ r pur . 
4. Western Plains (Uanos) Region: Barinas (Barinas), Portugu a. 
5. Central Region: Aragua (Aragua), Cojedes, GUarico, Carabobo. 
6. Eastern Region: Monagas (M:onagas), Nue a E parta, Anzoategui orth), uer . 
7. North-Western Region: Falcon (punto Fijo), Lara, Yaracuy. 
8. Guayana Region: Bolivar (Ciudad Bolivar), Anzoategui ( outh) D Ita .Unaeur . 
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Appendix 9: State of F alc6n 




b) Municipalised UBV: Student Distribution (2006) 
Municipality UBVISucre PFGs Offered and Student Distribution" 
Students ED SC IN SM AE LS EM 
1/2 Carirubana + Los 882 654 
- -
, 58 111 
Taques I 
- 59 ! 
! 
3 Miranda 803 474 25 
- 53 I - 205 17 
4 Falcon 435 303 20 - 40 
- 57 15 
5 Federacion 429 313 10 27 33 
- 46 -
6 Zamora 389 358 3 
- 9 - I 19 -
7 Colina 372 229 13 16 54 I - 32 20 
8 Mauroa 285 213 5 17 27 
-
11 12 
9 Union 273 223 23 
- - -
27 -
10 Dabajuro 214 175 
- - 11 - 15 13 
11 San Francisco 205 164 - - 19 
- 22 -
12 Monsenor Iturriza 205 167 
- 17 7 14 - -
13 Acosta 172 172 - -
- - - -
14 Petit 145 145 - - - - - -
15 Sucre 144 144 - - - - - -
16 Buchivacoa 133 133 - - - - - -
17 Bolivar 130 93 - - 37 - - -
18 Urumaco 122 122 - - - - - -
19 Jacura 110 110 - - - - ! - -
20 Tocopero 90 90 - - - - - -
21 Piritu 83 83 - - - - - -
22 Silva 76 59 - - - - 17 -
23 Democracia 72 72 - - - - - -
24 Cacique Manaure 66 57 - 9 - - - -
25 Palmasola 21 21 - - - - - -
Total 5856 4574 99 86 348 - 576 136 
Source. Obtained from UBV Falcon, August 2007. 
* ED = EducationlTeacher Training (PNFE); SC = Social Communication; IN = Informatics; SM = Social 
Management; AE = Agroecology; LS = Legal Studies; EM = Environmental Management; HS = Hydrocarbon 
Studies. 
These numbers do not include students of Integral Community Medicine and 
Energy Sciences, which are not directly offered through l'BY /i\I.isi6n Sucre, but 
through Misi6n Barrio Adentro and PDVSA, and other uniYersities. 
The table shows that 78% of students are in Education, and 10°'0 in Legal Studies. 
It also shows the patchy offer of study programmes. Howeyer, not all courses 
should be expected to be universally offered, which is especially the case with 




































• Caprtal de ParroqUl8 
The municipality of Miranda comprises seven parishes (paTTOql/l'as) (pari h capital in 
brackets): San Antonio (Coro); San Gabriel (Coro); anta na (Coro); Guzrn: n 
Guillermo (La Negrita); Mitare (Mitare); Rio Seco (Rio eco); aban ta ( aban ta) 
A/deas in the Municipality of Miranda a uly 2007) 
Aldea Students PFG* 
Juan Crisostomo Falc6n 359 PNFE/LS/SC/SM 
Lucas Guillermo 251 PNFE/LS/SM/EM 
Sim6n Rodriguez 195 PNFEILS/SM/EM 
Borregales 177 PNFE 
Calle Sierra 141 PNFEILS/SM 
Antiguo Furzan 132 PNFEILS/SC/SM 
Sim6n Bolivar 111 PNFEILS/SM 
Mitare 99 PNFEILS/SM 
Lucrecia de Gualdia 94 PNFEILS/SC/SM 
CENCAFA 56 PNFE/LS 
Sabaneta 49 PNFEISM 
Alberto Furzan 32 PNFElEM 
Rio Seco 29 PNFE 
Cabecera 17 PNFE 
Santa Rita 12 PNFE 
Total 1754 
Source: Obtained from UBV Falc6n , July 2007 
* PNFE = National Teacher Education Programme; SC = Social Communication, SM = Social anagemen 
LS = Legal Studies; EM = Environmental Management. 
In compari on to the table above th munici ali d 
th period 2006 to Jul 2007, de pit th fact that th 
ax not includ d h r (tho tud nt pr babl) are w 
tud nt num rumble 1m 
H rdr car on [ulht: fi n: 
rkc " ill the e n -muu ). 
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d) Community Councils in Falcon State aune 20(F) 
Municipality Community Projects 
Councils Financed 
1 Federacion 110 22 
2 Carirubana 108 77 
3 Miranda 78 9 
4 Mauroa 58 7 
5 Union 49 17 
6 Petit 48 43 
7 Zamora 47 15 
8 Falcon 46 46 
9 Piritu 45 6 
10 Democracia 43 5 
11 Colina 41 26 
12 Buchivacoa 37 1 
13 Sucre 37 21 
14 Urumaco 34 17 
15 Bolivar 30 19 
16 Jacura 27 17 
17 Los Taques 26 19 
18 Silva 25 11 
19 Acosta 23 7 
20 San Francisco 21 3 
21 Monserior Iturriza 21 5 
22 Dabajuro 15 1 
23 Tocopero 15 11 
24 Cacique Manaure 7 2 
25 Palmasola 6 3 
Total 997* 410 
Source: Anonymlsed by author 
* The 1018 community councils stated in Chapter Six are the updated figure (Interview 25, Appendix 16b) 
In 2007, a limit ofBs 30 million (close to US$ 14.000) per project was set. Once the 
first project is successfully realised, higher grants are allocated. 
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Appendix 10: ALBA Organisation Charts 
a) 5th ALBA Summit (April 2007) 
80lJVARlANA PARA LOS PUEBLOS DE NUe8TRA A~ ALBA ~SftICA 
CONSEJO DE PRESIDENTES DEL ALBA 
CONSEJODE 
MINtSmOS DEL ALBA 
COHSLUO iii 
MOVlMENTOS 
SOClALES DEL ALBA 
Source: Annex I, Political Declaration of the 5th ALBA Summit, Tintorero (Lara, Venezuela), 29/04/2007 
b) 6th ALBA Summit a anuary 2008) 
CONSEJO DE PRESIDENTES DEL ALBA 
(Cumbre ALBA - TCP) 
CONSEJODE 








While the three councils (pre idential; mini tetial' ocial m \" 'm '0 ) ha\· 
remained unchanged, the 2007 chart' ey n Corru111 ' 1 n: 11 ell, Ci.1L 
economic, in estment and finance, energy n\~ir nm nt ) uth) haY<::: 
r -conceptuali d through th formation of a P rmancnt 'ccrctary c f LI \ 
in charge of coordinating m mber tate' nati nal c rdln.l on',. Hll.l 
P litical ommi ion that coordinat yan u' c nulU: '1 n' (T· c n 111 




Appendix 11: Constructing ALBA - the P' . 1 nnclp es 
Constructing the ALBA: 'Our North is the South" 
'No~~' in the slogan "Our North is the outh" b ar a d ubI me, rung: In 
Castilian, 'norte' can either mean the geographical north r ( bj cti,' ' / aim'. 
ALBA Principles 
-Solidarity Mutual support and common efforts to achieve integral human 
development. 
Complementarity Identify and develop common projects that permit the 
conjunction of capacities in accordance with the jOint 
potentialities. May involve import substitution at the regional 
level. 
Cooperation The will ingness of all parts to advance their human, political and 
commercial re lations oriented to the development of strateg ic 
alliances and mutual agreement. 
Reciprocity The obligation to establish relationships based on the mutual 
recognition of the principles of equity and good faith 
Sources: MICE (2006: 32) , MICEJBANCOEX (n.d.), 

















Instrument (Agreement, Declaration etc.) 
San Jose Agreement (Barbados, Belice, Costa Rica, EI Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Dominican Republic). 
Energy Cooperation Agreement Argentina-Venezuela. 
Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement with Belice, Costa Rica, EI Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Domincan Republic. 
Integral Cooperation Agreement Cuba-Venezuela. 
Cultural Agreement Venezuela-Cuba. 
Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement with Saint Vincent & the Grenadines. 
Basic Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation. 
Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement With Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, 
Guyana 











Mexico and Venezuela supply 160.000 barrels of oil and derivatives per day 
(80.000 each) to Central American & Caribbean countries. Cooperative 
finanCing scheme that promotes commercial relations with Mexico and 
Venezuela. 
Scientific-Technical Exchange in natural energy resources, hydrocarbons, 
derivatives, electric energy. 
Co-exists with San Jose Agreement: Venezuela supplies an additional 78.400 
barrels per day. Quotas bilaterally determined according to countries' needs, 
between 600 (Belize) and 20.000 barrels/day (Dominican Republic). Initial 
period of one year, subsequently extended. 
Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement (up to 53.000 barrels/day). Science 
& Technology & Knowledge Exchange. Services. Trade. Agriculture & Food. 
Transport. Tourism. Health (Drugs. Doctors, personnel, free of charge). 
Education (General; Literacy; HE; software). Sports. Mixed Commission 
(yearly meetings). Any sectors for cooperation not mentioned can be 
proposed by either of the two parties at any moment. 
[Unifies the shared gasfield for joint exploitation http.//www consulvene 
canarias,org/noticias_anteriores/2003/agosto/11_0B_2003him} 
----
11/0812003 i ~ Au~nos A"es.\~ Bue~o~ ;,~ .. s M;~~'leS!~ O:tween P,es,"en!s Chavez and K;,chne, Bi~national Points 10 the fundamenlals of ALBA. C"'que of neofibe,.fism. exlemal debl. 
: 'Ilw 1t .. 1 I~ 111>1 C,h.IW·II\ (. Ir "cryeS If) dlll"!.lll' thl" Illllitl dl!l1ell>1()Il.dlt\ and the Llngc of act()r~ IIl\(JI\ l"ll .\LB.\ IS defined as a regl'JlLdlsm J~I IId(IOII,'/ It I( I to t\\'() "!.It(·" ;1" r"pI .. " .. III("(1 II\' Ihn' 
~",\nlll1\('llh. ",MIII ':JIIO';" I., .111\' thrl"e ()I ,nOll" '!.Ites In the rq'I'H1, JltiJ-rt'f!,lUf"J/tu thrce O( 1ll"Il ~t.ltt·" 111 one of the three sub,regHJll" (Canhl)e:IIl/.\ndc;tIl/.\I1UZIJlII.1I1 SOllth("11l (OIJ("), .1I1t! tfiJf/' 
r.,'::',II,J!(r,.lIIH"r Ih,lll 'l,d.lln.11' ttl (',nphaS1Zt' Ihe 1111("('''<''11:11 prt)ll""l'S) lI1cludes '1.I11(Jnal and ~llh Iunona! state (Jr )!.(J\"l'fllll1u1l act'H" and ("l1tlll('" a" well;l" 11011 ',1,11,' or 1I()11 )~()\(·rrlllj("f1!.d:1( tor .... IIHI 
mhlX"'S The h~I I' IC' IIl( 1,,1 II) lIl ... rnlmCIlI' 'lgnl"J \\1th \'cnl'zuebn lI1\'ohell1t"IlI ()tht'r~ o\Jnoll,h l'Xl"r, Il,r m"tancc lJl't"Wl'l'n Bolt\'la ;tlld (:1I1);t nlJ /12/2()OS) 
Argentina, supra-national financial institutions. Demand for fair interest rates on external 
19/0812003 debt. 
Caracas, Integral Cooperation Agreement Argentina-Venezuela. Bi-national Inter-ministerial Mixed Commission to define science, technology and 
Venezuela, knowledge exchange. Energy & Mining. 'Oil for agricultural products' under 
06/0412004 the rationale of reciprocity and equilibrium. 
Iguazu. Iguazu Declaration Venezuela-Argentina. Bi-national Intention to create PETROSUR. 
Argentina. 
08/0712004 
Caracas. Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement with the Republic of Paraguay. Venezuela supplies up to 18.600 barrels of oil or equivalent per day under 
Venezuela Caracas Agreement financing scheme. Possible supply of 300.000 barrels of 
18/1112004 Bi-national crude per year for refinery in Paraguayan state company PETROPAR. 
Revamping of oil refinery. Mixed Enterprise for exploration. 
Cusco. Peru, Cusco Declaration on the South American Community of Nations (CSN) at the 3rd Sub-regional Foundation of CSN. 
08/1212004 South American Presidential Summit. 
Ayacucho. Peru, Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement with Bolivia. Bi-national Venezuela supplies up to 1,650 barrels/day of oil and derivatives. 
09/1212004 
La Habana. Cuba-Venezuela: Joint Declaration. Science & Technology Knowledge Transfer. Trade (goods/services). Health 
Cuba, Agreement between the President of Venezuela and the President of the Council of Bi-national 
& Education (continental literacy; HE). Mixed Enterprises. Finance (credits; 
14/1212004 banks; tariffs; taxes; investment). Culture. Energy (oil). Sports. Tourism. State of the Republic of Cuba, for the application ALBA. Infrastructure. Telecommunication. TELESUR. Social Emergency Fund. 
Buenos Aires, Argentina-Venezuela: 9 Joint Statements, Agreements, Letters of Understanding, Bi-national TELESUR. Finance. Energy (oil and derivatives; infrastructure). Science, 
Argentina, Memoranda. Technology, Infrastructure and Socio-Economics of Health. 
31/01 -
0210212005 
Caracas, Joint Statement on Strategic Alliance Venezuela-Brazil. Energy (oil and derivatives; gas; ethanol; biodiesel). Petrochemicals. Science 
Venezuela, Declaration by the Governments of the Federal Republic of Brazil and Venezuela for Bi-national 
& Technology Cooperation (petro-industry, agriculture, fishing, health, 
1410212005 environment). Industry (mining). Finance (tariffs, taxes; Development Bank of the Execution of the Strategic Alliance. the South). Tourism. Military. Social (Intemational Humanitarian Fund; Social 
Charter of the Americas). TELESUR. 
- --_._----------
Integral Energy Cooperation Agreement between the Govemment of the Bolivarian Energy (oil; science & technology & knowledge exchange). Mixed 
RepublIC of Venezuela and the Govemment of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. Commission for Social Development meeting every six months. 
I Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement with Uruguay_ Venezuela supplies up to 43.800 barrels of oil per day_ 
LMonteVldeo. Agreement between Venezuela and Uruguay regarding TELESUR. Uruguay 10% shareholder of TELESUR. Uruguay. 
-_. ----_._- -- -------------
02/0312005 Montevideo Declaration. Bi-national Social Charter of the Americas. 
" ... the unhappiest may be the most privileged ... n 
Montevideo Declaration on PETROSUR. Advance PETROSUR as a "strategic alliance" and "effective integration 
instrument", "for new forms of integration in the economic, social and 
political" . 
Joint Declaration between the President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez Frias, and of Reference to Liberators Sim6n Bolivar/Bernardo O'Higgins. Democracy for 
Caracas, 
Chile, Ricardo Lagos Escobar. equity and social justice through citizen participation. Regional Integration & 
Multipolar World. Trade & Commerce. Solidarian Economy & South-South 
Venezuela, 
Bi-national 
Cooperation. Energy complementarity: creation of PETROSUR and 
21/0412005 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Energy and Oil of Venezuela PETROAMERICA. 
and the National Energy Commission of Chile. 
. .. 
Memorandum of Understanding between the National Commission for Scientific and Science, Technology and Innovation Knowledge cooperation. Areas: Public 
Technological Investigation (CONICYT) of Chile and the Ministry of Science and Health; Education; Environment; Information Technology; Aerospace; 
Technology of Venezuela. Biotechnology; Agroproduction; Metallurgical Industry; Oil, Gas, Alternative 
Energies. 
La Habana, Final Declaration from the First Cuba-Venezuela Meeting for the Implementation of the Health (Misi6n Barrio Adentro I, 1\; Misi6n Milagro). Education (Misi6n 
Cuba, Bolivarian Altemative for the Americas. Robinson I, 1\; Misi6n Ribas; Misi6n Che Guevara; Misi6n Sucre; HE 
28/0412005 Bi-national studentships). Energy. Finance (banks; taxes). Trade. Mixed Enterprises. 
Resources. Infrastructure. Agriculture & Fishing. Tourism. ICT. Sports. 
Environment. Science & Technology. Culture. 
Puerto La Cruz, PETROCARIBE Energy Cooperation Agreement: Antigua & Barbuda; Bahamas; Sub-regional Energy Security: oil, gas, electricity, alternative/renewable energy; 
Venezuela, Bellce; Cuba; Dominica; Dominican Republic; Grenada; Guyana; Jamaica; Sl derivatives; infrastructure; science & technology exchange. 
29/0612005 Vincent & The Grenadines, Sl Lucia, Sl Christopher (St Kitts) & Nevis, Suriname Socio-Economic Development (ALBA Caribe Fund). (all 15 CARICOM members except Barbados and Trinidad/Tobago). 
lima, Peru, 16111 Andean Presidential Council: Lima Presidential Minutes. Democracy, Development Sub-regional Venezuela proposes cooperation and sharing of experiences with the 
1810712005 and Social Cohesion. Missions, TELESUR, PETROANDINA, Bank of the South, University of the 
South. 
I Agreement on the Adherence of Uruguay to the PETROSUR Secretariat. Establishes Ministerial Council and Executive Secretariat. Complementarity 
by means of taking advantage of the comparative and competitive 
advantages. 
Montevideo, Joint Dedaration by the Govemments of Uruguay and Venezuela for Strengthening Bi- Energy, AgriculturaIFood, SociaVEndogenous Development (cooperatives, 
Uruguay, national Integration. NUDEs, RIPs, Pymes) , Housing, Trade, Industry, Mining, Tourism, 
10l08I2005 Bi-national ScienceIT echnology, Transport-Communication. 
! Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining of 
To construct a strategic alliance with resped to the exchange of information, 
L Uruguay and the Ministry of Basic Industry and Mining of Venezuela. 
knowledges, experience, technical assistance. 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Sodal Development of Uruguay Development of cooperation mechanisms to drive collective and coordinated 
and the Mlntstry of Popular Economy of Venezuela. action regarding the social economy. Exchange between Misi6n Vuelvan Caras and Uruguay's Plan de A/enci6n NscJonsl s 'S Emeraenci8 SOCIB/ 
---_. 
-(PANES). Training in Cooperativism. 
Letter of Intent between the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining of Uruguay and the Emerged from discussion of PETROSUR. PDVSA participation in joint 
Ministry of Energy and Oil of Venezuela. expansion of Uruguayan refinery for processing Venezuelan heavy crude. 
Agreement on Tourism Cooperation. Economic as well as socio-cultural purpose. Training & Education. 
Montego Bay, PETROCARIBE Energy Cooperation Agreements between the Government of the Bi-national Specification of the PETROCARIBE agreements. Creation of Mixed 
Jamaica, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the individual PETROCARIBE member states. Enterprises. Individual countries' quotas: between 700 (St Kitts & Nevis) and 
06/0912005 50.000 (Dominican Republic) barrel per day. 
Caracas, Caracas Declaration on the Occasion of the 1st Meeting of the Heads of State of the Sub-regional Presentation of the PETROAMERICA strategy by Venezuela. 
Venezuela, South American Community of Nations. 
26/0912005 
Sabaneta de Agreement between Via Cam pesina-Brazilian Landless Movement (Movimiento Sem Trans- MST as contributor to Venezuelan food sovereignty through the teaching of 
Barinas, Tierra, MST) and the Government of Venezuela, following a Protocol of Intent signed national agro-ecological practices and the establishment of the Latin American School 
Venezuela, 26- between Venezuela and MST during the World Social Forum 2005 in Porto Alegre. of Agro-Ecology "Pablo Freire" in the Centro Tecnico Productivo Socialista 
27/09120052 Florentino (Venezuela). The long-term strategy is to strengthen the ruraV peasant movements. 
Montevideo, Complementary Agreement to the Basic Technical Cooperation Agreement between the Establishes the "Fund of the South" (US$5 million), through which Venezuela 
Uruguay, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. supports plans/projects of worker-managed recuperated enterprises in the 
09/12120053 Bi-national areas of rubber, gloves, glass and leather tannery (FlIbrica Uruguaya de Agreement for Social Development. Neumaticos SA, FUNSA; Vicental; Envidrio). 
Letter of Intention about the Import of Cement by Venezuela and the Import of Coke by Popular economy & social development (financial, training). Uruguay. 
La Paz Declaration between Hugo Chavez Frias and Evo Morales Ayma. Energy. Agriculture. TechnicaVScientific Knowledge. Trade. Education 
Caracas Energy Cooperation Agreement. (literacy; HE). Sports. Health & Medicine. La Paz, Bolivia, 
2310112006 Agreement on Cooperation in the Energy Sector. Venezuela supplies up to 200.000 barrels of oil per month. Bi-national 
5 Cooperation Agreements between the Government of Venezuela and the Government PETROAMERICAIPETROSUR. Gas. Electricity. Petroindustry. 
of the Republic of Bolivia. Agriculture & Rural Development. Education (Literacy; HE). Social 
Development. Sports. Health & Medicine. 
r-- ..~.--.. --
Agreement on Cooperation in Science & Technology and Basic and Mining Industries Development and integration of information technologies. Development of 
between Venezuela and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. software and hardware industry. Special emphasis on basic and mining 
Agreement to develop VENESA T -1 and URUSA T -3 by joint use of orbital position 78°. enterprises. 
'----
. 
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Caracas, Cooperation Agreement in the area of Housing. Bi-national Operation of a Venezuelan Communication Satellite in the Recurso Satelital 
Venezuela, Cooperation Agreement in the area of Health and Medicine. Orbital Espectro (ROE). 14/0312()()Et Construction. 
Training & scientific development. Exchange of successful experiences in 
health programmes. 
Caracas, Energy Agreement between PDV-Caribe and Inter-municipal Energy Association for Trans- Creation of Mixed Enterprise based in EI Salvador [ALBA Petr61eos Sociedad 
Venezuela, EI Salvador (Enepasa). national de Economia Mixta, S.E.M.] 
20/0312006 
Ciudad de 28 Memoranda and Letters of Understanding between the Venezuelan national as well Trans- 41 Projects in: Environment. Agriculture. Science & Technology. Industry. 
Parana, Brazil, as federal state and municipal governments, TELESUR and the Brazilian state of national Training. Transport. Mining. Telecommunications. 
20/0412006 Parana. 
Caracas, Hydrocarbon Agreement between the Association of Nicaraguan Town Councils Trans- Foundation of ALBA Petroleos de Nicaragua ltd (ALBANIC). Employs 
Venezuela, (AMUNIC) and PETROCARIBE. national PETROCARIBE financing scheme. 
25/0412006 
Bolivia-Cuba-Venezuela: Joint Declaration. Health (ophthalmology; technology; specialists; infrastructure). 
La Habana, Contribution and SubSCription of the Republic of Bolivia to the Joint Declaration signed 
ICTfTelecommunication. TELESUR. Culture. Financial (banks; credits; tax 
exemptions). Education (Literacy; HE). Science & Technology Exchange. 
Cuba, in La Habana, 14 December 2004, between the Presidents of the Council of State of the Economic-Industrial (trade in goods and services; natural resources, mining, 
29/0412006 Republic of Cuba and of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Regional agriculture & fishing). Environment (energy saving). Energy (oil and 
Agreement for the Application of the Bolivarian Altemative for the Peoples of Our derivatives, gas, asphalt; infrastructure). Technical-Judicial Knowledge for 
America and the People's Trade Agreement. Institution-building (ministries). Development Fund/Unconditional aid. 
Transport. 'Human Resources'. Sports. 
Payment in products or national and other currencies. 
Puerto Iguazu, Declaration of Puerto Iguazu between Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela. MUlti-national Energy (Gasoducto del Sur), "rational and equitable" prices for gas, joint 
Argentina, investment for Bolivia's integral development. 
0410512006 
\ Puerto Principe. PETROCARIBE Energy Agreement Venezuela-Haiti. Bi-national Venezuela supplies up to 7,000 barrels per day under PETROCARIBE 
Haiti, 1510512006 conditions. 
i Statement by the presidents of Venezuela and Panama. Bi-national Commitment to cooperation in various sectors. ~deP.n.ma. Framewortt Agreement between Panama and Venezuela. 15 areas of cooperation. Setting up a Mixed Commission. 
Panama. ExecutIVe Agreement about Cooperation In the Energy Sector. . .. 
--- ------ - ---_.-
.-
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2210612006 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Panama Establishing a refinery in Panama. Venezuela supplies up to 150.000 bpd of 
and the Ministry of Energy and Oil of Venezuela regarding refinery. oil. 
Memorandum of Understanding between Venezuela and Panama for Setting Up a The instance and forum of agreement on cooperation regarding politics, 
Mechanism of Political Consultation and Agreement. economics, commerce, finance, education, science, technology, energy, 
Memorandum about Transport and Management of Natural Gas culture, tourism, natural disasters prevention, security. 
Fuerte Militar "EI Declaration between the presidents of Venezuela, Colombia y Panama on the Venezuelan-Colombian gas pipeline "Antonio Ricaurte" as the first section of 
Tigre", occasion of the start of the construction of the Trans-Caribbean Gas Pipeline. the Trans-Caribbean Gas Pipeline, with the final objective of connecting to 
Venezuela, Multi-national Panama. Memorandum of Understanding for setting up a Negotiating Committee regarding the 
08/0712006 Gas Interconnection between Venezuela, Colombia and Panama. 
Bridgetown, Basic Friendship and Cooperation Agreement between Barbados and Venezuela. Bi-national Mixed Commission to evaluate cooperation projects in 13 sectors. 
Barbados, 24- Agreement on Cooperation in Tourism between Barbados and Venezuela. Promotion of tourism involving state, private and social institutions. 25/1012006 
Mechanism of Consultation about Issues of Common Interest. Cooperation in regional and international forums. Democratisation of UN 
System. Integration of Venezuela, Barbados and CARICOM. Collaboration in 
Education, Sports, Tourism, Culture (e.g. English as Foreign Language). 
Cochabamba, Cochabamba Declaration at the 2nd Summit of Heads of State of the South American Sub-regional (Re)definition of CSN. 
Bolivia, Community of Nations (CSN). 
09/1212006 
Caracas, Joint Declaration between the President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez and the President- Bi-national Expresses strong commitment to creating UNASUR as a "new model of 
Venezuela, elect of Ecuador, Rafael Correa Delgado. integration" by reference to the ALBA principles and strategy. Welcomes 
21/1212006 Ecuador's decision to transform its political system towards a participatory democracy. Cooperation through PETROANDINA framework. Envisaged 
projects: Bank of the South; Radio of the South; TELESUR; News Agency. 
Adherence of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Joint Declaration signed in La Habana, Energy (up to 10.000 barrels of oil and derivatives per day; electricity; 
14 December 2004, between the Presidents of the Council of State of the Republic of promotion/consolidation of PETROAMERICA and PETROCARIBE). 
Managua, Cuba and of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and to the Declaration of Contribution Agriculture & Farming. Technical Cooperation & Knowledge Exchange. 
Nicaragua, and Subscription of the Republic of Bolivia from 29 April 2006 (includes 12 Regional Financial (Venezuelan Economic and Social Development Bank with 1110112007 Intergovemmental and Inter-institutional Cooperation Agreements, Memoranda, Letters Cooperation Fund). Economic-Industrial (aluminium factories). 
of Intent) Petrochemicals (Fertilizer). Food. Environment. Health & Medicine 
Joint PohtlCal Oedaration between the President of the Bolivarian Republic of 
(knowledge, human resources, technology, services). 
Venezuela, Hugo Chivez Frias, and the President of the Republic of Nicaragua, Venezuela debt cancellation (US$31.B million). 
Daniel Ortega Saavedra . 
. ~ 
JOint Oec1arahon between the President of the Republic of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, and ALBA principles and institutions, creation of Radio of the South. Venezuelan 
the President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias. Economic & Social Development Bank in Ecuador. Economic and Financial 
Agreement for the Creation of a High Level Mixed Commission. 
Cooperation Fund. 
Identify common interests and priorities of cooperatIon 
• 
~. 
Agreement on Cooperation in the Energy Sector between Ecuador and Venezuela. Energy (oil, gas, electricity, petro-chemical, ece-fuel. Mixed Enterprises for 
Quito, Ecuador Memorandum of Understanding between PDVSA and PETROECUADOR for exploration, storage, refinery etc.). Science, Technology, Experience & Bi-national Knowledge Transfer. 
16/0112007 Cooperation in the Area of Refinery. 
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Energy Sector between the PETROAMERICA, PETROANDINA, PETROSUR Framework. 
Ministry of Energy and Mining of Ecuador and the Ministry of Popular Power of Energy 
and Oil of Venezuela. 
Cooperation in the social and popular economy to increase the life quality of 
Memorandum of Understanding in Cooperation between the Ministries of Social Welfare the inhabitants of both countries. Fair Trade. Articulation of Misi6n Vuelvan 
and of Economy and Finances of Ecuador and the Ministry of Popular Power for the Caras and other Venezuelan Education & Training schemes with the 
Popular Economy of Venezuela. Ecuadorian programmes. Exchange of personnel (technical, facilitators, etc.) 
letter of Intent in Tourism between the Ministry of Tourism of Ecuador and the Ministry Tourism cooperation. 
of Popular Power of Tourism of Venezuela. 
Caracas, 16 Instruments signed between the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela. Bi-national Industry (ship-building; steel; ferro-nickel). Financial (credits). Transport 
Venezuela, (railway). Energy (electric power plant; oil exploration). Tourism. Agriculture. 
24/0112007 Telecommunication. 
Economic and Social Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Recognises the common pursuance of an "alternative world development 
Commonwealth of Dominica and the Government of Venezuela. model" through ALBA. Knowledges, Experiences & Technology Exchange. 
Education Cooperation Agreement between the Govemment of the Commonwealth of Social Economy. 
Ciudad de Dominica and the Government of Venezuela. Information & Communication between the Education Ministries. 
Roseau, Student Exchange Agreement between the Govemment of Dominica and the Bi-national 
CourseslWorkshops. Mutual Foreign Language (French/Spanish) Teacher 
Dominica, Government of Venezuela. Exchange. 
16/0212007 Studentship Programme for up to 50 Dominican undergraduate students (full Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Community Development, cost coverage) in Venezuela and Venezuelan Students of English in I Gender Affairs and Information of the Commonwealth of Dominica. And the Ministry of Dominica. 
Popular Power for Communication and Information of Venezuela. 
Exchange of experiences in/training of personnel (e.g. journalists, languages) 
in information & communication for alternative, community media. 
Saint Vincent Joint Declaration between between Hugo Chavez Frias President of Venezuela, Expresses the "true political wi"· to reach a "higher level of integration" under 
and the Roosevelt Skerrit Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Dominica. Ralph Gonsalves the ALBA principles and to promote a "more profound unity" between 
Grenadines. Prime Minister of Saint Vincent & The Grenadines and Winston Baldwin Spencer Sub-regional CARICOM and Venezuela. 
17102f2007 Prime Minister of Antigua & Barbuda. 
f---
Economic and Social Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Bilateral projects for local development. Joint education & training 
Bohvanan Republic of Venezuela and the Government of Saint Vincent & The programmes. TechnOlogy Transfer. Financing. Exchange of Experiences 
Gnmadlnes. among Sub-national Entities. 
Campden Park. Student Exchange Agreement between the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Studentships (n undergraduates in 2007/08. afterwards 30 p.a .. full cost 
Saint Vincent & Venezuela and the Government of Saint Vincent & The Grenadines. Bi-national 
coverage) in Venezuela; Venezuelan students of English In St 
, 
the GrenadInes. Vincent/Grenadines. Memorandum of UnderstandIng between the MinIstry of Popular Power for 
17102f2007 ConvnunlCabOn and Infonnabon of Venezuela and the MInistry of Telecommunications. Exchange of experiences inJtraining of personnel (e.g. journalists. languages) 
in Information & Communication for alternative community ~edla 
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Science, Technology and Industry of Saint Vincent & The Grenadines. 
Memorandum of Understanding for Tourism Cooperation between the Ministry of 
Popular Power for Tourism of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and the Ministry of 
Tourism, Youth and Sports of Saint Vincent & The Grenadines. 
Instruments signed within the framework of the Working Visit of the President of the 
Republic of Argentina, Nestor Kirchner (17 Agreements, Contracts, Letters of Intent, 
Memoranda). 
Final Minutes of the 1st Meeting of the High-Level Mixed Commission between the 
Republic of Nicaragua and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. (9 Working Groups 
established) 
Memorandum of Understanding between Venezuela's Foreign Trade Bank (BANCOEX) 
and the Nicaraguan Investment Finance Company (FNI). 
Letter of Intent between the Venezuelan Ministry for Agriculture and Land and 
Nicaraguan Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock Breeding and Forestry for strengthening 
the Venezuelan meat circuit. 
Letter of Intent for Cooperation in Drinking Water. 
Letter of Intent regarding geothermic energy. 
Energy Treaty for the Creation of an Organisation of Gas Producing and Exporting 
Countries of South America (OPPEGASUR) Signatories: Argentina, Bolivia, 
Venezuela. 
Memorandum of Understanding between Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina for the 
Constitution of the Bank of the South. 
Memorandum of Understanding between Venezuela and Nicaragua to develop a project 
for the construction of a refinery in Nicaragua. 
Agreement between Venezuela and Nicaragua regarding the New Television of the 
South, CA [TElESUR). 
Memorandum of Understanding Venezuela-Jamaica for the Expansion and 
Development of the Gas Industry. 







Exchangeltraining of personnel (e.g. joumalists, languages) in community 
media. 
Mixed working group. Exploration of cooperation potential. Reciprocal 
promotion of cultural knowledge. 
Science & Technology Transfer. Health & Medicine. Communication & 
Information. Political (Foreign Relations Education). Infrastructure & Services. 
Mixed Enterprises. Oil (supply). Finance (credit; Bank of the South). 
Finance. Energy. InfrastructurefTourismfTransportlHousing. Health. 
IndustryfTelecommunication. Education. Culture. Sports. 
Agriculture/Food/Popular EconomylWater. 
Promotion of trade under the prinCiples of complementarity, cooperation, 
solidarity. Exchange of information on trade, regular meetings etc. 
Strengthening the Venezuelan meat circuit (meat and livestock imports) 
Water infrastructure (Managuan aqueduct, rural water supply). 
Regional gas integration within the PETROSUR rationale and framework. 
Agrees on the invitation of all South American countries to create the Bank of 
the South. Invest regional savings in the region rather than invest them in the 
more developed countries. 
Within the PETROCARIBE Energy Cooperation Agreement. Between 
PDVSA and PETRONIC. Daily capacity: 150.000 barrels. 
Nicaragua subscribes to up to 5% of the current social capital of TElESUR. 
20 hours of Nicaraguan production (state, independent, university, 
community). 
Refers to PETROCARIBE Energy Agreement. Gas and electricity for 
aluminium industry. 
Venezuela, Unrflcabon between Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago 


















Trinidad & Tobago. 
Declaration of Margarita: Constructing Southem Energy Integration (1 st South American 
Energy Summit of CSNlUNASUR countries). 
Presidential Declaration on the Malvinas Islands. 
Energy Amendment Protocol with Bolivia. 
4 Energy Cooperation Agreements with Ecuador. 
Energy Cooperation Agreement with Paraguay. 
Agreement on the Execution and Studies of Quantification and Certification of the 
Reserves of the 'Block 5' Oilfields of the Area Ayacucho in the Orinoco Oil Strip, 
between ENAP (Empresa Nacional de Petroleo) Chile and PDVSA Venezuela. 
Political Declaration of the 5th Summit of the Bolivarian Altemative for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA). 
'Grand-national' Project (GNP). 
Framework Agreement for Cooperation ALBA-Haiti Bolivar, Peti6n, Marti, between 
Venezuela, Cuba and Haiti within the Framework of the Agreement for Application of 
the Bolivarian Altemative for the Peoples of Our America. 
ALBA Energy [Security} Treaty Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela. 
Tintorero Declaration ALBA Social Movements Council. 
ALBA Energy Agreement Haiti. 
ALBA Energy Agreement Nicaragua. 
ALBA Energy Agreement Bolivia. 
Minutes of the 11'" Meeting of the Political Consultation Mechanism between the 









Renaming of CSN into UNASUR. Establishment of Permanent Secretary in 
Quito, Ecuador. 
Reaffirming Argentina's legitimate rights. 
Joint exploration. Project Feasibility Studies. 
Mixed Enterprise for industrial and commercial activity. 
Not available. Based on Memorandum of Understanding about Energy 
Cooperation between the Ministry of Energy and Oil of Venezuela and the 
National Energy Commission of Chile, signed 20/04/2005. 
Declares the objective of constructing the Great Homeland. Bi-national Mixed 
Enterprises & Grand-National Companies (GNCs). 
GNPs in Education, Culture, Fair Trade, Financial, Food, Health, 
Telecommunication, Transport, Tourism, Mining, Industry, Energy. 
Cooperation in Health/Medicine, Education, Culture, Energy, Food Secrity & 
Sovereignty, Industry, Commerce, Rural Development, Public/Private 
Investment, Agriculture & Farming, Infrastructure, Tourism, Human 
Resources, Environment. 
Participation of all ALBA members in a GNC PETROALBA that operates in 
the Orinoco oil strip and guarantees oil supply to the members for 25 years. 
GNC for gas, electricity, alternative energies, energy saving. 
Support to the ALBA ethics, values and principles. Organisational and 
political Proposals. 
14.000 barrels/day. PETROCARIBE finance mechanism. 
27.000 barrels/day. PETROCARIBE finance mechanism. 
250.000 barrels/month. PETROCARIBE finance mechanism. 
Foreign Relations (Africa, Europe). MultilateraJism. Cooperation Cuba-
Venezuela-Sub-Saharan Africa. Welcomes progress made with ALBA and 
UNASUR. Cooperation in the education of diplomatic staff. "Communication 
Action Plan". 
--------------------t-----+----------------------- -
2'"' Letter of Intent between TELESUR (La Nueva Televisl6n del Sur, CAl and the 
Counol of Communication and Citizenship of the Presidency of the Republic of 
Nicaragua 
Bi-national Reactivation of the state TV channel, closed down In 1993. 
Caracas, Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Bolivia, the Republic of Cuba, Regional Economic, social, productive development projects. 
Venezuela, the Republic of Nicaragua and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for the creation of 
06/0612007 the ALBA BANK. 
Buenos Aires, Refers to PETROAMERICA, PETROSUR, OPPEGASUR, UNASUR. 
Argentina, Energy Security Treaty Venezuela-Argentina. Creation of GNC PETROSURAMERICA (oil, gas, refining, petro-chemicals, 06/0812007 Bi-national infrastructure, storage, distribution, electricity, alternative energies), through 
which Argentina participates in exploitation in "South American Bloc" of 
Venezuela's Orinoco oil strip [this is the principle of energy security]. 
Montevideo, Bi-national Refers to PETROAMERICA, PETROSUR, UNASUR. Oil, gas, refining, petro-
Uruguay, Energy Security Treaty Venezuela-Uruguay. 
chemicals, infrastructure, storage, distribution, electricity, alternative energies. 
08/0812007 Uruguay participates in the exploitation of the "South American Bloc" of 
Venezuela's Orinoco oil strip to guarantee stable and secure energy supply. 
Kumarakapay, Declaration of Kumarakapay (1 st International Congress of Anti-imperialist Indigenous Trans- "Constructing the Indo-American Socialism" from indigenous organizations 
Venezuela, Peoples of America - Abya Yala). national and community councils via the ALBA and its governments. Delegations from 
09/0812007 the entire continent reclaiming their "ancestral continent from Alaska to 
Patagonia". Constitution of the "Grand Nation Continental Council of Anti-
Imperialist Indigenous Peoples". ALBA. Rejects all forms of US "imperialism" 
and "state terrorism". 
Political Declaration of the Heads of State and/or Government (3rt! Presidential Summit Energy integration as an instrument for political strategic alliance. 
of PETROCARIBE). Achievements of first 2 years. 
Adherence Declaration of the Republic of Haiti to the PETROCARIBE Energy 
Caracas, Cooperation Agreement. Sub-regional 
Venezuela, Adherence Declaration of the Government of Nicaragua to the PETROCARIBE Energy 11/0812007 Cooperation Agreement. 
PETROCARIBE Energy Security Treaty (Belice, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Haiti, PETROCARIBE Energy Cooperation Agreement principles (oil, gas, 
Jamaica, Saint Vincent & The Grenadines, Nicaragua, Suriname, Venezuela). electricity). Technological cooperation (alternative energies, energy efficiency 
strategies). Bi-national mixed enterprises for individual countries' needs. 
Period of validity: 5 years. 
Resolutions 0302-04 adopted at the 3n1 Meeting of the Ministerial Council of Cienfuegos refinery as processing and storage centre for distribution among 
PETROCARIBE. PETROCARIBE member states. Studies/Working Groups: renewable energy; 
Cienfuegos. Sub-regional energy saving; petrochemicals; gas supply; energy & social development 
Cuba. 20- (fund); Communicational Plan to disseminate achievements. 
21/1212007 Integration of Honduras as full member of PETROCARIBE. 
ResoIubons 03 02-05 adopted at the 481 Summit of Heads of State and Govemment of 
PETROCARIBE 
-~ . -_ ... 
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Basic Industry of Cuba for the Extension of the Cienfuegos Refinery. 
Agreement between the Ministry of Energy and Oil of Venezuela and the Ministry for 
Basic Industry of Cuba for the Development of Petrochemical Industries. 
PETROCARIBE Energy Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Honduras 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
Political Declaration of the 6th Summit of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our 
America (ALBA). 
Agreement between Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Dominica and Venezuela on 
establishing a Great-National Enterprise for Energy, Oil and Gas within ALBA. 
Adherence of the Commonwealth of Dominica to the Bolivarian Alternative of the 
Peoples of our America (ALBA). 
Food Security and Sovereignty Treaty between Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela within the ALBA. 
Foundational Act of the ALBA BANK (Bolivia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela). 
ALBA Cultural: A Contribution to the Unity of Our America. 
Declaration in Support of the Process of Democratic Transformations in Bolivia. 
Political Declaration of the ALBA-TCP Social Movement Council. 
Memorandum of Understanding between Venezuela and Paraguay regarding Food 
Security and Sovereignty. 
Agreement about the Implementation of Cooperation Programmes for Food Sovereignty 
and Security between Ecuador and Venezuela. 
AlBA Cochabamba OedaratJon (Bolivia. CUba. Dominica. Nicaragua. Venezuela) 








Construction of a paint factory and a disposable syringe and nappy factory. 
Feasibility schemes regarding operation, market and ownership of the 
factories. 
Up to 20.000 barrels of oiVderivatives per day; can be subject to change 
according to need. 
Foreign Policy Statements. Universal access to basic services a 
"fundamental right". 
The enterprise executes projects in the entire chain of energy value creation 
(fossil and alternative/renewable). Creation of an ALBA Energy Training 
Centre. 
Points to the "opprobrious neoliberal period" LAC had been subjected to; 
rejects economic regionalisms. 
To establish the institutional framework for food security and sovereignty. 
ALBNendogenous development principles. Egalitarian representation of each 
member country. 
A politico-cultural project; integration is "essentially a cultural process". 
Strategy: a regional network of ALBA Houses. 
Calls for the solidarity of the democratic forces in the world with the 
democratically elected government of Bolivia. 
Commitment to constructing a transnational base structure. 
Institutional framework for food security and sovereignty. Establishment of a 
bi-national Permanent Enquiry Commission. Exchange of technical data. 
Bilateral trade; elaboration of policy proposals for food production and 
exchange, technology transfer; etc. 
Establish the institutional framework for programmes of scientific, financial, 
technological, commercial and logistical cooperation in the food and 
agriculture sector under ALBA principles. Food exchange. Standing 
Consulting Committee. 
---~-----
LAC union and identity. Public quality education for all as the driving force of 
the social transformations, an inalienable individual and social right, and for 
economic development. 'Education' in the philosophical tradition of 'popular 
education' for the defence of ·our original and diverse culture", Educational 
integration via literacy programmes, ·contextualised research", and formation 
of professionals required in the region. Literacy campaigns currently in 21 
countries wor1dwide. The Great-National Education Proj8d to counter In a 
"solid blod< the hegemonic aspirations" of "educational and cultural 
domination". 
-- -----.. ---- -----
Concrete agreements: Priority of literacy and post-literacy. Initiate the 
ueffective, solidarian and complementary integrationH of the national education 
systems. In HE: Policies for the formation of professionals at pre-and 
postgraduate levels. Education software and distance education. Recognition 
of titles and diplomas. Research to improve quality of education. Academic 
mobility of professionals and students. Creation of a High Level Commission 
with umaximum education authority" to formulate programme contents, 
schedules, and financial needs. 
Common Foreign Policy Statement: support to the unity of Bolivia. 
Caracas, Agreement about the Implementation of Cooperation Programmes for Food Sovereignty Regional Establishes an ALBA Food Commercialisation Network and Executive 
Venezuela, and Security (Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela). Commission. ALBA Food Security Fund (US$100 million). 
23/0412008 
0210512008 Declaration by the ALBA Social Movement Council in Support of Bolivia (signed by 30 Trans- Unconditional support to the social movements, the government and the 
social movements from Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela). national people of Bolivia in the face of the serious situation created by the illegal and 
unconstitutional separatist referendum scheduled by the oligarchy of Santa 
Cruz for 4th May. 
Managua, Presidential Summit uFood Sovereignty and Security: Food for UfeH Final Declaration Reference points: FAO-World Food Crisis. MDGs. Food crisis originates to a 
Nicaragua, (Belice, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, large part in the international economic order; asymmetrical impact of climate 
07/0512008 Mexico, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent & The Grenadines, Venezuela) Multi-national change. Rejection of agricultural subsidies in UE, USA, Japan. States have 
the obligation to guarantee the right to food. Subsidies to small producers. 
Sustainable food production in accordance with traditions, environment, 
popular access to ecological-organic production. Action Plan that employs the 
ALBA principles. Access to land. Venezuelan proposals. 
Caracas, Joint Statement on the occasion of to the visit to Venezuela of Fernando Lugo, Bi-Iateral StrategiC alliance for LAC independence, union, equality. Cooperation in: 
Venezuela, 18- President-elect of Paraguay. Energy Security. Food Security. Social (Literacy, Mision Milagro, Social 
19/0612008 Productive Development). Environment (Aquifers, Reforestation). 
--- -~ 
Dedaration of the 5th Extraordinary PETROCARIBE Summit. Consonance with ALBA principles .. Special Fund financed by Venezuela 
(US$ 0.5 from each barrel exported outside the cooperation agreements at a 
price above US$ 100). Declaration against energy speculation. 
Adherence Dedaration of Guatemala to the PETROCARIBE Energy Cooperation Sub-regional 
10 Projects regarding Efficient Energy Use. 44 Pilot Projects regarding 
Agreement. Renewable Energies. PETROCARIBE Communication Strategy. 
Maracaibo, FinancelMacroeconomy. Modification of the Financing Mechanism: adjustment to current wor1d market 
Venezuela, 12- prices. At a price of/over US$ 100 and US$150 per barrel, 60% and 70% 
1310712008 Resolution No 04.03-05. respectively of the bill are paid under the long-term conditions. Creation ot 
PETROFOODS. Creation of a PETROCARIBE Ministerial Council and a 
Council ot Agriculture Ministers of PETROCARIBE. Create a Fair Trade 
Planning Commission. Energy-Saving light bulb projed proposed by 
Honduras. Create a GNC Energy. 
, F oed Secunty Agreement between the Republic of Honduras and the Government of Bi-national Establishment of the institutional framework tor technical and scientific 














Ministerial Declaration of Tegucigalpa for Agriculture and Rural Development of the 
PETROCARIBE Member Countries. 
Paraguay 12 agreements 
Honduras ALBA Adherence Declaration. 
Joint Declaration (BOL, CUB, DOM, HON, NIC, VEN). 
_.--
Press Release by the ALBA Member Countries 
3rt! Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government of ALBA-PTA + 
Ecuador 
Special Declaration by the Heads of State and Govemment of ALBA-PTA in Solidarity 






illiteracy, unemployment, social exclusion. Food exchange policies and 
investment, commercialization; technology transfer; training programmes; 
shared scientific and academic activities; exchange of information; joint 
research and technology development. 
States consonance with ALBA principles. Food Security and Sovereignty. 
Declaration against Food Speculation and Protectionist Measures. Integral 
agriculture development plans with the participation and empowerment of the 
peasant movement in the processes of agricultural reform in each country. 
"Supreme Social Happiness". PETROFOODS Initiative and Oil Fund. 
In Honduras, the neoliberal model has aggravated poverty and systematic 
social exclusion. Embraces the ALBA principles established in the 2004 
ALBA Cuba-Venezuela Declaration. 
Immediate cooperation with respect to: the national development banks; 
issue of Honduran government bonds for housing and low incomelinformal 
economy credits; prospecting for oil in Honduran Caribbean by ALBA Grand-
national Company for Energy, Gas and Oil; Honduran projects presented to 
the ALBA Oil Fund for Food Production; Special Seed Fund; Centre for 
Genetics Development; TELESUR; Health (doctors, generic drugs, 
studentships); Literacy/Yo Sf Puedo; Energy-saving Programme (4 million 
ene~\li~t-blJlbs); 
Rejection of external intervention in Nicaraguan affairs regarding the 
municipal elections of 9 November 2008. 
Concrete proposals towards the constitution of an economic and monetary 
ALBA-PTA zone, which includes the creation of a Unitary Regional 
Compensation System (SUCRE) Common Account Unit, Chamber of 
Payment Compensation, and a Monetary Zone with Reserve Stabilisation 
Fund. Advance institutional consolidation and appointment of permanent 
representatives in the Coordination in Caracas. 
Solidarity with the Ecuadorian government's decision to audit all public debt 
(internal + external), and a warning to the multilateral financial institutions of 
concerted action in the case of sanctions against Ecuador for unilaterally 
declaring any debt as illegal. 
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Appendix 13: PETROAMERICA 
a) PETROAMERICA 
Estrategia Internacional de la Nueva PDVSA 
Caso: Integracion Latinoamericana 
Integraci6n Energetica a traves de: 
• DIstribucl6n de productos 
• Remodelaclon de refinerlas exlstentea 
• Construe cion de nuevas reflnerlas 










b) Orinoco Oil Strip 
Bi.ICI\II ia 
ct- ...... _,. 
Cu~ 
~lell1Ir 
Source: PDVSA (2008a: 32) 
The presented map is inaccurate (outdated) in so far a it d 
PETROALBA, created in 2007 (referred to in Chapt r iy) 
members have acquired shares in the oil strip. Hm ever, it h \v ' the bl c. II ateo to 
Argentina and Uruguay through the bi-national Energ) coot)' r Des (06 0) -( ~; 
08/08/2007), which involved the creation of the C P ~ \ Il ~RI \ . 
Furthermore, the map indicates the global dimen ion of n zu la' ' trL tegt (U .1no 
energy politics, characterized by technical cooperation ( .g. Ru ia, hina). J \rguL bh, 
through 'energy security', the participating nations will hav an int re t t JdenJ Ul en e 
of US /E U military aggression agains t Venezuela. 
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pp en dices 
d) P ETROCARlBE: Re-adjusted Payment Scheme 
LONG-TERM PAYMENT IN % OF PRICE PRICE PER BARREL 
PETROCARIBE, 2005 Ad'ustment, 2008 YEARS INTEREST 
~ USD 15 5 5 
~ USD 20 10 10 
2% pa 15+2 ~ USD 22 15 15 grace ~ USD 24 20 20 
~ USD 30 25 25 
~ USD 40 30 30 
grace 
~ USD 50 40 40 23+2 ~ USD 80 50 1% p a ~ USD 100 50 60 
~USD1~ ro 
Source: PETROCARIBE Agreement (A 12, 29/06/2005); Resolution No. 04.03-05 (A 12, 13/0712008) 
The long-term payment is graded in relation to the world market price: for xampl ,1f 
rrel costs up to US$ 15, 5% of the bill are paid over 17 year (including tw "ears 
e period), and at an interest rate of 2% per annum. At a barrel pric f C ~ 
a ba 
grac 
upw ards, the payment period increases to 25 years (including two y ar ac p n d), 
at 1 ° Yo interest rate per annum. The 2005 PETROCARIBE cheme, \ hich t k 
100 as the final benchmark, has been re-adjusted due to rising oil pric ( \ 1_, 
13/ 07/2008). Since then, at a barrel price of $ 100.00-149.99,6 ° ° f th bill at 
long -term payments, and at a barrel price of $ 150 and m r 0° ° ar I n -t rm 
pay ments, i.e. only 30% have to be paid within 90 day . 
By r ecognising the particular circumstances of the individual p rand ind bred 
co 
the 
untries, payment to Venezuela is negotiated bilaterall which £ r in tanc ,pr ndc:-. 
possibility of payment in goods and services at prefer ntial rat with pn nt) glven 
oods and services that are detrimentally affected by the dominant trad p liCles. 
erences between PETROCARIBE and ALB condition includ that . \LBJ \ 
to g 
Dif£ 
app lies a standard 23+2 years independent of the world market pric ,and . \LB \ ' tart!' 
a 50:50 ratio of immediate and long-term paym nt . with 
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Appendix 14: ALBA Agreements 
a) Agreement between the President of the Bolivaria R bli 
and the President of the Council of State of the R n beli~u fCeOf Venezuela 
Ii' f th B Ii . epu C ° uba for the 
a(pp. ca~on)~ e 0 vanan Alternative for the Americas (December '1 t "'00 t\ 
maID poUlts .,., - -t, 
Cuba's part in ALBA integration agreement 
1. Elimination of all tariff and non-tariff barriers on all imports from '" la 
2 All V la 
. . enezue . 
. . enezu.e ~ state or )omt ventures (mixed enterprises), and Venezuelan 
pnvate capltal Ul Cuba, are to be exempt from taxes on profits d . th 
. d fth unng e peno 0 e recovery of the investment. 
3. Cuba will gr~nt to vessels flying ~e Venezuelan flag the same treatment giyen 
to vessels flymg the Cuban flag, 10 all operations in Cuban ports. 
4. C~ba grants Venezuelan airlines the same facilities enjoyed by Cuban airlines 
Wlth. respect to ~~~sen~er tr~nspo~~on, freight to and from Cuba, and airport 
setvlces and facilities, 10cluding Wlthin Cuban territory. 
5. The price of oil exported from Venezuela to Cuba is to be fixed on the basis of 
international market prices, as stipulated in the current Caracas Agreement in 
force between the two countries. Given the volatile nature of oil prices, Cuba 
guarantees a fixed rate of not less than US$ 27 per barrel, always in confonnitv 
with the commitments assumed by Venezuela within the OPEc. . 
6. In relation to investments by Venezuelan State entities in Cuba, Cuba 
eliminates any restriction on the possibility of these being 100% the property 
of the Venezuelan State investor. 
7. Cuba offers 2000 scholarships per year to young Venezuelans for advanced 
studies in any area of interest to Venezuela, including scientific research. 
8. Venezuela can pay for the import of Cuban goods and selyices in \' enezuelan 
national currency or in other mutually acceptable currencies. 
9. Cuba offers its sporting facilities and anti-doping equipment under the same 
conditions as those granted to Cuban athletes. 
10. Extension of exchange and cooperation of all teaching methods and 
educational programmes and techniques of interest to Venezuela. 
11. Cuba places at the disposal of the UBV more than 15.000 medical 
professionals participating in Mision Barrio Aden/TV to train as many doctors and 
health specialists (including candidates for science degrees) as Ven~zuela needs. 
These doctors also support al those students in Mision Sucre who Wlsh to study 
medicine and graduate as doctors - who could number tens of thousands 
within 10 years. ., r • 
12. The Barrio Adentro primary health services to more than 15 million \ cnezuclans 
will be provided on highly preferential terms to be mutually agreed. . 
13. Cuba facilitates multi-destination tourism packages from Venezuela, \V1thout 
fiscal charges or restrictions of any other type. 
Venezuela's part in the agreement 
1. Technology transfer in the energy sector. . 
2 Eliminate all tariffs and non-tariff barriers on lIDportS fr~m Cub~. . 
. ( . d ) ill \ enezucla trl ml 
3. Exempt any Cuban state or joint venture m.Lx~ enterpnse . 
taxes during the period of the recovery of the ulVe~~~nt. . . "ector ;lnd 
4. Offering the scholarships that Cuba needs for studicSdill the l ncr~ . 
other areas of interest to Cuba, including research an sCience. 
5 Translated summary provided in Sanchez (200Sa: 2--29). 
Appendices 345 
5. Provide funding for construction or infrastructural projects in the sectors of 
energy, electricity, road construction, the development of ports, aqueducts, 
drainage systems, agro-industry, and services, amongst others. 
6. Tax incentives for projects of strategic interest to the Cuban economy. 
7. Preferential facilities to vessels and aircraft flying the Cuban flag in V~nezuelan 
territory, within the limits of its legislation. 
8. Facilitate multi-destination tourism packages from Cuba without fiscal charges 
or restrictions of any other type. 
9. Place its air and maritime transportation infrastructure and equipment at 
Cuba's service on preferential tenns in order to support Cuba's economic and 
social development. 
10. Offer facilities to establish joint ventures (mixed enterprises) \\-ith Cuban 
capital to process raw materials. 
11. Collaborate with Cuba on research in biodiversity. 
12. Cuban participation in the consolidation ofbi-national endogenous nuclei. 
13. Develop agreements with Cuba in the sphere of telecommunications, including 
the use of satellites. 
Appendices 
b) Final Declaration from the 1st Cuba-Venezuela M . £ " 
the ALBA (April 28, 2005)6 eetmg or the ApplicatIon of 
The delegations of Cuba and Venezuela meeting in Havan C b .1 ril -
d . . d b th hi . . a, u a on ... p '7 and "8 "(0) an UISplre y e stoncal J OUIt Statement and the Agreem t C B 1:"~' -, - .' £ th Am' (AL A) . en lor a 011\ anan Altemaoye 
or e encas B.' s~ed by Hugo Chavez Frias, president of the Boliyarian R ublic 
of Venezuela, and Presldent Fldel Castro Ruz president ofth C cil fS ~" 
f b 
, oun 0 tate and ~lini"ter" 
o Cu a, have drawn up and approved a Strateo-ic Plan ~or th li' f .\ T --
.. c- e app catton 0 .-u..B.\, in 
accordance Wlth the Article 3 of the above-mentioned agreement. 
The article establishes: "The two countries will produce a strateo-ic pI t th 
.. . c- an 0 guarantee e most 
benefictal producttve complementatton on the bases of rationalit'" expl I' on" ."" 
. . '.~, 0 g eXlsong 
advantages on one slde or the other, savmg resources extending useful empl t, 
.. .' o)men access to 
markets or any other conslderatton sus tamed in genuine solidarity that will promote the 
strengths of the two countries." 
The Strategic Plan agreed envisages the following among the most relevant actions: 
• Inaugurating this year in Venezuela 600 Integral Diagnostic Centers; 600 Rehabilitation and 
Physiotherapy Departments and 35 High Technology Centers offering professional hea1thcare 
services free of charge to the Venezuelan population. 
• The training of 40,000 doctors and 5,000 health technology specialists in Yenezuela \\ithin 
the Barrio Adentro (Inside the Neighborhood) II health care program for the poor. 
• The training in Cuba of 10,000 graduates from the Mission Ribas (preparation of high school 
students for university education) program in the areas of Medicine and Nursing, who will be 
deployed throughout the country's polyclinics and hospitals and will stay in the homes of 
Cuban families. 
• Cuba will continue its contribution to the development of Plans Barrio Adentro I and II, 
through which up to 30,000 Cuban doctors and other healthcare workers located throughout 
Venezuela will lend their services by the end of the second semester of this year. 
• This year in Cuba, 100,000 Venezuelans with a variety of ey~ c?nditio~s are to rec~ive surgical 
treatment. To that effect, the conditions have been created Wlthin hOSpItals to prm'1de the 
most modem and sophisticated methods available as well as living conditions to ensure a 
comfortable stay. 
Likewise, Cuba will maintain its support in order to contribute to the success of the special 
Bolivarian programs, including: 
• Mission Robinson I, through which Venezuela will soon declare itself the second illiteracy-
. h' h 146 million Yenezuelans how !I) rt-aJ 
free territory in the American conttnent, avmg taug t . 
and write. 
• Mission Robinson II, within which some 1.262 million Venezuelans are continuing their 
studies to sixth-grade level. 
. them access to urU\"ersity t'ducaoQ!1 .. m 
• Mission.Ribas, educating high school studde:~~o ~:~\"arian Re\'~lutlon. To th'at respect. the 
opportunity for young Venezuelans offere ) e 
fulfillment of the Scholarship Plan offered by Cuba is to be promoted. 
f \ T lanal"'!,, ,0/ (l-f '''on) 6 Translated version retrieved rom enezue . - -. - -
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• Mission Sucre for the universalization of high d . er e ucanon. 
• Mission V uelvan Caras to train specialized workers and r . . 
employment p oVlde them Wlth ne\\-' sources of 
• In addition, the two countries will work on the design f' . '. 
illiteracy in Latin America. 0 a connnental project to eliminate 
Medical treatment of Venezuelan patients in Cuba is t b . . d B 
b f . 0 e ffialntame. y the end of ~004 the num er 0 panents treated stood at 7,793, accompanied by 6 567 I '., fri ' 
b fi d f highl " , re au, e~ or ends who ene te rom y speClalized services including cardi cul ' 
. ovas ar surgery oph thalmology 
orthopedics, and organ transplants. It is anticipated that this year th ' ":11' I d ' 
furth 3 000 " ' e program \\ w mc u e a er, panents and the1r companions. . 
In ~e econ?mic and c?~ercial se~tor, the Strategic Plan also covers concrete plans :lS well :lS 
projects which we are JOIndy proposIng to develop in the immediate future. 
Today saw t:he inauguration, by the presidents of the two countries, of the Venezuela Petr61eos 
S.A. <?f~ce In Ha:ana.- PDVSA in Cuba - whose social objective is the exploration and 
ex~lolta~on,. refining, 1mportation, exportation and commercialization of hydro-carbons and 
the1r denvanves, as welllts transportation and storage. 
Also inaugurated in Havana was a 100%-Venezuelan subsidiary of the Industrial Bank of 
Venezuela, and the opening in Caracas of a 100%-Cuban subsidiary of the Foreign Bank of 
Cuba has been approved. The two state institutions will make a significant contribution to the 
sustained increase in economic relations and bilateral trade, which have already begun to 
materialize. 
The 3rd Meeting of the Administrative Commission of the Economic Complementation 
Agreement decided to grant preferential tariffs to 104 new lines of Cuban exports and a 
timetable for progressive tax relief, for those as well as existing preferences. In all cases, 
Venezuelan commitments as laid out in the Agreement between the :\ndean Community of 
Nations and :MERCOSUR have been taken into account. 
For its part, Cuba issued Joint Resolution No.6 from the Ministries of Finance and Prices and 
Foreign Trade, which exempts from taxes on profits companies owning or utilizing vessels 
of Venezuelan flag, and participating in the transportation of passengers or cargo on na nonal 
territory, and from the payment of tonnage rights for Venezuelan vessels arriving in Cuban 
ports from abroad. 
Cuba is to acquire the initial sum of $412 million in Venezuel~ items with pr~ductive 
purposes, as well as those manufactured for social use or for direct cons~pnon by the 
population, which will have a positive effect on generating employment m Venezuela, leadmg 
to the creation of some 100,000 new jobs. 
These goods will be on offer on the Cuban market, with pref~e~tial treatment \\1t~~ the 
policy of economic and social development and elevating the livtng standard of rhe (.ub~!l 
people. 
• \ T "DA . th two delegation.; also idenntlnj 11 
In the process of preparing this first ,"U...U meetmg, e . . . 
. f' . d ther methods ot econll!lUC 
ProJ'ects for the establishment 0 JOlOt ventures an 0 .. I t- aI··d oncc' .;rtll-ill'" 
el hi h will b progresslH' r onn lIt . . complementation in Cuba and Ven~zu .. a w c e . 
underway confirm their economic vtability. 
th ell' eement.; wert" stgned: In that regard, this afternoon (yesterday), e 10 0\\1I1g agr . 
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• A memorandum of understanding for the establishm f ' 
steel development in Venezuela and for the din' ent 0 a ~trategtc alliance for !ron and 
coor anon of a bilateral '. 
toward the recovery of raw materials. enterpnse onented 
• Letters of intent for the foundation of a J'oint b' dir ' 
, . usmess ected at the 
railway mfrastructure of both countries' the Cost' f' "unprovement of the 
, ' 11 enng 0 mtegranon In th f' 
transportanon; the constitution of a bilateral enterpn'se t ' e area 0 mantune 
th nl 0 promote agncultural d 'el e e argement of the supertanker base in Matanzas' th ' f" C\, opment; 
'th th· ' e creanon 0 a JOInt stratP01 allian 
W1 e goal of developmg nickel and cobalt rrurung" p' 'th' '""b,c ce 
C b b 
" rOJects In e regtons of :\ragu 
ara 0 0 and COJedes; the repatt and construction of sea el ' th ' _ a, 
V I
'· vess s, e creation ot a Cuban-
enezue an nuxed enterpnse for the production of sports' d 
. eqwpment an another for fud 
transportation. 
Likewise, it was agreed to work toward the orgaruz' ation and un' pI 'f ' . cd' ementatIon 0 ntne proJect, 
lor en ogenous development m both countries, including: . 
• An endogenous development proJ'ect in the state of Barinas' "Hato Cauca ". th· f 
. ' , ,gu , U1 e ~tate 0 
Apure, a Hotel Sheraton, Melia Miramar and School of Tourism in the state ofY , "S' Ri "Z' argas, ~ anta 
ta amorano Farm 1n Apure state and Ciudad Vacacional de los Caracas (Vacation City 
of Los Caracas) in the state of Vargas. 
• I~ Cu~a, endogenous projects will be developed in the Higher Institute of Agricultural 
SClence.1n Havana (ISCAH) for the training of young Cubans and thousands of experts and 
profess10nals from the Venezuelan agricultural sector, as well as those from the communities 
of Bolivar, Sandino and Marti, in the Sandino municipality of Pinar del Rio province. 
Among other documents signed after two intense days of meetings, especially notable are: 
• Three agreements between the government of the Bolivarian Republic of \' enezuela and the 
government of the Republic of Cuba, related to air transportation, maritime transportation and 
the establishment and operation of a shipyard for the repair and construction of small nayai 
units. 
• Bilateral agreements in the areas of plant and animal health. 
• Agreements, framework contracts and memorandums of understanding in tourism, 
information technology, communications; transportation, communication and info~ation; 
education and sports; biodiversity, the environment, science and technology; hydraulic 
resources and construction. 
• Memorandums of understanding between Venezuela's :Ministries of Popular Economy and 
Light and Commercial Industry and Cuba's Ministry of Domestic Trade. 
• A framework agreement, contracts for the buying and se~g of crude oil and the . . 
warehousing of crude oil and its derivatives, and letters of mtent for the re~~oratIon ot th( 
Cienfuegos Refinery and for technology transfers between PDVS.\ and CL PET. 
. 'th I . al Pn7\' indU';try and for coopcratl l )11 
• A framework agreement for cooperanon m e e ectnc en_bJ '.' 
in the energy sector. 
. b . the Venezuelan \llm~tn· lIt' Il.lbitat and 
• An international agreement on consttucnon , eN een . 
Housing and the Cuban Ministry of Consttucnon. 
• Agreements in the civil aeronautics sector. 
. d CaribbCln I ntC'L'f.l!l< ~n C;.U1H". tl) take 
• An agreement to convene the 1 st Lattn Amencan an '.' 
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• An agreement for Venezuela's utilization ofC b ' . . 
of construction of a slmilar facility 1!l' V 1a.u a s ann-dopIng lahoratorr and the l.._.....;_ enezue . uq:lIlrung 
• A framework agreement between the or " . 
World Festival of Youth and Students in ~e:~l~~rruruttees ofhoth countries for the 16th 
• Agreements between the two countries' Mini' . f . 
ALBA " . stnes 0 Forf"l011 :\ff:' t th . 1!l1!lternat:1onal agencies including th . ~ .. ~ a11'S or e promotlon of 
, - among 0 er 1n1t1atlv' . 
2nd South Summit, scheduled for Qatar 1!l' J 2005 es. - Its presentatlon at the 
U G une and at the High le\ 1 ~I . N eneral Assembly in September of th ' - 'e l~ eetlng of the e same year. 
In all, including government agreements, letters of intent, memorandums . 
contracts and framework agreements 40 docum t' of understanding. 
, en s were SIgned. 
Also, as part of th~ Strategic Plan, the 1st Conference for Caribbean Integrati . th S . Sec~or took place 1!l Caracas in March, with the participation of 10 Central on ~ e ports 
Canbbean countries. .:\mencan and 
An important program of bilateral cooperation was formalized in the fi hin d . 1 
d 
. s g an agncu cure 
sectors, an a 1st Sumnut on Regional Fishing and Agn'cultur h b d' r 
during May 15-19 of this year. e as een arrange ill \ enezucla 
A cultural co?peration program was drawn up, which includes - among other things - editonal 
~~d fUm sen:ces, and the development of discography, as well as studying the creation of a 
)01!lt enterpnse for culture industries. 
Contracts .worth $3~5 ~on have been signed for 2005, according to agreements made during 
the 5th J 01!lt Comnusslon, and which are part of the ALBA. 
All of these agreements include actions and initiatives to progressively contribute to 
strengthening the integration process inspired by the ALBA, which will become an example, 
and in which we aspire to include Latin America and the Caribbean. 
We should express that this Strategic Plan is a flexible tool that will continue to be extended 
and enriched as new proposals emerge that compliment the objectives established by the Joint 
Statement and the Agreement for the implementation of the ALBA. 
In view of the historical privilege of making this Final Declaration public in the presence of 
President Hugo Chavez and President Fidel Castro, both delegations formally pledge to spare 
no effort until the dream of Bolivar and Marti of a Latin united and integrated America and 
Caribbean is attained. 
As the Joint Declaration expresses: " ... we fully agree that the ;\LB.r\ will not become a realHY 
with mercantilist ideas or the selfish interests of business profitability or national benefit {I' the 
detriment of other peoples. Only a broad Latin Americanist \'ision, whi.ch ac~owledges the 
impossibility of our countries' developing and being truly independ~nt ill an lsolated manner. 
will be capable of achieving what Boli\rar called " ... to see the formatlo~ ill the .\mc:nCl~ I>! ~,l' 
greatest nation in the world, not so much for its size and riches. as for its freedom and ~II In. 
and that Marti conceived of as "Our America," to differentiate It from the other .\menra, {hl' 
expansionist one with imperialist appetites. 
In his memorable June 11, 1892, article in the magazine Pcl:'7~J, .I mt· ~brti \\TIlle: "{ )ur C::lrny 
. . di 'd t't' t s. 'Illat I:' wh\' we .lrc: olx·\1n~ 
obeys one plan: to mflame us, disperse us, VI e us, su oca cu. . 
. all riaht 1 up 10111 {(ll!t,thcr, ~'I C'\";ldc hun. 
another plan: to show ourselves m our s ta ture, to --e> er. , 
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finally making our homeland free. Plan against plan." 
Ibis, which we are approving today, is that of Bolivar and :"larti. 
iHasta la Victoria Siempre! 
Venezuelan and Cuban delegations 
Havana, 28th day of the month of April of 2005 
"Year of the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas" 
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Summit of the South American Presidents· BrasT Sta ~ 
01/09/2000 . I la tement. 
Guayaquil, t ld Summit of the South American Presidents' Guayaq '1 C 
Ecuador, . UI onsensus CreatJng 
27/07/2002 CSN 
Cusco, Peru, 3rd Sumn:'it of the South American Presidents: Cusco Dec . 
08/12/2004 Declaration. Formalisation of the South America Co la~on & ~yacucho 
n mmunity of Nations (CSN). 




st ~ummit of Heads of State of CSN: Brasilia Declaration and Programme of 
Brasilia, Brazil Action. 
30/09/2005 A background declaration refers to a letter by presidents Chavez (VEN) and 
yazque~ (URU) from 1 ~ A~gust 2005, with proposals for the course of the 
integration process, which Influenced the Brasilia Declaration and the respective 
Programme for Action. Re-
defining 
Montevideo, Extraor~inary Se.ssion of th~ ~eeting of Heads of State of CSN: Setting up of a CSN 
Uruguay Strategic Reflection. Commission on the South American Integration Process. 
09/1212005 composed of one high level representative of each country. to develop integration 
proposals in all possible dimensions. 
Bogota, 1st Conference of the Ministers of Defense of CSN: Bogota Declaration. 
Colombia, 
14/07/2006 
Cochabamba, 2nd Summit of Heads of State of CSN: Cochabamba Declaration. 
Bolivia, The Strategic Reflection Commission delivers its Final Document "A New Model of 09/12/2006 Integration of South America Towards the Union of South American Nations· 
Porlamar, 151 South American Energy Summit: Margarita Declaration. 
Venezuela, Renaming of CSN into UNASUR. Creation of South American Energy Council. 17/04/2007 Reference to PETROSUR, PETROANDINA, PETROAMERICA. 
Quito, Quito Declaration (ARG, BOL, BRA, ECU, PAR, VEN): the need for a new 
Ecuador, regional financial architecture to strengthen the continent's role in the globalised 
03/05/2007 financial and commercial worlds. Promoted Projects: Bank of the South. 
Stabilisation Fund. Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR). Regional Monetary 
System. 
Asunci6n, Declaration of Asunci6n (ARG, BOL, BRA, ECU, PAR, VEN): central outline of 
Paraguay, establishing the Bank of the South as an UNASUR Development Bank. Egalitanan MakIng 
22/05/2007 representation of each member country. UNASUR 
Rio de Janeiro, Declaration of Rio de Janeiro (ARG, BOL, BRA. ECU. PAR, URU. VEN) 
Brazil, Consensus on the Bank of the South Foundation Act. 
08/10/2007 
Buenos Aires, Bank of the South Foundation Charter (ARG, BOL, BRA. COL, ECU. PAR. URU. 
Argentina, VEN). 
09/1212007 
Lima, Peru, Lima Declaration of the 2nd Meeting of the pre~id;n~E~ t~~u~~~~~;~lCE i 
12/04/2008 UNASUR (BOL, BRA, CHI, COL, E~U, ~UY, P .' .. ' ~ FormatIOn of I TRIBUNAL). Cooperation and coordinatIon of the JudICIal powe 
working groups: Extradition; Exequatur; ExhortatIons 
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Caracas, Declaration of the 1st South American Energy Council (ARG, BOl BRA CHI 
Venezuela, ~OL, EC?U, GUY, PAR, PER, SUR, URU, VEN). Creates the link to AlBA by 
08/05/2008 introducing the concept of GNC. Presentation of South American Energy Treaty 
, 
within six months. 
Brasilia, Brazil, UNASUR Constitutive Treaty. Refers back to Cusco (2004), Brasilia (2005) and 
23/05/2008 Cochabamba (2006) declarations. Signatories: ARG, BOl, BRA, CHI, COL, ECU. I 
I GUY, PAR, PER, SUR, URU, VEN. I 
Santiago de La Moneda Declaration. Full support of Evo Morales' constitutional govemment 
Chile, against destabilization and coup attempts. Creation of three UNASUR 
15/09/2008 commissions: to investigate the massacre in the Bolivian Department of Pando. to 
support the political dialogue led by President Morales; and to support and assist UNASUR 
the Bolivian .,Rovemment according to its needs. 
, 
Isla Margarita, Nueva Esparta Declaration of the 3111 Meeting of the Presidents and 
Venezuela, Representatives of the Judicial Powers of UNASUR (BRA, CHI, COL, GUY, PAR, 
03/10/2008 PER, URU, VEN + PAN): Extradition; Altemative mechanisms for conflict resolution. 
Exhortations; Web site; Commitment to leveling out differences in national 
legislations in defined areas. 
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Appendix 16: Research Instruments 
a) Research Questions (RQs) as formulated in 2006 u ding 
(served as basis for interview guides) pgra report 
Overarching RQ: 
How are the Bolivarian Republic's HEFA policies realised within the context ofglobaJi.Jution? 
Education policy and governance 
What are the mechanisms through which municipalization is implemented? 
How has the Venezuela~ government been .d~~ng re-~em.ton:zlisation and re-scaling in tht §l,yn:.;,:.-, of 
HEF A? What scalar shifts, governance act/wtzes and mstltutzans of coordination aTP im'Oll'td? 
What role does the Venezuelan state assume with regard to the governance activities? 
How is. education poliff m~diated between the national and local scales in the proctSses of mlmi.ipwlz::;'Ulio1l? 
What IS the role of aldeas m the process of rescaling of education spaces? 
Are there tensions between local actors 'power and interests and state power and interests? 
How do both global and domestic pressures transform (redefine) Vene~elan stale POlJltr ,md (l/Jkl.;l101I 
poliff and practice? 
How do people at the community and household scales perceive municipalisation? 
Discourses 
To what extent do global HE discourses influence the agenda andgovernance ofHEE·1( 
How do the Vene~elan HEFA discourse and policies contest hegemonic globalisation through .JilmhJIir't 
and endogenous conceptions (or imaginations) of the global HE discourses? 
What are the meanings of de-concentration, decentralisation, devollltion and deregulation in Ihr HLF'I 
discourse as compared to global HE discourses? 
What are the meanings of other central government concepts (e.g. participation, demomJ~)'. tndogtnollJ 
development) ? 
Political, social, cultural and economic dimensions . 
How and to what extent does municipalizacion put the normative framework with regard 10 HE I', ,I und 
participatory democraff into effect at the local scale? .' 
How do popular forces construct and use political spaces for self-governance as guarante~d In the CBR I' ( . 
How do 'local' political, social and economic processes operate and what potential do thtse hold Jor 
participatory democraff? . . . 
How is local popular democraff used to further soctalJustlCe? . .' 
How is local HE space construction facilitated or constrcn.ne~ ~ the .natlonal-~!JSlanve SCule? 
How do aldeas function in their ascribed role as commum!) core soctal centres? 
How autonomous and responsive to local needs are the new HE spaces? 
How is local community knowledge generated? . . ' ' .. ( 
How does local community knowledge influence Ioc~1, regJonal and ~anona~/JO.llllO, ')l
ff 
Cenl ,; 
How does HEF A contribute to building a collecnve culture to achieve Soctalism of tht - IIT). 
Theory (re-)construction . . I.J., ' .. ? 
. d sfi d in response to soctal-spalla ~numIL.l. How are particular scales constztuted an tran orme . fi .r 5 'Iz' 1'lht ? 1 ff Cenlllr.,.? 
To what extent does Vene~elan re-territorialisation consntute a eatuTP D.! oafJ sm q... . 
What kind of state is emerging in T';'enei!'ela~ . Ih, t ., d 10 absorb /II( lurgt nllmb ... J J IE 
'/1 T / Ia 'n, h e to be socto-economrca~!.J s nit,ure 
How WItt v ene~e . n socte:/ .av . reconciled with the emo-gent po/iti".J/ (!'ono"::,' mo.ltf? . 
graduates? or How IS the massiJicatzon of HE or lob lisation gene",/!)' lid uilh tr~.,r.I to Ill: :r. 
How does Vene~ela challenge the parameters D.! g a -
particular? 
Can state law be emancipatory? 
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b) Recorded Interviews 
Date Interviewee Place 1 22107/2005 Albania Manzanares (UBV) Punto FijoNenezueia , 2 01/08/2005* Eduardo Leal (MES) Ca racaslVenezuei a 3 10/08/2005 RaQuel SolorzanolMeyling Pinango (UBV) CaracasIVenezuela 4 11/08/2005 Sol Santander/Paulina Campos (MES) CaracasIVenezuela 5 20/08/2005 Anakarina Carwafai (Mision Sucre) Los TeQueslVenez. 6 02109/2005 Maura Epaminare de Baloa(Misi6n Sucre) Pto. AyacuchoNenez 7 05/09/2005* Nilza Centeno/Rudy Castillo/Irina MolinalLeni Ciudad Bolivarl Marnez (UBV) Venezuela 
8 22/09/2005 Gilda Girardi (MED) CaracasIVenezuela 
9 24/09/2005 Luis Bravo CaracasIVenezuela 
10 02/04/2006 Eduardo LeaVGladys Guevara CaracasIVenezuela 
11 03/04/2006* Angel Tiodardo (UBV) CaracasIVenezuela 
12 05/04/2006 Euclides Cordoba (MES) CaracasIVenezuela 
13 11/07/2006 Vivien Zunioa (Lawyer, AMUNIC) ManaguaINicaraQua 
14 11/07/2006* Martha L. Aviles (Misi6n Milagro) ManaguaINicaraaua 
15 13/07/2006* Jhonny GutierrezlEfrain Duarte (MavoraiM San CarlosJNicaragua 
16 17107/2006* Susana Morales (Yo Si Puedo Coordinator) ManaQuaINicaraQua 
17 18/07/2006* Adrian Cruz(Carlos Fonseca Foundatiorl) ManaguaINicaraaua 
18 01/08/2006* Castor Nunez (Lawyer, UBV) Punto FijolVenezuela 
19 21/08/2006* Ines Colina (Social Medicine Worker) CorolVenezuela 
20 21/08/2006* Victor Galicia (President Neighbourhood Assoc.) CorolVenezuela 
21 21/08/2006 Angel Medina (Vice-Pres. Neighbourhood Assoc} CorolVenezuela 
22 29/08/2006* Amado Sanchez (Sub-Director MavoraltYMiranda) CoroNenezuela 
23 06/07/2007* Ines Colina (Social Medicine Worker) CoroNenezuela 
24 13/07/2007* Zoremil Chirinos (UBV Municipal Coordinator) CoroNenezuela 
25 17/07/2007 Joanna Asuaje (Fundacomun) CoroNenezuela 
26 17107/2007* UBV-PAR Group (4 Students) CoroNenezuela 
27 19/07/2007* UBV-PAR Group (4 Students) CoroNenezuela 
28 21/07/2007* UBV-PAR Group (4 Students) CoroNenezuela 
29 23/07/2007* UBV-PAR Group (4 Students) CoroNenezuela 
30 26/07/2007* Luis Quintana (MES) CaracasIVenezuela 
* Fully transcribed. 
c) Interview-Conversations (not recorded) 
Interviewee Place Date 
Pedro Silva, Assistant to Eduardo Leal, MES CaracasNenezuela 1 15/07/2005 
Anakarina Carwafal, Consultant Teacher PNFE Los TeQuesNen. 2 20108/2005 
Eduardo Leal, Universidad Nacional Abie~a (~NA) CaracasNenezuela 3 21/09/2005 CaracasNenezuela 
4 22/09/2005 Gilda Gerardi, National Coordinator of Bohvanan 
Schools, MED CaracasNenezuela 
5 23/09/2005 Eduardo Leal (UNA) . CorolVenezuela Carina Salazar, UBV Miranda Coordinator 6 02/03/2006 CaracasNenezuela 




Research Process Timetable: Key Activities and Events Durinjl +3 Period 
25 Feb 2005 
June-Oct 2005 
(4 months) 





Sep 06-Jan 07 
(4 II '!lIIII'.1 
~ Feb-April 2007 
La Habana, Cuba 
Comparative Education Conference 
UK 
Venezuela: 151 Field Period (4 months) 
Bristol 
Venezuela: 2na Field Period Venezuela 
~ Nicaragua: Field Trip (2 weeks. 08/07-22107/061 
\ Bristol 
\ Amsterdam: Centre for Latin American Research -
;lf1d [)()( .llllH~ntdtlon (CI DLA) 
t- M.IY Auq 2007 Utrecht N(~therlzlllds Inc,tltut(~ of Human r~lght~ 
---+ I' .11,\). School (If I dW Uilivel c,lty (It Utrecht t- - ~ . JlJ1i 2007 Venezuela 3 Field Period ('J WI't·kc,) 
\ 
S'·p 07--June 08 Bnstol 
t 
I presented on Nicaragua and Participatory Action Research. However, the conference ignited the re-focusing of 
• Attendance of presentation on HE in Venezuela - initiates re-focusing of my PhD research. 
• ESRC approves change of research focus from Nicaragua to Venezuela. 
• Initial ethnographic fieldwork included my familiarization with the Venezuelan reality, visiting revolutionary 
institutions (missions, NUDEs, ministries) and UBV headquarters in different parts of the country to 
identify the main research issue and the principal research site, gathering of informationlknowledge 
_(documents, interviews, conversations, observations, experiencing). 
Analysis of the 1 SI field period to define the key research issue and principal research site. 
• Interview transcriptions and data analysis of texts & documents. 
• Prepared upgrading report (upgrading on 20101/2006). 
• FirstQublication with A. Verger. 
Integration in UBV Punto Fijo (PF) headquarters. Participation in municipalized UBV Coro (seminars, classes, 
workshops, municipal & community activities). I organized a 10-session reading group Globalization & Education in 
UBV PF. I regularly participated in the weekly UBV Miranda (Coro) Academic Council Meeting and joined UBV 
Punto Fijo staff on their consultancy visits to UBV aldeas in FalcOn state. Other activities: 
• World Social Forum, Caracas, 24-29/01/2006. 
• "1 sl Regional Seminar of the University viewed as a Creative and Transformative Mission", UBV Punto 
Fijo, 9-10103/2006. 
• Mission Science [Misi6n Ciencia] Induction Workshop, Coro, 28/03/2006. 
• International Symposium "Venezuela & South American Integration", Maracaibo, 1-2/06/06. 
• International Congress "Latin American Independencies", Coro, 31/07-03/08/2006. 
• Participation in a 10-session Workshop "Education for Citizen PartiCipation in the Communities", convened 
by ACSALA. an internationally funded NGO. Cruz Verde (Coro). August 2006. 
• Interview transcriptions and data analysis of text~and dOc':ll11ents. ______ _ 
Research on ALBA in Nicaragua 
------- j - ---
Analysis of the 2' field period 
• Data analysis of texts & documents 
• Second PubllC<ltlon wi!bA. Verger _ 
3-month ESRC Studentshlp for theoretical work on Latin Amenca and Development 
• Wrrtlng Publication Nicaragua-ALBA 
3 month WUN -lf~~J1S Studentshlp for theoretical work on human rrghts and c,oudl Justice 
• Wntlng Publication SOCl~1 Justice and HI fA.'f:l. Venezuela 
UpCLltl119 ~flu,,~edge (CofO/~JfJca_sl_ 
final vmtlflCl up perrod 
• Data /,rldIY<-'I'> (jf Texts & Documents 
• 11 111t.-ffl,l1l f ;lldl InVitational Ledures & Seminars and 6 Intern;ltlonal (,( )flf"I"flce f )fj'·"~flt.ltl()fl·. 
• j.<'lrlty W'Jr> d'tlvlsm IUr<j(Jf~fflldr1y'1 
\ 'i ') 
A ppenclices 
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Appendix 18: Academic and Public Socl'ol A" . 
ogy CUVlt1es 
a) Publications submitted during PhD 
Refereedjour.nala~cles 
2008. Nicar~gua Re-visited: from neoliberal 'ungovernability' to thc BoliYarlan 
Altematlve for the Peoples of Our America (liB \) Glob IU' S" 
Education,6 (2), pp. 147-61. . " a alIOIl. OLulrum:.i 
Refereed book contributions 
forthcoming. Nicaragua: Constructing the BolivaDan alternatiye for the people.; of 
our America (ALBA). In U. Schuerkens (Ed). . 
forthcoming, 2009. Demerara slave rebellion, 1823. In :\"ess, I. (Ed) 111/f17:,I.':0'1I; 
Enryclopedia ofRtvolution and Protest. BlackwelL 
Non-refereed journal articles 
2006 (with A. Verger). Venezuela: higher education for all. Tbe Jo"nltllfor en/i,'".' 
Education Poliry Studies, 4 (1). 
Non-refereed book chapters 
in print. Social justice and higher education for all: The Boli\-arian l'[U\"(,l"lt\ ot 
Venezuela. In: Parameswaran, G. (Ed) Educalional.' 1£'(1'.1".1 and SO(!,J Eqlli()·: _,1 
Global Perspective. Hamilton Books. 
2009 (with A. Verger). Venezuela: higher education, ncoliberalisll1 and ~ociahsm, 
In: Hill, D. & Rosskam, E. (Eds) The developing world and .lIt/Ie ed"(,I/!rJ!:: ,\'c'rJ,'ii,(,,/ 
depredation and egalitan'an alternatives. New York: Routlcdgc. 
2007 (with M.M. Griera and A. Verger). Politicas de equidad cn cl terreno dt: b 
Educaci6n Superior. In: Polo, P. & Yerger, ,A, (Eds.) Globali,-\!lt1'on, r Dc'.I!~II,J.':la,b 
Educativas. Palma: Escola de Formaci6 en tvlitjans Didactics. 
2007 (with M.M. Griera and A. Verger). Yene<;ucla: reycrtint d !1l'()~bt:r:lli~mc.l:n d 
terreny de l'Educaci6 Superior. In: Verger, .\ & Polo, P. (Fd~) Globa/II'-ZtlL70 I 
Desigualtats Educatives. Palma: STEI-i. , 
2007 (with A. Verger). Educaci6n sup~rior en \:enezue,la: R~~Plt::ldo c~n b , 
ortodoxia liberal en politica educatlva- In: \ ila ~Ienno, I ~.~, (Ed.) I ene~eltl ;0"'0 
laboratorio de politicas publicaJ: JeiJ miradaJ a la Jociedad, la e(IIII()/I/U) fa edJI((]L70n 
bolivariana. Malaga: CEDMA. 
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b) International conferences 
2008. Higher Education For All as a Hwnan Right· The Bol:"·anan" L- " -• 11\ ru\"er5ltY or Ven~zuela. 1st ISA Fo~m of Soci~lo~, Barcelona, Spain [1/9/2(08). . 
2008. NIcaragua: constructtng the Bolivanan Alternative for the Peoples of Our 
America. 1 st ISA Forum of Sociology, Barcelona (6/9/2008). 
2008. Geographies of counter-hegemony: Higher Education For All and the 
Bolivarian University of Venezuela. Association of American Geographers 
(AAG) Annual Meeting, Boston (MA) (18/4/2008). 
2008. Social justice and Higher Education For All: a decade of policies and 
practices. Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS) Conference, u\Oerpool 
(29/4/2008). 
2008. Counter-hegemonic globalisation: the Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples 
of Our America (ALBA). Society for Latin American Studies (SL\S) 
Conference, Liverpool (29/4/2008). 
2008. Resistance to social fascism in Nicaragua: the Bolivarian Altemati\Oe for the 
Peoples of Our America (ALBA). Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLS.\) 
Annual Conference, Manchester (20/3/2008). 
2008. Human rights, social justice and Higher Education For All: The Bolivanan 
University of Venezuela. Socio-Legal Studies Association (SLS:\) Annual 
Conference, Manchester (19/3/2008). 
2007. Venezuela: Constructing a counter-hegemonic political knowledge economy. 
Association of American Geographers (AAG) Annual Meeting, San Francisco 
(CA), (20/4/2007). " " " 
2004. En-countering globalisation through partlClpatory action research. 
Comparative Education Conference, Havana, Cuba (29/10/2004)" 
Conference panels convened: ",-
2008 with Diana Raby (University of Liverpool), Symposlum 19, 1 ene~ela 1998-




c) Invitational lectures / seminars 
2008. The political and educational refonns of H Ch' Lak 
Chicago (IL) (21/04/2008). ugo avez. e Forest College. 
2008. ALBA and counter-hegemonic revolution-:lt"p identl't\' P , f R . 
S . C4.L,1 , oetlcs 0 eSl.;tance ymposlUm, Department of Spanish Portuguese and La' tln'·\ ' "di 
• • ' J. mencan "'ill es 
Uruverslty of Leeds (13-14/3/2008). ' , 
2008. Counter-hegemony in America: The Bolivarian Revolution and the :\LB:\.. 
Department of European Languages and Cultures Lancaster C niversity 
(10/3/2008). " 
2008. J-:ligher Education For All in a participatory democracy. Presentation 
deli,:,e~ed at: Popular Education in Venezuela: Shared Experiences in 
PartlClpatory Democracy, C-SCAIPE, Kingston LTniversity (9/2/2008). 
2008. Researching inequality and poverty. CLIO Research Day, Graduate School of 
Education, University of Bristol (22/1/2008). 
2007. From polyarchy to democracy: popular participation and Higher Education 
F or All in the Bolivarian Project. Conflict and Democracy in Contemporary 
Colombia and Venezuela Conference, University of Liverpool (22-
23/11/2007). 
2007. Venezuela's Higher Education For All: from 'Praxis of Resistance' to 'Poetics 
of Construction'. Department of Spanish, Portuguese and Latin American 
Studies, University of Leeds (24/10/2007). 
2007. Counter-hegemony in Latin America. Amsterdam Institute for Metropolitan 
and International Development Studies (AMIDSt), University of Amsterdam 
(25/9/2007). 
2007. Realising social justice and the international human rights agenda: the 
Bolivarian University of Venezuela. The Netherlands Institute of Human 
Rights (SIM), School of Law, University of Utrecht (19/06/2007). 
2007. Venezuela: Higher Education For All for social justice, International Institute 
of Social Studies (ISS), Den Haag (31/05/2007). 
2007. A counter-hegemonic research agenda. CEDLA, Amsterdam (05/03/2U()7), 
2006. Venezuela's counter-hegemonic political knowledge economy. SymposIUm 
Globalisation and Knowledge, University of Bristol (28/11/2006).. ~. 
2005. Critical theory and globalisation: Perspectives and debates, Se~ar Senes, 
'Analysis of Social Policy', Universidad Aut6noma de Barcelona (lAB), Spall 
(11/5/2005). . "'" , 
2005. Critical Theory and Participatory Action Research. SemIDar Sene,s :\nal)::'b 
of Social Policy', Universidad Aut6noma de Barcelona (UAB), Spall 
(9/5/2005). , cial P li ' 
2005 Social exclusion in Nicaragua. Seminar Series 'Analysls of So 0 c)'. 
Universidad Aut6noma de Barcelona (UAB), Spain ,(3/5/2005). , 
2005. Critical Discourse Analysis of 'A Fair Globalizatlon f~r, ;\11: Crcaung 
.. F All' Presented at the IVorkshop on en/lcal DlJ'(ollrs( "lntJ/rsIJ, Opporturutles or . 
University of Bristol, UK (3/2/2005). 
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d) Public sociology activities 
2008. Publi~ talk on Venezuela, with Paul Chatterton (Cniversity of Leeds). 
Education For Global Justice, Christchurch, The Grove, Ilkle\' (LK) 
(15/03/2008). . 
2008. Participatory Democracy and regional Latin American integration: ;\LB:\. 
Bristol Latin American Forum 2008, University of Bristol (1/3/2008) 
2007. Screening of Venezuela von Unten & Q&A panel discussion with Gennan 
Member of Parliament (Bundestag) Rainder Steenblock. Com'ened bv attac. 
Die Griinen Lubeck, Weltladen & InfoZentrum "Eine Welt". Haus :\kzcnt, 
Lubeck (Germany) (17/12/2007) (see 
http://www.raindersteenblock.de/25396.0.html) 
2007. Alternatives to Neoliberalism: the ALBA in Nicaragua. Bristol Latin 
American Forum 2007, University of Bristol (10/03/2007). 
2007. Venezuela: Higher Education & Revolution. Bristol Latin American Forum 
2007, University of Bristol (10/03/2007). 
2006. Screening of Chdvez- Ein Staatsstreich von Innen, followed by public discussion. 
Convened by attac Lubeck, Die Griinen Lubeck, InfoZentrum "Eine \X'clt", 
Okumenische Regionalstelle des Ev. Luth. Kirchenkreises Lubeck. Haus der 
Kulturen, Lubeck (Germany) (24/10/2006). 
2006. Screening of Chdvez- Ein Staatsstreich von Innen, followed by open public 
discussion. Convened by Die Guten e.V. and Venezuela Solidaritatsgruppe 
Niimberg. Z-Bau, Niimberg (Germany) (18/10/2006). 
Photographs 
Photograph 
1. Images of the Bolivarian Revolution 
Basketball ground in NUDE Fabricio Ojeda, 
Caracas, 7 July 2005. Several of the 
cooperative workers had just graduated from 
Misi6n Robinson and entered Misi6n Ribas. 
Misi6n Ribas Mural , Caracas, 2007 
Textile COoperative In UDE Fa Oeoa Ca 
on the outs IrtS of Caracas Ju 2005 
Photographs 
Left: At the crossroads. Presidential electoral 
campaign murals, 2006. Democratic choice could 
not be more rad ical between Chavez and old elite 
leader (then-Governor of Zulia) Rosales who 
participated in the 2002 coup against Chavez. 
.. 1 
Bel?w: Coro Bus Terminal - one of the many mobile 
National Electoral Council posts for updating the 
electoral register (1 August 2006). 
'Street education', Caracas reading Chavez' spe ch 
delivered at the 601/1 UN General Assembly. 15 
September 2005, distributed at a popular rally awaiting 
the President. 
Promoting cultural rights in public spaces:-, ---'<.t:~~;:'~~I§:~~~~.IiI.li~~ 
Puerto Ayacucho, 2005: --..;;:::::;;:. 
Bilingual Intercultural Education is a right of the 
indigenous children and adolescents. MEACQSUA: Ir~"LI DA LA UNIIAD 
- DI LATINOA"'IIICA Y IL CARla .. 1 
MERCOSUR Goal for Latin Amencan and C8n 
unity seen In Coro, July 2007 
Givmg truth the conceSSIOn means not 
Mural against reneWIng the concess on 0 
enterpnse RCTV, Coro 21 July 200 
The 5 Constituent Motors 
9 July 2007 
010 Coro 
Photographs 
Le Antl-RCTV slOgan, Com 9 J 
Below Electoral Campa n m a Coro 
July 2007 
Revolutionary murals in Caracas' legendary 
barrio 23 de Enero (23rd of January), 2005 
Photographs 
2. The BoIivarian University of Venezuela (DBY) 
Above" Profesor Eduardo Leal visiting " 
M"s"6n"Sucre PNFE students on a pubIJc 
I I , " t rk Escuela exhibition of students proJec wo " 
Republica del Paraguay, Los 
Teques, 20 August 2005" 
Left. UBV Caracas. P FE 7 J 5 
Below Mural UBV Falcon 'Pun 0 Fqo) The nn.,,.,,..,,.,,,,,, 
education is not to form profeSSlOna s nor , amors nor 
statists, but to create the S{>IfT and e tlea • 0 ' 
(Sim6n Bolivar) 
UBV Caracas HeadQuart 
served as the POVSA h 
Lett UBV randa A c 
Photographs 
3. Municipality of Miranda 
a) r l Anniversary Municipalisation UBV Miranda 
Inauguration Ad. Tea 0 
2006 
From left to ngh 
Alifrank Laguna Coord Ina or 0 Sooo-Eo 
InteradJon (PAR) UBV Falcon P no FIfO) 
Jose Bemos. Genera l Coordma or UB Fa 
(Punto Fijo) 
Carina Salazar. MUniCIpal COOrdl a or UB 
Miranda 
.a 
Workshop · Jundlcal Bases of CitIZen PartiCIpatIOn· 
with lawyer and UBV lecturer Castor ul'lez. Coro. 
16 May 2006. 
Cultural Street Cinema. Coro, 16 May 2006 
Seminar uRevolutlomslng Kno edge -S rom 
• h Canna a " r Pedagogy to Andragogy , W1 nd 
(UBV Coordinator MuniCIpal! Mlrand ~ omo 
Romero Coordinator Aldea Aldemena 
Falc6n . 15 Ma 2006 
Photographs 
b) Community Council Foundation Act (Sector Cabecera 
Seco, Municipality of Miranda, 19 July 2007) It Pari h lU 
Left Emilio Sangronis (Fundacom a Coro) p a:-es 
the election 
Below' As the first project to be rea iZed b e 
community counCIl. the Inhabl an s s a e a er 
infrastructure 
The process of establishing and reglstenng a commun council 
involves three communlty-Fundacomunal meetings of which the 
election is the th ird and last. Between the first and second meeting , 
over a period of 30 days, a demographic census of the communi 
has to be conducted. Subsequently, the election IS prepared 0 er a 
period of three months. 
. ' f r which reason the community counCIl 
32 families live In this sector, 0 . d · 20-40 families are required to orm 
regulation for rural zones IS applle ,I e t tied to ote In the comm nr 
a council. Over 90 people of age 15+ are en I 
council election in this sector 
rde 
The newly bUilt Barrio Adentro health centre, 2 August 2006. 
For two and a half years after arriving in Cruz Verde, Banio 
Adentro had been established in a community member's home. 
RlQht UBV-PAR group organised a "Commun ity 
Cleaning Action" as part of their involvement in 
the bamo, 24 July 2006. 
Folkloric Festival, Centro Educativo Inicial 
Georgina, Cruz Verde, 6 July 2007 
366 
In the distance to the left is the newly built 
nursery school where the first PAR-day of 12 
August 2006 was held. 
Entrance to the old ambulatorio, now the House of 
Intergenerational Meeting Cruz Verde, 2006. 
h 
.l Pn: p.lring lh R-dtl), 
Left 4 August 2006, Ambulatorio Cruz Verde 
Left and above: Neighbourhood mobilization, 6 August 2006 
Below: 'Getting your hands dirty' in ethnographic research. 
Preparing the facilities, 11 August 2006 
Students and Facil itators, 11 August 2006 
36 
mmum~ 
(12 Augu t 2006) 
The photographs show different groups from both 
the bamo and the parcelamiento working on different 
topICS as well as group reports. Each group worked 
lone or two UBV-PAR students. Top row right: 
faa a or Ana Scavo with the individual problem 
erarchy exerCise cards In the background on the 
a I Second row from top: facilitator Addel Rodriguez 
n terv-ew local press Bottom left: participants of 
e cui ure group who raised the issue of a 
community space for cultural activities. 
e democra c processes and events are 
e co ered by e local. regional and national 
ews Cl p refemng 0 the PAR-<lay Nuevo Dia, 
68 
l lu.l£ 'nu' in th~ fllmunal int r t (14 August 2006) 
The community declaration. 
Broad-based community action: the 
sign erected over the entrance of the 
new dmic lists the various community 
organIZations that participated in the 
occupation To highlight is the 
participation of the Asociaci6n de 
Vecmos, the Neighbourhood 
Assooabon, a mechanism created in 
the 41h Republic that often is 
associated with anti-Chavez sectors. 
Thelf partiCIpation supports the notion 
of the tru ly communal spirit of the 
popular action, rather than partisan co-
optation 
These facilities have been taken by the 
community to run the clinic. 
The new ambulatorio. 
LOCAL Re:CUPERADO POR lOS GRUPOS: 
COMIT£ DE SALUI> - ASOCIACION DE VECINOS. 
FUND.JOSE LEONARDO CHIRINOS- U8E. 
U8 DE DIA8ETICOS- COMITE DE TIE 
CLUB DE HIPERTENS05 - ADOLECENTES. 
:LU6 DE LA~ EDAD. CLUB DE MADRES. 
Squatters in their appropriated ambulatorio, 30 August 
2006. In the centre, Ines Colina , social medicine 
workerand community leader. 
369 
3 0 
\ _ mmuruty 1\1 ring (2 July 2007) 
Ambulatono Cruz Verde, WIth the newly built 
bas etball ground next to It, 4 July 2007. At the 
t e the organIZed community was in the 
process of applying for funding for a roof. 
Students intervieWIng Ines Colina , the key link between the UBV-PAR group and the Barrio Cruz Verde 
communrty, 14 July 2007 The first visit to the barrio since the PAR-day in August 2006 served the students to 
Inform themselves about the community's activism. 
~ UBV-Communrty Meeting 28 July 2007: socio-
ra ad:Mties around the boules lane. 
UBV Miranda, Aldea Crisostomo Falc6n, PAR theory, 6 
Ju 2007 
Preparatory meeting, 14 July 2007 
Therapeutic dance, 4 July 2007 
S 
n ty survey and the 151 UBV Student Community Meeting Img ndmgs rom their commu I 
I received a 'Sim6n Bolivar Award' from the UBV-
PAR group for my social commitment and interest in 
their university and community work. 
Below: UBV Miranda and UBV Falc6n representatives, 
Ines Colina, and the facilitators. 
e e ent concluded WIth a traditional dance performance. 
l \ )rk h p' du .tti n t r Citiz n Pacti ipation in th Communiti " 
Workshop Materials 
Right Session 2 August 
2006 In Cultural Hall Henry 
Chlrinos 
Session 14 August 2006 in community library Jose Leonardo Chirinos. 
Group Photo 15 August 
2006, Final Session 
I h ph 
3 
Top: The 72-year old woman learning to read and write 
really exists. 
Yo Sf Puedo Literacy Point, San Carlos, Nicaragua, 
13 July 2006 
Left: Literacy class in the facilitator's home. The Cuban 
lVNideo equipment in the background, left. 
Yo Sf Puedo Graduation Ceremony, 
Colonia Nicarao, Managua 15 July 
2006. 
Managua (old centre), 19 July 2006, the 27th 
anniversary of the Revolution, four months before 
Ortega's re-election and the nation's resumption of 
its revolutionary path. 
Left: Revolution memorial: Only the peasants and 
workers will go to the end. 
Below: In the background (centre) the statue of Augusto 
Cesar Sandino, 'watching over' the city. 
